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EDITED BY JULIUS KATZER

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PREFACE

Volume Twelve contains Lenin's writings for the period January-June 1907.

A number of the works included in this volume deal with the revolutionary tactics of the R.S.D.L.P. at the time of the Second State Duma election campaign—the defence of the Left bloc and the struggle against the Menshevik policy of collaloration with the Constitutional-Democrats (the Cadets). Among these writings are: "The Social-Democratic Election Campaign in St. Petersburg", "How To Vote in the St. Petersburg Elections (Who Benefits from the Fables About the Black-Hundred Danger?)", "The Second Duma and the Second Revolutionary Wave", "On the Tactics of Opportunism", "The Bolsheviks and the Petty Bourgeoisie", "The Elections to the Duma and the Tactics of the Russian Social-Democrats", "The Imminent Dissolution of the Duma and Questions of Tactics", and others.

There are also documents and articles by Lenin on preparations for the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and the reports and speeches he made at the Congress—"Draft Resolutions for the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.", the articles "The Platform of Revolutionary Social-Democracy", "Report to the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. on the St. Petersburg Split and the Institution of the Party Tribunal Ensuing Therefrom", "Speech on the Attitude Towards Bourgeois Parties", and other speeches.

Lenin's "Report to the Conference of the St. Petersburg Organisation on the Question of the Duma Campaign and Duma Tactics", and the articles "What the Splitters Have To Say About the Coming Split", "Reorganisation and the End of the Split in St. Petersburg", provide a picture of his

struggle for an ideological consolidation of the St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. on Bolshevik principles.

Lenin's "Preface to the Russian Translation of Karl Marx's Letters to Dr. Kugelmann" and his "Preface to the Russian Translation of *Letters by Johannes Becker, Joseph Dietzgen, Frederick Engels, Karl Marx, and Others to Friedrich Sorge and Others*", show the theoretical and political significance of the Marx and Engels correspondence, part of which was first published in a Russian translation in 1907.

This volume also contains two of Lenin's articles on the agrarian question—"Draft for a Speech on the Agrarian Question in the Second State Duma" and "The Agrarian Question and the Forces of the Revolution".

The articles "On the Report of the Moscow District of St. Petersburg Concerning the Elections to the Second Duma", "A Note on the Resolution of the Estonian Social-Democrats", "The First Important Step", to be found in this volume, are included in V. I. Lenin's *Collected Works* for the first time. In the last-named article Lenin criticises the opportunist behaviour of the Menshevik deputies to the Second Duma.

THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN ST. PETERSBURG ¹

St. Petersburg, January 18, 1907.

The election campaign in St. Petersburg is in full swing. The decisive moment is approaching: in the first place, the next few days will reveal the final grouping of the parties in the elections—who is allied with whom, and who is against whom. Secondly, the elections themselves are now very near.

The elections in the capital are of immense importance. The eyes of all Russia are now turned towards St. Petersburg. Here, the pulse of political life beats faster and the government makes itself felt more than elsewhere. Here are the headquarters of all the parties, the leading newspapers of all trends and shades, and the best public speakers at election meetings.

We can already say definitely and emphatically—St. Petersburg has passed the test. The election campaign in St. Petersburg has already provided an amazing abundance of political-educational material, and *day by day* continues providing more. This material must be assiduously studied. It must be systematically collected, and serve to bring out in the greatest possible relief the *class* basis of the various parties. And this live, direct knowledge, which interests and agitates everybody, must be carried to the broadest possible strata of workers and to the most remote rural areas.

We will try to begin collecting this material, in the form of a synopsis, of course. Let the reader look back and ponder over the whole course of the election campaign in St.

Petersburg, so as to obtain a true and consistent picture of the role played by the Social-Democrats, and not allow himself to be carried away by the minor events of the day and the kaleidoscope of loud-mouthed political chicanery.

The first stage. The Social-Democrats make the theoretical preparations for the elections. The most prominent representatives of the Right and the Left wings express their views. At first the Mensheviks do nothing but vacillate: (1) Cherevanin is for agreements with the Cadets.² (2) The Cadet press is jubilant and spreads the glad tidings to all corners of Russia. (3) Martov protests in *Tovarishch*,³ favouring a *purely* Social-Democratic election list, and reproaching the Bolsheviks (*Proletary*,⁴ No. 1) even for their *general* recognition of the possibility of agreements with the Trudoviks⁵ against the Cadets. (4) The Bolsheviks come out in favour of a *purely* Social-Democratic election list, but do not exclude agreements with the revolutionary democrats. (5) In the bourgeois press Plekhanov advocates blocs with the Cadets. (6) Vacillation among the Mensheviks: Larin wrathfully condemns blocs with the Cadets as a disgrace to Social-Democracy, Nik. I—sky⁶ admits the possibility of blocs with the Cadets, but prefers a bloc with the Trudoviks against the Cadets. (7) Martov and all the Mensheviks describe an arc of 180°, and swing over to Plekhanov.

The All-Russian Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party⁷ registers two definite trends: the Mensheviks and the Bundists⁸ are in favour of blocs with the Cadets; the Bolsheviks, Poles and Letts are unreservedly against such blocs, but admit the possibility of agreements with the revolutionary democrats.

The second stage. The idea of a bloc with the Cadets is developed in the press. Plekhanov goes so far as to speak of "a Duma with full powers", thus threatening to reduce Menshevism to an absurdity. Wishing to bring the Mensheviks and the Cadets closer together, he achieves the very opposite (owing to his utter failure to understand the political situation): he widens the rift between them. On the one hand, the Cadet Party solemnly and officially rejects the idea of "a Duma with full powers" as a revolutionary illusion, and jeers at Plekhanov. It is quite clear that the

Cadets want and demand an *ideological* bloc, the subordination of the Lefts to Cadet leadership, to compromising, anti-revolutionary Cadet tactics. On the other hand, Plekhanov's excess of zeal causes confusion in the ranks of the Mensheviks: both the Bundists and the Caucasian Mensheviks have made a public condemnation, in the press, of Plekhanov's pronouncements. Confused and perplexed, the Central Committee, where the Mensheviks have a majority, remains silent. Plekhanov is isolated and is silent, too.

The third stage. The beginning of mass action. Election meetings in Moscow and St. Petersburg. A gust of fresh air from the street penetrates into the musty atmosphere of intellectualist political chicanery. The mythical nature of the Black-Hundred⁹ danger at once becomes apparent; the street supports the Bolshevik contention that, by their outcry against the Black-Hundred danger, the Cadets are leading the opportunists by the nose in order to avert the danger threatening them from the Left. The struggle at election meetings in St. Petersburg and Moscow is, *in substance*, a struggle between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats, mainly the Bolshevik Social-Democrats. The Cadets try to drag *everybody*—the street, the crowd, the masses—to the *Right*; they oppose revolutionary demands, and, under the guise of following the path of "peaceful parliamentarianism", have high praise for a deal with the reactionaries. The Bolshevik Social-Democrats call the masses to the Left, and expose the fraudulent, selfish, class character of the fairy-tales about peaceful methods. The Mensheviks fade into the background (on the admission of the very Cadet press which is so enamoured of them); they timidly criticise the Cadets, not in a manner befitting socialists but like Left Cadets, and they talk just as timidly about the need for an agreement with the Cadets.

The fourth stage. The Conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation¹⁰ takes place. At this Conference, which has been elected by all the members of the Social-Democratic Party on the basis of discussions (i.e., the general opinion on the question of agreements with the Cadets was solicited), the Bolsheviks are in absolute preponderance—irrespective of whether votes challenged by either side are counted, uncounted, or counted at a special

quota. The Mensheviks walk out of the Conference and launch splitting tactics. Formally, they try to screen their conduct by means of ridiculous and miserable hair-splitting on points of organisation (they allege that the Bolshevik endorsement of credentials is irregular, although the Bolsheviks preponderate, no matter *how* the credentials are counted; secondly, that the Conference has refused to divide into two sections, a city section and gubernia* section, although the Central Committee has no right to demand this according to the rules, and has not demanded it of Wilno, Odessa, or any other cities).

Actually, the reason why the Mensheviks are creating a split is obvious to everyone: the opportunist Social-Democrats are deserting the proletariat for the liberal bourgeoisie, deserting the workers' Social-Democratic organisations for amorphous, non-party election groups.

The Conference pays absolutely no attention to the Menshevik walk-out and carries on with *its own* work. In St. Petersburg there are disputes even among the Bolsheviks; the so-called pure Bolsheviks would have no agreements with any other party whatsoever. The so-called dissenters are in favour of an agreement with revolutionary democracy, with the Trudoviks, in order to smash the hegemony of the Cadets over the unenlightened working-class masses in the capital of Russia. In certain cases, these disputes between the "purists" and the "dissenters" become acute, but actually all the Bolsheviks realise full well that this disagreement does not divide them on questions of principle but merely serves to stimulate a thorough and business-like discussion of all chances and prospects in the elections.

The socialist proletariat cannot refuse the non-socialist petty-bourgeois masses permission to follow its leadership in order that it may emancipate them from the influence of the Cadets. After a thorough discussion the Conference passes a resolution to offer the Socialist-Revolutionaries¹¹

* *Gubernia, uyezd, volost*—Russian administrative-territorial units. The largest of these was the gubernia, which had its subdivisions in uyezds, which in turn were subdivided into volosts. This system continued under the Soviet power until the introduction of the new administrative-territorial division of the country in 1929-30.—Ed.

and the Committee of the Trudovik Group agreements on the following basis: two places to the worker curia, two to the Social-Democrats, and two to the Trudoviks.

In St. Petersburg this was the only correct and the only possible decision; the task of defeating the Cadets could not be neglected; there would be no Black-Hundred danger if there were two Left election lists; but there could be if the Lefts were split still further, and it would be impossible to rally the masses of voters. The Conference's offer left the preponderance of the Social-Democrats intact; it consolidated the ideological and political hegemony of Social-Democracy in all the purity of its principles.

As for the Popular Socialist Party, the Conference decided to exclude it from the bloc as a semi-Cadet party, evasive on fundamental issues of the struggle outside the Duma. It is well known that after the Duma was dissolved this party separated from the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie and began to preach caution and moderation, in the legal press.

It goes without saying that revolutionary Social-Democracy *had to demand* that the Socialist-Revolutionaries adopt a *definite* attitude towards such a party, and either insist on its exclusion (this would probably have been quite feasible if the Mensheviks had not deserted the socialists for the Cadets at the decisive moment), or at least to disclaim all responsibility for *such* "Trudoviks".

The fifth stage. The split caused by the Mensheviks raises the hopes of the *whole* liberal bourgeoisie. The whole Cadet press is jubilant—jubilant over the "isolation" of the hated Bolsheviks, and the "courageous" way in which the Mensheviks went over from the revolution to the "opposition bloc". *Rech*,¹² the author of this latter expression, has outspokenly given the Mensheviks and Popular Socialists the title of "*moderate socialist parties*". Indeed, the impression is created that the Cadets will win over the whole of the petty bourgeoisie (i.e., all the Trudoviks, including the Socialist-Revolutionaries) and the whole petty-bourgeois section of the workers' party, i.e., the Mensheviks.

The Bolsheviks calmly continue their independent activities. We are glad, they say, to isolate ourselves from this dirty business, from the treachery and vacillation of the

petty bourgeoisie. We shall not subordinate our tactics to seat-hunting. We declare: *in any case* there will be three election lists in St. Petersburg: the Black-Hundred, the Cadet, and the Social-Democratic.

The sixth stage. The elections in the worker curia and the exposure of the duplicity of the Trudoviks.

In the worker curia the Social-Democrats win, but the Socialist-Revolutionaries obtain a much larger share of the votes than we expected. It turns out that it was *mainly Mensheviks* that the *Socialist-Revolutionaries defeated in the worker curia*. We are informed that in Vyborg District, the Menshevik stronghold, *more* Socialist-Revolutionaries have been elected than Social-Democrats!

Our country, therefore, bears out a phenomenon that has long been observed in other countries. Opportunism in Social-Democracy is so repulsive to the working masses that they swing over to the revolutionary bourgeoisie. The highly unstable and vacillating policy of the Mensheviks immensely weakens Social-Democracy and plays into the hands of the Cadets in the urban curia, and of the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the worker curia.

It is only *revolutionary* Social-Democracy that can meet the needs of the proletarian masses and *permanently* alienate them from *all* petty-bourgeois parties.

On the other hand, however, the events also reveal Trudovik duplicity. In the worker curia they (the Socialist-Revolutionaries) defeat us by routing the Mensheviks, who favour a bloc with the Cadets. At the same time they are playing a most unprincipled game in the election campaign. They make no party declarations, publish no independent organisational decisions, conduct no open discussion on the question of blocs with the Cadets. One would think that they were deliberately blowing out all the candles—like people who need the dark for their dark deeds.

It is said that the Socialist-Revolutionaries have formed a bloc with the Popular Socialists. No one knows the terms or the character of that bloc. It is all guess-work. *It is said* (cf. *Rodnaya Zemlya* of January 15; this is the newspaper that Mr. Tan¹¹ writes for) that the Socialist-Revolutionaries are in favour of a bloc with the Cadets. No one knows the truth. It is all guess-work. The same confusion

is revealed at election meetings: one Socialist-Revolutionary, jointly with the Popular Socialists, advocates a bloc with the Cadets; another gets a resolution carried against a bloc with the Cadets and for a bloc of all the Lefts against the Cadets.

The utter instability and duplicity of the *entire* petty bourgeoisie, including its most revolutionary section, is now *clearly* demonstrated to the masses. Were it not for the petty-bourgeois opportunists in our own Social-Democratic ranks, we should have an excellent opportunity of explaining to *all* the workers why *only* the Social-Democrats are capable of defending their interests honestly and consistently.

It is on that basis that the Bolsheviks are carrying on their agitation. The Bolsheviks are unswervingly pursuing their own line. In St. Petersburg there *are sure to be* Cadet and Social-Democratic election lists. Our decision *does not depend* on the vacillations of the petty bourgeoisie: if they respond to our call and follow the proletariat against the liberals, so much the better for them. If not, so much the worse for them; *in any case* we shall pursue the Social-Democratic path.

The seventh stage. *Disintegration*. The Cadets get themselves mixed up in negotiations with the Black Hundreds. The petty-bourgeois opportunists get themselves mixed up in negotiations with the Cadets. The Bolsheviks unswervingly pursue their own line.

The newspapers report: (1) that Mr. Stolypin has granted an audience to Mr. Milyukov; (2) that, according to reports in the foreign press, the government is willing to legalise the Cadet Party on condition that it forms no blocs with the Lefts.

A ray of light is thrown on the backstage machinations of the liberal traitors. The Cadets are *afraid* to reject the offer of the Black Hundreds, for the latter threaten to dissolve the Duma.

That is *the real reason* why the Cadets, to the horror of the petty bourgeois opportunists, have suddenly become so "adamant" on the question of agreements.

The Cadets are obdurate. More than two seats for all the Lefts? Never! In issue after issue the Cadet *Rech*

explains very distinctly and didactically that it is willing to lead the moderate socialists (two seats out of six) in order to combat "revolutionary illusions", to combat revolution. March with the revolution? Never!

The opportunists are in despair. The tone of the articles in *Tovarishch* against *Rech* grows positively hysterical. Mr. Bogucharsky, the renegade Social-Democrat, twists and turns, exhorting *Rech*, and, jointly with other writers on *Tovarishch*, urges it to consider what it is doing, etc. The recent joint jubilation of *Rech* and *Tovarishch* over the isolation of the Bolsheviks and the submission of the moderate socialists to the liberals now gives way to angry recriminations and a free fight. On January 7, St. Petersburg learned of the decision of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic Conference. Today is January 18. But so far the Cadets and the opportunists have not decided anything. The tone of *Rech* today is particularly uncompromising towards *Tovarishch*, and the tone of *Tovarishch* today is particularly sharp and perplexed in its remarks against *Rech*.

The Bolsheviks are unswervingly pursuing their own line. There will be three election lists in St. Petersburg. Where the petty bourgeoisie will find themselves is their business: the revolutionary proletariat will do its duty in any case.

What the eighth stage will be we do not know. This, in the final analysis, depends on the negotiations, on the relations between the Cadets and the Black-Hundred government. If they "come to terms" on the immediate legalisation of the Cadets, or on some other point, the petty bourgeoisie will be isolated. If, for the time being, the Cadets and the Black Hundreds fail to come to terms, the Cadets may even concede three seats to the petty bourgeoisie. The Social-Democrats will not allow this to determine their policy.

The course of events in the St. Petersburg election campaign provides us with a miniature but excellent picture of the relations between the Black Hundreds, the Cadets and the revolutionary proletariat. And this course of events strikingly confirms the old, tested and uncompromising tactics of the revolutionary Social-Democrats.

A straight policy is the best policy. A policy based on principles is the most practical policy. Such a policy alone

can really win Social-Democracy the lasting sympathy and confidence of the masses. It alone can free the workers' party from responsibility for the negotiations between Stolypin and Milyukov, and between Milyukov and Annensky, Dan or Chernov.

Henceforth, this responsibility must *forever* be borne by the opportunist Social-Democrats and the "Trudovik parties".

It is not surprising that the vacillating Mensheviks are trying to save themselves by resorting to hypocrisy. We are in favour either of a struggle against the Black-Hundred danger or of *purely* Social-Democratic election lists, say the Social-Democrats who left the Conference (if we are to believe today's newspapers). This is an amusing subterfuge, which only very simple-minded people can believe! It has been proved that there is no Black-Hundred danger in St. Petersburg if there are *two* Left election lists. But what if there are three? Are the Mensheviks anxious to try *this*?! No, they are simply clutching at anything, for the course of events has forced them to the wall: they must either desert to the Cadets and submit entirely to their ideological and political hegemony, or follow the Bolsheviks, the Social-Democratic election list to which the Trudoviks may be admitted.

In St. Petersburg such an election list would probably defeat both the Black Hundreds and the Cadets. And having chosen a correct line from the very outset, revolutionary Social-Democrats will unswervingly pursue it, undaunted by the possibility of temporary defeats in the event of the petty bourgeoisie deserting to the liberals—drawing new strength and determination from the vacillation and indecision of the opportunists.

There will be three election lists in St. Petersburg: the Black-Hundred, the Cadet, and the Social-Democratic! Citizens, make your choice!

DESCENDING RUNG BY RUNG

The St. Petersburg elections provide a wealth of instructive material for a *true* study of the character of the various parties, and the class tendencies, or class significance, of their policies.

In this respect two facts are of greatest interest: the negotiations between the Cadets and Stolypin, the leader of the Black-Hundred government, and the negotiations between the petty-bourgeois parties and the liberal landlords, the Cadets.

So far we know very little about the negotiations between the Cadets and the Black Hundreds: the audience granted by Stolypin to Milyukov, attempts to legalise the Cadet Party, for which the Cadets are to pay by abstaining from entering into blocs with the Lefts. *These* negotiations are being carried on very secretly, and their exposure is a matter of the future.

The other negotiations are to a certain extent public. The role the opportunist Social-Democrats are playing in them is particularly clear.

Why did they break away from the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation?

So as to make a deal with the Cadets.

But the Cadets will not agree to a deal with the Mensheviks *alone*.

And so, the Mensheviks are entering into a bloc with all the petty-bourgeois parties, i.e., the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Trudoviks, and the Popular Socialists.

The opportunists who have broken away from Social-Democracy are going over to the petty bourgeoisie!

What are the terms of this bloc?

They are: to enter into a *joint* agreement with the Cadets to secure for the Left bloc three Duma seats out of the six.

We know that the agreement between the Mensheviks and the petty-bourgeois parties has been made in writing—at any rate, a joint resolution has been adopted. Apparently, the new allies do not want to inform the public about it, or are in no hurry to do so.

We also know that *Comrade Dan* took part in the negotiations on the formation of this bloc, although *he had not been authorised to do so* either by the group of breakaway St. Petersburg Social-Democrats (31), or by any other party organisation.

We could not even dream of better confirmation than that provided by the course of political events, of our constant assertion that the Mensheviks are the *opportunist, petty-bourgeois* section of the workers' party, and that they are as unprincipled and vacillating as the petty bourgeoisie in general.

Just think what the Mensheviks are doing. Did they not proclaim from the housetops that they were protecting the class purity of Social-Democracy against the Bolsheviks, who, they alleged, were leaning towards the petty-bourgeois Socialist-Revolutionaries?

And now events are unmasking them. The Bolsheviks are openly urging the petty bourgeoisie to follow the proletariat *against* the liberal bourgeoisie.

The Mensheviks refuse, and *secretly* (for no one knows the terms of the bloc, and no one has authorised Comrade Dan) enter into a bloc with *all* the petty-bourgeois groups, including the extreme Right wing (the Popular Socialists), in order jointly to surrender those workers who are under their influence *to the leadership of the liberal bourgeoisie!*

All the petty-bourgeois parties, *including the Mensheviks* (it is not for nothing that *Rech* has already registered them as part of the "opposition bloc" which has abandoned the revolution, and has classified the Popular Socialists and the Mensheviks among the "moderate socialist parties"), prefer bargaining with the liberals to fighting in the ranks of the proletariat.

Let all class-conscious workers in St. Petersburg consider very carefully whither the Mensheviks are leading the workers' party!

What, may it be asked, is the result of the negotiations between the petty bourgeoisie and the liberals?

So far, all we know from today's papers (January 19) is that a meeting took place in St. Petersburg yesterday of representatives of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Trudovik Group, the Popular Socialists and the *Mensheviks* (i.e., the entire new petty-bourgeois bloc), and the *Cadets*. According to this report, the Cadets have definitely refused to cede three seats to the "Left bloc". But the "Left" bloc has refused to accept two seats.

Rech says in this connection: "The representatives of the Bolshevik Social-Democrats did not attend *the conference*." That is true. We do not associate with the petty bourgeoisie to betray the workers' party to the liberals!

What will happen next? No one knows. Probably, the petty-bourgeois bloc and the Cadets will go on with their bargaining.

It is reported, however, that there is a workers' committee in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, which emphatically condemns blocs with the Cadets. What truth there is in this, we do not know, for *the Socialist-Revolutionaries are deliberately concealing from the public* both the terms of their agreement with the Popular Socialists (no one even knows when and by whom, exactly, this agreement was concluded!) and the trends in their own party on the question of blocs with the Cadets.

Today (January 19), *Rech* has published a resolution adopted by the St. Petersburg Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party which confirms the rumour that the *workers'* section of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party is not in favour of blocs with the Cadets. The *Rech* report reads as follows:

"The St. Petersburg Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, having entered into an agreement [which? when? on what terms?]* with the Trudovik and Popular

* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed.*

Socialist groups, has decided to submit to both sections of the Social-Democratic Party—the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks—a proposal that the socialist [?] groups enter into an agreement for the purpose of conducting the pre[?]-election campaign in the most purposeful manner; and in the event of no agreement being reached with the two sections, to enter into an agreement with the Bolsheviks. In concluding this joint socialist agreement, the representatives of the Socialist-Revolutionaries must insist [?!?] on the impermissibility of agreements with the Cadets, and on the independent action of the socialist alliance.

"If, however, the majority of the groups [?] consider that a technical [!?] agreement with the Cadets is more expedient than independent action, the St. Petersburg Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party will submit [!] to the decision of the majority [the majority of *other* parties!], but will make it an absolute condition of the agreement that all the seats to which the socialist groups will be entitled shall be ceded exclusively to the worker curia."

A prize of 1,000,000 rubles might well be offered to anyone who could make anything out of this rigmarole! Insist on the *impermissibility* of agreements with the Cadets after having provisionally formed a bloc with the Popular Socialists who are wholeheartedly in favour of the Cadets! Demand from the Cadets three seats for the worker curia *exclusively* and at the same time take part in a "conference" with the Cadets jointly with the Popular Socialists and the Trudoviks, who *do not* make such a demand! Boast of independence as a party as distinct from "groups" and at the same time *submit* to the "majority", i.e., to the three groups (Trudoviks, Popular Socialists and Mensheviks)! O wise Oedipus, solve this riddle!

And the workers representing the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (in the Moscow District of St. Petersburg) *approve* this petty-bourgeois eyewash, which conceals the betrayal of their interests to the liberals! But these workers add: "We express our deep indignation with the Menshevik faction of the Social-Democratic Party for its obstructionist behaviour towards other socialist groups and parties."

O simple-minded Socialist-Revolutionary proletarians!

If you are indignant with the Mensheviks, why are you *not* indignant with the St. Petersburg Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party? Both are dragging you under the wing of the liberals.

The underlying cause of this dissension within the petty-bourgeois bloc is quite clear. There is a danger of a rupture with the Cadets. *The Popular Socialists and the Mensheviks are, perhaps, not averse to accepting two seats from the Cadets and to betraying the rest of the petty bourgeoisie, just as the Mensheviks betrayed the proletariat!*

That's what's behind it all!

From rung to rung downwards. Betray the workers' party and join the petty-bourgeois bloc. Betray the petty-bourgeois democratic bloc and join the Cadets! Go, and good riddance!

At the audience granted to him by Stolypin, Milyukov said: "May it please Your Excellency to note that I have split the revolution and have torn the moderates away from it. Haven't I earned a tip, Your Grace?"... Stolypin: "Well, yes, I will petition for your legalisation. I'll tell you what, Pavel Nikolayevich, you split that working-class rabble gently, and I will do it with a club. And so ... between the two of us... Let's shake hands on it, Pavel Nikolayevich!"

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THE PROTEST OF THE THIRTY-ONE MENSHEVIKS

We have just received a pamphlet entitled *Why We Were Compelled To Leave the Conference (Declaration Submitted to the Central Committee by 31 Members of the Conference)*.

In it the Mensheviks do not say *a single word* about the principles involved! Their defection from the workers' party to the petty-bourgeois bloc (the Mensheviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Trudoviks, and the Popular Socialists), and thence to the Cadets, is evidently of no interest to the proletariat. These protestants have no desire to discuss the real point at issue, but deal *only* with formalities.

Let us examine their formal arguments. There are three of them: (1) The history of the St. Petersburg Committee and its undemocratic organisation; (2) the irregularities in the Conference's endorsement of credentials; (3) the refusal of the Conference to divide into two parts, one for the city and one for the gubernia.

On the first point we should like to ask: what has the St. Petersburg Committee to do with it? *Special* elections were held for the Conference, were they not?

Essentially the Mensheviks are telling *atrocious lies* about the history of the St. Petersburg Committee and its alleged undemocratic organisation. It is worth noting as a curiosity, for instance, that the Latvian District (the inclusion of which the Mensheviks complain about), was included *before* the Unity Congress, that is, when there was an *equal* number of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks on the St. Petersburg Committee. More than six months ago, therefore, the Mensheviks themselves *voluntarily* agreed that it was correct to include the Letts. Or take another instance:

the Mensheviks complain that the St. Petersburg Committee had allowed the co-optation of a certain number of members. They forgot to add that it was the *Mensheviks themselves* that had carried out the co-optation. These instances enable one to judge the fairness of this belated criticism of the way the St. Petersburg Committee was formed.

Their second argument is that the Conference, if you please, committed irregularities in endorsing the credentials. The Mensheviks refuse to recognise the shop-assistants' votes, and *claim* that the following distribution of votes is the only correct one: Bolshevik—1,560, plus 180 in favour of the platform of the revolutionary bloc—total, 1,740. Menshevik—1,589. Or credentials, counting those left over: Bolshevik—35; Menshevik—32 (see p. 8 of the Menshevik pamphlet).

It remains for us only to emphasise that *even in the opinion of our severest critics* the Bolsheviks had, *and were bound to have*, *preponderance* at the Conference.

Everybody knows, comrades, that the "dissenters" (the platform of the revolutionary bloc) were also Bolsheviks. And since you yourselves admit that the Bolsheviks would have had 35 credentials against 32 *even if* the endorsement of the credentials depended on the Mensheviks, why make all this fuss?

You yourselves are compelled to admit that the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation is a Bolshevik body.

But let us see *how* the Mensheviks criticise the way in which the credentials were verified at the Conference.

They do not want to consider the votes of the shop-assistants at all. Why? "On the pretext that it was impossible to hold meetings," says the pamphlet, "the leading body of the shop-assistants, after an attempt to take a referendum of its members, which resulted in only 100 votes being cast, was authorised by the St. Petersburg Committee to elect five representatives, allowing, no one knows why, one per 60 members, there being 313 organised shop-assistants"... (p. 4).

The difficulty of organising a meeting of shop-assistants is common knowledge. On what grounds is this called a "pretext"? On what grounds are 313 *organised* shop-assistants (i.e., Party members) to be kept out? Do you not

admit yourselves that *an attempt was made to take a referendum*, i.e., that the leading body took steps to get all the members of the Party to express their opinion?

And by reducing the rate of representation from one per 50 to one per 60, the St. Petersburg Committee admitted that the representation was not entirely democratic.

Moscow District: among the challenged votes the Mensheviks recognise 185 Bolshevik votes. But under the heading "Reasons for Challenging", the authors of the pamphlet *themselves* write literally the following: "*Challenged tentatively, in case the Bolsheviks refuse to endorse similar elections in another district.*"

Isn't that good? The Mensheviks challenged the Bolshevik credentials *tentatively*, in case...!! In summing up they *themselves* state that "the number of votes that should really have been disqualified" was 115, and not 300; i.e., *they themselves admit* that 185 *should have been endorsed!*

Thus, the Menshevik methods consist in challenging "tentatively" votes that really should be endorsed!

And such people have the insolence to talk about irregular representation at the Conference....

The Mensheviks themselves count the number of *incontestable* votes as 1,376 for the *Bolsheviks* and 795 for the *Mensheviks*. And that means, my dear comrades, that even by adopting the unheard-of and original method of "tentative challenging" you *were unable* to challenge the bulk of the Bolshevik votes!

Of the 789 Menshevik votes challenged by the Bolsheviks (according to the pamphlet) the 234 votes of the Vyborg District are of special importance. Under the heading: "Reasons for Challenging" we read: "The elections were not carried out on the basis of platforms, although discussions were held." The fact that discussions were held does not prove in the least that *the voters themselves* spoke in favour of blocs with the Cadets, so that the Conference was right in refusing to assign to the partisans of a bloc with the Cadets *those votes* that were not directly and unambiguously in favour of it. The Conference reduced the representation for these 234 votes.

Further, the Bolsheviks challenged the 370 votes of the Franco-Russian Subdistrict (City District). Under the

heading: "Reasons for Challenging" we read: "Without platforms—100, and the remainder (270)—by two-stage elections with discussions."

You see, the votes of the shop-assistants ought to have been disqualified despite the "attempt to take a referendum". All the Menshevik votes ought to have been endorsed, despite the *two-stage elections*, which in fact did not in the least differ from the method by which the shop-assistants elected their representatives! No, Menshevik comrades, your defence of the Menshevik credentials is very weak!

As regards dividing the Conference, the Mensheviks refer to it very briefly: "Although this proposal was perfectly *rational*", the Conference rejected it (p. 5). But on the very next page the secret of its "rationality" is indiscreetly revealed: "Within the precincts of the city the Mensheviks had an overwhelming majority" (!) (if the votes were counted in the Menshevik fashion, i.e., if all the shop-assistants' votes were eliminated and all the Franco-Russian and Vyborg votes were included!).

So that's the game! Division was rational because it would have given the Mensheviks a fictitious majority. Simple, is it not? Why, then, comrades, did you forget to mention what "rational" division you propose for the *Railway* District, for instance, and why the Central Committee did not think it *rational* to propose that the conferences at *Wilno*, *Odessa*, etc., be divided?

The Menshevik protests over formalities are empty and trivial quibbling. What is serious is their decision to desert to the Cadets. But the 31 protestants are absolutely silent about that.

THE ST. PETERSBURG ELECTIONS AND THE HYPOCRISY OF THE THIRTY-ONE MENSHEVIKS

The newspaper *Tovarishch* has today (January 20) published lengthy excerpts from the manifesto of the thirty-one Mensheviks who seceded from the socialist organisation on the eve of the St. Petersburg elections.

First of all, let us briefly recall the *actual* history of what the Menshevik seceders from the Social-Democrats have done since they walked out of the Conference.

(1) After breaking away from the Social-Democrat workers, they *entered into a bloc with the petty bourgeoisie* (the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Trudoviks and the *Popular Socialists*) in order jointly to bargain with the Cadets for seats. The written agreement under which the seceding Social-Democrats joined the petty-bourgeois bloc *was concealed from the workers* and from the public.

However, we still have hopes that this agreement will eventually be published, and the secret revealed.

(2) As a constituent part of the petty-bourgeois bloc (incorrectly styled the "Left bloc" by the newspapers), the breakaway Mensheviks bargained with the Cadets for three places out of the six for this bloc. The Cadets offered two seats. They could not come to terms. The meeting between the petty-bourgeois "conference" (this expression is not ours—we borrow it from the newspapers) and the Cadets was held on *January 18*. Both *Rech* and *Tovarishch* reported it. *Rech* announces today that no agreement was reached (although we must, of course, be prepared to hear that negotiations are still being conducted behind the scenes).

So far the Mensheviks have made no announcement in the press concerning their *operation* for the sale of workers' votes to the Cadets.

They will probably report to the petty-bourgeois bloc, part of which they formed during the negotiations, and not to the workers' party!

They probably do not like to say *why Comrade Dan* took part in the negotiations, although he had been authorised to do so neither by the group of thirty-one nor by any other Party organisation.

Such are the *deeds* of the thirty-one Mensheviks.

What are their *words*?

Their first argument is that, having denied that there is a Black-Hundred danger in St. Petersburg, the Bolsheviks had no right to declare in favour of an agreement with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks, as that runs counter to the decisions of the All-Russian Conference, which demand independent action on the part of the Social-Democrats in the absence of a Black-Hundred danger.

This argument is false from beginning to end.

The thirty-one breakaway Mensheviks are deceiving the reading public. *No* Party body *has ever laid* an official ban on agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks in the absence of a Black-Hundred danger. Such an agreement has been concluded in Moscow, for instance, and the Central Committee has not challenged it.

But that is not all. The extent to which the thirty-one Mensheviks are distorting the truth when they invoke the decision of the All-Russian Social-Democratic Conference can be seen from the following. It is common knowledge that the decisions of this (advisory) Conference were carried by the votes of the Mensheviks and the *Bundists* against those of the Bolsheviks, the Poles and the Letts. And *these very Bundists* who were instrumental in getting the decision of the All-Russian Social-Democratic Conference passed, have *officially* sanctioned blocs with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and with revolutionary democrats in general, where there is no Black-Hundred danger, but where there is a *Cadet danger*. The Central Committee of the Bund has adopted a *decision* to that effect, and no one has protested against it. It was reported in *Nasha Tribuna*, the

Russian organ of the Bund, and all Russian Social-Democrats who are able to read know it.

The thirty-one Mensheviks are deceiving the workers and the entire reading public.

We have also explained that the All-Russian Social-Democratic Conference authorised the Central Committee everywhere *to exclude* non-Social-Democrats from the Social-Democratic election list, i.e., to demand absolutely independent action on the part of the Social-Democrats. So far the Central Committee has *nowhere* exercised this right, thus, in effect, recognising the autonomy of the Bund and of all other organisations of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

Further, the thirty-one Mensheviks are displeased because the Conference excluded the Popular Socialists (P.S., or Social Narodniks) from the Trudovik bloc. The thirty-one Mensheviks write: "It is common knowledge that these three parties [the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Popular Socialists and the Trudoviks; the latter are not a party] formed a tight bloc in St. Petersburg long ago and are acting jointly."

That is another untruth. First, it has never been officially declared anywhere that such a bloc has been formed and that its terms are really of a nature that would make it a "tight bloc". There have been only the *vaguest* newspaper reports, and they cannot be relied upon where important affairs are concerned and official relations between parties exist. Secondly, the fact that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Committee of the Trudovik Group, who were approached by the Social-Democratic Conference, *started* negotiations *without the Popular Socialists* proves that the bloc of the three Trudovik parties and groups was not a particularly "tight" one. A bloc which does not prevent any of its constituent parts from conducting negotiations independently of the other cannot be called a tight bloc. *We have so far received no official* answer from the Socialist-Revolutionaries with the demand that we consent to an agreement with the Popular Socialists too. Thirdly, *Tovarishch* publishes, on the same page as the communication of the thirty-one Mensheviks, the "January 16 resolution of the St. Petersburg Committee of the Socialist-

Revolutionary Party". A note to this resolution reads as follows: "*The withdrawal from the agreement [that is, the agreement between the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Trudoviks and the Popular Socialists] of the Popular Socialist Group will not dissolve the agreement. The withdrawal of any other socialist group or party, however, will dissolve that agreement.*"

Thus, the facts prove that the thirty-one Mensheviks were *not speaking the truth* when they called the Trudovik bloc a tight bloc.

The Conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats was *right* in rejecting the Popular Socialists. Firstly, it was right in principle, for there is no doubt that the Popular Socialist Party stands more to the Right, is more unreliable and closer to the Cadets, than any other Trudovik party. Secondly, it was right from the standpoint of practical politics, for it made a correct *forecast* of that line of division between the Trudovik parties which inevitably revealed itself *in the course of the political campaign*. It is now clear to all that, had the Trudoviks *nevertheless* succeeded in foisting the Popular Socialists on us (it would, of course, be ridiculous to fear the inclusion of the Popular Socialists in the Trudovik bloc if that could ensure victory over the Cadets in St. Petersburg), the *responsibility* for the unreliable Trudoviks would have rested *entirely* with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and not with the Social-Democrats. The workers' party took care to let all workers and all citizens *know* the real difference between the more reliable and the less reliable Trudoviks; it took care that responsibility for the bad Trudoviks should rest with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, not with the party of the proletariat.

What conclusion should be drawn from all this fuss over the Popular Socialists?

The conclusion is that the Mensheviks behaved in an *unprincipled* manner in joining a petty-bourgeois bloc *without any discrimination*, and proved incapable of doing what Social-Democrats are in duty bound to do in an election campaign, namely, to teach the masses to draw strict and proper distinctions between parties. The Mensheviks hastened to take their place in a *single* petty-bourgeois bloc

with the Popular Socialists, in other words, with a semi-Cadet group!

The Bolsheviks were consistent in matters of principle. They started with an open resolution, published everywhere in the name of an official Social-Democratic body, *informing* all and sundry of the Popular Socialist Party's unreliability. The Bolsheviks have now achieved the result that the more revolutionary Trudoviks (the Socialist-Revolutionaries) have *themselves* declared that the Popular Socialists may leave the Trudovik bloc without leading to its dissolution!

The Bolsheviks have *achieved* the separation of the revolutionary Trudoviks from the opportunist Trudoviks. The Mensheviks are immersed right up to their ears in an opportunist petty-bourgeois bloc.

The Bolsheviks have openly and publicly called upon the Trudoviks to join them in battle against the Cadets, and have already achieved undoubted political results, although they have not as yet entered into any bloc with anybody. Secretly from the workers, and discarding all principles, the Mensheviks have crawled into a petty-bourgeois bloc so as to haggle with the Cadets.

From this the workers can judge *whither* the Mensheviks are *really* leading them.

The third and last argument of the thirty-one Mensheviks is that an agreement between the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks in St. Petersburg would not diminish the Black-Hundred danger, but *increase* it. This assertion is so absurd, or so hypocritical, that we shall quote the Menshevik argument in full:

"A joint Social-Democratic and Narodnik election list will be popular enough to divert many votes from the Cadets, but not popular enough to achieve victory throughout St. Petersburg, especially if, in the eyes of the average voter, the blame for the non-conclusion of an agreement between all the revolutionary and opposition parties lies with the Social-Democrats and their allies. In that case, a considerable diversion of votes from the Cadets will benefit the united Black Hundreds, who will defeat both the Cadet and the Left election lists."

This whole argument is a piece of sheer hypocrisy intended to screen the bargaining for seats that is going on between the Mensheviks and the Cadets.

Indeed, just think what the Mensheviks are saying: an agreement between the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks will increase the Black-Hundred danger, for it will divert *many* votes from the Cadets! Very well, my dear comrades! But when, in your opinion, is the danger of a Black-Hundred victory greatest—when all the non-Black-Hundred votes are split between *two* election lists or when they are split between *three*? Let us assume that the Black Hundreds have 1,000 votes and the rest 2,100. When is the danger of a Black-Hundred victory greatest: when these 2,100 votes are split between *two* lists, or when they are split between *three*?

The thirty-one Mensheviks can apply to any schoolboy to help them solve this brain-racking problem.

But we shall proceed. The thirty-one Mensheviks are not only talking rank nonsense when they profess not to understand that if the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks come to an agreement there will be only two anti-Black-Hundred lists in St. Petersburg, while if there is no such agreement, there may be three. But that is not all.

In addition, the thirty-one Mensheviks are so ignorant of the history of the first elections that they do not know the relative proportion of Black-Hundred and Cadet votes in the St. Petersburg elections to the First Duma. We did not take 1,000 votes for the Black Hundreds and 2,100 for the rest at random. *This example was typical of nine out of the twelve districts of St. Petersburg* in the First Duma elections!

In these nine districts, which together returned 114 electors out of 160, the *lowest* Cadet vote was *more than twice* as high as the *highest* vote cast for the Black Hundreds, or the so-called Right bloc.

What does this show?

It shows that if there are *two* "Left" (i.e., non-Black-Hundred) election lists in St. Petersburg, *no conceivable* division of votes between the Lefts can give the victory to the Black Hundreds.

Since the thirty-one Mensheviks are apparently weak in elementary arithmetic, let us explain it to them: let them try to divide 2,100 into two parts in such a way that 1,000 Black-Hundred votes will defeat both these parts.

Let the Mensheviks rack their brains over this problem, as well as over the problem of whether three lists instead of two will increase or diminish the Black-Hundred danger.

There are no grounds whatever for supposing that the Black Hundreds will be stronger in this year's St. Petersburg elections than they were in last year's. No right-minded politician would venture to make such an assertion. It is clear to everybody that the Black Hundreds are completely discredited after the disclosures of the Lidval case, the assassination of Herzenstein,¹⁴ etc. It is common knowledge that news of Left victories in the elections is now coming in from all parts of Russia.

Under such circumstances, the cries about the Black-Hundred danger are the result either of absolute ignorance or of *hypocrisy*. And it is those who *conceal* their real aims and act behind the scenes that must play the hypocrite. The Mensheviks are raising an outcry about the Black-Hundred danger *in order to divert* the workers' attention from the game they, the Mensheviks, are playing, or did play recently, *by joining the petty-bourgeois bloc* and bargaining with the Cadets.

If two Left lists are put up, no split in the votes can give the victory to the Black Hundreds in St. Petersburg, unless the latter obtain a higher vote than they did at the last elections—and everything goes to indicate that their vote will not increase, but will decrease.

Thus, it was by no means for the purpose of combating the Black-Hundred danger that the Mensheviks joined the petty-bourgeois bloc and bargained with the Cadets—this is a childish fable that can deceive only those who are absolutely ignorant or hopelessly stupid.

The Mensheviks bargained with the Cadets to get their man into the Duma, in spite of the workers, with the aid of the Cadets—such is the simple explanation of all these peregrinations from the Social-Democrats to the petty-bourgeois bloc and from the petty-bourgeois bloc to the Cadets.

None but the very naïve can fail to see the purpose behind the Mensheviks' actions, which they are trying to

conceal by raising an outcry about the Black-Hundred danger.

While they were in the petty-bourgeois bloc, the Mensheviks insisted on *three* seats in the Duma so as to make sure of one seat *for themselves*. If the Cadets had conceded only two seats, the Mensheviks might not have obtained even one. The Cadets directly offered one seat to the Narodniks (Popular Socialists), but dared not take the other from the worker curia. And it is not yet certain who will win in the worker curia.

That is why the Mensheviks *concealed from the public* on what authority Comrade Dan was acting, on what terms they joined the petty-bourgeois bloc, what exactly was discussed at the "conference" of the petty-bourgeois bloc with the Cadets, *etc., etc.* After such behaviour on the part of the Mensheviks, we still do not and cannot know where they will turn now that the Cadets have rejected them. Will the Popular Socialists combine with the Mensheviks to wheedle two seats out of the Cadets *at the expense* of the worker curia (an *editorial* in *Rech* spoke of the possibility of such a decision); or will the Mensheviks decide on independent Social-Democratic lists, i.e., to have *three* Left lists in St. Petersburg instead of two? Or will they return to the Social-Democratic Labour Party and to its decision, following their luckless visits to the drawing-rooms of the petty bourgeoisie and the ante-chamber of the Cadets?

If the Mensheviks were really guided by fear of the Black-Hundred danger, and not by a craving to gain a seat in the Duma from the Cadets, *could they possibly have broken with the Cadets* over the number of the seats?

When a socialist really believes in a Black-Hundred danger and is sincerely combating it—he votes for the liberals without any bargaining, and does not break off negotiations if two seats instead of three are offered him. For instance, it may happen that at a second ballot in Europe a Black-Hundred danger arises when the liberal obtains, say, 8,000 votes, the Black-Hundred representative or reactionary, 10,000, and the socialist 3,000. If a socialist believes that the Black-Hundred danger is a real danger to the working class, he will vote for the liberal. We have no second ballot in Russia, but we may get a situation

analogous to a second ballot in the second stage of the elections. If out of 174 electors, say, 86 are of the Black Hundreds, 84 Cadets and 4 socialists, the socialists *must* cast their votes for the Cadet candidate, and so far not a single member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has questioned this.

The Mensheviks assert that they fear a Black-Hundred danger in St. Petersburg, and yet they break with the Cadets over the question of two seats or three!

This is sheer hypocrisy, calculated to screen how the petty-bourgeois section of the workers' party is haggling over a miserable seat in the Duma, begged from the Cadets.

Equally hypocritical is the talk the Mensheviks *now* indulge in about an *independent* Social-Democratic campaign in St. Petersburg, without the Trudoviks. For example: *Tovarishch* has published the following report of a speech delivered by Mr. Levitsky, a Menshevik, at a meeting in the Nemetti Theatre on January 19: "The Social-Democrats sacrificed their independence in the election campaign only in order to avert the Black-Hundred danger. Since they have failed in their object, the Social-Democrats must at least attempt to develop broad agitation, and the speaker, therefore, declared in favour of independent action by the Social-Democrats."

Assuming this Levitsky is sound in mind and judgement, is he not, may we ask, a hypocrite? *Since they have failed* "to avert the Black-Hundred danger" by putting up *one* joint list for all the Lefts, including the Cadets, Levitsky wants *three Left lists*—Cadet, Social-Democratic and Trudovik!

What is this but the floundering of an opportunist who feels that the ground has slipped from under his feet, who thinks he can make us forget that the day before yesterday the Mensheviks were in a petty-bourgeois bloc, and yesterday were bargaining with the Cadets!

The Mensheviks betrayed the workers, went over to the Cadets; and now that their shady deal has failed, they want to clear themselves *by merely talking* about independent Social-Democratic action! But this is just empty talk, mere eyewash; even if there were three Left lists in St. Petersburg, the Black Hundreds could win only in the event

of the Left vote being split; and the Mensheviks themselves have *strengthened* the position of the petty-bourgeois bloc by renouncing the proletarian party and *entering* the bloc to bargain with the Cadets *together* with that bloc.

Indeed, the Mensheviks have plenty to "clear themselves" of now—such is the discredit they have brought upon themselves by their entire conduct in the St. Petersburg election campaign. Indeed, the only thing the Mensheviks can now do is to indulge in empty and sonorous phrases, for they themselves do not seriously believe that a purely Social-Democratic list can be put up in St. Petersburg at the present time.

And we most emphatically warn the Bolsheviks not to trust these sonorous and hypocritical phrases.

The Bolsheviks have nothing to "clear themselves" of, nothing to repent of. Our political line, which at first was ridiculed by all the bourgeois press in the capital, is now being magnificently and strikingly justified by the entire course of events. The absurdity of the Black-Hundred danger tale is becoming clear. The Cadet danger is becoming obvious. The policy of the Cadets, whose leader is being (or has been?) received in audience by Stolypin, is now being exposed.

The Bolsheviks did not enter a petty-bourgeois bloc behind the back of the workers' party. They did not strengthen that bloc by sanctioning the participation of the semi-Cadet Popular Socialist Party along with the Trudoviks. The Bolsheviks have not taken a single step or uttered a single word that the petty-bourgeois parties can interpret as a renunciation of independent action by the Social-Democrats.

While Milyukov was grovelling at Stolypin's feet and Mensheviks and Trudoviks of *all* shades were grovelling at Milyukov's feet—the Bolsheviks alone stood firm, *never for a moment* ceasing to do what Levitsky and his like have now remembered to do because they have quarrelled with the Cadets.

Therefore, we must not under any circumstances do the stupid thing which the dismayed and hypocritical Mensheviks are prattling about; we must not reject a revolutionary

bloc and petty-bourgeois support for the socialists *against* the Cadets.

It was because the Bolsheviks took the right course at once, without hesitation, that the instability of the Trudoviks and the firmness of the workers' party (except for its opportunist appendage, of course) has now become clear *to all*. It has become really clear that the Social-Democratic proletariat is going its own *independent* way, *directing* all the other elements against the Black Hundreds and against the liberals, *freeing* all the petty-bourgeois parties and trends from the influence of Cadet ideology and Cadet policy, and publicly *assessing* the degree of reliability and suitability of the revolutionary and the opportunist groups among the Trudoviks.

And to be afraid to lead all the Trudoviks now, when they have tasted the bitterness of Cadet benevolence and are prepared to fight the Cadets, would be unpardonable childishness and a manifestation of political spinelessness.

The thirty-one Mensheviks who have entangled themselves in the bargaining with the Cadets are now compelled to admit, in spite of themselves, that "a joint Social-Democratic and Trudovik list will be *popular enough to divert many* votes from the Cadets...". Yes, that is exactly how it is! And that is exactly why we *cannot* neglect the task of undermining the hegemony of the Cadets *in the capital*, towards which the eyes of all Russia are turned.

If we capture half the Cadet vote in several districts *plus one extra vote, we shall win*, for we shall have all the advantage of the split between the Black-Hundred bourgeoisie and the liberal conciliatory bourgeoisie (there is no danger in this, for in nine districts the Cadets have *more* than twice as many votes as the Black Hundreds).

It is becoming clearer every day that the Mensheviks took the wrong political course when they raised an outcry about the Black-Hundred danger. It is becoming clear that the delegates and electors stand *more to the Left* this year than they did last year. Instead of acting as the ludicrous and shameful accomplices of the liberal landlords (which cannot be justified by the plea of a Black-Hundred danger, for none exists), a useful and responsible role awaits us: to exercise the *hegemony* of the proletariat over the demo-

cratic petty bourgeoisie in the struggle to *prevent* subordination of the unenlightened masses to the leadership of the *liberals*.

The first elections to the Duma resulted in a Cadet victory, and these liberal bourgeois are exerting every effort to consolidate and perpetuate a hegemony that rests on the stultification of the masses, on their failure to think independently and to pursue an independent policy.

It is our bounden duty to bend every effort to rally around ourselves, particularly in St. Petersburg, *all those* who are capable of fighting the Black Hundreds and the Cadets—to rally them for the aims of the people's revolution, for independent action by the vast masses of the people.

And we shall do this without sacrificing an iota of the ideological independence of *our* Social-Democratic agitation, without retreating in the least from our socialist aims but giving them *full* expression, and without for a moment ceasing to expose the vacillation and treachery of the petty bourgeoisie.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats alone stand firmly and resolutely on the positions of the struggle for freedom and the struggle for socialism.

Written on January 20
(February 2), 1907

Published as a separate pamphlet
in 1907

Signed. *N Lenin*

Published according
to the text of the pamphlet

HOW TO VOTE IN THE ST. PETERSBURG ELECTIONS

IS THERE A DANGER OF THE BLACK HUNDREDS WINNING THE ST. PETERSBURG ELECTIONS?

The State Duma elections in the City of St. Petersburg are to take place shortly. The city voters, who number about 130,000, will have to elect 160 electors for the entire city. These 160 electors, together with the 14 electors from the workers, will elect 6 deputies to the Duma.

Who should be elected to the Duma?

Three main parties are contesting the elections in St. Petersburg: the Black Hundreds (the Right parties), the Cadets (the so-called people's freedom party), and the Social-Democrats.

The smaller parties and trends (Trudoviks, non-party people, Popular Socialists, radicals, etc.) may join partly the Cadet election list, and partly the Social-Democratic list. This has not yet been definitely decided.

At all events, there is no doubt that there will be *three* election lists in St. Petersburg—the Black-Hundred, the Cadet, and the Social-Democratic.

All voters must, therefore, clearly realise whom they are sending to the Duma:

the *Black Hundreds*, i.e., the Right parties, who are for a government based on military courts, for pogroms and violence?

the *Cadets*, i.e., the liberal bourgeoisie, who go to the Duma to legislate, i.e., to compromise with the Gurkos, who actually enjoy both the right to legislate and the right to dissolve the Duma if it incurs their displeasure?

or the *Social-Democrats*, i.e., the party of the working class, which, at the head of the whole people, is fighting

for full freedom and socialism, for the emancipation of all working people from exploitation and oppression?

Let every voter know that he must choose between these *three* parties. He must decide whom to vote for: the champions of police tyranny and violence; the liberal capitalists, who through the Kutlers are bargaining with Gurkos; or for the champions of the interests of the working class and of all working people?

Citizens and voters! You are told that the Cadets and the Social-Democrats may enter into an election agreement, that they may put up a joint election list.

This is not true. Let everybody know that whatever happens there will be *three* lists in St. Petersburg: the Black-Hundred, the Cadet and the Social-Democratic.

You are told that if the Cadets and the Social-Democrats put up separate lists, they may split the vote and thus help the Black Hundreds to win.

This is not true. We are going to prove to you that even in the *worst possible* case of a split vote, i.e., even if the votes are *evenly* divided between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats in *all* election wards of St. Petersburg—even in that case a Black-Hundred victory in St. Petersburg is *impossible*.

It is common knowledge that during the elections to the First Duma there were *two* principal lists of candidates in St. Petersburg: the Cadet and the Black-Hundred (or the so-called bloc, or coalition, of the Right parties). The Cadets were victorious in *all* the districts of St. Petersburg.

Now there will be *three* lists: the Black-Hundred, the Cadet and the Social-Democratic. That means that the Social-Democrats expect to win part of the Cadet votes and also to win the support of those who did not vote in the elections to the First Duma.

You are told that this split of the Cadet and Social-Democratic vote may help the Black Hundreds to win, for the Cadets and the Social-Democrats together would be stronger than the Black Hundreds, whereas separately they may prove weaker, i.e., be defeated.

To see whether this is possible, let us take the figures of the votes cast in *all* the wards of St. Petersburg in the elections to the First Duma. Let us see how the votes were

ЗРЪННЕ

Resonance plot $\beta_1(\lambda) = 4.0$, $\beta_2(\lambda) = 1.0$.

Второй и третий пункты статьи 112(1) Закона о банкротстве (Положения о процедуре ликвидации) не являются применимыми к делу, поскольку в нем не рассматривается ликвидация должника.

Donat: an \mathcal{A} -bimodule D is called *invertible* if $D \otimes_{\mathcal{A}} A \cong A$ and $A \otimes_{\mathcal{A}} D \cong A$.

Какъ голосовать на выборахъ въ Петербургѣ.—Рабочій съѣздъ и буржуазная демократія.—Вопросы дня.—Въ рабочей курии.—Предвыборныя собранія.

№ 1.

С.-Петербургъ. Четвергъ. 25 Января.

№ 1.

Какъ проявляется на выборахъ въ Петербургъ?

11/10/2008 10:00 AM: The above mentioned person is not
in the list yet.

[illegible]

distributed between the Cadets and the Black Hundreds in the various wards. We will take the least favourable case in each ward, i.e., the *lowest* vote cast for a Cadet (for different candidates received a different number of votes) and the *highest* vote cast for a Black-Hundred candidate.

We will *halve* the *lowest* Cadet vote, on the assumption that the Social-Democrat will divert exactly half the votes (this is the least favourable to us, and the most favourable to the Black Hundreds).

Let us now compare this *half* of the *lowest* Cadet vote with the *highest* vote cast for a Black-Hundred candidate in each ward. We will get the following figures:

Voting in St. Petersburg in the Elections to the First Duma

Wards	Lowest Cadet vote	One half of that number	Highest Right vote	Number of electors
Admiralty	1,395	697	668	5
Alexander-Nevsky	2,929	1,464	1,214	16
Kazan	2,135	1,067	985	9
Narva	3,486	1,743	1,486	18
Vyborg	1,853	926	652	6
Petersburg	4,788	2,394	1,729	16
Kolomna	2,141	1,070	969	9
Moscow	4,937	2,468	2,174	20
Spassky	4,873	2,436	2,320	15
Liteiny	3,414	1,707	2,097	15
Rozhdestvensky	3,241	1,620	2,066	14
Vasilyevsky Ostrov	3,540	1,770	2,250	17

These figures show clearly that even in the most unfavourable case of a split in the Cadet vote, the Black Hundreds would have been successful in the 1906 elections in *only three* wards out of the *twelve*. They would have had only 46 electors out of 174 (160 from the city and 14 from the workers). This means that the Black Hundreds *could not* have been elected to the Duma at the first elections even if the Cadet vote had been split equally between the Cadet and the Social-Democratic candidates in *all* wards.

Thus, those who are trying to scare the voters with the possibility of a Black-Hundred victory if the Cadets and Social-Democrats split the vote, are deceiving the people.

The Black Hundreds *cannot* win as a result of a vote split between the Cadets and Social-Democrats.

The Cadets are deliberately spreading false rumours of a "Black-Hundred danger" so as to deter the voters from voting for the *socialists*.

Citizens and voters! Do not believe the yarns about the Black Hundreds winning if the votes are divided between the Cadets and Social-Democrats. Vote freely and boldly according to your convictions—for the Black Hundreds, for the bourgeois liberals, or for the socialists.

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But perhaps the Cadets, who are spreading false rumours about a "Black-Hundred danger" through the newspapers *Rech*, *Tovarishch*, *Sevodnya*, *Rodnaya Zemlya*, *Rus*, *Strana*,¹⁴ and many others, will try to advance some other arguments, try some other subterfuges.

Let us consider all possible arguments.

Perhaps the Cadet vote will be split between three and not two lists? In that case will not the Black Hundreds win in all the wards and be elected to the Duma?

No. The Cadet vote cannot be split between three lists, for there will be *only* three lists in St. Petersburg. Apart from the Black Hundreds, the Cadets and the Social-Democrats, there is *not a single* party of any importance that is putting up an independent list.

All parties in Russia have their representatives in St. Petersburg. All parties and trends *have already announced* their positions in the elections. Not a single party, except for the three main parties mentioned above, not one little group, *even thinks* of contesting the elections independently. All the smaller parties, *all the trends, except the three main ones*, are wavering *only between these three election lists*. All progressive parties and groups which sympathise with freedom are wavering *only* between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats.

Not one of the *Trudovik* parties, neither the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Committee of the *Trudovik* Group, nor the Popular Socialists, has expressed the desire to put up an independent list. On the contrary, *all these Trudovik*

parties are negotiating to join either the Cadet or the Social-Democratic list.

Hence, those who say that the Cadet vote may be split between three lists are deceiving the people. In St. Petersburg there will be only three main lists: the Black-Hundred, the Cadet, and the Social-Democratic.

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A second possible argument: it is said that as a result of the Senate interpretations ¹⁶ the number of voters, especially those of the poor classes, has been reduced, and that therefore the Cadets may not poll as many votes as they did in the elections to the First Duma.

That is not true. In the First Duma elections the total number of voters in St. Petersburg was about 150,000; it is now about 130,000. The number who voted last year was no more than 60,000 to 70,000. Hence, there is no reason to fear a change in the temper and views of the bulk of the voters. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the *majority* of the 130,000 voters in St. Petersburg belong to the *needy strata of the population*, who might prefer a capitalist to a worker only owing to misunderstanding, ignorance or prejudice. If all socialists do their duty and carry on agitation to enlighten the city population, they will certainly be able to count on winning not ten thousand, but several tens of thousands of the 130,000 voters.

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A third possible argument: it is said that the Black Hundreds may get a bigger vote this year, and that we cannot judge from last year's figures.

That is not true. From all the newspaper reports, all the meetings and the information available about the state of the various parties, we see that the Black Hundreds in St. Petersburg are not stronger, but probably much weaker than they were last year. The people have become politically more conscious; the Octobrists¹⁷ are howled down at every meeting; and the dissolution of the Duma, the

government's policy of violence and the Gurko-Lidval policy are completely alienating voters from the government. At the first elections the Black Hundreds were still able to crow; but they subsided altogether, as soon as election time began to draw near.

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A fourth possible argument: it is said that the government has refused to issue election forms to the Left parties, is not permitting them to hold meetings, publish newspapers, etc., and that, therefore, it is safer and surer for all the Lefts to combine in one election list with the Cadets.

That is not true. The fact that the government is resorting to violence, is breaking the law and encroaching on the freedom of elections, can only stiffen the backs of the mass of voters. We Social-Democrats do not lose, but gain in the eyes of the voters from the fact that the police, with increasing frequency, are closing down meetings because of our speeches. As for fighting the government for its breaking the law—how would an agreement with the Cadets help in this? It would hinder, not help things, for the Cadet Party is the most cowardly of all opposition parties, the one most given to treachery. Is it possible to combat infringement of the law by Cabinet Ministers jointly with a party of which the ex-Minister Kutler, a recent colleague of Witte and Durnovo, is a member? On the contrary, it is because the Kutlers are very much closer to the Durnovos and Stolypins than to the masses of workers and shop-assistants that we, in the interests of the fight for freedom, must remain independent of the Cadet Party, the party of the Kutlers.

Let us assume that the government has decided to seize, to arrest, the Left electors. Will an agreement with the Cadets be of any avail? Or should the socialists rely on the Cadet Kutler petitioning the Cabinet Ministers Stolypin and Gurko, his recent colleagues, on behalf of the revolutionaries?

The newspapers recently reported that Stolypin is granting an audience to Mr. Milyukov, the Cadet leader, to dis-

cuss the legalisation of the Cadet Party.* Are the socialists to rely on the Cadet gentlemen "petitioning" for the legalisation of the Trudovik, the Socialist-Revolutionary and the Social-Democratic parties?

A socialist with a conscience and a sense of shame will never appear in a joint list with the Kutlers and the Milyukovs.

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Can the Social-Democrats win in the St. Petersburg elections?

Taking advantage of the government's ban on Social-Democratic newspapers, the Cadet newspapers are dinning into their readers' ears that a Social-Democratic victory at the elections is inconceivable without the aid of the Cadets.

That is not true. It is *quite possible* for the Social-Democrats in St. Petersburg to gain a victory over the Black Hundreds and the Cadets.

The Cadets pretend not to see this, deliberately forgetting that a split vote may be to the advantage of *any* party, and not the Black Hundreds alone. The Black Hundreds may win three wards out of twelve if the vote is split equally between the Cadets and Social-Democrats.

The Social-Democrats may win twelve election wards out of twelve if the vote is split between the Cadets and Black Hundreds.

To convince oneself of this, one need only consider the figures quoted above. They show that, by *polling in each ward one vote more than half the Cadet total* (polled at the last elections) it is possible to win in the whole of St. Petersburg.

For this we must have *not less than 14,274 votes* in the nine "safe" wards of St. Petersburg (which does not include the three where the Black Hundreds may win).

* At an election meeting at the Tenishev School on January 22 Mr. Vodovozov stated that Mr. Milyukov had been to see Stolypin and had come to terms with him, and that the people's freedom party is responsible for its leaders. Without denying this fact, Mr. Gredeskul declared that if Mr. Milyukov had been to see Stolypin, it was in the interest of the country and the party.

And is it really impossible for the Social-Democrats to poll 15,000 to 20,000 votes in St. Petersburg?

In St. Petersburg enfranchised shop-assistants and clerks alone number 30,000 to 50,000. *Golos Prikazchika* " the shop-assistants trade union paper, was conducted on Social-Democratic lines. If all socialists were to unite for agitation among shop-assistants, and were to agree to include the Trudoviks in their list, these shop and office employees alone could ensure victory for a joint Social-Democratic and Trudovik election list.

Moreover, there are a very large number of poor tenants, fully capable of understanding that the socialists will defend their interests better than the liberal houseowners and landlords, the rich lawyers and the government officials, the Petrunkeviches, Rodichevs, Vinavers, and Kutlers.

Look at the election meetings in St. Petersburg. Even the Cadet newspapers, whose accounts of these meetings are atrociously distorted to favour the Cadets, are compelled to admit that the real contest lies between the Cadets and the socialists, and not between the Rights and the Lefts. St. Petersburg election meetings are incontrovertible proof that the *Social-Democrats*, particularly in alliance with the Trudoviks, are *stronger than the Cadets* in St. Petersburg.

How many voters will attend election meetings? Cautious people estimate not more than one-tenth of the total number of voters will. Let us accept even this figure, which is the lowest estimate. That gives us 13,000 voters. Further, we may take it for granted that every voter who has attended meetings will take along with him to the polling-booth at least two others who have not attended any meetings. Judging from all facts and observations, 20,000 of the 39,000 voters will be for the Social Democrats in alliance with the Trudoviks.

Therefore, these figures, too, show that a victory of the Social-Democrats over the Cadets and the Black Hundreds in St. Petersburg is *quite possible*.

All St. Petersburg voters should know *that it depends entirely on them* whether the Cadets or the Social-Democrats win,

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The socialists are conducting their election campaign in St. Petersburg primarily and mainly for the purpose of enlightening and rallying the masses. The socialists are striving to make clear to the masses the tasks now confronting the people in their struggle for freedom. The liberals, however, are not bothering about anything but seats in the Duma, and do not care whether the voters have any clear and definite ideas.

The liberals, i.e., the Cadets, and the vacillators who follow in their train, sometimes take a vote at election meetings, at some of which they succeed in winning overwhelming majorities for resolutions calling for an agreement among all the Lefts, on the understanding that two seats out of the six should go to the Cadets.

Those who propose such resolutions and those who vote for them show that they fail to realise the situation in the St. Petersburg elections. There will not and cannot be an agreement of "all the Lefts" in St. Petersburg. There will be three election lists in St. Petersburg: the Black-Hundred, the Cadet, and the Social-Democratic.

Moreover, it is ridiculous even to vote for the Cadets getting two seats out of the six. Those who *really* want such an outcome must understand that it *cannot* be effected by a deal with the Cadets. It can be done only by voting *for the Social-Democrats*.

In fact, the result that some people desire (six seats for the Lefts, of which two go to the Cadets) can be achieved only if the Social-Democrats gain a partial victory in St. Petersburg. Let us assume, for example, that the Social-Democrats win only in four constituencies, say, in the Spassky, Moscow, Petersburg and Vyborg wards. They would then have 60 electors, and with the worker curia, 74 electors. The Black Hundreds (we take the most unfavourable and most unlikely case) will have 46 electors (Liteiny, Rozhdestvensky and Vasilyevsky Ostrov wards). The Cadets will then have the remaining 54 electors. *This is the way* we could really secure the election of Left Duma deputies for St. Petersburg, with a preponderance of those standing Left of the Cadets. It *cannot* be achieved by

bargaining with the Cadets, as certain unintelligent and vacillating people are doing.

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Let us briefly recapitulate the conclusions we have drawn.

Only three main parties are contesting the St. Petersburg elections, and electors will have *three* lists before them: the Black-Hundred, the Cadet, and the Social-Democratic.

The danger of a Black-Hundred victory in St. Petersburg is an absurd fabrication.

Even if the Cadet vote is split least favourably between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats, a Black-Hundred victory is impossible.

The fable of the "Black-Hundred danger" in St. Petersburg is deliberately fostered by the Cadets to avert the real danger threatening *them* in the form of a socialist victory.

The Trudoviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and several small groups have not yet made up their minds whether to follow the Cadets or the Social-Democrats.

In St. Petersburg it is quite possible for the Social-Democrats to win complete victory over the Black Hundreds and the Cadets.

Voters must vote in accordance with their convictions and sympathies, and not out of fear of a fictitious Black-Hundred danger.

Are you for the government, the liberal bourgeoisie, or the Social-Democrats?

Citizens, make your choice!

THE ST. PETERSBURG ELECTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF OPPORTUNISM

On January 6 a St. Petersburg general conference was held. The conference was to decide whether or not there were to be agreements in the capital with the Cadets.

Notwithstanding Plekhanov's appeals to "worker comrades", published in *Tovarishch*; notwithstanding Madamo E. Kuskova's hysterical articles; notwithstanding Plekhanov's threat to list the workers among the "enemies of freedom" if they insist on maintaining an independent Social-Democratic position, and notwithstanding the Cadets' more or less alluring promises, the organised and class-conscious proletariat of St. Petersburg proved so politically mature that, after the discussions and the voting, the majority declared against agreements of any kind with the Cadets. It was clear that the conference, elected by organised workers after discussions and voting in accordance with platforms,* would declare itself to the same effect.

Space prevents us from dealing in *Proletary* with the proceedings of the conference in detail; besides, considerable literature has been published on this subject. It is important to note here, however, that our opportunists have gone so far in their policy of bourgeois compromise that they cannot accept the conference's decision. It was obvious from the very outset of the conference that, supported by the Central Committee, the St. Petersburg Mensheviks would not submit to the conference decision. The

* Except in the Menshevik Vyborg District and Franco-Russian Subdistrict, where the platforms were not voted on.

friends of the Cadets were only seeking for a pretext to break with revolutionary Social-Democracy. A pretext had to be found, no matter what kind it would be. As the question of the credentials failed to provide this pretext, the Mensheviks took advantage of the *recommendation* of the Central Committee that questions of election tactics be decided by the electoral units directly concerned, and walked out of the conference on the issue of dividing the conference into two parts, one especially for the city and one for the suburbs. They wanted to substitute the territorial administrative units of the police for Party organisational units. If the Mensheviks' advice had been taken, we should not only have had to keep the suburban districts out of the conference, but we should also have had to split up hitherto *integral* districts, such as the Neva, Moscow and Narva districts, and reorganise the Party to suit the authorities, not the Party.

It was also obvious that, whichever way the question of dividing the conference was decided, the majority would declare against agreements with the Cadets. The Mensheviks walked out and, to the delight of the entire bourgeois press, decided to conduct an independent campaign in St. Petersburg, wage a struggle against their own Party comrades, split the St. Petersburg proletariat for the sake of an agreement with the bourgeois and monarchist party—the “people's freedom” party.

The bourgeois press has every reason to rejoice! The gutter newspaper *Sevodnya* has solemnly declared in a special leading article that, by taking this decision, the Mensheviks have *saved Russia*; and *Rech*, the official organ of the Cadets, has promised to reward the Mensheviks by ceding one seat in the worker curia to a “Menshevik”, but under no circumstances to a “Bolshevik”.

The first result of Menshevik independent action is that the bourgeoisie has begun to dictate its will to the worker curia.

Continuing its proceedings after the Mensheviks had walked out, the conference decided that, since there is no Black-Hundred danger in St. Petersburg, and in order to undermine the hegemony of the Cadets and free the democratic petty bourgeoisie from their influence, an agreement should be entered into, on definite terms, with

the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks for the distribution of seats (two to the worker curia, two to the Social-Democrats, one to the Socialist-Revolutionaries and one to the Trudoviks).

The bourgeois press is jubilant: the Trudoviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries have formed a bloc with the Popular Socialists, which is gravitating to the Cadets; the Mensheviks have broken away—the Bolsheviks are isolated! Revolutionary tactics are condemned, “peaceful methods” are triumphant, hurrah for an agreement with the monarchy, and down with the method of popular mass struggle!

Having split the Social-Democrats and enfeebled the proletariat, the hydra of revolution, the Cadets shamelessly strike a bargain—with Mr. Stolypin. The newspapers report that the prime minister has granted Milyukov an audience to take place in a day or two, and that the prime minister’s condition for the legalisation of the Cadet Party is—no blocs with the Left. The Cadets are willing to concede to the entire “Left”—actually, to the *petty-bourgeois*—bloc (the Popular Socialists, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Trudoviks, and Mensheviks) only two out of the six seats in St. Petersburg. To pacify the gallery the Cadets are *prepared* to throw two seats to the importunate petty-bourgeois bloc. As they are certain the Left bloc will not accept this, the Cadets are negotiating with Stolypin, the head of the Black Hundreds.

The scene changes. The election campaign begins. Election meetings are being held. The Mensheviks, who very, very rarely speak at these meetings, blather timidly about agreements with the Cadets. The Bolsheviks, who speak at all meetings, call upon proletarians and semi-proletarians to join a united workers’ party—the Social-Democratic Party; they call upon all revolutionary and democratic voters to form a united revolutionary bloc against the Black Hundreds and the Cadets. The Cadets are shouted down, while the Bolsheviks are applauded. The democrats in the city—the workers and the petty bourgeoisie—are swinging towards the Left and shaking off the Cadet yoke.

The scene changes: the “compromisers” are in a tearing rage. It is with foaming mouth that they speak of the Bol-

sheviks. Down with the Bolsheviks! In moving unity *Novoye Vremya*¹⁹ and *Tovarishch*, the Octobrists and the Cadets, the Vodovozovs and the Gromans launch a crusade against the red spectre of Bolshevism. If Bolshevism ever needed justification for its revolutionary and class tactics, it has now found it in the fury with which it is being attacked by the entire bourgeois press. If the petty-bourgeois revolutionary democrats, sincerely striving to carry out their slogans, needed an object lesson, they are getting it now in the contempt with which they have been treated by the big and middle bourgeoisie, in the policy of compromise (with the government) which the Cadets are pursuing behind the backs of the people.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats say to all democrats among the urban and rural poor, only in alliance with the proletariat, only by throwing off the tutelage of the Cadets, only in a determined and consistent struggle against the autocracy will you find salvation. If you are mature enough for this, you will follow the proletariat. If not, you will remain under the tutelage of the Cadets; and, whatever the upshot of the election campaign, whatever the result of your bargaining among yourselves for seats, the proletariat will continue to pursue its own class revolutionary road.

Menshevism is now undergoing a severe test. The election campaign has become the corner-stone of its opportunist tactics. Part of the Social-Democrats have fallen under the hegemony of the bourgeois ideologists. Bourgeois ideologists are jeering scathingly at the Mensheviks, whom they call "moderate socialists" (the term *Rech* uses), who can always be depended on. Their friends from the Right do not take them into consideration ... they only count on their loyal service to the Cadets. A section of Social-Democrats have sunk so low that the liberal bourgeoisie regard them merely as subservient tools, and the revolutionary-minded proletariat prefers to vote for the Socialist-Revolutionaries (as was the case in the elections of delegates in the Menshevik stronghold—the Vyborg District) rather than vote for *such* Social-Democrats.

The crisis of opportunism is approaching. Menshevism is being dealt a decisive blow by the agreement with the

"compromisers". The Vasilyevs, Malishevskys and Larins have paved the way to ... the cemetery. Confusion and mutual expulsion reign in the ranks of the Mensheviks. Martov is expelling the Vasilyevs and the Malishevskys from the Party. Let the workers expel the very spirit of Menshevism from the Party!

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THE ELECTIONS IN THE WORKER CURIA IN ST. PETERSBURG

The elections of workers' delegates are an extremely important event in the political life of Russia and in the history of our labour movement, an event that has not yet been properly appreciated.

For the first time *all* parties with any standing among the proletariat have come *before the masses* of the workers, not with general programmes or slogans, but with a definite practical question: *to the candidates of which party* will the masses of the workers entrust the defence of their interests? As everyone knows, the system of elections in the worker curia is, of course, far removed from proper democratic representation. Nevertheless, the masses of the workers are making themselves heard in the elections. And the broad masses of the workers are witnessing *a struggle between parties*, that is, between *definite* political parties, *for the first time* in Russia.

Elections of workers' delegates have already taken place in many parts of the country; but nothing like complete and exact information on the struggle of the parties in these elections is as yet available. The newspapers give only the most general, approximate, and *superficial* conclusions. Unless our Party officials, and especially the advanced workers themselves, undertake the necessary and extremely important task of *studying* the course and the results of the elections in the worker curia, we can definitely say that we shall lose extremely valuable and necessary material for the future development of Party work and Party agitation.

The general impression produced by the elections in the worker curia in Russia is unanimously summed up by all newspapers as follows: complete victory for the extreme Lefts, primarily the Social-Democrats, the Socialist-Revolutionaries coming second.

The elections have fully borne out the fundamental thesis of Social-Democracy: as a class, the proletariat is revolutionary. The proletarian *masses* are Social-Democratic in their aspirations and sympathies. The proletariat is the most revolutionary class in Russia.

All the talk about the Social-Democratic Party in Russia not being a workers' party has in fact been *refuted* by the elections. Only liberals who are deliberately lying, or opportunists who indulge in idle words can now doubt the *mass proletarian character* of the Social-Democratic Party in Russia.

Before passing from general to particular conclusions, we must make the reservation that *nothing* like complete data is *yet available*. However, we consider it not only possible, but absolutely necessary to *suggest* a number of further conclusions, not with the idea of claiming to have exhausted the question, but for the purpose of *submitting it, as a question of vast importance*, for the consideration of *all* comrades, evoking an exchange of ideas, the collection of material, etc.

The striking thing revealed by the first newspaper reports is the difference between Russia proper and Poland, which is much more advanced economically, culturally and politically. In Russia, in St. Petersburg and Moscow, at any rate, there are *no* frankly bourgeois parties that enjoy even limited support among the proletariat. The Social-Democrats preponderate absolutely; considerably less influence is exercised by extreme Left bourgeois democrats who regard themselves as socialists, namely, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. There are no Cadets among the workers, or at any rate, a very insignificant number of them.

In Poland there is a frankly bourgeois party that stands to the Right of the Cadets, and has played a conspicuous part in the elections—the *Narodowci* (*Narodowi-Demokraci* — National-Democrats).²⁰ This fact cannot be attributed to police and military persecution. The Polish bourgeoisie,

which skilfully plays upon the national oppression of all Poles and the religious persecution of all Catholics, seeks and finds some support among the masses, and, of course, among the Polish peasantry.

It is, however, self-evident that it would be absurd to deduce from this difference that there is some exceptional advantage intrinsic in Russian backwardness. This is not the case. The explanation is much simpler: it is due to historical and economic, and not to national, differences. There are in Russia immeasurably more survivals of serfdom among the masses of the people, in the rural districts, in the agrarian system—hence the more primitive, more direct revolutionary sentiments among the peasantry and among the working class, which is closely connected with the peasantry. This revolutionary sentiment undoubtedly expresses a general democratic (which in essence means bourgeois-democratic) protest, rather than proletarian class-consciousness. And then, our bourgeoisie is less developed, less class-conscious, less skilled in political struggle. It neglects activities among the proletariat not so much because it could not win a certain section away from us, but because it stands in less need of popular support (than in Europe and Poland). For the time being, it can rely on privilege, bribery, and brute force. The time will come, however, when in this country, too, all sorts of people of bourgeois origin will preach such abominations as nationalism, something in the nature of Christian democracy, anti-Semitism and so on, to the masses of the workers.

Let us now pass on to Russia proper. First of all, there is the noteworthy difference between St. Petersburg and Moscow. In Moscow the Social-Democrats gained a complete victory over the Socialist-Revolutionaries. According to some reports, not yet fully verified it is true, about 200 Social-Democratic delegates were elected, as against a mere 20 Socialist-Revolutionary delegates!

In St. Petersburg the reverse is the case: everyone is astonished at the *unexpectedly* high percentage of Socialist-Revolutionary delegates. Of course, the Social-Democrats predominate over the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but not overwhelmingly. The proportion of Socialist-Revolutionaries is estimated at 33 per cent or even (though this

is hardly correct) at 40 per cent. Whichever figure we take for the time being until the detailed returns are available, we can understand why rank-and-file Social-Democrats in St. Petersburg feel that *they have been beaten* in the worker curia. Even if one-third of the delegates are Socialist-Revolutionaries, that is *actually* a defeat for the Social-Democrats in the capital—a defeat in comparison with what we have seen in the rest of Russia, and with what all of us, as Social-Democrats, regard as normal and essential.

This is a fact of tremendous importance.... In St. Petersburg the extreme Left bourgeois democrats deprived the socialists of their *overwhelming* preponderance in the worker curia. It is our duty to give this fact the closest attention. *All* Social-Democrats must set to work to study this phenomenon carefully and find the correct explanation for it.

The general impression of the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats, who are amazed by the results of the elections of January 7 and 14, can be summed up as follows: (1) it was at the *biggest* factories, the strongholds of the most class-conscious, the most revolutionary proletariat, that Socialist-Revolutionaries inflicted the most telling defeat on the Social-Democrats; (2) the Socialist-Revolutionaries defeated *mostly* and in the main the *Menshevik Social-Democrats*. Where a Socialist-Revolutionary candidate opposed a Bolshevik Social-Democratic candidate, the Social-Democrats were far more often, *in most cases in fact*, victorious.

The supreme significance of both these conclusions is obvious. We must therefore take good care that these are not mere impressions but *conclusions* drawn from exact and verified data that can leave no room for two interpretations. It is, of course, extremely unlikely, almost impossible even, that the consensus of opinion of active Social-Democrats in the most diverse districts of St. Petersburg is mistaken. Of course, it would be ridiculous pedantry to expect revolutionaries who are at present overwhelmed with election work to compile exact and accurate statistics; nevertheless, the principal data, the main facts and figures *can and must* be collected, for they will be essential in *all* our Social-Democratic work in St. Petersburg for a long time to come.

Below we deal with this question in greater detail (see the article: "The Struggle Between the Social-Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the Elections in the Worker Curia in St. Petersburg"). We shall here confine ourselves to an appraisal of the political significance of this *relative* defeat of Social-Democracy at the elections in the St. Petersburg worker curia.

First of all, it must be noted that the numerical preponderance of Social-Democratic delegates is obviously an indication of the greater *number of factories* in which the Social-Democrats have organisational groups. More detailed information will probably confirm what the Social-Democrats observed in the days of freedom in October, namely, that the Socialist-Revolutionaries carry on no effective, prolonged and serious organisational work among the proletariat, but just grab at any opportunity that may crop up and push resolutions through at meetings when feeling runs high, taking advantage of any moment of excitement to win votes through frothy and flashy "revolutionary" phrases and speeches.

This element of the Socialist-Revolutionary victory will, in all probability, be noted by every conscientious investigator as a feature of the recent elections in the worker curia in St. Petersburg. The whole point here, in the final analysis, is that a "revolutionary" petty-bourgeois party is incapable of steady and consistent proletarian activities; at the slightest change in the workers' temper, it completely disappears from the working-class suburbs. Only at certain moments is it able to exploit the as yet insufficient political education of the masses, "captivating" them with their ostensibly broad presentation of questions (actually nebulous, intellectualist flummery), playing on their undeveloped class-consciousness, demagogically utilising the traditional "back-to-the-land" urge in cases where rural connections still exist, and so on and so forth.

Naturally, the bourgeois character of the revolution leads to the working-class districts being "raided" from time to time by hordes of radical and truly revolutionary bourgeois youths who have no class backing and who, whenever there are signs of a new upsurge or a new onslaught of the revolution, turn instinctively to the proletariat as

the only mass that is engaged in a serious *fight* for freedom. Socialist-Revolutionary speakers at workers' meetings are a kind of stormy petrel indicating that the proletariat is in fine fettle, has recuperated somewhat, and is regaining strength after former defeats, that something is beginning to ferment among proletarians, something deep and widespread, which will make them grapple again with the old order.

A comparison of the October and "Duma" periods with that of the present elections, and a simple statistical assessment of the number of permanent Socialist-Revolutionary organisational groups would undoubtedly show the truth of this explanation.

But it would, of course, be very foolish to *confine ourselves* to this explanation, and shut our eyes to the fact that it was at the largest factories, where the workers are most class-conscious and experienced in battle, that the Socialist-Revolutionaries *defeated* the Social-Democrats. Fortunately, we already know that, in fact, the extreme Left bourgeois democrats defeated not Social-Democracy, but the *opportunist vulgarisation* of Social-Democracy.

The revolutionary bourgeois democrats shirked battle with revolutionary Social-Democrats and, in fact, defeated only those who trail along in the wake of the non-revolutionary bourgeoisie, those *who advocate blocs with the Cadets*. This is most clearly corroborated by the evidence of Social-Democratic Party workers on the character of the speeches delivered by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and by facts on the Socialist-Revolutionaries' "victory" over the Mensheviks.

The St. Petersburg elections took place on January 7 and 14. On January 7 the workers of St. Petersburg learned that the thirty-one Mensheviks had broken away from the Social-Democratic Conference in order to bargain with the Cadets for seats in the Duma. For the whole following week the St. Petersburg bourgeois press exulted and rejoiced, praising the Mensheviks, inviting them to be seated next to the Cadets, and applauding their renunciation of the revolution, their joining the "*opposition bloc*", "the moderate-socialist parties", etc., etc.

The rout of the Mensheviks in the big factories is the first warning the proletarian masses have given the vacillating opportunist intellectuals!

The Mensheviks have turned towards the Cadets—the proletariat of St. Petersburg have turned away from the Mensheviks.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries took advantage of the split among the Social-Democrats, took advantage of the workers' indignation at the Cadet-like Mensheviks, and did so with brazen alacrity. In the working-class suburbs they attacked the Social-Democrats for forming blocs with the Cadets (without saying anything about the Bolsheviks and the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.), but in the city *they themselves were bargaining with the Cadets!* It is now clear why they have been so carefully concealing from the public their views and their resolutions on blocs with the Cadets, and their blocs with the Popular Socialists, *and so on and so forth.** They commit all the sins of Menshevism *clandestinely*, but when they confront the workers they reap applause and win votes by castigating Menshevism.

The organiser of the Semyannikov Subdistrict League of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, whose report we quote below, writes in that report on the elections at the huge Semyannikov Works, as follows: despite the Bolsheviks' protests, the Mensheviks nominated Comrade X.¹¹ "At an election meeting at the works, a Socialist-Revolutionary intellectual spoke and severely criticised Comrade X's Menshevik arguments in favour of an agreement with the Cadets, and, as the workers said, Comrade X 'was in the soup'." In the eyes of the masses the defeat of the Mensheviks was complete. "*When the masses learned,*" we read in the same report, "that the Social-Democratic candidates were in favour of an agreement with the Cadets and that those candidates were Mensheviks, *they said then and there [at the works] that they would not vote for the Mensheviks.*"

This makes it quite clear why, during the election of delegates for the Social-Democratic conference, the Mensheviks were opposed to voting in accordance with platforms, i.e., were opposed to a *direct* vote of the masses themselves on the question of blocs with the Cadets!

* They published the resolution of their St. Petersburg Committee *after* the elections in the worker curia.

"At the Nevsky Stearin Works, in the Menshevik factory subdistrict, a worker, N. M., who had been nominated as a delegate, declared bluntly: 'Now that I have heard that the Social-Democrats are in favour of an agreement with the Cadets, I am going over to the Socialist-Revolutionaries.' *And he did go over, and was elected delegate!*"

Such is the shameful state to which Social-Democracy has been brought by these miserable opportunists, who are capable of breaking away from the workers' party on the eve of the elections, in order to haggle with the Cadets for seats.

The only conclusion to be drawn from this by a Social-Democrat who values the honour and good name of the proletarian party is that ruthless war must be waged on Menshevism in St. Petersburg. We must open the eyes of the workers to the people whose Cadet policy is driving the workers away from socialism and towards the revolutionary bourgeoisie.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries have captured the biggest factories from the Mensheviks. We must recapture them from the Socialist-Revolutionaries. We must send new agitators and fresh revolutionary Social-Democratic literature to the biggest factories and explain to the workers that they have fallen out of the hands of the Cadet-loving Mensheviks into the hands of *Cadet-loving* Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The whole course of the St. Petersburg election campaign, all the facts of the endless vacillations of the Mensheviks, of their efforts to enter a counter-revolutionary bloc with the Cadets (after they broke away from the workers' party), and of their bargaining, *jointly with the Socialist-Revolutionaries*, with the Cadets for seats, give us a wealth of ammunition with which to fight *both the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries* at the big factories in St. Petersburg.

The big factories must and will become strongholds of revolutionary Social-Democracy, inaccessible to opportunists and petty-bourgeois revolutionaries alike.

**THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN S.D.'s AND S.R.'s
IN THE ELECTIONS
IN THE WORKER CURIA IN ST. PETERSBURG**

The important success achieved by the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the elections in the worker curia has evoked despondency in many Social-Democrats. But it is a fact of the greatest significance, revealing the serious mistake made by the Social-Democrats and therefore deserving thorough investigation. We must not give way to despondency and distress, but study the recent elections to get at the causes of our comparative reverse and ensure the proper organisation of Social-Democratic activities among the workers in future.

Excellent material for a study of the elections of worker delegates is provided by the "Report of the Semyannikov Subdistrict League of the Neva District", St. Petersburg Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, which covers the period from November 15, 1906 to January 15, 1907.

We will not quote this Report in full, but cite only *the exact figures* on the struggle of the Menshevik and Bolshevik Social-Democrats against the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the election of delegates in *twenty-three factories* in one of the largest (and historically one of the most *important*) working-class suburbs of St. Petersburg.

We give these figures separately for each factory, so that every competent Party official can verify and correct our data, and we indicate where the candidates were Bolsheviks and where they were Mensheviks. The biggest fac-

tories, i.e., those which elected more than one delegate, are italicised.

Factories where Bolshevik candidates were nominated	Number of delegates elected		
	S.D.	S.D. sympa- thisers	S.R.
Russo-American Engineering Works	1	—	—
Armature Works	1	—	—
Offenbacher	1	—	—
Uppenek	1	—	—
Railway Sleeper Impregnation Works	1	—	—
Former Onufriyev Works	1	—	—
Rafter Works	—	1	—
<i>Pahl</i>	2	—	1
Vienna	1	—	—
Atlas	1	—	—
Alexandrovsky Railway Car Shops	1	—	—
Iron Foundry	—	—	1
<i>Total for 12 factories</i>	11	1	2

Factories where Menshevik candidates were nominated	Number of delegates elected		
	S.D.	S.D. sympa- thisers	S.R.
<i>Semyannikov Works</i>	—	—	5
<i>Maxwell</i>	1	—	1
<i>Thornton</i>	1	—	—
<i>Gromov</i>	1	—	—
<i>Nauman</i>	1	—	—
<i>Grapp</i>	1	—	—
<i>Alexeyev</i>	1	—	—
<i>Nevsky Stearin Works</i>	—	—	1
<i>Vargunin</i>	—	—	1
<i>Obukhov</i>	—	—	4
Playing-Card Factory	one (unspecified)		
<i>Total for 11 factories</i> . . .	6	—	12
	and one (unspecified)		
<i>Total for 23 factories</i> . . .	17	1	14
	and one (unspecified)		

These figures show first of all that, on the whole, the *Social-Democrats have defeated* the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Social-Democrats secured the election of 18 delegates

(if we include the Social-Democratic sympathiser among the Social-Democrats), while only 14 Socialist-Revolutionaries were elected.

Further, these figures show: (1) that at the largest factories, the Socialist-Revolutionaries were, on the whole, victorious; (2) that, in general, the Socialist-Revolutionaries defeated the Menshevik Social-Democrats; (3) that, on the whole, the Bolshevik Social-Democrats defeated the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Indeed, if we take the four biggest factories, i.e., those which elected more than one delegate each, we get the following: total number of delegates elected (i.e., by 14,000 workers)—14, of whom *11 were Socialist-Revolutionaries and three Social-Democrats*. At the other 18 smaller factories, *15 Social-Democrats and 3 Socialist-Revolutionaries* were elected. We have no information as to the total number of workers at these factories; it may exceed 18,000, for factories employing less than 2,000 workers elect only one delegate; but it may also be less than 18,000, since all factories employing 50 or more workers elect one delegate each.

Consequently, our general conclusion on the victory of the Social-Democrats over the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the Neva District must be revised: at the biggest factories the *Socialist-Revolutionaries defeated the Social-Democrats*. Figures on the number of delegates elected are not sufficient to enable us to draw a precise conclusion: we must have the figures for *each factory*; and, moreover, we must have data on the number of workers employed and the number that voted at each of them.

Further, the facts quoted above clearly show that *the Mensheviks are entirely to blame for the victory of the Socialist-Revolutionaries*. The Mensheviks lost 12 seats to the Socialist-Revolutionaries, 12 out of 18, whereas the Bolsheviks lost only 2 (out of 14).

At the Bolshevik factories (counting as Bolshevik, not merely those where Bolsheviks are, *in general*, employed, but where Bolshevik candidates were put up in opposition to the Socialist-Revolutionaries), the Socialist-Revolutionaries were undoubtedly routed, in particular at the largest factory, Pahl's, where the Bolsheviks secured the

election of two delegates out of three. Since we have no information as to where the Socialist-Revolutionaries put up candidates, and, consequently, it is very probable that they were defeated at the Russo-American Engineering Works, at the Alexandrovsky Railway Car Shops, the Atlas Works, etc., the conclusion to be drawn is that, *on the whole, the Bolsheviks defeated the Socialist-Revolutionaries.*

At the Menshevik factories, on the contrary, the Social-Democrats were defeated: the Socialist-Revolutionaries won 12 seats, the Social-Democrats only 6. There is no doubt that, *in the eyes of the proletarian masses, the Socialist-Revolutionaries are on the whole defeating the Mensheviks.*

We do not know exactly how far the conclusions drawn from the facts about the Neva District can be applied to the whole of St. Petersburg. However, judging by the fact that "all Social-Democratic St. Petersburg" is talking about the unexpected victories of the Socialist-Revolutionaries at the big factories, and that the total number of Social-Democratic delegates is evidently very much larger than that of the Socialist-Revolutionary delegates, we may take it that the facts about the Neva District are more or less typical. It is reported that at the Baltic Works in the Vasilyevsky Ostrov District, which is a *Menshevik* stronghold, the Socialist-Revolutionaries defeated the Mensheviks by an enormous majority: they obtained as many as 1,600 votes, and the Mensheviks less than 100. On the other hand, at the big Tubing Works in the same district, the Socialist-Revolutionaries also got about 1,600 votes, but the Bolsheviks got about 1,500. Here, one of the ballot boxes was broken, and the Bolsheviks have *challenged* the elections; they have declared them irregular, and have demanded their annulment. Or take another report. At the Franco-Russian Works, from which the swaggering Menshevik intellectuals "*brought*" 370 *exclusively* Menshevik votes to the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic Conference, a *Bolshevik* and a *Socialist-Revolutionary* were elected delegates. In the Vyborg District, that Menshevik stronghold, the Socialist-Revolutionaries defeated the Menshevik Social-Democrats, and so on and so forth.

To be able to verify all these reports and obtain exact data, it is *absolutely necessary immediately*, while the elec-

tions are still fresh in our minds, to collect particulars about *all* factories which elected delegates. Local Social-Democratic Party officials can easily collect and record the figures for each particular factory. A summary of these figures is *essential* to us Social-Democrats, to enable us conscientiously to examine the results of the elections so as not to gloss cravenly over our mistakes and shortcomings, but subject them to Party criticism and exert all our efforts to eliminate them.

We *cannot* conduct consistent Social-Democratic work in St. Petersburg unless we pay close attention to the way in which the *masses of the workers* have voted for the candidates of the various parties. For the bourgeois parties it is important only to win so many seats. For us it is important for the masses themselves to *understand* the tenets and tactics of *Social-Democracy* as distinct from all petty-bourgeois parties, even though they may call themselves revolutionary, socialist parties. We must therefore strive to obtain exact and complete data on the voting at the elections in the St. Petersburg worker curia.

We therefore earnestly appeal to all local district and subdistrict Social-Democratic officials in St. Petersburg to furnish us with exact data on the following: (1) district; (2) name of factory; (3) number of workers employed; (4) number of persons who voted; (5) the political trend represented by the contending candidates: Socialist-Revolutionary, Bolshevik, Menshevik, or other parties; (6) number of votes cast for *each* candidate. A summary of this data will serve as a solid basis on which to judge the various aspects of Social-Democratic work and our possible gains or losses in the next elections.

HOW TO VOTE IN THE ST. PETERSBURG ELECTIONS

WHO BENEFITS FROM THE FABLES ABOUT THE BLACK-HUNDRED DANGER?

Long ago, revolutionary Social-Democrats pointed out that the fables about the Black-Hundred danger have been deliberately invented and circulated by the Cadets to stave off the *danger from the Left*.

No attention was paid to the Social-Democrats. The liberal press has been howling in chorus about the Black-Hundred danger. The petty-bourgeois radicals, the Narodniks,²² naively copied the liberals. The opportunist Social-Democrats also fell into line with the liberals, and in some cases (e.g., in St. Petersburg) stooped to downright blacklegging against the proletariat.

But what do the elections show?

Everyone now sees that there has been a *leftward* swing in the mood of the voters. The Black Hundreds have suffered a much heavier defeat at the elections than they did last year. The revolutionary Social-Democrats have *proved to be right*. The Black-Hundred danger in the elections is a *fable* circulated by the Cadets, who are bargaining with Stolypin behind the backs of the people. It is well known that in St. Petersburg Mr. Vodovozov, who last year voted for the Cadets, has now renounced them, and has publicly exposed Milyukov's visit to Stolypin. Milyukov has had to admit the fact. But he is still *concealing* from the people the terms on which Stolypin is prepared to legalise the Cadets!

In their newspapers the Cadets are now straining every nerve to convince Stolypin of their moderation, their modesty, their loyalty, their independence of the "Lefts" and their readiness to fight them.

An advantageous and convenient policy, is it not? To curry favour with Stolypin and his friends, i.e., the Black Hundreds, by renouncing the Lefts, by fighting the Lefts in the press, at meetings, in the elections. And to curry favour with the Lefts, or rather, with simpletons and black-legs among the Lefts, by vociferating about the Black-Hundred danger, with the call: Vote for the Cadets so as not to split the vote!

That is exactly the policy the Cadets have pursued in Moscow. On the very day of the elections, Mr. Kokoshkin, former member of the Duma and one of the most prominent Cadets, wrote in *Russkiye Vedomosti* ²³:

"It is obvious to everyone that the Left bloc cannot win the votes of those non-party elements who are vacillating between the Octobrists and the Cadets; it cannot capture a single vote from the Union of October Seventeenth. But it can capture votes from the people's freedom party, and thereby contribute to the triumph of reaction, and this will be the only practical result of its activities, if successful."

Mr. Kokoshkin wrote that on the morning of election day. And the elections showed that Mr. Kokoshkin was telling a *foul lie*. The result of the Left bloc's activities showed that it was impossible for the Rights to have achieved a *triumph* in Moscow, *no matter how many votes we captured from the Cadets!*

The Moscow elections have *proved* that the fable about the Black-Hundred danger is a *Cadet lie*, which can henceforth be repeated only by deliberate blacklegs among the Lefts.

Take the votes, district by district. We give them in full in this issue in our article "Preliminary Returns of the Moscow Elections". These figures show that *in 14 districts out of 16* * the votes polled by the Octobrists were *less than half* the combined Cadet and Left vote. Consequently, *in 14 districts* the Lefts could not, by their independent action, "*contribute to the triumph of reaction*".

Mr. Kokoshkin *lied*, slandered the Left bloc, when he called it an abettor of reaction!

* There are 17 election wards in Moscow. Complete figures for the Pyatnitsky (17th) District are not yet available. Here the Cadets obtained at least 1,488 votes, the Octobrists, probably about 600, and the Left bloc, probably about 250.

Mr. Kokoshkin tried to *scare* the voters with his *falsehood* about the Black-Hundred danger, in order to deter them from voting for the Left bloc.

Mr. Kokoshkin, like the St. Petersburg Cadets, is *afraid* to put the *real issue* even before voters, with property qualification; he is afraid to ask even them whether, *on principle*, the voters sympathise with a party that parleys with Stolypin, or with the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks. The Kokoshkins, like the St. Petersburg Cadets, are not speculating on the intelligence of the voters, *but on the terror of the petty bourgeois*, who is hypnotised by the wailing of the servile liberal press about the Black-Hundred danger.

And the Moscow elections were indeed elections by *terrified petty bourgeois*. Here is confirmation of this from a source that surely no one will suspect of sympathy with the "Bolsheviks".

Birzheviye Vedomosti ²⁴ of January 29 published a report from its special correspondent on how "Moscow Is Electing Electors". This is what this correspondent writes:

"After leaving the line, the voters withdraw a good distance away and compare notes.

"Well, I suppose you voted for Gringmut,' a contractor asks one of his foremen.

"Oh, no, Sergei Petrovich, we are for the Cadets,' answers the foreman, a tubby little fellow.

"Why not for the Left bloc?' inquires the contractor.

"Too risky, that would split the vote,' answers the foreman."

So that is why the mass of ordinary townspeople voted for the Cadets in Moscow! The ordinary townsman voted against the Lefts *not because he felt any antipathy against them*, but because it was "too risky, *that would split the vote*," i.e., because *he believed the Cadet liars*, who took advantage of their monopoly of the liberal daily press to fool the ordinary townsman.

The elections of January 28 in Moscow show that four election lists could not split the vote *in such a way as to create the danger of a Black-Hundred victory!*

In Moscow the Cadets hoodwinked the frightened townspeople. The St. Petersburg voters should know of this;

they must not let themselves be caught a second time by the Cadets, who are bargaining with Stolypin!

We also draw the attention of our readers to a comparison of the figures (for 9 districts of Moscow—unfortunately fuller information is unavailable) for 1906 and 1907. It is common knowledge that all Cadet henchmen and blacklegs among the Lefts are clamouring about the Senate interpretations as proof that the 1906 figures are *nothing to go by*, that we must expect something worse in the 1907 elections, and that there is now a Black-Hundred danger.

But what has Moscow proved? In 1906, in 9 districts, 13,220 votes were cast for the Cadets, 5,669 for the Rights (Octobrists) plus 690 (for the monarchists), in all 6,359 (perhaps even *somewhat more*, for, as can be seen from the figures we quote, there are no returns for the monarchist vote in several of these 9 districts).

In 1907, in the same districts, 14,133 votes were cast against the Black Hundreds (11,451 for the Cadets and 2,682 for the Lefts), while 5,902 votes were cast for the Black Hundreds (4,412 for the Octobrists and 1,490 for the monarchists).

Thus, despite the Senate interpretations, *the total vote* in 1907 is even slightly higher than it was in 1906 (20,025 as compared with 19,579). The anti-Black-Hundred vote is *higher* than in 1906 (14,133 as compared with 13,220); the Black-Hundred vote is *lower* than in 1906 (5,902 as compared with 6,359).

The *facts* from Moscow prove that the 1906 figures *can* be taken for comparison, for the 1907 figures show an *improvement*.

And what do the St. Petersburg figures for 1906 show? They show that in 9 districts electing 114 electors, the *highest* Black-Hundred vote in 1906 was *less than half of the lowest Cadet vote*.*

Thus, a split in the anti-Black-Hundred vote between the Cadets and the Lefts *cannot result in a victory for the Rights in St. Petersburg*.

* The figures are given *in full* in *Zreniye*, No. 1. (See p. 49 of this volume.—*Ed.*) We are reproducing them in this issue to make them known to *all* St. Petersburg voters.

Even the elections of electors by urban voters in St. Petersburg *Uyezd*,* which took place on January 29, show that the Black-Hundred danger is a Cadet falsehood. Even among these voters, who had the greatest difficulty in obtaining voting forms and going to the polling-booth, the Black Hundreds got *so few* votes that they could not have won, *no matter how the vote was split*. The Cadets received at least 1,099 votes, the *Social-Democrats* 603, the *Octobrists* 652, and the *Union of the Russian People*²⁵ 20. The *Rights could not* have been elected, no matter how many votes we captured from the Cadets! We therefore declare most emphatically that those people in St. Petersburg who are now calling upon the electorate to vote for the Cadets, to refrain from splitting the vote because of the Black-Hundred danger, *are deliberately lying and deceiving the voters*. Those who are not participating in the elections in St. Petersburg, even in a single ward, because of the Black-Hundred danger, *are deliberately lying and deceiving the voters to cover up their blacklegging against the Left bloc*.

In St. Petersburg, as in Moscow, there is no Black-Hundred danger, but there is a Cadet danger. There is the danger that the ignorant and terrified petty bourgeois will vote for the Cadets, not out of any antipathy against the Left bloc, towards the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks, but out of fear of splitting the vote, a fear inspired by the lies of the Cadet press.

All those who want *intelligent* voting in St. Petersburg must combat *this* "danger".

There is no Black-Hundred danger in St. Petersburg, there is only a Cadet danger. Therefore it will be unpardonable blacklegging against the Lefts *to abstain* from voting in those three districts (Vasilyevsky Ostrov, Rozhdestvensky and Liteiny) where (judging by the 1906 figures) a victory of the Black Hundreds is possible if the vote is split. These three districts elect 46 electors out of the total of 174 (160 for the urban, 14 for the worker curia). Consequently, *these districts cannot affect the result of the elections*. But they may *greatly* affect the victory of the Lefts or the

* See footnote to p. 18.—Ed.

Cadets. Let us assume that the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks are successful in four districts: Spassky, Moscow, Petersburg and Vyborg (we have taken these districts at random). The Lefts will then have 74 electors (60 from the city and 14 from the workers). If the Cadets are successful in *all* the other districts, they will have 100 electors *and get all their candidates into the Duma!* If, however, the Black Hundreds are elected in the three districts mentioned above (46 electors), the Cadets will have only 54, and they will be *obliged* to combine with the Lefts and get *two seats out of the six in the Duma.*

That means that whoever abstains from voting in the three "Black-Hundred" districts of St. Petersburg is *secretly helping the Cadets* and is blacklegging against the Left bloc!

Citizens and voters! Give no credence to the deceivers who talk to you about the danger of splitting the vote in St. Petersburg. Give no credence to their false tales of a Black-Hundred danger in St. Petersburg.

There is no Black-Hundred danger in St. Petersburg. The Rights cannot win in St. Petersburg as a result of a division of the votes between Cadets and Lefts.

Do not vote out of fear of a "danger" invented by the Cadet liars (who run to Stolypin by the back door); vote as your conscience and your convictions guide you.

Will you vote for the liberal bourgeoisie, who want to saddle the peasants with ruinous land-compensation payments, betray the peasants into the hands of the liberal landlords, and are secretly bargaining with Stolypin and carrying on negotiations with the Black Hundreds?

Or will you vote for the Social-Democratic Labour Party, for the party of the proletariat supported by all Trudovik parties?

Citizens, vote for the Left bloc!

THE MOSCOW ELECTIONS—PRELIMINARY RESULTS

The liberal newspapers and those serving the liberals are still vociferating about the Black-Hundred danger in Moscow and St. Petersburg.

To show how utterly *false* these outcries and phrases are, we give here tables of the results of the Moscow elections so far published in the St. Petersburg press.

For the purpose of comparison we also quote from the newspaper *Nasha Zhizn*" for March 28, 1906, the results of the 1906 elections in Moscow.

The significance of the figures for the two years, which prove and prove again how *utterly false* are the fables about the "Black-Hundred danger", is dealt with elsewhere.

Number of votes polled in Moscow in 1907:

Moscow Election Wards	Const.-Dem.	Octobrists	Monar- chists	Left Bloc
Arbat	1,348	514	154	214
Basmannaya . . .	934	462	113	155
City	643	266	107	61
Lefortovo	938	631	244	190
Myasnitskaya . .	1,331	551	191	191
Prechistenka . . .	1,183	538	161	175
Presnya	1,196	550	187	458
Rogozhskaya . . .	1,565	963	287	286
Serpukhovskaya .	469	189	69	101
Sretenka	1,239	403	106	303
Sushchevsky . . .	2,061	700	398	841
Khamovniki . . .	1,011	647	197	297
Yakimanka	1,153	552	171	241
Tverskaya	1,730	680	189	313
Yauza	1,117	299	75	162
Meshchanskaya .	1,839	838	262	689
Total, 16 wards . . .	19,757	8,783	2,891	4,677

Moscow Election Wards	Const.-Dem	Octobrists	Monar-chists	Left Bloo
In 1906				
Arbat	1,269	700	?	—
Sushchevsky	2,867	930	193	—
Presnya	1,662	646	150	—
Prechistenka	1,810	734	?	—
Tverskaya	1,810	850	174	—
City	571	362	50	—
Sretenka	1,368	640	40	—
Yauza	600	300	?	—
Basmanaya	1,263	507	83	—
Total, 9 wards . . .	13,220	5,669	690	—
Same 9 wards in 1907	11,451	4,412	1,490	2,682

Thus, the Moscow elections prove that the stories about the Black-Hundred danger are *false*. We remind the reader once again that the election figures for St. Petersburg in 1906 *prove the same thing*:

Voting in St. Petersburg in the Elections to the First Duma

Wards	Lowest Cadet Vote	One Half of That Number	Highest Right Vote	Number of Electors
Admiralty	1,395	697	668	— 5
Alexander-Nevsky	2,929	1,464	1,214	—16
Kazan	2,135	1,067	985	— 9
Narva	3,486	1,743	1,486	—18
Vyborg	1,853	926	652	— 6
Petersburg	4,788	2,394	1,729	—16
Kolomna	2,141	1,070	969	— 9
Moscow	4,937	2,468	2,174	—20
Spassky	4,873	2,436	2,320	—15
Litelnv	3,414	1,707	2,097	+15 ²⁷
Rozhdestvensky	3,241	1,620	2,066	+14
Vasilyevsky Ostrov	3,540	1,770	2,250	+17

Zreniye, No 2,
February 4, 1907

Published according
to the Zreniye text

A POLITICAL LIDVALIAD

The *Telegraf*²⁸ for January 26 reports the following episode at a meeting held on January 24 in the Civil Engineers' Hall.

"V. V. Vodovozov appears on the platform and reminds the meeting of the incident in the Nemetti Theatre: 'I asked there whether it was true that Milyukov was conducting negotiations with Stolypin behind the backs of the voters. I was answered by shouts: "Lies", "Calumny", and Prof. Gredeskul answered that Milyukov was an honest man, in whom the party had implicit confidence. I have not the least doubt about Milyukov's personal integrity, but such negotiations did take place. Milyukov himself does not deny it. Today in *Rech* he writes that he discussed with Stolypin the legalisation of the people's freedom party, but that the terms were unacceptable. *But Milyukov is concealing these terms. If they are abominable they ought to be made public, they ought to be publicly condemned ... pilloried!*'

"I close the meeting!" announces a police inspector.

"The public make for the exit, shouting and whistling. The organisers of the meeting sharply reproach Vodovozov, and the police inspector sends a couple of constables to the platform, in case of emergencies."

Mr. Vodovozov deserves thanks and appreciation, not sharp reproaches, for his attempts to *expose* Milyukov's negotiations with Stolypin. Only *philistines* who fail to understand their duties as *citizens*, or those who are anxious to *conceal* from the people the intrigues of the Cadets, can reproach a politician for such action. We really do not know in which of these categories to place the organisers of the meeting, at which the principal speaker was Nabokov, a Cadet.

The question of the negotiations between Milyukov and Stolypin is of tremendous importance. Those who are inclined to treat this question lightly, to brush it aside as

a minor scandal of no significance, are a thousand times wrong. Those who *fear* a scandal fail to recognise it as their civic duty to expose *political Lidvaliads*.

And the negotiations between Milyukov and Stolypin are indeed a little bit of political Lidvaliad, in which criminal embezzlement and fraud are replaced by the *politically dishonest and criminal* haggling of a party that has misappropriated the great words, "the people's freedom".

We have already pointed out in the newspaper *Trud*²⁹ that Milyukov is *concealing* Stolypin's "terms" *from the people*. He does not say whether there was one audience or several, and when they took place. Nor does he say whether Stolypin invited him, or whether he requested an audience. And lastly, he does not say whether the St. Petersburg Committee and the Central Committee of the Cadets have taken any decision on the matter, and whether anything has been communicated to the provinces about it.

It is not difficult to see that a full assessment of Cadet Zubatovism³⁰ depends on these facts. Only *shameful* things are *concealed* from the people. Mr. Vodovozov is right: *they must be made public*. And it is Mr. Vodovozov's *duty* to continue his disclosures, if he wishes those citizens who understand their political duties to regard him as an honest, consistent and sterling politician, and not a journalist in search of sensation. In cases of *infamy* in public affairs, it is the *duty* of a citizen to *compel* those who are concealing the infamy to speak.

Anyone who knows *anything* of these villanies and wants to do his duty as a citizen must *compel* the Milyukovs to take him to court for libel, and *there* expose the Cadet leader, who, in the thick of the people's election fight against the old regime, pays back-door visits to a leader of the old regime, behind the backs of the people!

We publicly address the following questions to Mr. Milyukov and the Cadet Party:

(1) When did Milyukov (*and his friends?*) have his audience or audiences with Stolypin?

(2) Did Stolypin invite Milyukov? Did Milyukov at the time *know anything* about the "abominable" (to use Mr. Vodovozov's expression) terms which Stolypin wanted to discuss with him?

(3) When did the St. Petersburg Committee and the Central Committee of the Cadets (or the two committees jointly) meet to discuss Stolypin's *proposals*? Did they not decide to take *certain steps* towards meeting these proposals? Was *anything* about this communicated to the provinces?

(4) What connection is there between Milyukov's audience with Stolypin and *certain other steps* taken by these two worthies to meet each other half way, and the *character* of the Cadets' behaviour at the "conference" with the petty-bourgeois bloc on January 18?

We shall return, probably more than once, to these disclosures about the "audience" granted to a Cadet by a reactionary. With all the documents in our hands that an outsider can procure, we shall yet prove that these negotiations between the Cadets and the Black Hundreds *caused the failure* of the bloc of "Lefts" and Cadets which many people desired, and which we have always opposed.

For the time being we say:

Let Mr. Milyukov and the Cadet Party be advised that *not only* Vodovozov, but very many other people will exert all their efforts *to expose this political Lidvaliad!*

THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS IN THE WORKER CURIA IN ST. PETERSBURG

Although the gathering of exact data on the elections in the worker curia is making slow progress (the Bolsheviks have issued and circulated a printed questionnaire), the general character of the elections has nevertheless been made clear.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries have no doubt gained more than we expected. This is admitted even by the Mensheviks (*Nash Mir*,¹ No. 1). In the gubernia worker curia they secured the election of 4 electors out of 10. In the city worker curia they were defeated by the Social-Democrats, who secured the election of all 14 electors, but the Socialist-Revolutionary candidates polled a high vote (110-135 for the Socialist-Revolutionaries, 145-159 for the Social-Democrats, out of a total of 269 votes).

To proceed. Nobody denies that the Socialist-Revolutionaries defeated us in the biggest factories.

The Mensheviks do deny the *following* fact, the most vital for an understanding of the causes of our failures, namely, *that the Socialist-Revolutionaries defeated mainly Mensheviks.*

In a special article published in No. 1 of *Nash Mir*, on the elections in the worker curia, they *say nothing* about this, but while hypocritically complaining that the Social-Democrats had been weakened by factional strife, they slurred over the fact that it was the Mensheviks who have brought this factional struggle *to the point of a split*, and their tactics to a degree of "Cadetism" that *antagonised* the advanced workers.

But even the data so far collected go more and more to confirm our original conclusion (in *Proletary*, No. 12), namely, that it was *Mensheviks** who were defeated by Socialist-Revolutionaries.

For the Neva District, this is borne out by the figures for the various factories, published in *Proletary*, No. 12. The bald statement to the contrary in *Nash Mir*, No. 1, is simply ridiculous.

For the Moscow District, it is confirmed by the report in the present issue.³²

For the Vyborg District, the Mensheviks themselves (*Nash Mir*, No. 1) give the following figures: for the urban section of the district (Mensheviks) 17 Social-Democrats, 12 Socialist-Revolutionaries, and 2 unspecified. For the gubernia section of the district, where only Bolsheviks were working—7 Social-Democrats and not a single Socialist-Revolutionary.

Though not conclusive proof, these figures on the whole fully bear out our contention that it was the Mensheviks who were defeated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries. *Nash Mir*'s attempt to argue that the Socialist-Revolutionaries were completely inactive in the gubernia section of the Vyborg District, and that "consequently there was no competition", is obviously unsound. In the first place, the question arises—why were the Socialist-Revolutionaries inactive in this particular suburb of St. Petersburg, although they were active in others? Was it not due to the fact that the "competition" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries had been eliminated beforehand by all our preliminary work? Secondly, the Mensheviks do not tell us exactly who the candidates were. Nor do they give us the figures for each factory. Thirdly, we know from the newspapers that it was at the election meetings in this very Vyborg District that the Socialist-Revolutionaries castigated the Mensheviks for their "Cadetism".

Thus, *Rech* for January 24 reports a meeting held on January 21 in the Nobel Hall (No. 11 Neustadt St.). According to *Rech*, Gurvich, a Social-Democrat, spoke and reproached the extreme Left parties for boycotting the Duma

* See p. 65 of this volume.—Ed.

(*Rech* uses italics to describe this service rendered the Cadets at a Left meeting!). Gurvich accused the Narodniks of "petty haggling" that killed the bloc with the Cadets. Replying to Gurvich, Narodnik Bickermann said that "*the previous speaker's statement about petty haggling is slander*". Narodnik Smirnov argued that the Menshevik Gurvich "in no way differs from a Cadet". Smirnov referred to the fact that Gurvich had been publicly "praised" by the Cadet Gredeskul.

Such is the *Rech* report. It shows that it was for the Mensheviks' attitude to the Cadets that they were castigated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

In the Neva, Moscow and Vyborg districts, the Socialist-Revolutionaries' success was particularly striking. It is these districts that help us to understand the cause of that success: the opportunist Social-Democrats are discrediting Social-Democracy in the eyes of the advanced proletariat.

But if the action of the Right Social-Democrats cost us four places out of ten in the gubernia worker curia, we made up for it in the city worker curia.

As will be seen from what follows, we made up for it by *the fact* that we displayed the tactics of revolutionary, not opportunist, Social-Democracy for all delegates to see.

The total number of workers' delegates for the city was 272. Of these, 147, i.e., more than half, were Social-Democrats or their sympathisers. The rest were partly definite Socialist-Revolutionaries (54), partly indefinite (55), non-party (6), one *Right* and 9 Trudoviks, the "Lefts" (two of them Cadets), and so on.

The St. Petersburg Committee carried on vigorous activity among the delegates. The question discussed was one of universal interest, the question of tactics in the St. Petersburg elections, with or against the Cadets? Representatives of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. explained to the delegates the position of revolutionary Social-Democracy, while the Mensheviks spoke in defence of their own tactics.

On January 28, the *decisive* meeting of the delegates of all parties was held. Some 200 to 250 people were present. A resolution was carried, with only 10 or 12 voting against,

fully endorsing *the tactics of the Bolsheviks*, demanding support for the Left bloc, and definitely opposing the *Mensheviks* and their "covert" support of the Cadets.

Here is the text of the resolution:

"Whereas

"(1) the success of the Left election lists, which have already been put forward by the Social-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Trudoviks and Popular Socialists in opposition to the Black-Hundred and Cadet lists in the urban curia is of extreme political importance;

"(2) such success is possible only if all the Left parties unanimously support the Left lists;

"this meeting of workers' delegates from various factories calls on all Left parties to support the joint Left lists and under no circumstances to put up separate lists, or support the Cadets, even covertly, in any district of St. Petersburg.

"In conformity with the opinion of the masses, this meeting of delegates expresses the wish that our Menshevik Social-Democratic comrades should enter into agreement with the Lefts and contribute to the success of the Left lists in the St. Petersburg elections."

Thus, in the city of St. Petersburg, which the Mensheviks wanted to separate from the gubernia, representatives of the *entire proletariat have condemned Menshevik tactics!*

It was clear at the Social-Democratic conference that the majority of the St. Petersburg workers sympathised with Bolshevik tactics and this has now been *proved conclusively* by the delegates' decision.

On January 28, representatives of the masses of the workers called for the last time on the Mensheviks to abandon their tactics of "covertly" supporting the Cadets, their *blackleg* tactics against the Left bloc.

But even after that, the Mensheviks refused to submit to the will of the proletariat. On February 1, *Rech* published excerpts from their manifesto, in which they put spokes in the wheel of the Left bloc. On January 29, late at night, the non-party Progressists of the Kolomna District *tore up* their written agreement with the Mensheviks, after all the representatives of the Left bloc had explained to the Progressists that the Menshevik terms ("a free hand" for the electors, in other words, freedom to desert to the Cadets!) were untenable.

On January 30 a meeting was held of workers' delegates belonging to the R.S.D.L.P. or sympathising with it. The

majority of these delegates, ninety-eight persons, were present. Comrade V., representative of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., proposed that they examine the question of future Social-Democratic electors submitting to the instructions of the St. Petersburg Committee in electing members of the State Duma. He pointed out that under normal circumstances this question would not have given rise to any doubts or differences, since the instructions of the St. Petersburg Committee are, of course, binding on all members of the St. Petersburg organisation. But at present a considerable section of the organisation, the majority of the Mensheviks, has broken away and announced that the Menshevik electors reserve freedom of action for themselves. The representative of the St. Petersburg Committee pointed out that if the workers' electors were to follow this recommendation of the unofficial, seceding section of the organisation, it would mean that the split already begun by the Mensheviks would be made final and would be a contravention of the decision adopted at the general meeting of delegates by an overwhelming majority to support the Left bloc in the election campaign. Comrades M. and A., Menshevik members of the St. Petersburg Committee, objected to this, and insisted that the workers' electors must only reckon with the opinions of the delegates. By an overwhelming majority the following resolution, proposed on behalf of the St. Petersburg Committee, was passed: "This meeting considers that submission to the instructions of the St. Petersburg Committee is obligatory for electors during the elections."

The Mensheviks vigorously *opposed* this resolution. The most prominent and *responsible* Mensheviks did not hesitate to oppose the St. Petersburg Committee even at a moment like this—on the eve of the elections. They moved an "amendment" to substitute the words "St. Petersburg Organisation" for St. Petersburg Committee.

But the workers immediately saw through the Menshevik tactics, intended to split the Party in the interests of the Cadets. They shouted to the Menshevik speakers: "Sit down!" The amendment, which was a covert justification of the split, was *rejected* by an overwhelming majority.

The meeting then proceeded with the nomination of R.S.D.L.P. candidates for electors. The St. Petersburg Committee submitted a list of 14 candidates, whom it recommended from a list of 21 nominated by the district meetings of delegates. The motion to accept this list as a basis for discussion, was carried by an overwhelming majority, despite objections from the Mensheviks, who said this was "governmental pressure". Comrade V., representative of the St. Petersburg Committee, explained that this was not "governmental pressure", that the St. Petersburg Committee has authority only to the extent that it enjoys the confidence of the organised Social-Democratic proletariat of St. Petersburg, and that, in submitting the list of recommendations, it was only doing its duty as the organisation's guiding body. All the nominees were discussed, and one of the candidates, on the proposal of the representative of the St. Petersburg Committee, was withdrawn and replaced by another. Then they were put to the vote, which resulted in the entire list proposed by the St. Petersburg Committee being approved by a considerable majority.

The St. Petersburg Committee's list was published in all newspapers on the eve of the elections.

The elections of February 1 resulted in a victory for the united Social-Democrats. *The St. Petersburg Committee's list was elected in toto.* All fourteen electors are Social-Democrats!

Of these fourteen—*eight* are Bolsheviks, four are Mensheviks (strictly speaking, one is a syndicalist, not a Menshevik), and two are non-factional Social-Democrats *who are in favour of the Left bloc.*

In the city worker curia, the Bolsheviks made up for the losses sustained by the Social-Democrats in the gubernia worker curia.

Let *Rech* now rave to its heart's content (see the article in the issue of February 3), and say that the Bolsheviks did not give the Socialist-Revolutionaries even a proportionate minority.

We never promised the Socialist-Revolutionaries proportional representation—and no one has shown what the proportion is, for no figures on the voting are avail-

able. We are the first to have *begun* collecting these figures.

We have left ourselves a *free hand* to fight all the other parties in the worker curia.

Thanks to action by the *revolutionary* Social-Democrats, out of the total number of workers' electors for St. Petersburg and St. Petersburg Gubernia, only 4 are Socialist-Revolutionaries and 20 are Social-Democrats.

At the next elections we shall win *all* the places for Social-Democracy.

Proletary, No. 13,
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ON THE REPORT OF THE MOSCOW DISTRICT OF ST. PETERSBURG CONCERNING THE ELECTIONS TO THE SECOND DUMA

We call our readers' attention to the fact that the data on the elections of delegates by the St. Petersburg workers expose, to an ever greater extent, *the way in which* the Mensheviks got themselves votes for the Social-Democratic conference. From the Franco-Russian Subdistrict, for example, they "brought" 370 Menshevik votes to the conference. Here the Bolsheviks did not count on a single valid Party vote. But what happened then? The delegate from the Franco-Russian Factory was a *Bolshevik*, who has now been chosen as elector!

And that is where an unexpected exposure of the Mensheviks came from.

To continue: the Menshevik weekly *Nash Mir* (No. 1, January 28) had the temerity to say of the Moscow District that "in the Bolshevik Neva and Moscow districts, exclusively Socialist-Revolutionaries were elected as delegates" (p. 14). It has already been shown in *Proletary*, No. 12 that this is a *patent untruth* as far as the Neva District is concerned, for there it was precisely the Mensheviks who were so thoroughly defeated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Let us turn to the Moscow District. The Mensheviks consider this a Bolshevik district *now* that they have to find somebody to blame for the defeat other than themselves! But the Mensheviks must not forget that this time their words can be *verified*! We can take the *official* statement made to the Central Committee by the thirty-one Mensheviks on their reasons for leaving the conference (the

printed pamphlet we analysed in *Proletary*, No. 12*). Among the thirty-one signatures we find "*five from the Moscow District*".

But the conference approved the mandates of four Bolsheviks and four Mensheviks from the Moscow District.

Instructive, is it not?

When Menshevik votes have to be mustered for the conference they count *five* Mensheviks against three or four Bolsheviks. *In that case* the Mensheviks want to be in the majority!

But when they want to shift the political responsibility on to somebody else they declare that the Moscow District is a "Bolshevik district"....

The Bolsheviks counted 185 votes for the Moscow District, and the Mensheviks, in that same pamphlet, admitted that they had challenged these votes only "tentatively", that actually *the votes should have been confirmed* (p. 7 of the same pamphlet).

The Mensheviks counted their votes for the Moscow District as 48+98+97, altogether 243. Of these, 195 were challenged, although the Mensheviks themselves insisted at the time (p. 7 of the pamphlet) that all 243 votes should be confirmed!

The Mensheviks, therefore, considered themselves to have a very substantial majority in Moscow District—243 votes against 185. ... *Nash Mir* has, indeed, acted *very* injudiciously: its own words serve to prove that the Mensheviks acted *dishonestly* at the conference.

In conclusion we would remind the comrade who sent us the report on the Moscow District that it is extremely important to have *complete* figures, for each factory separately, on the election of delegates and on the number of votes polled by the different candidates.

* See pp. 29-32 of this volume.—Ed.

SOME FIGURES ON THE ELECTIONS IN THE WORKER CURIA IN SOUTH RUSSIA

Our appeal to all Russian Social-Democrats to organise the collection of exact figures on the elections in the worker curia has not been futile. We have already received replies to 93 of the questionnaires we distributed among the St. Petersburg comrades. These 93 questionnaires were distributed by districts as follows: Peterburgskaya Storona, 7; Vasilyevsky Ostrov, 22; Vyborg, 18; Moscow, 18; City, 28. We ask comrades to expedite the dispatch of the remaining forms to help make our information complete, particularly for the big factories. We shall then publish the full figures.

From the provinces we have the returns for six factories in Ekaterinoslav Gubernia. We give these in tabulated form to show the comrades what kind of information the Party needs and what conclusions we should draw from the experience of the first Party elections in the worker curia.

Name of factory	Number of workers	Number of delegates	Party affiliation of delegate elected	Number of votes cast	Number of votes cast for:				
					S.D. Bolsh.	S.D. Mensh.	S.R.	Non-party	Right
Esau Works	350	1	S.D. Mensh.	130	—	112	15	—	3
Locomotive Repair Shop	2,700	2	S.D. Mensh.	800	—	650	—	—	—
Locomotive Depot	700	1	S.D.	230	230		—	—	—
Nail Factory	700	1	S.D. Bolsh.	250	250	—	—	—	—
Pipe-Rolling Works	850	1	S.D. Mensh.	200	—	195	—	—	5
Bryansk Rolling Mill	4,350	4	S.R.	1,100	—	300	800	—	—
Total, 6 factories	9,850	10	6 S.D. 4 S.R.	2,710	250	1,257	815	—	8
					230 1,737				

Of course, we do not know how typical these figures are, and to what extent the conclusions to be drawn from them can be applied to the whole of Ekaterinoslav Gubernia. In order to draw final conclusions we must obtain complete data.

For the time being there are two points we can mention. The percentage of workers taking part in the elections is not high. Evidently, Social-Democratic activity is not thorough enough and does not reach the masses in their entirety. On the whole, less than one-third of the total number of workers took part in the elections. The lowest percentage is at the Tubing Works—200 out of 850, i. e., less than one-fourth. The highest is at the Esau Works: 130 out of 350, i.e., more than one-third.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries competed with us at two factories: Esau and Bryansk. At the latter, *the Socialist-Revolutionaries defeated the Mensheviks!* The biggest factory elected *four Socialist-Revolutionary delegates.*

Thus, the preliminary figures for the South (very incomplete, it is true) confirm the conclusion we drew about the North: *the Socialist-Revolutionaries are beating the Mensheviks*, for the edification of the opportunists, it might seem, or else to teach a lesson to people who with unpardonable thoughtlessness brush aside revolutionary bourgeois democracy and hanker after liberal-monarchist bourgeois democracy!

The Socialist-Revolutionaries account for 40 per cent, i.e., two-fifths, of the total number of delegates (10). But the number of votes cast for the Socialist-Revolutionaries was *less than one-third* of the total—815 out of 2,710. It is worth noting that, despite their victory at the biggest factory, the proportion of votes obtained by the Socialist-Revolutionaries was smaller than the proportion of delegates. This shows how groundless and unsupported were the assertions of St. Petersburg Socialist-Revolutionaries that their share of votes must have been larger than that indicated by their share of delegates. Such assertions must not be made without documentary statistical evidence of the number of votes cast at each factory.

We hope that comrades all over Russia will continue to collect information along the lines indicated, so that the Party as a whole may form a clear and definite idea of the results of its campaign, and learn to understand the causes of its relative failures.

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ST. PETERSBURG ELECTIONS

The election campaign in St. Petersburg is drawing to a close. The elections are only three days away, and by the time the reader sees these lines the results of the voting in St. Petersburg will be known.

One might think it useless to discuss the significance of the St. Petersburg elections until they are over. But that is not so. The election campaign in St. Petersburg has such a long history and has provided such an abundance of unusually instructive political material that its significance is already quite clear. Whatever the outcome of the elections, there can be no doubt that the St. Petersburg campaign of 1906-07 already constitutes an important, independent stage in the history of the Russian revolution.

The St. Petersburg election campaign has been a definite gain for the revolution, first, because it has brought out the relations between the political parties and revealed the frame of mind (and, consequently, the interests and the entire political situation) of the different classes, and then it has served in a big, public, mass event, as a *practical* test of the various answers given to the *fundamental* questions of Social-Democratic tactics in the Russian bourgeois revolution.

The main events in the St. Petersburg election campaign occurred with the speed of a whirlwind. And in this whirlwind, when immediate *action* was necessary at all costs, the true nature and character of the various parties and trends revealed themselves as never before. No formal ties or party

traditions were able to withstand this whirlwind—organisations broke asunder, promises were broken, decisions and positions were changed, and every day brought momentous news. The clashes between the different parties and trends were unusually sharp; polemics, sharp enough even in ordinary times, developed into a *mêlée*. This is not due to the fact that Russians have no self-restraint, or that they have been warped by illegal conditions, or that we are ill-bred—only philistines can bring forward such explanations.

No, the sharpness of these clashes, the fury of the struggle, was due to the *depth* of class differences, to the *antagonism* of the social and political trends which events brought to the surface with unexpected rapidity, and which demanded immediate “steps” from all, brought them all into collision, and compelled each to defend in struggle, *auskämpfen*, his proper place and his real line of policy.

All parties have their headquarters in St. Petersburg, the hub of political life in Russia. The press is not of local, but of national significance. It was therefore inevitable that the struggle of the parties in the St. Petersburg election campaign should become an extremely important symptom, a portent and prototype of many future battles and events, parliamentary and non-parliamentary, in the Russian revolution.

At first the question at issue was the seemingly petty, secondary, “technical” question of an agreement between all the opposition and revolutionary parties against the Black-Hundred danger. But this “simple” question actually concealed the fundamental political questions of: (1) the attitude of the government towards the liberals, the Cadets; (2) the real political trend of the Cadets; (3) the hegemony of the Cadets in the Russian liberation movement; (4) the political trends of the petty-bourgeois Trudovik parties; (5) the mutual class interests and political affinity of the moderate Popular Socialists and the revolutionary Socialist-Revolutionaries; (6) the petty-bourgeois or opportunist section of the Social-Democratic Labour Party; (7) the hegemony of the proletariat in the liberation movement; (8) the significance of the visible and open, and of the invisible and concealed elements and “potentialities” of the

revolutionary petty-bourgeois democratic movement in Russia.

And this abundance of political questions was raised and settled by events, by the course of the election campaign itself. These questions were raised against the will of many parties and without their being aware of them—and they were settled “violently” even to the extent of breaking all traditions—and the outcome was a surprise to the vast majority of the politicians taking part in the campaign.

“The Bolsheviks scraped through by a fluke,” says the philistine, shaking his head over all these surprises. “It was just a stroke of luck.”

Such talk reminds me of a passage in the recently published letters of Engels to Sorge. On March 7, 1884, Engels wrote to Sorge:

“A fortnight ago, my nephew from Barmen, an independent Conservative, came to visit me. I said to him: ‘We have reached such a pitch in Germany that we can simply fold our arms and make our enemies do our work. Whether you repeal the Anti-Socialist Law, extend it, tighten it up or modify it—will make no difference, whatever you do, you will play into our hands. ‘Yes,’ he replied, ‘circumstances are working wonderfully in your favour.’ ‘Well, of course,’ I replied, ‘they would not if we had not correctly defined them forty years ago and had we not acted accordingly.’ My nephew made no reply.”³³

The Bolsheviks cannot speak of forty years, of course—we are comparing something small with something very big—but we can speak of months and years of Social-Democratic tactics in the bourgeois revolution defined in advance. The Bolsheviks did indeed *fold their arms* during the most important and decisive moments in the election campaign in St. Petersburg—and *circumstances worked for us*. All our enemies, from the formidable and ruthless enemy Stolypin, to the revisionists, “enemies” with cardboard swords, *worked for us*.

At the beginning of the election campaign in St. Petersburg the whole opposition, all the Lefts, were opposed to the Bolsheviks. Everything possible or conceivable was done against us. *Yet everything turned out as we said.*

Why? Because long before (as long ago as "Two Tactics",* 1905, in Geneva) we gave a far more correct assessment of the government's attitude towards the liberals and the attitude of the petty-bourgeois democrats towards the proletariat.

What *killed* the bloc that was almost arranged between the Cadets and all the "Lefts" *except the Bolsheviks*? The negotiations between Milyukov and Stolypin. Stolypin beckoned—and the Cadet turned his back on the people to fawn like a puppy on his Black-Hundred master.

Was this chance? No, it was *necessity*, because the fundamental interests of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie compel them to abandon the revolutionary struggle conducted together with the people at every decisive moment, and seek a compromise with reaction.

What was the cause of the *absolute instability* and spinelessness of all the petty-bourgeois (Narodnik and Trudovik) parties and of the Mensheviks, the petty-bourgeois section of the workers' party? Why did they waver and vacillate, dash from Right to Left, follow in the wake of the Cadets, and hold them so dear?

Not because of the personal qualities of the individual, but because the petty bourgeois is inevitably inclined to follow in the footsteps of the liberal, to drag along behind him, because the petty bourgeois has no faith in himself, is unable to endure temporary "isolation", is unable to face the baying of the bourgeois hounds without fear and trembling, has no faith in the independent revolutionary struggle of the masses, of the proletariat and peasants, shirks the role of leader in the bourgeois revolution, renounces his own slogans, and adapts and accommodates himself to the Milyukovs....

And the Milyukovs accommodate themselves to Stolypin!

The Bolsheviks determined their policy themselves, and in advance, unfurled *their own* banner, the banner of the revolutionary proletariat, before the people.

Down with hypocritical fables about a Black-Hundred danger, about "fighting" by paying calls on Stolypin! Those who really want freedom for the people and victory

* See present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 15-140.—Ed.

for the revolution—let them follow us, both against the Black-Hundred gang and the Cadet hucksters.

We will fight *independently, under all circumstances*. We are not afraid to "isolate" ourselves from your cheap and nasty, petty and miserable tricks and transactions.

With the proletariat for the revolution—or with the liberals for negotiations with Stolypin—voters, make your choice! Make your choice, Messrs. Narodniks! And you too, Menshevik comrades!

And having determined *our* line, *we sat back*, and waited for the outcome of the scrimmage that had begun. On January 6 our conference unfurled *our* banner. Until January 18 Milyukov grovelled at Stolypin's feet while the Mensheviks, Narodniks and non-party people, grovelled at Milyukov's feet.

They all got themselves in a tangle. They were all playing at diplomacy, and wrangled and quarrelled among themselves to such an extent that they *could not* march together.

We did not play at diplomacy, and *denounced them all* for the sake of a clear and open declaration of the principles of revolutionary proletarian struggle.

And all who were *capable of fighting* followed us. The Left bloc became a fact. The hegemony of the revolutionary proletariat became a fact. *The proletariat* led all the Trudoviks and a large part of the Mensheviks, even intellectuals.

The banner of *the proletariat* has been raised at the St. Petersburg elections. And whatever the outcome of the first serious elections in Russia in which all parties have participated—the banner of the independent proletariat, which is pursuing its own line, has already been raised. It will be held high in the parliamentary struggle and in *all other* forms of struggle that will lead to the victory of the revolution.

By the strength of its own independence, consistency and firmness, the socialist proletariat must win over the masses of oppressed and downtrodden peasants, the masses of wavering, vacillating and unstable petty-bourgeois democrats, and alienate them from the treacherous liberal bourgeoisie, thus gaining control over the bourgeoisie, and,

at the head of a popular mass movement, crush the hated autocracy—such is the task of the socialist proletariat in the bourgeois revolution.

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**PREFACE TO THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION
OF KARL MARX'S
LETTERS TO Dr. KUGELMANN**

Our purpose in issuing as a separate pamphlet the full collection of Marx's letters to Kugelmann published in the German Social-Democratic weekly, *Neue Zeit*, is to acquaint the Russian public more closely with Marx and Marxism. As was to be expected, a good deal of space in Marx's correspondence is devoted to personal matters. This is exceedingly valuable material for the biographer. But for the general public, and for the Russian working class in particular, those passages in the letters which contain theoretical and political material are infinitely more important. In the revolutionary period we are now passing through, it is particularly instructive for us to make a careful study of this material, which reveals Marx as a man who responded directly to all questions of the labour movement and world politics. The editors of *Neue Zeit* are quite right in saying that "we are elevated by an acquaintance with the personality of men whose thoughts and wills took shape in the period of great upheavals". Such an acquaintance is doubly necessary to the Russian socialist in 1907, for it provides a wealth of very valuable material indicating the direct tasks confronting socialists in every revolution through which a country passes. Russia is experiencing a "great upheaval" at this very moment. In the present Russian revolution the Social-Democrat should more and more frequently pattern his policy after that of Marx in the comparatively stormy sixties.

We shall, therefore, permit ourselves to make only brief mention of those passages in Marx's correspondence that are of particular importance from the theoretical standpoint,

and shall deal in greater detail with his revolutionary policy as a representative of the proletariat.

Of outstanding interest as a contribution to a fuller and more profound understanding of Marxism is the letter of July 11, 1868 (p. 42, et seq.).³⁴ In the form of a polemic against the vulgar economists, Marx in this letter very clearly expounds *his* conception of what is called the "labour" theory of value. Those very objections to Marx's theory of value which naturally arise in the minds of the least trained readers of *Capital* and for this reason are most eagerly seized upon by the common or garden representatives of "professorial" bourgeois "science", are here analysed by Marx briefly, simply, and with remarkable lucidity. Marx here shows the road he took and the road to be taken towards elucidation of the law of value. He teaches us his *method*, using the most common objections as illustrations. He makes clear the connection between such a purely (it would seem) theoretical and abstract question as the theory of value and "the interest of the ruling classes", which must be "*to perpetuate confusion*". It is only to be hoped that everyone who begins to study Marx and read *Capital* will read and re-read this letter when studying the first and most difficult chapters of that book.

Other passages in the letters that are very interesting from the theoretical standpoint are those in which Marx passes judgement on various writers. When you read these opinions of Marx—vividly written, full of passion and revealing a profound interest in all the great ideological trends and in an analysis of them—you realise that you are listening to the words of a great thinker. Apart from the remarks on Dietzgen, made in passing, the comments on the Proudhonists (p. 17)³⁵ deserve particular attention from the reader. The "brilliant" young bourgeois intellectuals who dash "into the thick of the proletariat" at times of social upheaval, and are incapable of acquiring the standpoint of the working class or of carrying on persistent and serious work among the "rank and file" of the proletarian organisations, are depicted with remarkable vividness in a few strokes of the pen.

Take the comment on Dühring (p. 35),³⁶ which, as it were, anticipates the contents of the famous *Anti-Dühring*

written by Engels (in conjunction with Marx) nine years later. There is a Russian translation of this book by Zederbaum which, unfortunately, is not only guilty of omissions but is simply a poor translation, with mistakes. Here, too, we have the comment on Thünen, which likewise touches on Ricardo's theory of rent. Marx had already, in 1868, emphatically rejected "Ricardo's errors", which he finally refuted in Volume III of *Capital*, published in 1894, but which to this very day are repeated by the revisionists—from our ultra-bourgeois and even "Black-Hundred" Mr. Bulgakov to the "almost orthodox" Maslov.

Interesting, too, is the comment on Büchner, with an appraisal of vulgar materialism and of the "superficial nonsense" copied from Lange (the usual source of "professorial" bourgeois philosophy!) (p. 48).³⁷

Let us pass to Marx's revolutionary policy. There is among Social-Democrats in Russia a surprisingly widespread philistine conception of Marxism, according to which a revolutionary period, with its specific forms of struggle and its special proletarian tasks, is almost an anomaly, while a "constitution" and an "extreme opposition" are the rule. In no other country in the world at this moment is there such a profound revolutionary crisis as in Russia—and in no other country are there "Marxists" (belittlers and vulgarisers of Marxism) who take up such a sceptical and philistine attitude towards the revolution. From the fact that the revolution is bourgeois in content they draw the shallow conclusion that the bourgeoisie is *the driving force* of the revolution, that the tasks of the proletariat in this revolution are of an ancillary, not independent, character and that proletarian leadership of the revolution is impossible!

How excellently Marx, in his letters to Kugelmann, exposes this shallow interpretation of Marxism! Here is a letter dated April 6, 1866. At that time Marx had finished his principal work. He had given his final judgement on the German Revolution of 1848 fourteen years before this letter was written. He had himself, in 1850, renounced his socialist illusions that a socialist revolution was impending in 1848. And in 1866, when only just beginning to observe the growth of new political crises, he writes:

"Will our philistines [he is referring to the German bourgeois liberals] at last realise that without a revolution which removes the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns ... there must finally come another Thirty Years' War..." (pp. 13-14). ³⁸

There is not a shadow of illusion here that the impending revolution (it took place from above, not from below as Marx had expected) would remove the bourgeoisie and capitalism, but a most clear and precise statement that it would remove only the Prussian and Austrian monarchies. And what faith in this bourgeois revolution! What revolutionary passion of a proletarian fighter who realises the vast significance the bourgeois revolution has for the progress of the socialist movement!

Noting "a very interesting" social movement three years later, on the eve of the downfall of the Napoleonic Empire in France, Marx says in *a positive outburst of enthusiasm* that "the Parisians are making a regular study of their recent revolutionary past, in order to prepare themselves for the business of the impending new revolution". And describing the struggle of classes revealed in this study of the past, Marx concludes (p. 56): "And so the whole historical witches' cauldron is bubbling. When will *our country* [Germany] be so far." ³⁹

Such is the lesson to be learned from Marx by the Russian Marxist intellectuals, who are debilitated by scepticism, dulled by pedantry, have a penchant for penitent speeches, rapidly tire of the revolution, and yearn, as for a holiday, for the interment of the revolution and its replacement by constitutional prose. From the theoretician and leader of the proletarians they should learn faith in the revolution, the ability to call on the working class to fight for its immediate revolutionary aims to the last, and a firmness of spirit which admits of no faint-hearted whimpering following temporary setbacks of the revolution.

The pedants of Marxism think that this is all ethical twaddle, romanticism, and lack of a sense of reality! No, gentlemen, this is the combination of revolutionary theory and revolutionary policy, without which Marxism becomes Brentanoism,⁴⁰ Struvism⁴¹ and Sombartism.⁴² The Marxian doctrine has fused the theory and practice of the class

struggle into one inseparable whole. And he is no Marxist who takes a theory that soberly states the objective situation and distorts it into a justification of the existing order and even goes to the length of trying to adapt himself as quickly as possible to every temporary decline in the revolution, to discard "revolutionary illusions" as quickly as possible, and to turn to "realistic" tinkering.

In times that were most peaceful, seemingly "idyllic", as Marx expressed it, and "wretchedly stagnant" (as *Neue Zeit* put it), Marx was able to sense the approach of revolution and to rouse the proletariat to a consciousness of its advanced revolutionary tasks. Our Russian intellectuals, who vulgarise Marx in a philistine manner, in the most revolutionary times teach the proletariat a policy of passivity, of submissively "drifting with the current", of timidly supporting the most unstable elements of the fashionable liberal party!

Marx's assessment of the Commune crowns the letters to Kugelman. And this assessment is particularly valuable when compared with the methods of the Russian Right-wing Social-Democrats. Plekhanov, who after December 1905 faint-heartedly exclaimed: "They should not have taken up arms", had the modesty to compare himself to Marx. Marx, says he, also put the brakes on the revolution in 1870.

Yes, Marx *also* put the brakes on the revolution. But see what a gulf lies between Plekhanov and Marx, in Plekhanov's own comparison!

In November 1905, a month before the first revolutionary wave in Russia had reached its climax, Plekhanov, far from emphatically warning the proletariat, spoke directly of the necessity *to learn to use arms and to arm*. Yet, when the struggle flared up a month later, Plekhanov, without making the slightest attempt to analyse its significance, its role in the general course of events and its connection with previous forms of struggle, hastened to play the part of a penitent intellectual and exclaimed: "They should not have taken up arms."

In September 1870, six months before the Commune, Marx gave a direct warning to the French workers: insurrection would be *an act of desperate folly*, he said in the well-known Address of the International.⁴³ He exposed

in advance the nationalistic illusions of the possibility of a movement in the spirit of 1792. He was able to say, *not after the event*, but many months before: "Don't take up arms."

And how did he behave when this *hopeless* cause, as he himself had called it in September, began to take practical shape in March 1871? Did he use it (as Plekhanov did the December events) to "take a dig" at his enemies, the Proudhonists and Blanquists who were leading the Commune? Did he begin to scold like a schoolmistress, and say: "I told you so, I warned you; this is what comes of your romanticism, your revolutionary ravings"? Did he preach to the Communards, as Plekhanov did to the December fighters, the sermon of the smug philistine: "You should not have taken up arms"?

No. On April 12, 1871, Marx writes an *enthusiastic* letter to Kugelmann—a letter which we would like to see hung in the home of every Russian Social-Democrat and of every literate Russian worker.

In September 1870 Marx had called the insurrection an act of desperate folly; but in April 1871, when he saw the mass movement of the people, he watched it with the keen attention of a participant in great events marking a step forward in the historic revolutionary movement.

This is an *attempt*, he says, to smash the bureaucratic military machine, and not simply to transfer it to different hands. And he has words of the highest praise for the "*heroic*" Paris workers led by the Proudhonists and Blanquists. "What elasticity," he writes, "what historical initiative, what a capacity for sacrifice in these Parisians! ... [p. 88]. History has no like example of a like greatness."

The *historical initiative* of the masses was what Marx prized above everything else. Ah, if only our Russian Social-Democrats would learn from Marx how to appreciate the *historical initiative* of the Russian workers and peasants in October and December 1905!

Compare the homage paid to the *historical initiative* of the masses by a profound thinker, who foresaw failure six months ahead—and the lifeless, soulless, pedantic: "They should not have taken up arms"! Are these not as far apart as heaven and earth?

And like a *participant* in the mass struggle, to which he reacted with all his characteristic ardour and passion, Marx, then living in exile in London, set to work to criticise the *immediate steps* of the "recklessly brave" Parisians who were "*ready to storm heaven*".

Ah, how our present "realist" wiseacres among the Marx-ists, who in 1906-07 are deriding revolutionary romanticism in Russia, would have sneered at Marx at the time! How people would have scoffed at a *materialist*, an *economist*, an enemy of utopias, who pays homage to an "attempt" to storm *heaven*! What tears, condescending smiles or commiseration these "men in mufflers"⁴⁴ would have bestowed upon him for his rebel tendencies, utopianism, etc., etc., and for his appreciation of a heaven-storming movement!

But Marx was not inspired with the wisdom of the small fry who are afraid to discuss the *technique* of the higher forms of revolutionary struggle. It is precisely the *technical* problems of the insurrection that he discussed. Defence or attack?—he asked, as if the military operations were taking place just outside London. And he decided that it must certainly be attack: "*They should have marched at once on Versailles...*".

This was written in April 1871, a few weeks before the great and bloody May....

"They should have marched at once on Versailles"—the insurgents should, those who had begun the "act of desperate folly" (September 1870) of storming heaven.

"They should not have taken up arms" in December 1905 in order to oppose by force the first attempts to take away the liberties that had been won....

Yes, Plekhanov had good reason to compare himself to Marx!

"Second mistake," Marx said, continuing his *technical* criticism: "The Central Committee" (the *military command*—note this—the reference is to the Central Committee of the National Guard) "*surrendered its power too soon...*".

Marx knew how to warn the *leaders* against a premature rising. But his attitude towards the heaven-storming *proletariat* was that of a practical adviser, of a participant in the *struggle* of the masses, who were raising the *whole*

movement to a *higher level* in spite of the false theories and mistakes of Blanqui and Proudhon.

"However that may be," he wrote, "the present rising in Paris—even if it be crushed by the wolves, swine, and vile curs of the old society—is the most glorious deed of our Party since the June insurrection...." ⁴⁵

And, without concealing from the proletariat a *single* mistake of the Commune, Marx dedicated to this *heroic deed* a work which to *this very day* serves as the best guide in the fight for "heaven" and as a frightful bugbear to the liberal and radical "*swine*".

Plekhanov dedicated to the December events a "work" which has become practically the bible of the Cadets.

Yes, Plekhanov had good reason to compare himself to Marx.

Kugelmann apparently replied to Marx expressing certain doubts, referring to the hopelessness of the struggle and to realism as opposed to romanticism—at any rate, he compared the Commune, an *insurrection*, to the peaceful demonstration in Paris on June 13, 1849.

Marx immediately (April 17, 1871) severely lectured Kugelmann.

"*World history*," he wrote, "*would indeed be very easy to make, if the struggle were taken up only on condition of infallibly favourable chances.*"

In September 1870, Marx called the insurrection an act of desperate folly. But, when the *masses* rose, Marx wanted to march with them, to learn with them in the process of the struggle, and not to give them bureaucratic admonitions. He realised that to attempt in advance to calculate the chances *with complete accuracy* would be quackery or hopeless pedantry. What he valued *above everything else* was that the working class heroically and self-sacrificingly took the initiative in *making* world history. Marx regarded world history from the standpoint of those who *make* it without being in a position to calculate the chances *infallibly* beforehand, and not from the standpoint of an intellectual philistine who moralises: "It was easy to foresee ... they should not have taken up..."

Marx was also able to appreciate that there are moments in history when a desperate struggle of the *masses*, even

for a hopeless cause, is *essential* for the further schooling of these masses and their training for the *next* struggle.

Such a *statement* of the question is quite incomprehensible and even alien in principle to our present-day quasi-Marxists, who like to take the name of Marx in vain, to borrow only his estimate of the past, and not his ability to make the future. Plekhanov did not even think of it when he set out after December 1905 "*to put the brakes on*".

But it is precisely this question that Marx raised, without in the least forgetting that he himself in September 1870 regarded insurrection as an act of desperate folly.

"... The bourgeois *canaille* of Versailles," he wrote, "... presented the Parisians with the alternative of either taking up the fight or succumbing without a struggle. The *demoralisation of the working class* in the latter case would have been a *far greater* misfortune than the succumbing of any number of 'leaders'." ⁴⁶

And with this we shall conclude our brief review of the lessons in a policy worthy of the proletariat which Marx teaches in his letters to Kugelmann.

The working class of Russia has already proved once, and will prove again more than once, that it is capable of "storming heaven".

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THE SECOND DUMA AND THE SECOND REVOLUTIONARY WAVE

St. Petersburg, February 7, 1907.

Events are moving at a pace which can only be called revolutionary. Four days ago, in discussing the election campaign in St. Petersburg, we wrote that the political alignment was already clear: revolutionary Social-Democracy alone had independently, resolutely, and proudly unfurled the banner of relentless struggle against the violence of reaction and the hypocrisy of the liberals. The petty-bourgeois democrats (including the petty-bourgeois section of the workers' party) were wavering, turning now to the liberals, now to the revolutionary Social-Democrats.

In St. Petersburg the elections to the Duma take place today. Their results cannot affect the alignment of social forces we have already indicated. And yesterday's elections, which have accounted for 217 of the 524 members, i.e., more than two-fifths, are a clear indication of the political composition of the Second Duma, a clear indication of the political situation which is developing before our eyes.

According to *Rech*, which, of course, is inclined to paint a picture favourable to the Cadets, the 205 members already elected to the Duma are distributed as follows: Rights, 37; National-Autonômists, ⁴⁷ 24; Cadets, 48; Progressists and non-party, 16; non-party Lefts, 40; Narodniks, 20 (13 Trudoviks, 6 Socialist-Revolutionaries, and 1 Popular Socialist); and 20 Social-Democrats.

We have before us a Duma that is undoubtedly more Left than the previous one. If the rest of the elections yield similar results we shall have the following round figures

for 500 members of the Duma: Rights, 90; Nationalists, 50; Cadets, 125; Progressists, 35; non-party Lefts, 100; Narodniks, 50; Social-Democrats, 50. It goes without saying that this is only an approximate estimate made for the sake of illustration, but there can hardly be any doubt of the correctness of these totals.

The Rights constitute one-fifth; the moderate liberals (the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, including the Nationalists, Cadets, and some, if not all, Progressists)—two-fifths; the Lefts—two-fifths (non-party, one-fifth, and Narodniks and Social-Democrats sharing equally the other fifth)—such is the make-up of the Second Duma as it appears to us on the basis of the preliminary returns.

What does this mean?

The most savage and shameless tyranny of the Black-Hundred government, which is the most reactionary in Europe. The most reactionary election law in all Europe. The most revolutionary popular representative body in Europe in the most backward country!

This glaring contradiction clearly reveals the fundamental contradiction in the whole of contemporary Russian life, reveals to the full the revolutionary character of the present day.

Two revolutionary years have elapsed since the great day of January 9, 1905. We have experienced long and painful periods of savage reaction. We have experienced brief "bright intervals" of liberty. We have experienced two great popular outbreaks of strikes and armed struggle. We have experienced one Duma and two general elections, which definitely determined the alignment of parties and caused an extremely sharp alignment among the population, which until recently had no conception of political parties whatsoever.

During these two years, we have grown out of our faith—naïve in some and crudely selfish in others—in the unity of the liberation movement, and have cast off many illusions of peaceful constitutional methods; we have gained experience in mass forms of struggle and have reached a point where we must employ the most stern and extreme method of struggle conceivable—that of the armed struggle of one part of the population against the other. The bour-

geoisie and the landlords have become fierce and brutal. The man in the street is weary. The Russian intellectual is limp and despondent. The party of liberal windbags and liberal traitors, the Cadets, has raised its head, hoping to make capital out of the prevailing weariness born of the revolution, and claiming as its hegemony what is really its readiness, like Famusov,⁴⁸ to go to the utmost limits of obsequiousness.

But below, deep down among the proletarian masses and among the mass of the destitute, starving peasantry, the revolution has made headway, quietly and imperceptibly undermining the foundations, rousing the most somnolent with the thunder of civil war, galvanising the most lethargic with the rapid changes from "liberties" to bestial tyranny, from calm to parliamentary excitement, elections, mass meetings, and feverish "union" activity.

As a result we have a new, even more Left Duma, and in prospect we have a new, even more formidable and more unmistakable *revolutionary crisis*.

Even the blind must now see that it is a revolutionary and not a constitutional crisis that lies ahead of us. There can be no doubt about that. The days of the Russian constitution are numbered. A new clash is inexorably approaching—either the revolutionary people will be victorious, or the Second Duma will disappear as ingloriously as the First, followed by the repeal of the election law and a return to the Black-Hundred absolutism *sans phrases*.

How petty our recent "theoretical" controversies have suddenly become in the glaring light of the rising sun of revolution! Are not the complaints of the miserable, frightened and faint-hearted intellectuals about the Black-Hundred danger in the elections ridiculous? Have not events brilliantly confirmed what we said in *November (Proletary, No. 8)*: "By their outcry against the Black-Hundred danger, the Cadets are leading the Mensheviks by the nose in order to avert the danger from the Left"?*

Revolution is a good teacher. It forces back on to the revolutionary track those who are continually going astray either from weakness of character or weakness of intellect.

* See present edition, Vol. 11, p. 314.—*Ed.*

The Mensheviks wanted blocs with the Cadets, unity in the "opposition", the opportunity to "utilise the Duma as a whole". They did everything possible (and impossible too, to the extent of splitting the Party, as was the case in St. Petersburg) to create an all-liberal Duma.

Nothing came of it. The revolution is stronger than opportunists of little faith think. Under the hegemony of the Cadets, the revolution can only lie prone in the dust—it can triumph only under the hegemony of the Bolshevik Social-Democrats.

The Duma is turning out to be exactly as we depicted it in our polemic with the Mensheviks in *Proletary*, No. 8 (November 1906). It is a Duma of sharp extremes, a Duma in which the moderate and cautious mean has been swept away by the revolutionary torrent, a Duma of Krushevans⁴⁰ and of the revolutionary people. The Bolshevik Social-Democrats will raise their banner in this Duma and say to the masses of the petty-bourgeois democrats what they said to them during the St. Petersburg elections: make your choice between Cadet haggling with the Stolypins, and joint struggle in the ranks of the people! We, the proletariat of all Russia, are marching to that struggle. All who want freedom for the people, and land for the peasants, follow us!

The Cadets already feel that the wind has changed, that the political barometer is falling rapidly. It is not surprising that the Milyukovs have lost their nerve and, casting off all shame, have started howling—in the street—about "red rags" (in the sanctums of the Stolypins these creatures have always secretly abused the "red rag"). It is not surprising that today's *Rech* (February 7) refers to the "jumps" in the political barometer, to the government's vacillation "between the resignation of the Cabinet and some kind of pronunciamento, action by the Black Hundreds and the military, the very date of which has been fixed for the 14th". And the desolated soul of the Russian liberal wails and sighs: What, again a "policy of spontaneous reflexes..."

Yes, miserable heroes of miserably stagnant times! Revolution *again*! We gladly welcome the approaching wave of the people's spontaneous wrath. But we shall do all in

our power to make this new struggle as little spontaneous and as conscious, consistent, and steadfast as possible.

The government set all the wheels of its machine in motion long ago: violence, pogroms, barbarous atrocities, deception and stultification. And now all these wheels have come loose; everything has been tried, even the shelling of villages and towns. The popular forces are not exhausted; on the contrary, they are now forming more and more widely, powerfully, openly and boldly. A Black-Hundred autocracy and—a Left Duma. The situation is undoubtedly a revolutionary one, and a struggle in the most acute form is undoubtedly inevitable.

But it is precisely because of its inevitability that we must not force the pace, spur or goad it on. Leave that to the Krushevans and Stolypins. Our task is *to reveal* the truth to the proletariat and the peasantry clearly, directly and with unsparing candour, to open their eyes to the significance of the coming storm, to help them to meet the enemy in organised fashion, with the calmness of men marching to death, like soldiers in the trenches facing the foe, and ready at the first shots to dash into the attack.

"Shoot first, Messrs. Bourgeois!" said Engels to the German capitalists in 1894.⁶⁰ And we say: "Shoot first, Krushevans and Stolypins, Orlovs and Romanovs!" Our task is to help the working class and the peasantry *to crush* the Black-Hundred autocracy when it hurls itself upon us of its own accord.

Therefore—no premature *calls* for an insurrection! No solemn manifestos to the people. No pronunciamientos, no "proclamations". The storm is bearing down on us of its own accord. There is no need of sabre-rattling.

We must get our weapons ready—in the literal and in the figurative sense. First of all, and above all, we must train a solid army of the proletariat, conscious of its purpose and strong in resolve. We must increase tenfold our work of agitation and organisation among the peasants—among those who are starving in the villages and among those who last autumn sent their sons to serve in the army, sons who experienced the great year of revolution. We must tear down all the ideological blinds and screens concealing the revolution, put an end to all doubts and vac-

illation. We must say simply and calmly, in the plainest and most popular form, as loudly and distinctly as possible: a struggle is inevitable. The proletariat will accept battle. The proletariat will sacrifice everything, will throw all its forces into the fight for freedom. Let the ruined peasantry, let the soldiers and sailors know that the fate of Russian freedom is about to be decided.

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THE ELECTION RESULTS IN ST. PETERSBURG

St. Petersburg, February 9, 1907.

The Cadets have won the St. Petersburg elections. They have secured the election of 151 electors in 11 districts. The Left bloc has won in one district only—the Vyborg District—and has secured the election of 9 electors out of 160.

The outstanding features of the elections in St. Petersburg are: an increase in the percentage of those voting in nearly all districts, and the weakening of the Rights. The Cadets are at the top of the list, with 28,798 votes (counting the maximum numbers of votes cast for their candidates). The Left bloc takes second place, with 16,703 votes; the Octobrists come third, with 16,613 votes, the monarchists fourth with 5,270 votes.

This, when compared with Moscow, is a big step forward. One district has been won. The Lefts have advanced from third to second place in the list. In Moscow, the votes cast for the Left bloc amounted to 13 per cent. The St. Petersburg figure was nearly twice as high, i.e., 25 per cent.

This, of course, was partly due to somewhat more extensive agitation, and to the political influence of the Duma general elections, which were far more favourable to the Left than had been expected. In Moscow not a single daily newspaper published lists of the Left bloc electors. In St. Petersburg several papers did so: it is said that *Tovarishch* has even increased its circulation very considerably since it "swung to the Left". In Moscow there were no information bureaus to help Left voters to fill in their ballot papers. In St. Petersburg there were. In Moscow most of the petty-bourgeois townspeople believed the Cadet fable about the Black-Hundred danger. In St. Petersburg there were

already unmistakable signs that this credulity of the petty bourgeoisie and the opportunists had been shaken.

Here are the returns for each ward, taking in each case the maximum number of votes for the candidates on the respective election lists (figures taken from *Rech*).

Wards in the City of St. Petersburg	Highest vote for:				Difference between Cadet and Left votes	Number of votes we had to gain from Cadets to win
	Cadets	Left bloc	Octobrists	Monarchists		
Spassky	3,397	1,644	1,514	624	—1,753	877
Narva	2,377	1,643	1,326	307	— 734	368
Liteiny	2,776	919	2,153	667	—1,857	929
Kolomna	1,318	1,122	1,068	236	— 196	99
Vasilyevsky Ostrov	2,313	1,949	2,102	418	— 364	183
Rozhdestvensky	2,784	1,325	1,195	537	—1,459	730
Kazan	1,749	589	998	201	—1,160	581
Admiralty	955	246	725	196	— 709	355
Moscow	4,100	1,702	2,233	706	—2,398	1,200
Alexander-Nevsky	2,735	1,421	799	588	—1,314	658
Petersburg	3,282	2,754	1,851	541	— 528	265
Vyborg	1,012	1,389	649	249	+ 377	—
<i>Total . . .</i>	28,798	16,703	16,613	5,270		Total for five not hopeless wards, 1,573

These returns enable us to draw a number of interesting conclusions.

First of all, about the "Black-Hundred danger". The elections have proved that it was non-existent. Our repeated declarations and warnings, reiterated by all Bolshevik publications, including *Ternii Truda* ⁵¹ and *Zreniye*, ⁵² have been *fully confirmed*.

The Black Hundreds *could not* have won in St. Petersburg, *no matter how* the votes had split between the Cadets and the Lefts!

Moreover, even if the Octobrists and the monarchists had joined forces (an impossibility, especially in St.

Petersburg, where the German Octobrists in the Vasilyevsky Ostrov District were on the point of quarrelling even with the Union of October Seventeenth), the Black Hundreds could not have *won* in St. Petersburg! This will be obvious to anyone who takes the trouble to make a very simple calculation from the figures given above. The total Cadet and Left vote (45,500) is *more than twice* the total Octobrist and monarchist vote (22,000). No conceivable distribution of votes among these four election lists, no "measures" taken by the Rights, could have created a Black-Hundred danger.

The petty bourgeoisie—the Narodniks and the opportunist Social-Democrats—who caught up the Cadets' outcry about the Black-Hundred danger, were *deceiving the people*. We said so before the elections. The elections *have proved* that we were right.

The spinelessness and political short-sightedness, characteristic of the petty-bourgeois intellectuals and philistines have revealed themselves in practice in St. Petersburg. Though not nearly to the same extent as in Moscow, the St. Petersburg elections were, nevertheless, elections by *philistines, scared and deceived by the Cadets*. All the election literature published in St. Petersburg, from *Rech* to *Tovarishch*, which latter faint-heartedly defended the Left bloc (apologising for its Left sympathies?), teems with evidence that the Cadets and their henchmen scared the man in the street with a phantom of their own invention—the possibility of a Black-Hundred danger arising out of the voting.

The Cadets strove to ward off the danger threatening them from the Left, with an outcry about the Black-Hundred danger, while they themselves waited on Stolypin, and promised that they would be reasonable, become more loyal, and keep away from the Lefts. Stolypin himself has admitted, according to today's *Tovarishch* (February 9), that he *knows* something about this Cadet swing to the Right!

Further, the St. Petersburg election results enable us to answer the question—what have we gained from these elections? Has our straightforward anti-Cadet propaganda succeeded in rousing *new* sections of hitherto indifferent voters and drawing them into political life? To what ex-

tent have we *alienated* the petty bourgeoisie from the liberals in whose wake they followed, and won them over to the proletariat?

To enable us to judge, let us first of all compare the Cadet and the Left votes (the maximum, as before) in 1906 and in 1907.

Number of Votes (Maximum)

Wards in the City of St. Petersburg	1906	1907			Difference between last and first columns
	Cadets	Cadets	Lefts	Together	
Spassky	5,009	3,397	1,644	5,041	+ 32
Narva	3,578	2,377	1,643	4,020	+ 442
Liteiny	3,767	2,776	919	3,695	- 72
Kolomna	2,243	1,318	1,122	2,440	+ 197
Vasilyevsky Ostrov	3,777	2,313	1,949	4,262	+ 485
Rozhdestvensky	3,393	2,784	1,325	4,109	+ 716
Kazan	2,242	1,749	589	2,338	+ 96
Admiralty	1,553	955	246	1,201	- 352
Moscow	5,124	4,100	1,702	5,802	+ 678
Alexander-Nevsky	2,991	2,735	1,421	4,156	+ 1,165
Petersburg	4,946	3,282	2,754	6,036	+ 1,090
Vyborg	1,988	1,012	1,389	2,401	+ 413
<i>Total</i>	40,611	28,798	16,703	45,501	+ 4,890

These figures very clearly reveal the proportion of votes cast in 1906 and 1907 for the opposition and for the revolution. Of the seventeen thousand votes we polled (in round figures), we captured about *twelve thousand* from the Cadets and attracted *five thousand* from the hitherto indifferent (partly boycotting) masses.

What strikes one at once is the difference between the "hopeless" districts, i.e., those where, apparently, we could not have won in 1907, whatever effort we had made, and the districts that were not hopeless. The principle "hopeless" districts, for instance, were the Admiralty and the Liteiny. Here, the preponderance of Cadet votes over ours is enormous. What is it due to?

The reason is obvious. The population of the first district consists of government officials; that of the second consists of the big bourgeoisie (this was pointed out *before* the elections by *Ternii Truda*). The Social-Democrats, supported by the Trudoviks, could not have won where there is no trade and industrial proletariat, where there is a preponderance of civil servants. Even the number of voters who went to the polls in these districts declined—no interest was displayed! In these districts the *only* thing we did was capture about one-fourth of the Cadet votes for the Left bloc.

At the other extreme there are the districts that are not hopeless, where the Social-Democrats, supported by the Trudoviks, roused a *mass* of new elements, and roused the urban poor from their apathy and somnolence, to political life. These are the Alexander-Nevsky and Petersburg wards. Here the gain in the *anti-Black-Hundred* vote, i.e., the Cadets and Lefts combined, is *over one thousand* in each district. Here *most* of the Left votes are *new* votes, not votes captured from the Cadets. The voice of struggle, the voice of the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks has awakened those whom the unctuous voice of the Cadets could not rouse.

In the Petersburg Ward we had only to capture 265 votes from the Cadets for victory to have been ours. Clearly, 265 added to 2,754 would have made victory quite possible. And it is also clear that the urban poor in these districts, by no means of the proletarian type—shop-assistants, cab drivers and small householders—*rose* in favour of the Lefts. It is obvious that the appeal issued by the Social-Democrats and supported by the Trudoviks was not made in vain, that a formidable number of the inhabitants of these districts are capable of going further than the Cadets, to the Left of the Cadets.

In the Alexander-Nevsky Ward the struggle was incomparably more difficult. To win there we would have had to capture 658 votes from the Cadets. Six hundred and fifty-eight in addition to 1,421 is rather a big figure, but still it is *less than half*. We have no right to regard as hopeless those districts in which we could have been victorious had we obtained fifty per cent more votes than we actually did.

The Kolomna Ward could easily have been won: all we had to do was to capture 99 votes from the Cadets. In the Vasilyevsky Ostrov Ward, where the three main lists—Cadet, Octobrist and Left—each polled about an equal number of votes, we could have won if we had captured 183 votes from the Cadets. In the Narva Ward we could have won if we had captured 368 votes from the Cadets.

To sum up: the Left bloc in St. Petersburg *undoubtedly* won over to its side the shop-assistants and the urban petty bourgeoisie, *roused* a section of them to political life for the first time, and *captured* a very considerable section of them from the Cadets.

The hopeless and despondent opinion that Social-Democratic ideas are unintelligible to trade and industrial office employees in the intermediary stage when the Trudoviks support the socialists, has been *fully refuted* by the St. Petersburg elections. If we want to and set about it properly, we *can* rouse for the political *struggle* hundreds and thousands of the urban poor in every district in the capital. We *can* win, in every district, hundreds of shop-assistants, clerks, etc., from the party of the bourgeois liberals who are bargaining with Stolypin. If we work tirelessly in that direction, the influence of the treacherous Cadets over the urban poor *will be broken*. The Cadets will not survive another election struggle against the Left bloc in St. Petersburg! They will be completely routed under the present electoral law, if they go into battle again after months of "Stolypin" agitation and Milyukov haggling!

Indeed, it is obvious that even in the present elections the Left bloc needed very little more to achieve a victory. The only hopeless districts were the Admiralty, Liteiny, Spassky, Rozhdestvensky, Kazan and Moscow. In these six districts we needed *over fifty per cent more* votes than we received in order to win, and this was hardly conceivable, however strenuously we might have conducted election agitation, distributed literature, etc. (or, rather, it was conceivable, but not under Stolypin's military-court manner of conducting free elections!). The first two of these districts were socially inaccessible to the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks. The other four were acces-

sible, but our activities among the trade and industrial office employees in those districts were still far too feeble.

We captured one of the remaining six districts the first time we contested it as a Left bloc. In four we were from 99 to 368 votes short of capturing them from the Cadets. In one we were 658 votes short. We had only to capture 1,573 votes from the Cadets, in these five districts, and the Left bloc would have been victorious, *would have won the whole of St. Petersburg!*

It is doubtful whether anyone will venture to say that it would have been too much for the Social-Democrats to capture 1,573 votes in five districts if they had worked unitedly, if the opportunists, who were bargaining with the Cadets, had not procrastinated so long in forming the Left bloc, or if the *breakaway Mensheviks had not acted as blacklegs against the Left bloc.*

What is a blackleg? A blackleg is a man connected with the fighting proletariat, who tries to trip it up when it is engaged in the collective struggle.

Does this definition fit the breakaway Mensheviks? Of course it does, for they subverted the unity of the Social-Democratic organisation in St. Petersburg, sowed discord in the ranks of the fighters, deserted to the Cadets at the height of the battle, and lastly, *deliberately obstructed* us even after the Left bloc was formed. Suffice it to recall that the Left bloc was formed on January 25, and on January 28, the breakaway Mensheviks issued, in *Tovarishch*, an appeal to the voters in five districts to abstain from voting! On February 1 the same Mensheviks (*Rech*) published an appeal, in which they tried to frighten petty bourgeoisie with the bogey of the Black-Hundred danger!

That is not all. In today's *Rech*, page 3, there is a report on the elections in the *Petersburg* District, in which we read that one of the ballot papers was marked: "*I abstain from voting. A Menshevik.*"

Let the reader give thought to the significance of this!

On January 28 the Mensheviks published, in *Tovarishch*, the resolutions of the executive body of the breakaway section. In Point VI of these resolutions, the *Petersburg* District was *excluded* from the list of districts where the Black-Hundred danger was supposed to have existed.

Point VI stated expressly that an agreement with the Lefts was expedient in the Petersburg District. Point III stated expressly that even if no agreement was reached with the Lefts the Mensheviks called upon the voters to vote for the Lefts in those districts where there was no "obvious" Black-Hundred danger. *And yet* a "Menshevik" *abstained* from voting in the Petersburg District!! Then what did the breakaway Mensheviks do in other districts?

After this, how can anybody fail to recognise the *fact* that it was blacklegging by a section of the Mensheviks that *prevented* the victory of the Left bloc in the St. Petersburg elections, where there was no Black-Hundred danger at all?

Let the proletariat learn from the vacillations and treachery of the petty bourgeoisie. We shall always be the first to unfurl *our* flag boldly and resolutely. We shall always urge the petty bourgeoisie to throw off the tutelage of the liberals and come over to the side of the proletariat. And these tactics—the only revolutionary, proletarian tactics in a bourgeois revolution—will bring us victory at every revival of the mass political struggle.

Saratov, Nizhni-Novgorod—the first victory; Moscow, St. Petersburg—the first attack. Enough, gentlemen of the Cadet Party! The deception of the urban poor by the liberal landlords and the bourgeois lawyers is coming to an end. Let the Stolypins and the Milyukovs sneer at the "red rag". The Social-Democrats are standing at their post, keeping the red flag flying in the sight of all toilers and all the exploited.

REPORT TO THE CONFERENCE
OF THE ST. PETERSBURG ORGANISATION
ON THE QUESTION OF THE DUMA CAMPAIGN
AND DUMA TACTICS⁵³

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

The speaker pointed out that the question of Duma tactics was undoubtedly the central policy question at that time, and was therefore the main point around which the congress campaign would revolve. Two of the questions that the Central Committee had included in its proposed congress agenda, as reported in the newspapers, were brought into the foreground—that of immediate political tasks and that of the State Duma.

The first question, he said, had been formulated very vaguely. The Mensheviks may have taken it to mean support for a Cadet ministry, but did not care to say so openly. At all events they had shown a noticeable desire to shelve once again the *fundamental* questions of Social-Democratic tactics in the Russian revolution, just as they had done at the Fourth (Unity) Congress. By that time, experience too had taught them that if these questions were evaded the Social-Democrats would have no consistent party tactics of any sort. It would be sufficient to recall that the Central Committee's tactics on the question of supporting the Duma (i.e., Cadet) ministry (June 1906) failed to receive the backing, not only of the Party in general, but of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma in particular. After the dissolution of the Duma, the famous "partial mass expressions of protest", proposed by the Central Committee, had shared the same fate. The attitude towards

the Cadets in the elections was then so uncertain in the Party that among the most influential and responsible Mensheviks—a special opinion was expressed—by Cherevanin before the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in November (1906), and by Plekhanov (not to mention Vasil'yev) after it.

Such being the situation, it was the duty of revolutionary Social-Democrats to take advantage of full representation at the Fifth Party Congress, where the Poles, Letts and Bundists would be represented for the first time, in order to raise fundamental questions of the tactics of Social-Democracy in the Russian bourgeois revolution. It would be no use discussing "immediate political tasks" without first clearing up the basic questions—the tasks of the proletariat in our revolution in general, whether objective conditions existed for the further development of the revolution, the alignment of classes and parties at the time and, especially, the class character of the Cadet Party. Unless these questions were settled—and that would be facilitated by the wealth of experience gained from the First Duma and the elections to the Second—it would be impossible to find a principled and intelligent solution to the problem of the Cadet ministry, that of the tactics to be pursued in the event of the dissolution of the Second Duma, etc., etc.

The speaker therefore went on to cover these questions briefly. The economic conditions of the masses of the population offered clear evidence that the fundamental aims of the revolution had not been accomplished; an objective basis for immediate mass movements existed. This was reflected, in politics, in an intensification of the conflict between the autocracy, which was then coming to an understanding with the organised Black-Hundred landlords, and the masses—not only of the proletariat but also of the rural poor (after the worker curia, the peasant curia had yielded the *largest* percentage of Left electors!), and the urban poor (Cadet hegemony over the petty-bourgeois urban democrats had undoubtedly been seriously shaken by the elections to the Second Duma). It therefore followed that a revolutionary, and not a constitutional crisis was approaching, and that the struggle inside the Duma was, owing

to objective conditions, again engendering a struggle outside the Duma, the transition to which would be accelerated if the activities of the Social-Democrats and bourgeois democrats inside the Duma were successful. It was the task of the proletariat, as leader in the democratic revolution, to develop the revolutionary consciousness, determination and organisation of the masses, and to free the petty bourgeoisie from the leadership of the liberals. Support for a liberal ministry, ostensibly responsible to the Duma but actually dependent on the Black-Hundred tsarist gang, was out of the question. The possibility of utilising such a ministry (supposing it proved a reality and not an empty promise to fool the Cadets, like Stolypin's promise to legalise the Cadets, made in January 1907 to keep the Cadets from entering into blocs with the Lefts) would depend entirely on the strength of the *revolutionary* classes, their political consciousness and solidarity.

As far as the class character of the various parties was concerned, the past year had been universally marked by the rightward swing of the upper classes and the leftward swing of the lower classes. The Centre was growing weaker and being eroded by the flood of advancing revolutionary development. The Black Hundreds had gained strength and were better organised; they had established close relations with one of the strongest economic class forces of old Russia—the feudal landlords. The Octobrists were still the party of the counter-revolutionary big bourgeoisie. The Cadets had made a sweeping swing to the Right. It was becoming more and more evident that their mainstay was the liberal (middle) landlords, the middle bourgeoisie and the top bourgeois intelligentsia. They carried the urban poor with them by force of tradition, deceiving them with loud-sounding phrases about “the people's freedom”. The elections to the Second Duma had proved directly that the Lefts, even under most adverse conditions, had to a very large extent captured the “lower section” of urban democrats from the Cadets, at the very first onslaught.

The Cadets had shifted to the Right, towards the Octobrists. The democratic petty bourgeoisie in the towns, and still more in the country, had gained greater strength and had gone more to the Left than the rest. The speaker

recalled that up to the spring of 1906 this petty bourgeoisie had had no extensive political experience of legal party organisation. Considerable experience had now been gained—beginning with that of the Trudoviks in the First Duma to that of the unexpectedly large number of “Lefts” and “Trudoviks” elected to the Second Duma.

The Bolshevik view that the Russian revolution could not be achieved by the liberals but only by the proletariat, if it succeeded in winning the peasant masses to its side, had been remarkably well confirmed by the experience of 1906 and 1907.

The Duma tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy emerged logically from these premises. Social-Democrats would have to regard the Duma as one of the instruments of the revolution and resolutely, openly and clearly unfurl their consistent, proletarian revolutionary banner in full view of the masses. They would have to engage in agitation, propaganda, and organisation to develop the revolution and explain to the masses that another great struggle outside the Duma would be inevitable. The Cadet phrases about “blowing up the Duma” were a vile provocation on the part of a liberal who had secret talks with Stolypin. Don’t “blow up” the Duma, don’t allow the Duma to be dissolved—these phrases meant “do nothing that would be too unpleasant for Stolypin & Co.”. The Social-Democrats would have to expose the provocative nature of this police-like Cadet catchword and show that even in the First Duma the conduct of the Social-Democratic Party (Bolsheviks and Mensheviks alike) had made all artificial revolutionary “paths”, “proclamations”, etc., impossible. The Cadets knew this and in true *Novoye Vremya* style were substituting “blowing-up” tactics for the tactics of developing a mass, people’s revolution.

The Social-Democrats in the Duma would have to do the same as they had done in the St. Petersburg elections—unfurl their revolutionary banner, compel the vacillating petty bourgeoisie to choose between them and the Cadets, and consent, in periods of decisive action, to partial agreements in particular cases with those petty-bourgeois democrats who would follow them against the Black Hundreds and the Cadets. After explaining the significance of the

"Left bloc" in the Duma and the conditions under which it should be formed, the speaker voiced a strong warning against regarding it as a permanent agreement that would in any way tie the hands of the Social-Democrats, or as a long-term agreement concluded against future contingencies. There would have been no Left bloc in the St. Petersburg elections if the Social-Democrats there had bound themselves by a permanent agreement or even by a provisional agreement with the Narodniks, all of whom, even the "revolutionary" Socialist-Revolutionaries, had gone with the Mensheviks to the Cadets to sell out democracy! Only by pursuing a firm and independent policy, and not by diplomacy and petty bargaining, could the Social-Democrats secure, where necessary, the co-operation of those elements of the democratic bourgeoisie that are really capable of fighting.

CONCLUDING SPEECH

The speaker opposed this in his concluding speech.⁴⁴ On the one hand, even during the most militant actions the Social-Democrats would absolutely have to remain a free and independent party with its own organisation even in the "joint" Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, etc. On the other hand, they could not commit the error of the Mensheviks, whose conception of a "political bloc" was something opposed to a "fighting alliance", because all agreements are permissible only within the limits of a certain *political* line. Of course, in opposing the Cadets on a given question, the Social-Democrats in the Duma *could not* reject agreements with the Lefts, if the latter followed the Social-Democrats on that question and if such an agreement were essential to gain a parliamentary victory over the Cadets (e.g., to amend a law, to delete some particularly objectionable passage from an address, declaration or decision, etc.). But it would be folly and a crime for Social-Democrats to tie their hands by means of anything like permanent and restricting agreements with anyone.

**DRAFT RESOLUTIONS
FOR THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P."**

**Written on February 15-18
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1. THE PRESENT STAGE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

Whereas:

1. the economic crisis which Russia is now experiencing shows no signs of early abatement, and in its protracted course is continuing to create unemployment on an enormous scale in the towns and starvation in the villages;

2. as a result of this, the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between the landlords and the peasantry, and also between the government-bribed peasant bourgeoisie and the poor villagers, is becoming more acute;

3. the political history of Russia during the past year, from the First Duma to the new elections, reveals a rapid increase of political consciousness in all classes, which is reflected in the enormous strengthening of the extreme parties, in the dissipation of constitutional illusions and in the weakening of the "Centre", i.e., the liberal-bourgeois Cadet Party, which is striving to halt the revolution by offering concessions acceptable to the Black-Hundred landlords and the autocracy;

4. the policy of the Constitutional-Democratic Party directed towards the achievement of this purpose will release only a minimum of the productive forces of bourgeois society, will not in any way satisfy the elementary needs of the proletariat and of the mass of the peasantry, and will necessitate the constant forcible suppression of these masses;

This conference declares:

1. that the political crisis that is developing before our eyes is not a constitutional but a revolutionary crisis leading to a direct struggle of the proletarian and the peasant masses against the autocracy;

2. that the forthcoming Duma campaign must therefore be regarded merely as one of the episodes in the people's revolutionary struggle for power, and must be utilised as such;

3. that, as the party of the advanced class, the Social-Democratic Party cannot under any circumstances at present support the Cadet policy in general or a Cadet ministry in particular. The Social-Democrats must bend every effort to expose the treacherous nature of this policy to the masses; they must explain to them the revolutionary tasks confronting them; they must show the masses that only when they attain a high level of political consciousness and are strongly organised can possible concessions by the autocracy be converted from an instrument of deception and corruption into an instrument for the further development of the revolution.

2. THE ATTITUDE TO THE BOURGEOIS PARTIES

Whereas:

1. the Social-Democrats are now faced with the particularly urgent task of defining the class character of the various non-proletarian parties, of assessing present class relations, and, accordingly, of defining their attitude towards other parties;

2. the Social-Democrats have always recognised the necessity of supporting every opposition and revolutionary movement against the present social and political order in Russia;

3. it is the duty of Social-Democrats to do all in their power to enable the proletariat to act as the leader in the bourgeois-democratic revolution;

This conference declares:

1. that the Black-Hundred parties (the Union of the Russian People, the monarchists, the Council of the United Nobility," etc.) are coming out more and more resolutely and definitely as the class organisation of the feudal-minded landowners, and are with increasing arrogance robbing the people of their revolutionary gains, thereby causing an inevitable intensification of the revolutionary struggle; the Social-Democratic Party must expose the close link

between these parties and tsarism and the interests of big feudal landownership, and explain to the masses that an uncompromising struggle must be waged for the complete abolition of these relics of barbarism;

2. that such parties as the Union of October Seventeenth, the Commercial and Industrial Party, and to a certain extent the Party of Peaceful Renovation, etc., are class organisations of a section of the landowners and particularly of the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, which have not yet definitely come to terms with the autocratic bureaucracy on the division of power under a thoroughly undemocratic constitution of some sort based on a property qualification, but which have gone over entirely to the side of the counter-revolution and are manifestly supporting the government*; the Social-Democratic Party [while taking advantage of the conflicts between these parties and the Black-Hundred autocracy to develop the revolution] must [at the same time] carry on a most relentless struggle against these parties;

3. that the parties of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, and their principal party, the Cadets, have now definitely turned away from the revolution, and are seeking to halt it by coming to terms with the counter-revolution; that the economic basis of these parties is provided by a section of the middle landlords and the middle bourgeoisie, especially the bourgeois intelligentsia, while a section of the urban and rural petty-bourgeois democrats still follow these parties merely by force of tradition and because they are deliberately deceived by the liberals; that the ideal of these parties does not go beyond a bourgeois society of law and order, protected from the encroachments of the proletariat by a monarchy, police, a two-chamber parliamentary system, a standing army and so forth; the Social-Democrats must use the activities of these parties for the political education of the people, counteract their hypo-

* Wording proposed by the minority: "...of the bourgeoisie which have entirely gone over to the side of the counter-revolution, are manifestly supporting the government, and whose object is to secure a thoroughly undemocratic constitution based on a property qualification."

critically democratic phraseology by consistent proletarian democracy, expose the constitutional illusions which they are spreading, and ruthlessly fight against their leadership of the democratic petty bourgeoisie;

4. that the Narodnik or Trudovik parties (the Popular Socialists, the Trudovik Group, the Socialist-Revolutionaries) come more or less close to expressing the interests and viewpoint of the broad masses of the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie, wavering between submission to the leadership of the liberals and a determined struggle against landed proprietorship and the feudal state; these parties hide their essentially bourgeois-democratic aims behind a more or less vague socialist ideology; the Social-Democrats must persistently expose their pseudo-socialist character and combat their efforts to obliterate the class distinction between the proletarian and the small proprietor; at the same time they must exert every effort to free these parties from the influence and leadership of the liberals, and compel them to choose between the policy of the Cadets and that of the revolutionary proletariat and thus compel them to side with the Social-Democrats against the Black Hundreds and the Cadets;

5. the joint action ensuing herefrom must preclude all possibility of deviation from the Social-Democratic programme and tactics, and must serve only for the purpose of making a united and simultaneous onslaught against reaction and against the treacherous liberal bourgeoisie.

Note: The words in square brackets are those deleted by the minority, which proposed the amended wording quoted above.

3. THE CLASS TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

Whereas:

1. the democratic revolution in Russia is heading for a new upswing; the big capitalist and landlord class is taking the side of counter-revolution, while new strata of the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, following the example of the proletariat, are coming over to the revolution;

2. the class interests of the proletariat in the bourgeois revolution are such that conditions must be created for the most successful struggle for socialism against the propertied classes;

3. the only possible way to create and secure these conditions is to carry the democratic revolution to its completion, i.e., to win a democratic republic, the complete sovereignty of the people and the minimum of social and economic gains necessary for the proletariat (the eight-hour day and other demands of the Social-Democratic minimum programme);

4. only the proletariat can bring the democratic revolution to its consummation, the condition being that the proletariat, as the only thoroughly revolutionary class in modern society, leads the mass of the peasantry, and imparts political consciousness to its struggle against landed proprietorship and the feudal state;

5. the role of leader in the democratic revolution provides the proletariat with the greatest opportunity to improve its social and economic position, develop its class-consciousness in every way, and pursue its class activities not only in the economic, but also in the wide political sphere;

This conference declares:.

1. that the main task of the proletariat at the present moment of history is to consummate the democratic revolution in Russia;

2. that any belittling of this task will inevitably have the result of converting the working class from the leader of the people's revolution, carrying with it the mass of the democratic peasantry, into a passive participant of the revolution, trailing behind the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie;

3. that all organisations of the Party must guide the activities of the proletariat in carrying out this task, without for a moment losing sight of the independent socialist aims of the proletariat.

4. THE TACTICS OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS IN THE STATE DUMA

1. The correctness of the tactics of boycotting the State Duma, which helped the masses to make a proper appraisal of the impotence and lack of independence of this institution, was fully confirmed by the farcical legislative activities of the First State Duma and by its dissolution;

2. however, the counter-revolutionary behaviour of the bourgeoisie and the compromising tactics of the Russian liberals prevented the immediate success of the boycott and compelled the proletariat to accept battle with the landlord and bourgeois counter-revolution, using the arena of the Duma campaign as well;

3. the Social-Democrats must wage this struggle, outside the Duma and within the Duma, to develop the class-consciousness of the proletariat, strengthen and expand its organisation, further expose constitutional illusions in the eyes of the people, and promote the development of the revolution;

4. the Social-Democrats' immediate political tasks in the forthcoming Duma campaign are: (1) to make clear to the people the complete unfitness of the Duma as a means of realising the demands of the proletariat and of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, especially of the peasantry; (2) to make clear to the people the impossibility of achieving political freedom by parliamentary means as long as real power remains in the hands of the tsarist government; to make clear the necessity of insurrection, of a provisional revolutionary government, and of a constituent assembly elected on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage and a secret ballot;

5. to carry out its fundamental socialist, as well as immediate political, tasks, the Social-Democratic Party, as the class party of the proletariat, must remain absolutely independent, must form a Social-Democratic group in the Duma, and should under no circumstances merge its slogans or tactics with those of any other oppositional or revolutionary party;

6. with particular reference to the activities of the revolutionary Social-Democrats in the Duma, the following

questions, which are being raised by the whole course of political life at the present moment, must be clarified:

(1) as one of our Party organisations, the Social-Democratic group in the Duma should see its primary function in carrying on work of criticism, propaganda, agitation and organisation. This, and not immediate "legislative" objectives, should be the purpose of the bills the Social-Democratic group will introduce in the Duma, particularly on such questions as improving the standard of living, securing freedom for the class struggle of the proletariat, overthrowing the feudal yoke of the landlords in the rural districts, giving aid to the starving peasants, combating unemployment, releasing the sailors and soldiers from the slave conditions at army barracks, etc.;

(2) the tsarist government will certainly not surrender its positions until the decisive victory of the revolutionary people has been achieved and, consequently, a conflict between the Duma and the government is inevitable whatever tactics the Duma pursues, other than treacherous sacrifice of the people's interests to the Black Hundreds; the Social-Democratic group and the Social-Democratic Party, taking into consideration only the course of the revolutionary crisis that is developing outside of the Duma as a consequence of objective conditions, must, therefore, neither promote premature conflicts nor artificially avert or postpone a conflict by modifying their slogans, for this would only discredit the Social-Democrats in the eyes of the masses and cut them off from the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat;

(3) exposing the bourgeois nature of all the non-proletarian parties and opposing all their Duma bills, etc., with their own, the Social-Democrats must constantly fight against Cadet leadership in the movement for freedom, and compel the democratic petty bourgeoisie to choose between the hypocritical democracy of the Cadets and the consistent democracy of the proletariat.

5. THE INTENSIFICATION OF MASS DESTITUTION AND OF THE ECONOMIC STRUGGLE

Whereas:

1. a number of facts testify to the extreme intensification of destitution among the proletariat and also of its economic struggle (the lock-out in Poland, the movement among the workers of St. Petersburg and Ivanovo-Voznesensk against the high cost of living, the extensive strike movement in the Moscow industrial area, the urgent calls of the trade union organisations to prepare for an intense struggle, etc.);

2. all signs go to show that these various manifestations of the economic struggle are accumulating to such an extent that there is every reason to expect mass, economic action all over the country, involving far larger sections of the proletariat than before;

3. the whole history of the Russian revolution shows that all the powerful upsurges of the revolutionary movement began only on the basis of such mass economic movements;

This conference declares:

1. that all Party organisations must pay most serious attention to these circumstances, collect fuller information about them, and that this question should be put on the agenda of the Fifth Party Congress;

2. that the greatest possible number of Party members must be concentrated on economic agitation among the masses;

3. that this economic movement must be regarded as the main source and foundation of the entire revolutionary crisis that is developing in Russia.

6. NON-PARTY WORKERS' ORGANISATIONS AND THE ANARCHO-SYNDICALIST TREND AMONG THE PROLETARIAT

Whereas:

1. in connection with Comrade Axelrod's agitation for a non-Party labour congress, a trend (represented by Larin, Shcheglo, El, Ivanovsky, Mirov, and the Odessa publica-

tion *Osvobozhdeniye Truda*) has appeared in the ranks of the R.S.D.L.P., the aim of which is to destroy the Social-Democratic Labour Party and to set up in its place a non-party political organisation of the proletariat;

2. besides this, outside of and actually against the Party, anarcho-syndicalist agitation is being carried on among the proletariat, using this same slogan of a non-party labour congress and non-party organisations (*Soyuznoye Dyelo* and its group in Moscow, the anarchist press in Odessa, etc.);

3. notwithstanding the resolution passed by the November All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., a series of disruptive actions has been observed in our Party, with the object of setting up non-party organisations;

4. on the other hand, the R.S.D.L.P. has never renounced its intention of utilising certain non-party organisations, such as the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, in periods of more or less intense revolutionary upheaval, to extend Social-Democratic influence among the working class and to strengthen the Social-Democratic labour movement (see the September resolutions of the St. Petersburg Committee and the Moscow Committee on the labour congress, in *Proletary*, Nos. 3 and 4th);

5. the incipient revival creates the opportunity to organise or utilise non-party representative working-class institutions, such as Soviets of Workers' Deputies, Soviets of Workers' Delegates, etc., for the purpose of developing the Social-Democratic movement; at the same time the Social-Democratic Party organisations must bear in mind that if Social-Democratic activities among the proletarian masses are properly, effectively and widely organised, such institutions may actually become superfluous;

This conference declares:

1. that a most determined ideological struggle must be waged against the anarcho-syndicalist movement among the proletariat and against Axelrod's and Larin's ideas in the Social-Democratic Party;

2. that a most determined struggle must be waged against all disruptive and demagogic attempts to weaken the R.S.D.L.P. from within or to utilise it for the purpose of

substituting non-party political, proletarian organisations for the Social-Democratic Party;

3. that Social-Democratic Party organisations may, in case of necessity, participate in inter-party Soviets of Workers' Delegates, Soviets of Workers' Deputies, and in congresses of representatives of these organisations, and may organise such institutions, provided this is done on strict Party lines for the purpose of developing and strengthening the Social-Democratic Labour Party;

4. that for the purpose of extending and strengthening the influence of the Social-Democratic party among the broad masses of the proletariat, it is essential, on the one hand, to increase efforts to organise trade unions and conduct Social-Democratic propaganda and agitation within them, and, on the other hand, to draw still larger sections of the working class into the activities of all types of Party organisations.

TACTICS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

INTERVIEW GRANTED TO A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT
[OF *L'HUMANITÉ* ON FEBRUARY 17 (MARCH 2), 1907]

The last Congress of Russian Social-Democracy, held in Stockholm in April 1906, decided that the Social-Democrats should not conclude any election agreements with bourgeois parties. This principle was immediately applied in the elections to the First Duma in Siberia and the Caucasus. Would it be equally valid for the Second Duma? The Bolsheviks said "Yes", the Mensheviks said "No". The Bolsheviks demanded an extraordinary congress to decide the question. At the beginning of November, only a conference was held, at which all Party organisations were represented. The Mensheviks, jointly with the Bund, supported a proposal on an agreement with the Cadets in the forthcoming elections. The Bolsheviks, jointly with the Letts and Poles, condemned such an agreement. The proposal of the former obtained 18 votes, that of the latter, 14 votes. The conference decided that local organisations must state their own views on the question. "Let it be in St. Petersburg as elsewhere", the Bolsheviks deliberately told the Mensheviks.

Two things must be understood: on the one hand, the Mensheviks, notwithstanding their name, have a majority in the Central Committee of the Party—in other words they are the masters of its general policy; on the other hand, the Bolsheviks have a majority in the St. Petersburg and Moscow Gubernia Committees. To have the two metropolitan cities against it, is a difficult and humiliating situa-

tion for the Central Committee. This explains the attempt on the part of the Central Committee to put through a Menshevik policy in St. Petersburg and Moscow at any cost. For the elections in St. Petersburg the Central Committee took the risk of infringing local autonomy by provoking a split as soon as an excuse was found.

The St. Petersburg organisation has not yet held the gubernia conference that was envisaged by the All-Russian Conference in November. For a long time the liberal newspapers have been conducting a lively discussion of election tactics. They were afraid that the socialists would act without them and muster the masses, without them and against them, around the banner of the revolution. They fulminated against the Bolsheviks, persistently qualifying them as "sectarians, dogmatists, Blanquists, anarchists, etc.", but they wanted to conduct the election campaign jointly with the other revolutionary parties, and put up a joint election list with them. They have the biggest St. Petersburg newspapers, so it was easy for them to make themselves heard. The Bolsheviks had only their illegal newspaper *Proletary* at their disposal, which is published abroad and appears only twice monthly.

In secret and through their underground connections, the Menshevik Central Committee informed the Cadets that the Social-Democrats' tactics depended on their committee alone, and not on the Bolshevik Gubernia Committee. This was revealed at an informatory conference held early in January and attended by representatives of the Cadets, the Popular Socialists, the Trudoviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Social-Democrats. All were in favour of a joint election list. All—except the delegate from the Gubernia Committee who announced, after the conference, that the committee would take a decision only some days later. Then the delegate from the Central Committee intervened. "It would be better," he stated, "if the agreement were not concluded by the organisation as a whole but by each election ward separately [there are 12 such wards in St. Petersburg]."

"But this is the first I hear of such a proposal!" the delegate from the Gubernia Committee replied. "Is this the plan of the Central Committee?"

"No, it is my own idea," answered the delegate from the Central Committee.

To one who understands, half a word is enough. The Cadets understood. *Rech* (official organ of the Cadet Party), *Tovarishch* (organ of the Left Cadets, something like the Millerand-Socialists), and *Strana* (organ of the Party of Democratic Reform⁴¹) all announced that the Mensheviks constitute the reasonable part, the model part, the decent part of Social-Democracy. The Bolsheviks represent barbarism. They prevent socialism from becoming civilised and parliamentary! But it has been announced in the presence of Milyukov, the leader of the Cadets, that the Bolsheviks would act separately.

The St. Petersburg Conference that was to decide the question of election tactics was held on January 6. It was attended by 39 Bolsheviks and 31 Mensheviks. The latter at first challenged the correctness of the credentials. Though they dared not claim a majority, this did, however, serve them as a pretext for walking out of the Conference. Their second pretext: they demanded, in accordance with the proposal of the Central Committee of January 4, that the organisation divide into two parts for a decision on the question of election tactics—that there should be separate conferences for St. Petersburg City and St. Petersburg Gubernia. To anybody who knows the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation, based partly on place of residence, partly on the national principle (the Lettish and the Estonian sections) or on the principle of employment (the military and the railwaymen's sections), this was not only a contravention of the organisation's autonomy, but even, in certain respects, contrary to common sense. The Conference, therefore, declared itself against this proposal, which did not in any way accord with its principles and, moreover, had been put to it as imperative.

The thirty-one delegates walked out of the Conference, and the Central Committee announced that the minority was relieved of the necessity of submitting to the decision of the majority. This was not merely a challenge, but the Central Committee's announcement of a split.

The thirty-one organised their own separate committee and participated in the negotiations that the Cadets were

conducting with the Left bloc of Trudoviks, Popular Socialists and Socialist-Revolutionaries. However, the appearance of a new actor on the stage upset the deal. On January 4, *Novoye Vremya* published an article by the Octobrist Stolypin, brother of the minister. "If the Cadets had the courage to make a complete break with the revolutionary groups and take a firm stand on constitutional ground, their party would be legalised," he wrote. A few days later (January 15), Milyukov called on Minister Stolypin, and two days after his visit all Cadet newspapers reported that the Cadets had broken off negotiations with the Left. But this game brought the Cadets no advantage; they had only seriously but unnecessarily compromised themselves. They were unable to accept Stolypin's conditions.

As for the Mensheviks, they compromised themselves at the same time, no less seriously and just as unnecessarily. At first, despite Milyukov's visit to Stolypin, they continued their talks with the Cadets and with the Left groups. It was only on January 18 that the Conference took place at which the split occurred and at which they were unable to come to an agreement on the distribution of seats for the deputies. Furthermore, in that same period, *Rech* wrote that in order to alienate the Bolsheviks the Cadets were giving the Mensheviks the seat that had been promised the worker curia, and the Mensheviks did nothing by way of protest against this extraordinary method of trafficking in workers' votes. Far from it! The Central Committee continued bargaining with the Cadets, which meant consenting to their terms. It was this fact that aroused the workers' indignation! It was this selfsame fact that made me write my pamphlet "The Hypocrisy of the Thirty-One Mensheviks",* for which the latter want to arraign me before a Party tribunal.

After the Conference of January 6, at which the split occurred, the Bolsheviks declared: "If the Lefts, including the Mensheviks, conclude an alliance with the Cadets, we shall wage the struggle alone. If the negotiations end in a breakdown, we, in our turn, will propose the terms of an

* See pp. 33-34 of this volume.—Ed.

agreement, and the acceptance of these terms will mean for them the acceptance of the principle of proletarian hegemony."

The negotiations between the Lefts and the Cadets ended in a breakdown (the Conference of January 18); this was our first victory. We proposed terms for a Left bloc that would not enter into a deal with the Cadet Party; these terms were accepted on January 25 by all except the Mensheviks. This was the second victory. Of the six places in St. Petersburg, we proposed two for the worker curia, two for the Social-Democrats, and two for the other parties. And it was obvious that the worker curia would elect two Social-Democrats. Fifteen days still remained to election day, but something happened then that the Cadets had not expected—in addition to the Black-Hundred list, the Octobrist list, and the Cadet list, there appeared the election list of a Left bloc including neither Cadets nor Mensheviks.

At their previous conferences with the Left parties, the Cadets had offered the Lefts two seats, while the Lefts had claimed three. When the Cadets saw that our Left bloc had been formed against them, they took fright and entered in their list only three candidates from their party. Of the other three places they offered one to Professor Kovalevsky (Party of Democratic Reform), the second to the priest Petrov (a very popular demagogue, a Christian Democrat) and the third to the workers. They made this last concession, incidentally, in order to prevent a storm of indignation among the people.

The Cadets won the elections, but it must be stressed that the Left bloc polled 25 per cent of the total number of votes in St. Petersburg and that they were victorious in the Vyborg District. In many districts the Cadets won by a very small majority. In five districts it would have been enough to gain a further 1,600 votes to ensure a victory for the Left bloc; in Kolomna District the Lefts were short of only 99 votes. The Mensheviks, therefore, prevented a victory of the Left parties in St. Petersburg; nevertheless, the revolutionary Left is, in general, stronger in the Second Duma than it was in the First.

The experiment we have conducted has been highly instructive. First, we see that the St. Petersburg workers

persist in remaining Bolsheviks, stoutly determined to defend the autonomy of their organisation against encroachment by the Central Committee. Then, we now know what we ought to think of the Black-Hundred danger, an argument that was dragged out into the open to justify an agreement with the Cadets during the first stage of the elections. This is nothing but an invention to deceive the socialist parties and protect the Cadets from the Left danger. For, indeed, "the real danger to the Cadets is from the Left", as *Rech* was once forced to admit. "Whoever votes for the Left makes it possible for the Rights to break through," the Cadet newspapers hammered away at us for weeks. This slogan provided them with a means of planting doubt among the wavering. By their bold campaign they brought about a situation in which the Left bloc obtained fewer votes (13 per cent) in Moscow than in St. Petersburg, because we had no newspaper of our own in Moscow. But they could not prevent the revelation of the incontestable truth—the Black-Hundred danger was a lie and a pretext. There were four election lists in Moscow just as there were in St. Petersburg; neither in St. Petersburg nor in Moscow did the alliance of the Black Hundreds and the Octobrists bring the Rights victory. We are in possession of figures that can be quoted in case of necessity.

The Mensheviks are thus at liberty to adhere to the Cadets and serve them. We shall not follow them. Neither will the people follow them. The Cadets' behaviour has been such that the masses are swinging more and more to the Left. If Milyukov imagines that by speaking of our "adventurous policy" and classifying our banner as a "red rag" he will deprive us of followers, we can only invite him to continue talking such nonsense, for it is to our advantage. The Cadet-like Mensheviks would be wise to give thought to the fact that at those St. Petersburg factories where the workers were formerly Bolsheviks, Bolsheviks were again elected, but that at those factories where the workers were formerly Mensheviks and where propaganda was conducted mainly by Mensheviks—the *Socialist-Revolutionaries were victorious!* The Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves must have been amazed at the number of votes they received. How grateful they should be for Menshevik

opportunism! As far as we are concerned, such results can only fortify our conviction that today, more than ever, our duty and the guarantee of our success lie in joint work, not with the liberal bourgeoisie, who want to put an end to the revolution, but with the democratic peasantry, against the baseness and treachery of the bourgeoisie, who are day by day becoming more and more counter-revolutionary. The best policy is, once again and always, the frankly revolutionary policy, the bitter, completely independent struggle under the proletarian banner which by degrees is gathering around our party the countless masses of democratic peasants together with worker-proletarians.

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THE OPENING OF THE SECOND STATE DUMA ⁶⁰

St. Petersburg. February 20, 1907.

The Second Duma meets today. The conditions it has been convened in, the conditions, internal and external, during the elections, and the conditions it will function in—all these are different from what they were for the First Duma. Obviously, it would be a mistake to expect a simple repetition of events. On the other hand, however, one essential feature is discernible in all the changes that have taken place in the past year of constant political ups and downs, namely that, on the whole, the movement has risen to a higher plane, that for all its zigzag path it is persistently pressing ahead.

In brief, this essential feature may be described as follows: a shift to the Right at the top, a shift to the Left at the bottom, and an accentuation of the political extremes—and not only political, but also and above all social and economic extremes. It is particularly characteristic of the events immediately preceding the opening of the Second Duma that the seemingly unruffled surface of political life has concealed a quiet, inconspicuous, but deep-going process in the growth of understanding among the masses, both in the working class and among the broadest sections of the peasantry.

Though there has been little change in the constitution bolstered by military courts in the past year, the political migration of the classes has been tremendous. Take the Black Hundreds. At first they consisted mainly of a gang of scoundrels in police service, with a small following recruited from the most ignorant and deluded sections of the common people, often deliberately befuddled with drink. Today the reactionary parties are headed by the Council of the United Nobility. The feudal-minded landlords have

closed their ranks and have become thoroughly "aware of themselves" in the course of the revolution. The reactionary parties are becoming the class organisation of those who will defend to the death the blessings most threatened by the present revolution: the huge landed estates—that feudal survival—the privileges of the highest estate, the opportunities they have to influence affairs of state through personal connections with the *camarilla*, etc.

Take the Cadets. Of the frankly and patently bourgeois parties this party was considered unquestionably the most "progressive". How far to the Right it has shifted! There is no longer any of last year's vacillation between reaction and the struggle of the people. This has yielded to frank hatred for this struggle, a cynically outspoken ambition to put a stop to the revolution, to settle down quietly, come to terms with reaction and begin to build the cosy little nest—cosy for the landlord of capitalist inclinations and for the manufacturer—of a monarchist constitution, a narrow, mercenary, class constitution, one of ruthless severity towards the masses of the people.

It is now no longer possible to repeat the error so many people used to slip into when they said that the Cadets stand to the Left of the Centre—that the line of demarcation between the parties of freedom and the parties of reaction lies to the Right of the Cadets. The Cadets are the Centre, and this Centre is ever more openly working for a deal with the Right. As a result of the political realignment of classes, the Cadets now find their support in the landlord whose estate is being run along capitalist lines, and in the broad section of the bourgeoisie. The democratic, petty-bourgeois sections of the population, however, are patently drawing away from the Cadets, following them only by force of habit, from tradition, and at times simply because they have been deceived.

In the countryside the main battle of the present revolution—the fight against feudal survivals and landed proprietorship—is even fiercer and more clear-cut. The Cadets' non-democratic nature reveals itself much more glaringly to the peasant than to the urban petty bourgeois. And the peasant has turned his back on the Cadet with even greater finality. It was the peasant electors, I would say,

more than any others, who ousted the Cadets from the gubernia electoral assemblies.

The antagonism between peasant and landlord—the most deep-rooted and most typical form of the antagonism between the people's freedom and feudal survivals in the bourgeois revolution—is not in the forefront in the towns. The urban proletariat has already come to realise another and much more profound conflict of interests, and this has given rise to a socialist movement. Taken as a whole, the worker curias all over Russia, have returned almost exclusively Social-Democratic electors, with only a scattering of Socialist-Revolutionaries and an altogether negligible number of electors from other parties. But even among the urban petty-bourgeois democrats the shift of the lower stratum to the Left, away from the Cadets, is unmistakable. According to figures published in *Rech* by a Cadet statistician, Mr. Smirnov, in 22 cities, with 153,000 voters voting on four election lists, the monarchists received 17,000 votes, the Octobrists 34,000, the *Left bloc* 41,000, and the Cadets 74,000. So enormous was the number of votes wrested from the Cadets in the very first election contest—despite the tremendous power of the Cadet daily press, the legal status of the Cadet organisation, the Cadet falsehood about the danger of a Black-Hundred victory and despite the illegal status of the Lefts—that there can be no doubt about the turn taken by the shop-assistants, petty clerks, petty civil servants and poorer householders. The Cadets will not be able to stand up to another such battle. Urban democracy has abandoned them for the Trudoviks and the Social-Democrats.

The whole of the proletariat has mobilised, and the great mass of the democratic petty bourgeoisie, especially the peasantry, are mobilising against the Black-Hundred Council of the United Nobility and against the liberal bourgeoisie, who have funkcd completely and turned tail on the revolution.

The political realignment of classes is so profound, so far-reaching, and so mighty that no military courts, no Senate interpretations, no tricks of the reactionaries, no spate of Cadet falsehood monopolising the columns of the entire daily press—in fact, nothing at all has been able

to prevent this realignment from being reflected in the Duma. The Second Duma demonstrates the intensification of the profound, conscious, and increasingly organised mass struggle between the various classes.

The task of the moment is to understand this basic fact, and to be able to connect the various sections of the Duma with this mighty support from below. It is not to the top, not to the government, that we must look, but to the depths, to the people. It is not to the petty technical details of Duma procedure that we must devote our attention; it is not vulgar considerations of how best to lie low, of how to keep quiet in order to prevent the Duma from being dissolved, in order not to anger Stolypin and Co.—it is not these vulgar Cadet considerations that must interest the democrat. All his attention, all the strength of his spirit, must be directed towards strengthening the transmission belt which connects the big wheel that has begun to revolve energetically down below with the little wheel up above.

Now, more than ever before, it is the duty of the Social-Democratic Party, as the party of the most advanced class, to rise boldly to full stature, to speak out independently, resolutely and courageously. If it is to further the socialist and purely class aims of the proletariat, this Party must show it is the vanguard of the entire democratic movement. True, we must dissociate ourselves from all petty-bourgeois groups and strata—but not for the purpose of secluding ourselves in supposedly splendid isolation (which would really mean assisting the liberal bourgeois, trailing along in their wake), but for the purpose of ridding ourselves of all vacillation, of all half-heartedness, for the purpose of becoming the *leader* of the democratic peasantry.

The primary task of the Social-Democrats entering the Second Duma is to wrest away from the liberals those democratic elements that are still under their sway; to become the leader of those democrats; to teach them to seek support in the people and join ranks with the masses down below; to unfurl *our own* banner before the whole of the working class and before the entire impoverished and famine-stricken peasant masses.

THE SECOND DUMA AND THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT⁶¹

Workers, comrades!

The day set for the opening of the Second State Duma has arrived. The class-conscious proletariat never believed that freedom for the people and land for the peasants could be attained by sending petitioners to the tsar, ruler of the gang of Black-Hundred cutthroats. The class-conscious proletariat boycotted the Duma to warn the backward peasant masses, who believed in the Duma. And the story of the First Duma—the government's mockery of its proposals and its eventual dissolution—has shown that the class-conscious proletariat was right, has shown that liberty cannot be attained by peaceful means, under laws promulgated by the tsar and enforced by the Black Hundreds.

The Social-Democrats advised the people to send fighters to the Second Duma, not petitioners. The people's faith in peaceful methods has been shattered. That is evident from the fact that the Cadét Party, the party of liberals, which advocated peaceful methods, suffered a crushing defeat in the elections. This party of liberal landlords and bourgeois lawyers, which is desirous of reconciling the Black-Hundred autocracy with popular freedom, is entering the Second Duma with depleted forces. The Black Hundreds have gained in strength, and now have several dozen deputies in the Duma. Much greater, however, is the gain of the Lefts, i.e., of those who stand more or less resolutely and consistently for revolutionary struggle as opposed to peaceful methods.

РАБОЧИЙ

Газета Охтенск. и Самсон. подрайонов Выборгского района.

№ 2.

пятница, 23 Февраля 1907г.

Цена 1 к.

Товарищи - рабочие!

День созыва второй Госуд. Думы настал. Сознательный пролетариат никогда не вярнул, а то чтобы можно было добиться воли народу, земли крестьянству путем послышки ходатаев к царю управляющему шайкой черносотенных насильников. Сознательный пролетариат бойкотировал Думу, чтобы предупредить темные крестьянские массы, которая вярнула в Думу и опитъ съ первой Думой, издѣлка правительства над ея предложениями ея разгонъ показали что сознательный пролетариат былъ правъ — показали что мирный путь, на почвѣ законовъ царств изданныхъ и черносотенцами оберегаемыхъ, нельзя добиться свободы.

Во вторую Думу социалдемократія совѣтовала народу послать не ходатаевъ а борцовъ. Вѣра въ мирный путь подорвана у народа. Это видно изъ того что партия либераловъ проповѣдующая мирный путь, жалеть, потерпѣла крушение на выборахъ. Эта партия либеральныхъ помѣщиковъ и буржуазныхъ адвокатовъ, пытающаяся примирить черносотенное самодержавіе съ народной свободой, входитъ во вторую Думу ослабленной. Усилились черносотенцы, которые провели нѣсколько десятковъ депутатовъ. Но еще гораздо болѣе усилились лѣвые, т. е. тѣ, кто болѣе или менѣе рѣшительно и послѣдовательно стоятъ не за мирный путь, а за революціонную борьбу.

Вторая Дума — лѣвѣе первой Думы. Во второй Думѣ гораздо болѣе социалдемократовъ и болѣе революціонныхъ демократовъ (с-р и часть трудовиковъ). Первая Дума была Думой надеждъ на мирный путь. Вторая Дума — Дума острой борьбы между черносотеннымъ царскимъ правительствомъ и представительными массами, массы пролетаріата, сознательно добивающихся свободы ради борьбы за социализмъ, — массы крестьянства, стихійно поднимающагося противъ крѣпостниковъ помѣщиковъ.

Выборы новой Думы показали, что не смотря на всѣ пресѣдованія и запреты рѣстеть и крѣпнѣть революціонное сознание въ широкихъ народныхъ массахъ. Близится новая революціонная волна новыхъ революціонныхъ силъ народа за свободу.

Этотъ бой будетъ данъ не въ Думѣ. Этотъ бой рѣшить возстаніе пролетаріата, крестьянства и сознательной части войска. Этотъ бой надвигается на насъ въ томъ ходомъ событий, въ томъ ходомъ столкновений лѣвой части Думы съ правительствомъ и кадетами.

Будьте же готовы, рабочие, къ серьезнымъ событіямъ. Не тратьте своихъ силъ понапрасну. Намъ не мало ускорить развитіи пусть царь и его черносотенные слуги нападаютъ первые. Имъ придется нападать на народъ разогнать Думу, отменить избирательный законъ, начинать рядъ насилій чтобы развязаться съ новой Думой.

Пусть насильники начинаютъ. Пролетариатъ долженъ стойко, твердо, выдержанно готовить болѣе и болѣе широкія массы народа къ великому, отчаянному бою за свободу. Товарищи-рабочие! Мы пережили первые великія схватки революціи 9-го января 1905г., октябрьскую стачку, декабрьское возстаніе. Мы будемъ вновь собирать новыя силы для новаго еще болѣе грознаго, рѣшительнаго выступленія когда разгорится костеръ лѣвой Думы во всероссийскій пожаръ. Нужно всѣ силы собрать и сосредоточить для грядущаго рѣшительнаго сраженія.

Помните товарищи, что вторая Дума неизбежно ведетъ къ борьбѣ къ возстанію. Не растрачивайте своихъ силъ на пустяки.

Да здравствуетъ всенародное возстаніе за свободу!

Да здравствуетъ революція!

Да здравствуетъ международная революціонная социалдемократія!

Н Ленинъ.

ПИСЬМА РАБОЧИХЪ

Заводъ Крейтена.

(Окончаніе)

Къ сожалѣнію, филитрова въ изученіи истерской кожану указалъ. Литература тутъ игнорируется, особенно важная, и пропала нѣтъ изученъ по ханчѣ «старый грѣхъ». Организовались въ этой истерской только одинъ человекъ. Мастеръ оиофавице извѣстнаго провокатора Ушамова, вопіетъ оправдываетъ свою фальшивую собственную поведленіе.

Передъ выборами по городской куріи черносотенные и кадетскія прокламации и бюллетени въ большомъ количествѣ получаютъ нѣкоторыми квартирниками, которые, принося ихъ на заводы, казначъ подъ молоткомъ и латѣй вытѣсняютъ на показъ съ подписью. «Кадетская бюллетень посягъ достойной казни».

The Second Duma is more Left than was the First. Its deputies include many more Social-Democrats, and a greater number of revolutionary democrats (the Socialist-Revolutionaries and a section of the Trudoviks). The First Duma was a Duma of hopes for peaceful development. The Second Duma will be the scene of a sharp struggle between the Black-Hundred tsarist government and the representatives of the masses: the masses of proletarians, who are consciously striving for liberty in order to facilitate the fight for socialism, and the masses of the peasants, who are rising spontaneously against the feudal-minded landlords.

The elections to the new Duma have shown that despite all persecution and bans, revolutionary consciousness is spreading and gaining force among the masses of the people. A new revolutionary wave is approaching, a new revolutionary battle of the people for freedom.

This battle will not be fought in the Duma. It will be decided by an uprising of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the class-conscious sections of the armed forces. It is a battle that is being brought closer to us by the entire course of events, by the entire course of the clashes between the Left section of the Duma, and the government and the Cadets.

Be prepared, then, workers, for events of great moment. Do not waste your strength to no purpose. There is no need for us to hasten the denouement: let the tsar and his Black-Hundred lackeys begin the attack. If they want to get rid of the new Duma, they will have to attack the people, dissolve the Duma, revoke the election law, and launch a new series of repressions.

Let the oppressors begin. The proletariat must keep firmly, steadily, consistently to its task of preparing ever broader masses of the people for the great and desperate fight for freedom. Comrade workers! We have come through the first great encounters in the revolution: January 9, 1905, the October strike, and the December uprising. We shall gather our forces anew for still another advance, even more formidable and resolute than the last, when the flame of the Left Duma shall flare up into a nation-wide conflagration. We must gather and concentrate all our forces for the decisive battle that is impending.

Remember, comrades, that the Second Duma must inevitably lead to battle, to insurrection. Do not waste your strength on trifles.

Long live the rising of all the people for freedom!

Long live the revolution!

Long live international revolutionary Social-Democracy!

Written on February 20 (March 5),
1907

Published according
to the newspaper text

Published on February 23, 1907
in *Rabochy*, No. 2
Signed: *N. Lenin*

THE FIRST IMPORTANT STEP

St. Petersburg, February 21, 1907.

Yesterday we expressed the hope that the Mensheviks, who have fine words to say in *Russkaya Zhizn*⁸² on the independence of Social-Democracy, would pursue a correct policy.

On the evening of the day before yesterday a Cadet meeting was held that shattered all those hopes....

This is what happened.

After lunch on February 19, the Social-Democratic Duma group held a meeting. It was proposed that they should attend a private conference arranged by the Cadets. Some of the deputies objected strenuously. They said that it was a disgrace for working-class deputies to go to liberal bourgeois who were bargaining with Stolypin, and that the Social-Democrats should pursue a proletarian and not a Cadet policy, should not lead the peasants to the liberal landowner, and should not assist the formation of a *Cadet* "Left" bloc. The Mensheviks got their own decision adopted.

On the evening of February 19, a meeting of some 300 members of the Duma "opposition" was held at Dolgorukov's apartment. It was attended by Cadets, Narodowci (Polish Black-Hundred bourgeois nationalists), all the Lefts—Trudoviks, S.R.'s and ... Social-Democrats. Some of the Social-Democrat deputies did not go to the Cadets.

What happened at the meeting at the Cadet's apartment?

At this meeting all the Lefts, all democrats, petty bourgeois (Narodniks, Trudoviks, S.R.'s) and all Cadet-like Social-Democrats *signed the Cadet proposals*. According to *Tovarishch*, the Mensheviks made the formal proviso that their decision was not final, they would still have to

consult the group. According to *Rech* (the Cadet central newspaper) however, *nobody* made any proviso at all.

And so, there were Social-Democrats who, like faithful servants of the liberals, accepted their entire plan, gave the majority of seats in the presidium (two out of three) to the Cadets, and agreed to the Trudoviks taking the third place, *thus tying up the Trudoviks with the Cadets*, and agreed to refrain from explaining to the people what political significance the selection of the presidium has, or why it is *obligatory* for every conscientious citizen to decide that question from the standpoint of party alignment, and not by private arrangement behind the scenes.

Can such conduct be justified by the fear that a Black-Hundred presidium would be elected in the Duma? No. In Comrade P. Orlovsky's article of yesterday, we demonstrated that the Black Hundreds *could not win, whatever the division of votes between the Cadets and the Lefts*.

The Menshevik policy is *actually* determined, not by the danger of a Black-Hundred victory, but by the desire to render service to the liberals.

What must the policy of the Social-Democrats be?

Either abstain, and, as socialists, stand aside from the liberals, who betray liberty and exploit the people, or give the lead to the democratic petty bourgeoisie that is capable of struggle, both against the Black Hundreds and against the liberals.

The former policy is obligatory for socialists when there is no longer any substantial difference between *any* of the bourgeois parties from the standpoint of the struggle for democracy. That is what happens in Europe. There is no revolution. All the bourgeois parties have lost the ability to struggle for democracy, and are struggling only for the petty, selfish interests of big or small *proprietors*. Under such circumstances, Social-Democracy *alone* defends the interests of democracy, and in so doing persistently unfolds its own socialist views to the masses.

The latter policy is obligatory when the conditions of a bourgeois-democratic revolution obtain, when, in addition to the working class, there are certain bourgeois and petty-bourgeois strata capable of struggle for the democracy that is essential to the proletariat,

In present-day Russia the second policy is obligatory. Without ever forgetting their socialist agitation and propaganda, and the organisation of the proletarians into a class, Social-Democrats must, *jointly* with the democratic petty bourgeoisie, *crush* both the Black Hundreds and the *liberals*, as the situation may demand.

That is because the liberals (Cadets, Polish Narodowci (?), the Party of Democratic Reform, etc., etc.) have already turned emphatically away from the revolution and have entered into a deal with the autocracy against the people's freedom they talk so falsely about. It has now even transpired that last year the Cadets *helped the government* obtain 2,000 million from France to spend on summary military courts and shootings; Clemenceau said outright to the Cadets that there would be no loan if the Cadet Party came out officially against it. The Cadets refused to oppose the loan for fear of losing their position as *the government party* of the morrow! Russia was shot down, not only by Trepov's machine-guns, but by the Franco-Cadet millions.

It is impermissible for revolutionary Social-Democrats to support the hegemony of the Cadets. It is, however, not enough for them to have spoken against going to the Cadet meeting on February 19. They must demand, categorically and unconditionally, that the group break with the Cadet-like policy and come out forthrightly and openly in the Duma with an independent policy of the proletariat.

On the question of the presidium, the Social-Democrats should have said: we do not want our own presidium. We support the *whole* list of Lefts or Trudoviks *against the Cadets*, that is, we support all three candidates for the presidium, against the Cadet candidates, and will abstain if the Trudoviks follow in the wake of the Cadets, despite our warnings. In any case it would be essential to put up a candidate from the Lefts even though there would be no chance of his being elected; at the first voting, the number of votes given for him would show what forces the Social-Democrats could rely on in the event of a struggle against the Cadets. And if it should turn out that he obtained more votes than the Cadet, even if it were less than the absolute majority required for election, the voting would show

the people clearly that this is not a Cadet Duma, and that the Cadet *is not everything* in the Duma.

The election of the presidium is not a mere bagatelle. It is the first step, after which others will follow. The die is cast.

There must be either a Cadet-like policy which would mean turning the Social-Democrats into an appendage to the liberals;

or there must be the policy of revolutionary Social-Democracy, in which case we should not begin by kowtowing to the Cadets, but by openly unfurling *our own* banner. Then we would not go to the Cadets. Then we would call on the petty bourgeoisie, and especially on the peasant democracy, to do battle against both the Black Hundreds and the liberals.

Novy Luch, No. 2,
February 21, 1907

Published according
to the text in *Novy Luch*

PETTY-BOURGEOIS TACTICS

The newspaper *Tovarishch* of February 21 carries excerpts from the decisions adopted at the recent extraordinary congress of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. These decisions are devoted to the tactics to be adopted in the Duma.

A lot might and should be said about these decisions. We cannot deal here with the fundamental error of these and all other decisions of the Socialist-Revolutionaries—their failure to analyse the different parties from the class point of view. No tactics worthy of the name can be elaborated without such an analysis. We shall frequently have occasion to return to this subject when we compare the decisions of the Socialist-Revolutionaries with the platform of the revolutionary Social-Democrats (the resolutions adopted at a conference of representatives from several Bolshevik organisations, which met from February 15 to February 18 *; they are to be published within the next few days.**

Nor shall we go into the somewhat excessive emphasis which the Socialist-Revolutionaries place on the elementary truth that the revolutionaries have no desire at all to “create extraneous [?], unessential conflicts”, to “hasten the dissolution of the Duma”, and the like. That is a mere detail.

* Today's *Sovremennaya Rech*** (February 22), on page 3, correctly reports the composition of this conference, and prints an excerpt of one of the six resolutions it adopted. Readers should bear in mind that there are several inaccuracies even in this excerpt.

** See pp. 133-44 of this volume.—Ed.

From the point of view of the immediate tasks of the day, the following decision is the kernel of the Socialist-Revolutionary tactics:

"4. The Congress is of the opinion that strict party alignments within the Duma, with each group acting on its own in isolated fashion, and bitter strife among the groups, might completely paralyse the activity of the opposition majority, and thus discredit, in the minds of the working classes, the very idea of popular representation. The Congress therefore considers it essential that the party deputies exert every effort to organise the most constant and co-ordinated action on the part of all the socialist and extreme Left party groups; particularly in questions of the fight against the Rights in the Duma and against the government, for liberties and political rights for the people, it is essential to strive in each individual case for the most co-ordinated actions on the part of the revolutionary and socialist section of the Duma in conjunction with the opposition. Moreover, all these co-ordinated actions, both long-term and partial, must be conducted along lines which do not conflict in any way with the fundamental principles of the party programme and tactics."

What a splendid exposition of the fundamental principles of petty-bourgeois tactics! What a splendid demonstration of their flimsiness!

"Long-term [!] and partial co-ordinated actions", "the most constant [!] and co-ordinated".... How empty these words are in the absence of any attempt to explain just what *community of interests* of just what *classes* lie at the root of all this "co-ordination"! We revolutionary Social-Democrats favour joint actions by the party of the proletariat and the parties of the democratic petty bourgeoisie against the Black Hundreds and against the Cadets, as the party of treacherous liberalism. The Socialist-Revolutionaries are so far from understanding this class foundation of the Russian revolution that, on the one hand, they talk about co-ordination of the socialist and extreme Left groups *in general*, i.e., about concealing the contradictions between the proletariat and the small producer; and, on the other hand, they talk about co-ordinated action by the revolutionary and socialist section of the Duma with the *opposition*, against the Black Hundreds.

No, gentlemen, we shall not even discuss permanent agreements, or co-ordinated action in general. You must first agree with us on the policy of fighting both the Black

Hundreds and the Cadets—agree *in deed*. That is our ultimatum. That is our line of policy in the democratic revolution. We shall declare *in regard to any question* arising in the present revolution, as we declared during the St. Petersburg elections—the proletariat goes unhesitatingly into battle both against the Black Hundreds and against the Cadets. As long as the petty bourgeois vacillate, as long as they follow the Cadets—unrelenting war against the petty bourgeois. You have abandoned your Cadets? You agree to oppose the Cadets? If that is actually so, if that is not a mere paper declaration but something you prove in action, then, and only then, will the Social-Democrats fight together with you in *democratic* action.

But the most remarkable thing, I should say, is the beginning of the resolution just quoted. Just think of it: “strict party alignments within the Duma”, “bitter strife among the groups”* may “discredit, in the minds of the working classes, the very idea of popular representation”. Veritable Socialist-Revolutionary “Plekhanovs”, in the Vasilyev sense of the word!**

No, gentlemen. The principle of class struggle is the very foundation of all Social-Democratic teachings and of all Social-Democratic policy. The proletarians, the peasants, and the townspeople are not such babes in arms that the idea of representation can be dimmed in their minds by bitter disputes, or by the acute struggle between the classes. Our job is not to be sugary to them, but, on the contrary, *to teach* them, *from the Duma platform*, to distinguish clearly between the parties and to understand their *class* roots, which the sly bourgeoisie keep buried deep underground.

* *Rech* of February 22 carried a special article, immediately following its editorial, on the resolutions of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Citing *precisely this* passage on the harmfulness of “strict party alignments”, the organ of the liberal bourgeoisie declares: “Thus we have an *absolutely correct* definition of the *point of departure of the new tactics*.” Precisely! The tactics of the Socialist-Revolutionaries are *correct* from the point of view of the interests of the liberal bourgeoisie in general, and of its deal with the reactionaries in particular!

** See present edition, Vol. 11, p. 424.—*Ed.*

That is just what is so *criminal* about the Menshevik policy in the Duma—they will not, or cannot, tell the people from the Duma platform the whole truth about the class nature of the various parties, about the Milyukovs' secret haggling with the Stolypins, about the fundamental difference between the democratic aims of the peasant and those of the liberal, between the socialist aims of the peasant and those of the proletarian.

But the world holds other things besides this policy of the Mensheviks, inaugurated by their silent voting at the dictates of the Cadets.

This complete failure to understand the class roots of the "oppositional" liberalism that is secretly trading away freedom and democracy to the Stolypin gang, underlies the opportunist tactics pursued by the petty bourgeois (the Trudoviks, the Popular Socialists, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries) and the petty-bourgeois wing of the workers' party—the Mensheviks.

The fight against the Black Hundreds is just a blind, a specious pretext. *In actual fact* these petty-bourgeois tactics are applied on occasions when there is *no possibility whatsoever* of a Black-Hundred victory. Such was the case, for example, in the St. Petersburg elections and in the election of the chairman of the Duma. The real essence of petty-bourgeois tactics is this: both the Trudoviks (the Socialist-Revolutionaries are fictitiously independent; in actual fact they are bound up with the Trudoviks, are simply the Left wing of that group. This was proved by the St. Petersburg elections; it is being proved once more by the present party alignments inside the Second Duma)—both the Trudoviks and the Mensheviks give support to the leadership of the Cadets. Not only in Russia, but all over Europe as well, the liberals have long kept the democratic petty bourgeoisie in tow, for it is too disunited, too undeveloped, too irresolute to act independently—and too much of the proprietor in inclination to follow the proletariat. That is the Achilles heel of petty-bourgeois policy—its inability and incapacity to cast off the ideological and political hegemony of the liberal bourgeois. It is no mere chance that the petty bourgeois tag along behind the Cadets; it is a result of the basic economic features in any

capitalist society. The Social-Democrats' fundamental task—one that is absolutely alien to the Menshevik mind—lies, therefore, in an unflagging effort to break down the hegemony of the liberals over the democrats, an unflagging effort to liberate the petty-bourgeois masses from Cadet tutelage and bring them under the influence and leadership of Social-Democracy.

The Trudovik proposes "constant and co-ordinated actions". No, thank you! We refuse to have dealings with people who yearn for the Cadets as the drunkard yearns for his glass, with people who for months begged for admittance into a bloc with the Cadets in the St. Petersburg elections, flocked like sheep to the Cadet meeting on February 19, and gave their votes to a Cadet, to a trader in democracy?* No, thank you!

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1907

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to the newspaper text

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on February 23, 1907

* See pp. 161-64 of this volume. — *Ed.*

WHAT THE SPLITTERS HAVE TO SAY ABOUT THE COMING SPLIT

Russkaya Zhizn has raised a ridiculous outcry over the attitude of *Novy Luch* towards the Social-Democratic Duma group. (The article "Even Here!" in No. 45.)

It is ridiculous because *Russkaya Zhizn* chose to avoid the issue instead of attempting to give at least some sort of pertinent answer to our criticism of the group's conduct.

We declared that our group should not under any circumstances have voted for the Cadet candidate for the chairmanship.

We declared that, in its official capacity, our Duma group should not under any circumstances have attended private meetings called by the Cadets and the Polish Narodowci.

We declared, finally, that the Duma group's conduct may lead to a split, for it follows a line contrary to the spirit and the letter of the decisions of the Party's Stockholm Congress.

Lastly, we called upon the Bolshevik section of our Duma group to wage a most ruthless struggle against the opportunism of the majority of the group, and to hold steadfastly to the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy in the group.

We have written a great deal on this subject; we have published several articles on the conduct of the Duma group in connection with the presidium, examining the question from every angle.

Russkaya Zhizn raises no objection whatever to the actual issue involved; it does not make a single serious

attempt to defend the tactical line of the Mensheviks, who are actually in control of the Duma group.

We were entitled to expect, and did expect, some attempt on the part of *Russkaya Zhizn* to show that its tactical line is in full harmony with the decisions of the Stockholm Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., that this line is one that should bring about the hegemony of our Duma group over the entire Left wing in the Duma.

But nothing of the sort has occurred. Instead of this we get a stream of sorry talk, of ridiculous complaints that *Novy Luch* is badgering the Social-Democratic Duma group, that *Novy Luch* is spurring the Bolsheviks in the Duma group towards an immediate split.

Instead of an answer on the point at issue, we get the hypocritical exhortation: "*Novy Luch* should speak more clearly. It should dot all its i's. And it should recall the counsel of the gospel: 'That thou doest, do quickly.'"

Comrades! Your brashness is truly superb! Your outcries about a split engineered by the Bolsheviks are the very acme of truth and sincerity.

The only organisation of our Party in which there is a split at present—and a very bad split—is the St. Petersburg organisation. Who split this organisation? The Mensheviks split it, did so against the will of the organised workers and to the gratification of the Cadets, motivating their action by a Black-Hundred danger which proved non-existent in St. Petersburg. And despite this fact, the Mensheviks stubbornly refuse, to this very day, to restore the unity of the St. Petersburg organisation—stubbornly persist in their efforts to deepen and widen the split.

The Bolsheviks fought with might and main against election agreements with the Cadets being regarded as permissible. But agreements were recognised as permissible at the November Party Conference. At this conference the Bolsheviks bound themselves to abide by the decisions of the local organisations; and in every case where the local organisations deemed it necessary to enter into election agreements with the Cadets, the Bolsheviks kept their promise, as a "sacred and inviolable" duty to the Party. The Mensheviks undertook the same obligation; but when they found that the organised workers of St. Petersburg would

not agree to follow them in the Cadet leading strings, they split the organisation.

And now they wail about a split! As to the challenge presented to us by *Russkaya Zhizn*, we can find no difficulty at all in answering it. We have always dotted our i's, and anyone who has eyes to see with can see the dots.

The unity of the Party is most dear to us. But the purity of the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy is dearer still. We submit, as we have always done, to the will of the majority at the Party's Stockholm Congress. We consider it imperative to carry out all its decisions. But we demand that these decisions be carried out by the central, leading organs of the Party. And the opportunist vacillations of the Mensheviks, all their attempts to propitiate the Cadets by abandoning the line laid down by the Congress, have met, and will always meet, with our merciless criticism and unyielding resistance. That is our right and our duty. We shall never give up that right, never fail in that duty. And if a split does take place, it will only show that the Mensheviks themselves have trampled underfoot the decisions they themselves passed at the Stockholm Congress. There cannot and will not be a split of any other kind. And such a split can signify only one thing: the final transformation of the Mensheviks into vassals of the Cadets.

"The scarlet banner of the proletariat has faltered in the hands of the Social-Democratic Duma group," we wrote two days ago.

The Cadets demand that this banner be dipped to them. The day when the Mensheviks agree to this incredible infamy will be the day of the split; for on that day the Mensheviks will cease to be a part of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

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on February 24, 1907

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to the newspaper text

ON THE TACTICS OF OPPORTUNISM

Plekhanov has broken the silence that was his only wise tactics after his renowned proposal of a common slogan—a Duma with full powers—for the Social-Democrats and the Cadets. Plekhanov has come out in *Russkaya Zhizn* with a new attempt to impel our Party towards the Cadets, an attempt to impose on the Party the slogan of support for a “responsible ministry”—a slogan already rejected by the Party in the period of the First Duma.

Let us examine Plekhanov's arguments.

First of all we must note that, in the zeal of his campaign against the Bolsheviks, Plekhanov resorts to an *absolute untruth* as to their views. Namely, he very definitely ascribes to us the desire to “smash through”, the desire and aspiration to do battle “right away”.

For our readers to see how wrong Plekhanov is, we shall cite an official Bolshevik publication dated *February 11*:

“... A struggle ... is undoubtedly inevitable. But it is precisely because of its inevitability that we must not force the pace, spur or goad it on. Leave that to the Krushevans and Stolypins. Our task is *to reveal* the truth to the proletariat and the peasantry clearly, directly and with unsparing candour, to open their eyes to the significance of the coming storm, to help them to meet the enemy in organised fashion with ... calmness.... ‘Shoot first, Messrs. Bourgeois!’ said Engels to the German capitalists in 1894. And we say: ‘Shoot first, Krushevans!’... Therefore—no premature *calls*.”*

* See p. 117 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The ease with which our esteemed Plekhanov performs the duties of "critic" is really wonderful. *No premature calls*, the Bolshevik organisations declare a week and a half before the opening of the Duma. The Bolsheviks want to do battle "*right away*", Plekhanov declares in an article which appeared on February 23; they want to "smash through".

Of course, that is the simplest, the cheapest, the easiest method of crushing the Bolsheviks: first impute *an absurd idea* to them, and then raise a fuss and fulminate ("excessive zeal", "stupidity", "worse than treachery", and so on, and so forth). But Plekhanov should not forget that when he slanders the Bolsheviks he is not slandering the dead—that the Bolsheviks can make it clear to all the world, by *simply referring* to an official document, how false Plekhanov's statements are. That will put Plekhanov out of countenance. And then Plekhanov will begin to understand that he cannot get away scot-free with statements about the Bolsheviks such as *only Novoye Vremya* has hitherto been in the habit of making about revolutionaries.

Let us proceed to the substance of the question Plekhanov raises, the question of whether the workers' party should support the slogan of "a responsible ministry". Plekhanov defends this slogan as follows:

"One of the two: either the swiftly growing forces of revolution *already* surpass the forces of the government, in which case the demand for a responsible ministry can and should serve as the signal for the decisive conflict against reaction.

"Or the forces of revolution *do not yet* surpass the government's forces of resistance, so that the decisive conflict is *not yet* in order; but the demand should be supported in that case, too, for it is a splendid means of education, of developing the political understanding of the people, and thus preparing them for a victorious fight, in the future.

"Thus, in either case the Social-Democratic deputies *must not fail to take up this demand*, in the interests of the people and in the interests of the revolution."

A very edifying argument. Let us start with the first part. Thus, we assume, with Plekhanov, that the forces of revolution already surpass those of the government. If that were so, the demand for a responsible ministry would be, first, superfluous, secondly, harmful and, thirdly, the liberals would not support it.

1. It would be superfluous because in any case such a "signal for the decisive conflict" is a *roundabout* signal, not a direct one. This "signal" does not express the definite idea of a really *decisive* battle against the reactionary forces; on the contrary, it expresses the idea of a concession such as the reactionaries might themselves voluntarily concede. We do not deny that, generally speaking, it may be right under certain special conditions to issue signals, not for a decisive battle, but for a minor preliminary skirmish—even a demonstration—which has all the appearances of a battle. But that is another question. In the conditions which Plekhanov has *assumed* (that the forces of *revolution* already surpass, etc.), a roundabout signal would obviously be superfluous.

2. "The forces of revolution already surpass the forces of reaction".... What does that imply? Does it include *awareness* on the part of the forces of revolution? Plekhanov will probably agree that it does. A people unaware of their revolutionary tasks cannot be strong enough to triumph over reaction in the decisive conflict. Further: does the demand we are examining, *correctly* express the aims of the revolution in the fight against the reactionaries? No, it does not; for in the first place, a responsible ministry does not by any means signify the transfer of power into the hands of the people, or even the transfer of power into the hands of the liberals, but is, in essence, a deal, or an attempt at a deal, between the reactionaries and the liberals; and in the second place, in view of the objective conditions, even the *actual* transfer of *power* to the liberals *cannot* bring about the realisation of the fundamental demands of the revolution. This idea is expressed clearly in the passage Plekhanov quotes from the article in *Symposium No. 1*,⁶⁴ but he has not even attempted to touch upon the actual substance of the idea.

The question now arises: how would the *decisive* (Plekhanov's condition) conflict with reaction be affected by a slogan in which the demands of the revolution (the *forces* of which *already* surpass—Plekhanov's condition!—the forces of reaction) are *incorrectly* expressed? Obviously, its effect would undoubtedly be *harmful*. This slogan *dulls* the consciousness of the masses that are advancing to the

decisive conflict. If we launched this slogan, we would actually be calling for a *decisive* battle, but pointing to a battle *objective* that *can decide nothing*—you shout about shooting a cow, but aim at a crow.

It can *never* be exactly determined *before* the battle whose forces “already surpass” those opposed to them. Only a pedant could dream of such a thing. The concept of “forces *surpassing* the forces of the enemy” implies that the fighters are *fully conscious* of their tasks. Plekhanov is *causing direct harm* to the revolution when he speaks of the “decisiveness” of the conflict and at the same time *dulls* this consciousness. That is really “worse than treachery”, my dear critic! With “forces” sufficient for a victory over reaction, the “leader” calls on his troops to fight for a *deal* with the reactionaries.... Plekhanov jokingly compares himself to the Roman general who executed his son for prematurely starting the battle. A pretty jest. Now, if I were the “son”, at a time when the *decisive* conflict was at hand, when “the forces of revolution *already surpassed* those of the government”, I would *shoot* (or, in the Roman days, stab) the “*daddy*” who advanced the slogan of a deal with the reactionaries—would do so without the slightest compunction, calmly leaving it to future Mommsens to investigate whether my action was the killing of a traitor, the execution of a traitor, or whether it was an act of criminal insubordination.

3. In arguing against the slogan of “a responsible ministry” in the days of the First Duma, we adduced only the two arguments cited above. We must now add a third: *the liberals themselves* would withdraw the demand for a responsible ministry if this demand *could possibly* become, *directly or in roundabout fashion*, a signal for the decisive battle between “revolution” and reaction.

Why do we now have to add this argument? For the reason that the liberals (including the Cadets) have shifted far to the Right since the First Duma, and have come out *decisively* against the revolution. For the reason that Golovin, who is supported by bad Social-Democrats for his liberalism, came out in his very first speech not as a liberal, not as a Cadet, but as an *Octobrist*.

If Plekhanov has so much fallen behind affairs in Russia as to be ignorant of this, his article is, of course, deserving of clemency. But even aside from such mistakes, the whole gist of his arguments is fundamentally wrong.

Let us proceed to the second case. The forces of revolution *do not yet* surpass the forces of reaction, and the decisive conflict is *not yet* in order. In that case, says Plekhanov, the importance of this slogan is in its influence on the development of the political consciousness of the people. That is true. But in that case—and here Plekhanov is a thousand times wrong—a slogan of this kind will *corrupt*, not enlighten, the minds of the people; it will *confuse*, not revolutionise—*demoralise*, not educate. This is so clear that we need not bother to develop the idea—at any rate, until our next talk with the most esteemed Plekhanov.

And so, no matter how you put it, it's still the same. Whether the forces of revolution have matured or not, Plekhanov's slogan cannot be considered "mature" food for the minds of the Social-Democratic proletariat. This slogan sacrifices the *fundamental interests* of democracy and of our revolution—the enlightenment of the masses as to the aims of a real *people's* fight for *real* power—sacrifices these interests to temporary, casual, unessential, muddled *liberal* slogans, aims and interests.

And it is just such sacrifice of the fundamental interests of the proletariat to the half-hearted, muddled aims of liberalism that makes up the essence of *opportunism* in tactics.

A few words in conclusion. In his article Plekhanov tries to bait us on the subject of the boycott. We shall discuss this with him in more detail when he deigns to go over from baiting, to a contest on the actual issues. Meanwhile, we might note this: the son of the Roman general, Plekhanov sarcastically declares, did gain the victory in his premature battle, whereas the Bolsheviks, so far, have nothing but defeats to their credit.

You have a bad memory, Comrade Plekhanov. I suggest that you recall the *Bulygin* Duma.⁶⁶ Remember how Parvus and the new *Iskra*,⁶⁷ which you supported, opposed the boycott at the time. The Bolsheviks were for the boycott.

The development of the revolution brought *complete* victory for Bolshevism; and in the October and November days only Trotsky's exuberances distinguished the Mensheviks.

Thus it was, and thus it will be, my dear Comrade Plekhanov. When the revolution is on the decline, the pedants who, after the event, arrogate to themselves the role of "Roman generals" come onto the stage with their lamentations. When the revolution is on the upswing, things happen as *the revolutionary Social-Democrats* desire, compare them as you may to "impatient youths".

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1907

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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THE BOLSHEVIKS AND THE PETTY BOURGEOISIE

An article bearing the above title, published in *Noviye Sily*,⁶⁷ provides a suitable occasion for giving certain explanations.

The newspaper expresses dissatisfaction at our "hackneyed" division of the bourgeoisie into petty, revolutionary and liberal. There is no doubt, says this organ of the Trudoviks, repeating the usual Menshevik argument, that many petty-bourgeois people voted for the Cadets.

Many petty bourgeois, it is true, did vote for the Cadets. But the class character of a party cannot be judged from the fact that certain elements, among others, voted for it at a *given moment*. Undoubtedly many German petty bourgeois vote for the Social-Democrats and many workers for the German "Centre". *Noviye Sily*, however, probably realises that it cannot be concluded from this fact that the "hackneyed" division of the working classes into petty bourgeoisie and proletariat is wrong.

The entire history of the Cadet Party, and the latest elections in particular, have shown clearly that the landowner who runs a capitalist estate, the middle bourgeois, and the bourgeois intellectual constitute the *class* basis of the party. The majority of the people, i.e., extensive sections of the urban petty bourgeoisie, as well as the peasantry, have no interest in a party that fears any independent action by the masses, and opposes such action, that defends land redemption payments and carries on a struggle against local agrarian committees using the four-point electoral system⁶⁸ as a pretext, etc. This alone accounts for the rapid *retreat* of the petty bourgeoisie from the Cadets at the recent election. The peasantry, as we know,

completely rejected the Cadets, and were mainly responsible for their defeat at gubernia electoral meetings. As we said in *Novy Luch*, No. 1,* the urban petty bourgeoisie had already cast 41,000 votes for the Left bloc, as compared with 74,000 votes for the Cadets, and this despite the fact that the Left had no daily press, etc.

The Cadets are a party of the liberal bourgeoisie. The economic position of that class makes it *afraid* of a peasant victory and of working-class solidarity. This accounts for the inevitable, and by no means fortuitous, tendency of the Cadets to turn the more rapidly to the Right, to turn towards a deal with reaction, the more rapidly the popular masses turn to the Left. After the dissolution of the Duma, it was an economic necessity, not fortuity, that made the proletariat, the peasantry, and the impoverished urban petty bourgeoisie turn terrifically Left and become revolutionised, and made the Cadets turn terrifically Right. Only the petty bourgeois or the political philistine could regret this, or try to change or stop the process.

We Social-Democrats have a different task—that of accelerating the liberation of the masses from the sway of the Cadets. This sway is maintained by tradition, by old ties and by the influence of the liberals, by their economic domination of the petty bourgeoisie, their role as a bourgeois intelligentsia, as liberal civil servants, etc. The sooner the masses realise what *their own* interests are, the sooner will they understand the hostility of the liberals to the mass movement, the sooner will they alienate themselves politically from the liberals and enter various democratic, revolutionary organisations, unions, parties, etc. In particular, the peasantry, who in Russia constitute eight- or nine-tenths of the petty bourgeoisie, are struggling primarily for land. The liberal landlord (and there are still such in Russia—the landowner curia elected 24.4 per cent of the Cadets and those more to the Left at the last elections) is *against* the peasant in the struggle, and the liberal civil servant, the bourgeois intellectual is very close to the liberal landlord. That is why the peasantry are now more determinedly and more speedily emancipating them-

* See p. 154 of this volume.—Ed.

selves from the influence of the Cadets than the urban petty bourgeoisie are. The victory of the peasantry in the struggle for land is the real economic basis for the victory of the bourgeois revolution in Russia. The liberals (including the Cadets) are *opposed* to the victory of the peasantry; they defend land redemption payments, i.e., the conversion of part of the peasantry into *Grossbauern*, and part into *Knechte* under a landlord of the *Prussian* type. For this reason the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution is *impossible* in Russia without the emancipation of the peasantry from the political sway of the liberals. The victory of the peasantry *abolishes* landed proprietorship, and gives the fullest scope to the development of the productive forces on purely capitalist lines. The victory of the liberals *preserves* landed proprietorship, only superficially cleansing it of its feudal aspects, and leads to the *least* speedy and *least* free development of capitalism, to the development of the Prussian, we might say, type of capitalism, not the American.

Noviye Sily does not understand this economic, class basis of the Russian revolution when it says that in its social-economic demands the petty bourgeoisie are closer to the liberals, and in their political demands closer to the proletarians, and that the "centre of gravity of the revolution" is shifting to "politics". *Noviye Sily's* arguments are a mass of confusion. The petty bourgeois, the peasant included, is naturally closer to the liberal than to the proletarian; he is closer as a *proprietor*, as a petty producer. It would, therefore, be politically ridiculous and, from the standpoint of socialism, downright reactionary, to unite the petty bourgeoisie and the proletarians in one party (as the Socialist-Revolutionaries would like to do). However, in the present bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia, the struggle is by no means on account of the antagonism between masters and workers (as it will be in the socialist revolution) but on account of the antagonism between peasant and landlord: "the revolution's centre of gravity" is shifting towards this, the *economic* struggle, and certainly not towards the "political" struggle.

But even if our revolution is bourgeois in its economic content (this cannot be doubted), the conclusion must not

be drawn from it that the leading role in our revolution is played by the bourgeoisie, that the bourgeoisie is its motive force. Such a conclusion, usual with Plekhanov and the Mensheviks, is a vulgarisation of Marxism, a caricature of Marxism. The leader of the bourgeois revolution may be either the liberal landlord together with the factory-owner, merchant, lawyer, etc., or the proletariat together with the peasant masses. In both cases the bourgeois character of the revolution remains, but its scope, the degree of its advantage to the proletariat, the degree of its advantage to socialism (*that is*, to the rapid development of the productive forces, first and foremost) are *completely different* in the two cases.

From this, the Bolsheviks deduce the *basic* tactics of the socialist proletariat in the bourgeois revolution—to carry with them the democratic petty bourgeoisie, especially the peasant petty bourgeoisie, draw them away from the liberals, paralyse the instability of the liberal bourgeoisie, and develop the struggle of the *masses* for the complete *abolition* of all traces of serfdom, including landed proprietorship.

The question of the Duma presidium was a partial question of the general tactics of the Social-Democrats in the bourgeois revolution. The Social-Democrats had *to wrest* the Trudoviks *away* from the Cadets, either by voting for the Trudoviks or by demonstratively abstaining from voting and giving a reason for the abstention. *Noviye Sily* now admits that it was a *mistake* for the Left to take part in a conference with the Cadets. This is a valuable admission. *Noviye Sily*, however, is sadly mistaken in thinking that “it was a mistake of practical expediency and not of principle”. This opinion, as we have shown, arises out of a misunderstanding of the fundamentals, principles and tactics of the socialist proletariat in the bourgeois revolution.

It is only from this point of view that a correct answer can be found to those particular questions that are giving *Noviye Sily* a headache.

How “to guarantee that the petty bourgeoisie, recognised by *Novy Luch* as allies, will not turn away from the Left and defect to the Constitutional-Democratic camp”? It is because this cannot be guaranteed that we are *against*

any permanent agreement with the Trudoviks. Our line is "march separately but *strike together*" at both the Black Hundreds and the Cadets. That is what we did during the St. Petersburg elections, and that is what we shall always do.

Noviye Sily's objection is that part of the petty bourgeoisie might be drawn away from the Cadets. Of course they might, just as we took away part of the Cadet *Tovarishch* at the St. Petersburg elections. To achieve this, we Social-Democrats must go firmly along our own, revolutionary road, paying no attention to what the Cadet's Marya Alexevna⁶⁰ may say.

Legislative work "must inevitably be placed in the hands of the Constitutional-Democrats". Nothing of the sort. The Cadets, as leaders of the liberal "Centre" in the Duma, have a majority over the Black-Hundred group, without our support. We must therefore table our own Social-Democratic bills, not liberal and not petty-bourgeois, bills that are written in revolutionary language, not in official jargon, *and must put them to the vote*. Let the Black Hundreds and the Cadets turn them down. We shall then go over to a ruthless criticism of the Cadet bill and regularly submit amendments. When the amendments end we shall abstain from voting on the Cadet bill as a whole, leaving the Cadets to defeat the Black Hundreds; thereby taking no responsibility on ourselves before the people for the poverty and worthlessness of Cadet pseudo-democracy.

Novy Luch, No. 6,
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Signed: N. Lenin

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to the text in *Novy Luch*

THE IMMINENT DISSOLUTION OF THE DUMA AND QUESTIONS OF TACTICS

St. Petersburg, February 27, 1907.

The papers are full of news, rumours and surmises about the imminent dissolution of the Duma.

Is it probable? If we examine the objective state of affairs, we shall have to form the conclusion that it is more than probable. The convocation of the Duma was, for the government, a necessity born of compulsion. They had to make one more attempt, accompanied by the greatest possible repressive measures, to convene a popular representative body in order to come to terms with the bourgeoisie. The experiment is an obvious failure. Military courts and all the other niceties of the Stolypin constitution have rendered extraordinary aid to revolutionary agitation among masses until now unaffected, and have produced a Left Duma from out of the depths of the peasant masses. The Cadets, the Centre party of the Russian revolution, have lost ground as compared with the First Duma. The Cadets have undoubtedly swung to the Right, but with such a Duma at such a time the government are completely unable to come to terms with them. The Cadets could merge with the Octobrists, and they are moving steadily in that direction: suffice it to name Mr. Struve and Mr. Golovin. But the specific feature of the present situation is precisely this—there is no Cadet-Octobrist majority in the Duma. The entire "Centre" has been hopelessly crushed by the sharpened struggle of the extremes: the monarchist Right, and the Left wing of the Duma. This latter part constitutes two-fifths of the deputies. Its role in the Duma

is tremendous. Its prestige among the masses of the people is very high. Its growing ties with those masses cannot be sundered by any half-measures. Necessity dictates that the government dissolve the Duma: they are unable to extricate themselves from the situation now obtaining, without resorting to force. The "legality" of this situation only deepens the crisis, since its true power among the masses of the people must be greater than that expressed "legally", i.e., that which has been passed through dozens and hundreds of police screens.

The dissolution of the Duma is more than likely: it is inevitable because what we are experiencing is actually a revolutionary, not merely a constitutional crisis. And it is specifically because of this that it would be dangerous, ridiculous and pitiful politics to hide one's head under one's wing and attempt to make excuses for the inevitable consequences of the present political situation or to attempt, by means of words and phrases, to obscure the clear, weaken the acute, and conceal the obvious.

The Cadets are pursuing a policy of this kind. Mr. Izgoyev, writing in today's *Rech*, says: "It is *almost* beyond our power to save the Duma." This is almost correct. "In three or four months' time, when the Duma will have acquired prestige in the country by its legislative activities, the situation might be different." This is not only correct but obvious. And the government, too, can see the obvious.

But Mr. Izgoyev is afraid of unvarnished truth and begins to twist and turn: "But will it be granted these three or four months? It is a vicious circle from which there is no way out. The way out is not in the street, 'organised' or 'unorganised'; there would be a way out if people inspired by real patriotism were in power..."

Naturally! They have hypnotised themselves with their own empty verbosity, have driven themselves into a blind alley of honeyed phrases, and now they are weeping, wailing and sorrowing.... This is truly an example of a perplexed, tearful and impotent philistine!

Let the reader not imagine that Izgoyev's speeches are the chance mouthings of a casual Cadet writer. Oh, no. They are a summary of the policy officially *laid down* by the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the *leading* party,

which has got its man elected chairman. In that same *Rech* we read: "After lengthy debates at the evening meeting on February 25 of the people's freedom parliamentary group on the attitude to be adopted towards the government's declaration, it was decided to maintain silence, expressing neither confidence nor distrust, and to go over to the examination of current problems. Should the Right parties introduce, for provocative purposes, a formulation expressing confidence in the ministry, it was decided to vote against it. In the event of the extreme Left (the Social-Democrats) proposing a vote of no confidence, the people's freedom party decided to table its own proposal to proceed with current business. There is, incidentally, a hope that a preliminary agreement by the entire opposition will be achieved on this question, to which the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Popular Socialists and Trudoviks are already inclined to consent." Let us add that our Social-Democratic group in the Duma has, according to *Russkaya Zhizn*, decided to "act fully independently", a decision that meets with our warm approval.

Honestly, the Cadet policy is something inimitable. It would be incautious to vote "no confidence". The Duma must be saved. But to say "we do not express confidence"—that is permissible. What is this but a political "man in a muffler"? Are these not philistines who, faced by the approach of an inevitable storm, cover their eyes with their nightcaps and reiterate: "We are cautious ... we are saving...". You are saving your philistine nightcap, and nothing more, esteemed knights of the "people's freedom"!

And what could be more ridiculous than calling the resolution of the Rights expressing confidence in the ministry "a provocation"? It is the legitimate right of every member of the Duma, the natural answer of a people's representative to the ministry's question, "This is our programme. Does the Duma wish to work with us in this spirit?" The writing of this nonsense can only be explained as complete confusion among the Cadets. No, gentlemen, a nightcap cannot protect you against counter-revolution. The right to dissolve the Duma is a super-"legal" right according to that constitution which the pitiful liberals so foolishly praised and so treacherously persuaded the people to take

seriously. We cannot get away from the fact that the ministry will ask the Duma whether it wishes to carry out some programme or another. And the answer: "We do not express confidence", will still be a superb and quite sufficiently "constitutional" excuse to dissolve the Duma; even without the help of the Kovalevskys, dozens of "constitutional precedents" can be found for the dissolution of parliament for refusing the government much less important things than ... than ... than military courts and punitive expeditions.

What conclusion is to be drawn from this? The conclusion is that it is foolish to play at constitutions when there aren't any. It is foolish to close one's eyes and remain silent about the fact that the days of even the present Russian "near-constitution" are numbered, that the annulment of the franchise and the return to complete absolutism are *inevitable*.

What is to be done? *Aussprechen was ist*—to admit the truth. The government are undoubtedly compelled to dissolve the Duma. It is to the government's advantage that the Duma should disband itself in silence, should obediently play the constitutional comedy and not open the eyes of the people to the *inevitability* of a coup d'état. And the cowardly Cadets, with their superb, inimitable "historical" formula: "maintain *silence*", the Cadets who, instead of "a vote of no confidence" say "we do not express confidence", are only helping the government effect a *silent* coup d'état.

Real champions of liberty, real representatives of the people, should act differently. They should realise that the continued existence of the Duma does not at all depend on politeness, caution, care, diplomacy, tact, taciturnity or other Molchalin-like virtues.⁷⁰ They should tell the people, simply and clearly, *from the rostrum of the Duma, the whole truth*, including the reason why the dissolution of the Duma, a coup d'état, and a return to pure absolutism are inevitable. The government *need* silence on this. The people *need* to know it. The representatives of the people—while they still are representatives of the people!—should say this from the rostrum of the Duma.

The position is quite clear. There is no other way: either infamous silence, obediently offering the neck, or a calm

but firm statement to the people that the first act of the Black Hundreds' coup d'état is being carried out.

Only the struggle of the people can prevent that. And the people must know the whole truth.

We hope that the Social-Democrats in the Duma will tell them that truth.

Proletary, No. 14,
March 4, 1907

Published according
to the *Proletary* text

CADETS AND TRUDOVIKS⁷¹

In *Russkaya Zhizn*, No. 49, Comrade D. Koltsov repeats the usual Menshevik argument in favour of the policy of support for the Cadets. But he does it so forthrightly and naïvely that there really is nothing left to do but thank him for reducing an erroneous theory to the absurd.

"With whom have the Social-Democrats the greater number of points of contact," he asks in his article "The Cadets and Bourgeois Democracy", "with urban or rural democracy? From whom can Social-Democracy the sooner expect support in its struggle against cultural, religious, national and other prejudices? Who will the sooner support all measures likely to liberate the productive forces? It is only necessary to raise these questions, which are basic in Social-Democratic policy, for the answer to be clear of itself. Everything in the *Communist Manifesto* concerning the revolutionary role of the bourgeoisie remains as true in the twentieth century as it was in the nineteenth, as true for Russia as it was for England, ... etc. As far as rural democracy is concerned, it will in many cases defend old, outworn modes of production and social organisation, despite its revolutionary gallop.... When the Bolsheviks speak about the Cadets they forget the urban democracy that stands behind them; on the contrary, for them the Socialist-Revolutionary and Trudovik parliamentary group is the embodiment of the entire peasantry. This means that they cannot see the wood for the trees, cannot see the social interests of the broad masses of the people behind parliamentary representation."

From the bottom of our heart we welcome this Menshevik turn to the study of the *fundamental* principles of our disagreement on tactics. It is high time.

And so the Cadets are *the progressive urban bourgeoisie* and the Trudoviks *the backward rural bourgeoisie*. This is what your "Marxism" amounts to.

If this is true, why do you not say so openly and directly to the whole Party? Why do you not announce, clearly and distinctly, in a draft resolution for the Party congress, that, in the name of the *Communist Manifesto*, the R.S.D.L.P. is *duty bound* to support the Cadets *against the Trudoviks*?

We should be very glad if you were to make this statement. We have been demanding it of you for a long time; we did so long before the Unity Congress, when we *defined* the class composition of the Constitutional-Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries in the draft resolution on our attitude to the bourgeois parties, and invited you to give *your definition*.

How did you answer this challenge?

You evaded it. In your draft resolution for the Unity Congress there is no attempt to express the idea that the Constitutional-Democrats are the progressive urban democracy, and the Trudoviks (Peasant Union, Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc.) the backward rural democracy. In *your* resolution for the Unity Congress on the attitude to the bourgeois parties there is only a repetition of the Amsterdam resolution,⁷² a repetition that is peculiar on account of its indecisiveness.

Today we *repeat* the challenge. We have again raised the question of the Marxist definition of the class basis of the various bourgeois parties in Russia. We have published the appropriate draft resolution.

And we are certain that you will *again refuse to accept the challenge*. We are certain that you will not risk writing, in the draft of the official Menshevik resolution, that the Cadets are the progressive urban bourgeoisie and that they, *to a greater extent than the Trudoviks*, promote a policy of the free development of the productive forces, etc., etc.

Here is how matters stand:

The main economic problem in the present bourgeois revolution in Russia is that of the peasants' struggle for land. This is a struggle inevitably brought about by the desperate position of the peasantry, the many survivals of serfdom in the Russian countryside, etc. The struggle

impels the peasant masses towards a decisive democratisation of political relations (for without the democratic reorganisation of the state the peasants cannot overcome the feudal-minded landlords) and towards the abolition of landed proprietorship.

For this very reason the Social-Democrats include *confiscation* of the landed estates in their programme. It is only the extreme opportunists among Social-Democrats who are not in sympathy with this programme and defend the substitution of the word "alienation" for "confiscation", although *they are afraid to present such a draft openly*.

The Cadets are a party of the liberal bourgeoisie, liberal landowners and bourgeois intelligentsia. If D. Koltsov has any doubts about the landowner colouring of the Cadets, we can point to two facts: (1) the composition of the Cadet group in the First Duma. Refer to Borodin's" book, Comrade Koltsov, and you will see how many landlords there were there; (2) the Cadets' draft agrarian programme is, in effect, a plan of *the capitalist landlord*. Land redemption payments, conversion of the peasant into a *Knecht*, and the formation of local land commissions of equal numbers of landlords and peasants with chairmen appointed by the government—all this shows as clearly as can be that Cadet policy in the agrarian question is one of retaining landed proprietorship by *cleansing* it of some of its feudal traits, and by the peasant's ruination through redemption payments and his shackling by government officials. In this way the economic significance of Cadet agrarian politics amounts to a *deceleration* of the development of the productive forces.

The confiscation of landed estates and the complete victory of peasant democracy would, on the contrary, mean the *most rapid* development of the productive forces possible under capitalism.

In our draft resolutions for the Fifth Congress we give *direct* expression to *this* assessment of the *economic* significance of Cadet policy. Once more: please express your "Marxist theory" as clearly as this, Comrade D. Koltsov!

A comparison of the Cadet and Trudovik agrarian projects and their attitude to questions of political democracy (the law on assembly in the First Duma, the attitude to the various types of organisation for local agricultural com-

mittees, the programmes of the Constitutional-Democratic Party and the Trudovik Group in the First Duma, and so on, and so forth), shows that the Cadets are a party of liberals, striving, and forced to strive, *to halt* the revolution by reconciling liberty with the old authorities (to the detriment of liberty) and the landlord with the peasant (to the detriment of the peasant). The Trudovik parties (the Popular Socialists, Trudoviks, and Socialist-Revolutionaries) are the urban and, particularly, the rural (i.e., peasant) petty bourgeois democracy, *forced* to strive for the further development of the revolution.

The victory of the revolution in Russia is possible only if the proletariat carries with it the democratic peasantry both against the old order and against the liberals.

This postulate, which determines the *fundamentals* of the Bolshevik tactics as a whole, was excellently confirmed by the entire experience of the First Duma and the post-Duma period. Only by reducing our disputes to *fundamentals* shall we transform them from squabbles into the solution of the basic problems of the bourgeois revolution in Russia.

We therefore welcome the frankness and directness of Comrade Koltsov, and repeat our challenge: let the Mensheviks try to formulate *these* ideas concerning the Cadets and the Trudoviks, and express them clearly and unequivocally.

Rabochaya Mova, No. 1,
March 1, 1907
Signed. N. L—n

Published according to the text
in Rabochaya Mova

APROPOS OF STOLYPIN'S DECLARATION ⁷⁴

DRAFT MANIFESTO

The deputies to the State Duma who are members of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, announce the following to the people and propose that the Duma do likewise:

Through its prime minister, Mr. Stolypin, the government has announced to the people's representatives that it intends to continue the policy pursued since the dissolution of the First Duma. The government does not wish to consider the will of the people's representatives. It demands that the people's representatives should reconcile themselves to this policy, help develop and perfect this government policy, and apply it more precisely and fully.

What does this government policy consist in?

. It consists in protecting the interests of a handful of big landowners, courtiers and dignitaries, protecting their right to exploit and oppress the people. Neither land nor freedom!—this is what the government has announced to the people through its mouthpiece Stolypin.

The peasantry can expect nothing from the government but the defence of the landowners and a ruthlessly savage struggle against the peasants' striving for enlightenment, liberty and improved conditions, for the transfer of the land to the peasants, and for liberation from irksome bondage, a life of hardship and gradual extinction from famine. From the government the peasants must expect the continuation of that same violence that has taken thousands and tens of thousands of the best people away from the peasantry, people who have been incarcerated in prisons, banished, or killed in the valiant struggle against the law-

lessness of government officials and oppression by the landowners. To bribe a tiny minority of village bloodsuckers and kulaks with petty hand-outs, to help them plunder the ruined countryside of whatever is left, as a reward for their aid to the autocratic government—such is the policy Stolypin and his ministry intend to pursue.

The workers can expect nothing of this government but violence and oppression. As before, the workers will have their hands bound in their struggle to improve their condition. As before, the workers' unions will be banned; as before, workers' newspapers will be persecuted. As before, the big manufacturers will obtain help and support from the government in every step they take to keep the workers down. The workers must not expect aid from the government in the dire want caused by unemployment, but must expect that want to grow and become more acute. Government help to the working class consists in laws drawn up at conferences of manufacturers and police officials. The workers of Russia long ago discovered the true value of this governmental "solicitude" for the working class.

The soldiers and sailors who spilled their blood in the war with Japan, a war undertaken by the government in the predatory interests of a handful of courtiers, the soldiers and sailors who spilled their blood at home in the struggle to make life easier, to rid themselves of the penal servitude of barrack life that the soldier might feel himself a human being, not a beast—the soldiers and sailors can expect nothing of the government but a continuation of the former violence and oppression and the same rough treatment, and a crust of stale bread as a reward for pacifying and subduing their brothers, the workers and peasants who are fighting for their freedom, fighting for land for the peasants.

The government announcement has shown clearly that the government wants war, not peace, with the people. There is one thing this announcement does not say and which must be said to the people by those deputies they sent to the Duma and who remain faithful to the people's interests—the government does not say that its announcement signifies an irrevocable and inevitable decision to dissolve the Second Duma without even giving it an opportunity to

express the will of the people, to express the needs of the peasants, workers and soldiers, of all working people, and to express anything the people included in the mandates they gave the deputies when they sent them to the Duma.

The Social-Democratic Labour Party has always told the people that the Duma is powerless to give them freedom and land. Those deputies to the Duma who defend the interests of the working class and the peasantry are prepared to devote all their efforts to further those interests, to help the people by announcing the truth in the Duma, by explaining to the many millions of people scattered throughout Russia how harmful is the anti-popular policy pursued by the government, what evil plans against the people the government is elaborating, and which laws and measures it refuses to grant the people.

But Duma deputies and an entire Duma capable of helping the people are meaningless without the people. If Russia has obtained even tiny liberties for a short period, if Russia has been granted popular representation even if only for a brief period, this is only because it has been won by the struggle of the people, the selfless struggle for liberty by the working class, the peasantry, the soldiers and the sailors.

The government has once again declared war on the people. It has taken a road leading to the dissolution of the Second Duma, to the annulment of the present franchise, to the reversion to the old order of the old Russian autocracy.

The deputies of the working class proclaim this to the entire people.

Written late in February 1907

Published according
to the manuscript

THE ELECTIONS TO THE DUMA AND THE TACTICS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

The Duma election results demonstrate the physiognomy and strength of the various classes.

The franchise in Russia is *neither direct nor equal*. In the first place, the peasants elect one delegate per ten households; these, in turn, elect a peasant delegate from among their number; the delegates so elected then elect a peasant elector, and the latter, together with electors from other social-estates, elect the deputies to the Duma. The system is the same for the landowner, urban and worker curias, the number of electors from each curia being fixed by law in the interests and to the advantage of the upper classes, the landowners and the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, not only the revolutionary parties, but the opposition parties as well are subjected to the most barbarous, the most illegal police oppression; then there is the complete absence of freedom of the press and assembly, arbitrary arrests and banishment, as well as the military courts operating in the greater part of Russia, and the state of emergency connected with them.

How, then, under such circumstances, could the new Duma have turned out more oppositional and more revolutionary than the First?

To find an answer to this question, we must first of all examine the figures published in the *Cadet Rech* on the distribution of the electors according to party, in connection with the party-political composition of the Second Duma; these figures cover about nine-tenths of all the electors in European Russia (Poland, the Caucasus, Siberia, etc., being excluded). Let us take the five chief po-

litical groups, since more detailed information on electors' political leanings is not available. The first group consists of the *Rights*. To this group belong those known as the Black Hundreds (the monarchists, the Union of the Russian People, etc.), who champion a return to complete autocracy in its purest form, favour unbridled military terror against revolutionaries, and instigate assassinations (like that of Duma Deputy Herzenstein), pogroms, etc. Further, this group includes the so-called *Octobrists* (this is the name given in Russia to the party of the big industrialists), who joined the counter-revolution immediately after the tsar's manifesto of October 17, 1905, and who now support the government in every possible way. This party frequently forms election blocs with the monarchists.

The second group consists of those *belonging to no party*. We shall see later that many electors and deputies, especially those of the peasantry, hid behind this name in order to escape repressions for their revolutionary convictions.

The *liberals* form the third group. The liberal parties are headed by the Constitutional-Democrats (known as the Cadet Party), or "people's freedom" party. This party constitutes the Centre in the Russian revolution; it stands between the landlords and the peasants. The bourgeoisie tries to reconcile these two classes. The assessment of this party of the liberal bourgeoisie—the Cadets—is a most important point of difference between the two trends within Russian Social-Democracy.

For opportunist reasons and not because of their political convictions, the Polish Black Hundreds are on the side of the Russian liberals in the Duma; this is the party of "National-Democrats" who in Poland use every means, including informing, lock-outs and assassination, to struggle against the revolutionary proletariat.

The fourth group is the *Progressists*. This is not the name of a party, but, like the term "non-party" is a meaningless conventional term whose primary purpose is to serve as a screen against police persecution.

Lastly, the fifth group is the *Lefts*. To this group belong the Social-Democratic and Socialist-Revolutionary parties, the Popular Socialists (approximately the equivalent of

the French Radical Socialists) and those known as the *Trudoviks* *—a still completely amorphous peasant democratic organisation. In their class character, the Trudoviks, Popular Socialists and Socialist-Revolutionaries are petty bourgeois and peasant democrats. Sometimes electors from some revolutionary groups attempted to hide under the general name of "Lefts" during the election campaign, in order the better to escape police persecution.

The *Rech* figures will now show the correctness of the conclusions we have drawn concerning the social composition of the parties.

As can be seen from the *tables* (on pages 199 and 200), the *big cities* constitute a special group—St. Petersburg elects 6 deputies, Moscow 4, Warsaw and Tashkent 2 each, the remainder 1 each, a total of 27 deputies for 17 cities. The remaining deputies to the Duma are elected at joint meetings of electors of all four curias for each gubernia; but in addition to this the peasant electors elect one deputy from the peasant curia for each gubernia. Thus we get three groups of deputies—from the gubernia electoral meeting, from the peasant curia and from the big cities.

A few dozen electors from the progressive or Left bloc could be ascribed to the various party groups only on the basis of estimates; on the whole, however, these figures provide the fullest and most reliable material for an understanding of the class structure of the various Russian parties.

The *worker curia* even in the provinces, and, needless to say, particularly in the big cities, voted almost exclusively Left, 96.5 per cent to be exact. Out of the 140 Left electors from the worker curia 84 were Social-Democrats, 52 were unspecified Lefts (but mostly Social-Democrats), and four were Socialist-Revolutionaries. Despite the false assertions of the liberals who want to depict it as a party of revolutionary intellectuals, the Russian Social-Democratic Party is, therefore, a real *working-class* party. In St.

* In the German press this party is often called the "labour group", which seems to point to kinship with the working class. In actual fact there is not even this verbal relationship between them in Russian. It is, therefore, better to leave the word "Trudoviks" untranslated, using it to mean petty-bourgeois, specifically peasant, democrats.

II. Number of Duma Deputies

Parties	51 Gubernias of European Russia						Poland		Caucasus		Siberia and Eastern Gubernias		Entire Russian Empire	
	From the Gubernias		From Peasant Curias		From Big Cities		Deputies	per cent	Deputies	per cent	Deputies	per cent	Deputies	per cent
	Deputies	per cent	Deputies	per cent	Deputies	per cent								
Rights	85	25.7	4	7.5	5	18.5	1	2.7	2	7.1	—	—	97	19.8
Non-party	18	5.4	3	5.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	7.1	22	4.5
Liberals	82	24.8	10	18.9	17	63.0	32	86.5	9	32.2	6	42.9	156	31.8
Progressists	20	6.0	10	18.9	—	—	3	8.1	2	7.1	—	—	35	7.1
Lefts	126	38.1	26	49.0	5	18.5	1	2.7	15	53.6	7	50.0	180	36.8
Totals	331	100	53	100	27	100	37	100	28	100	14	100	490	100

Petersburg—both the city and the gubernia—of the twenty-four electors chosen by the worker curia twenty were Social-Democrats and four Socialist-Revolutionaries; in Moscow—both the city and the gubernia—only Social-Democrats were elected—thirty-five, etc.

In the *peasant curia* we immediately see an astonishing disproportion; 33.8 per cent of the peasant electors belong to the Right, whereas of the *Duma deputies* elected by those same electors from the peasant curia only 7.5 per cent were Rights. Obviously the peasant electors only *called* themselves Rights to avoid government repressions. The Russian press has recorded this phenomenon in more than a hundred cases, and the election statistics now provide full confirmation of it.

The peasant curia cannot be judged by what the electors call themselves, but exclusively by the party which their *deputies* consider themselves as belonging to. We see that, *following upon the worker curia*, the peasant curia *forms the group that is most Left*. The peasants elected only 7.5 per cent Rights and 67.95 per cent *standing Left of the liberals*! The greater part of the Russian peasantry are *revolutionary* in temper—such is the lesson to be drawn from the elections to the Second Duma. This is a fact of great importance because it shows that the revolution in Russia has not come to an end by a long way. Until the peasant's demands have been met, or, at least, until he has calmed down, the revolution *must* continue. Of course, the peasant's revolutionary temper has nothing in common with Social-Democracy; the peasant is a bourgeois-democratic revolutionary, and by no means a socialist. He is not struggling for the transfer of all means of production into the hands of society, but for the confiscation of the landlord's land by the peasantry.

The bourgeois-democratic, revolutionary consciousness of the peasantry finds its typical party-political expression in the Trudoviks', and in the Socialist-Revolutionary and the Popular Socialist parties. Out of the fifty-three Duma deputies from the peasant curia, twenty-four belong to the peasant democrats (ten Lefts, ten Trudoviks and four Socialist-Revolutionaries), and, furthermore, of the ten Progressists and three non-party deputies elected by the peas-

ants the majority undoubtedly belong to the Trudoviks. We say "undoubtedly" because the Trudoviks have been ruthlessly persecuted since the First Duma, and the peasants are wary enough not to call themselves Trudoviks, although *in actual fact* they vote together with the Trudoviks in the Duma. For example, the most important bill introduced in the First Duma by the Trudoviks was the Agrarian Bill, known as the "Draft of the 104" (the essence of this Bill was the immediate nationalisation of the landlords' land, the future nationalisation of peasant allotments and equalitarian land tenure). This Bill is an outstanding product of peasant political thought on one of the most important problems of peasant life. It was endorsed by seventy Trudoviks and by twenty-five peasants who described themselves as non-party, or gave no answer to the question on their party membership!

Thus the "Trudovik" Group in Russia is undoubtedly a rural, peasant democratic party. It comprises parties that are revolutionary not in the socialist, but in the bourgeois-democratic sense of the word.

A distinction must be made between the big cities and the smaller towns in the *urban curia*. The political contradictions between the different classes are not so clearly marked in the smaller towns, where there are no large masses of proletarians (who form a special worker curia) and the Rights are weaker. In the big cities there are no non-party electors at all, and the number of indeterminate "Progressists" is insignificant; but here the Right is stronger and the Left weaker. The reason is a simple one; in the big cities the proletariat constitutes a separate curia, which is not included in our table of electors.* The petty bourgeoisie are less numerous than in the smaller towns. Big industry predominates, and is represented partly by the Rights and partly by the liberals.

* There are no data for this, and so the figures on electors from the worker curia have been removed from the table. We have precise figures on only 37 worker-electors. *All of them, without exception, belong to the Left.* According to the law, the total number of worker-electors for the whole of Russia is 208. We have more precise data concerning 145 of them, which, together with the above mentioned 37 electors from the worker curia in the big cities makes 182, i.e., nine-tenths of the total number of worker-electors.

The figures on the composition of the electors show convincingly that the basis of the liberal parties (mainly, therefore, the Cadets) is the urban, primarily the big industrial bourgeoisie. The swing to the Right of this bourgeoisie, which is frightened by the independent action and strength of the proletariat, becomes particularly clear when we compare the larger cities and the smaller towns. The urban (i.e., bourgeois) curia is permeated with Left elements to a much greater degree in the latter.

The basic differences amongst Russian Social-Democrats are closely connected with this last problem. One wing (the Minority, or "Mensheviks") regard the Cadets and liberals as being the progressive urban bourgeoisie as compared with the backward rural petty bourgeoisie (Trudoviks). It follows from this that the bourgeoisie is recognised as the motive force of the revolution, and a policy of support for the Cadets is proclaimed. The other wing (the Majority, or "Bolsheviks") regards the liberals as representatives of big industry, who are striving to put an end to the revolution as quickly as possible for fear of the proletariat, and are entering into a compromise with the reactionaries. This wing regards the Trudoviks as revolutionary petty-bourgeois democrats, and is of the opinion that they are inclined to adopt a radical position on a land question of such importance to the peasantry, the question of the confiscation of the landed estates. This accounts for the tactics of the Bolsheviks. They reject support for the treacherous liberal bourgeoisie, i.e., the Cadets, and do their utmost to get the democratic petty bourgeoisie away from the influence of the liberals; they want to draw the peasant and the urban petty bourgeois away from the liberals and muster them behind the proletariat, behind the vanguard, for the revolutionary struggle. In its social-economic content, the Russian revolution is a bourgeois revolution; its motive force, however, is not the liberal bourgeoisie but the proletariat and the democratic peasantry. The victory of the revolution can only be achieved by a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

If we want to know exactly whether the alliance between the liberals and the urban petty bourgeoisie is a stable one, we shall be interested in the statistics on the *number*

of votes cast in the cities for the party blocs. According to Smirnov's statistics for 22 big cities, 17,000 votes were cast for the monarchists, 34,500 for the Octobrists, 74,000 for the Cadets and 41,000 for the Left bloc.*

During the elections to the Second Duma a fierce struggle was waged between the two wings of Social-Democracy, between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, on the question of whether to enter into a bloc with the Cadets or with the Trudoviks against the Cadets. In Moscow the supporters of the Bolsheviks were stronger; a Left bloc was formed there, with the Mensheviks taking part in it. In St. Petersburg the Bolsheviks were also stronger, and a Left bloc was formed there as well, but the Mensheviks did not take part and withdrew from the organisation. A split occurred and still continues. The Mensheviks referred to the Black-Hundred danger, i.e., they feared a victory of the Black Hundreds at the elections because of the votes of the Lefts and the liberals being split. The Bolsheviks declared that this danger was an invention of the liberals, whose one purpose was to attract petty-bourgeois and proletarian democracy under the wing of bourgeois liberals. The figures show that the total number of votes cast for the Lefts and the Cadets was more than double the combined votes cast for the Octobrists and the monarchists.** A split vote for the opposition, therefore, could not have helped the victory of the Right.

These figures, covering more than 200,000 urban voters, and data on the general composition of the Second Duma, show that the real political meaning of the blocs of So-

* By "Left bloc" we mean the election bloc of the Social-Democrats and the petty-bourgeois democratic parties (primarily the Trudoviks, using that name in its widest sense and recognising the Socialist-Revolutionaries as the Left wing of the group). This was a bloc directed against both the Rights and the liberals.

** According to the estimates of that same Mr. Smirnov, in sixteen cities where 72,000 people went to the polls and where there were two (or three) election lists instead of four, the opposition obtained 58.7% and the Rights 21% of the votes. Here, too, the first figure is more than double the second. Here, too, the danger from the Black Hundreds was a deceptive bogey invented by the liberals, who talked a lot about the danger from the Right although they actually feared the "Left danger" (an expression which we borrow from the Cadet newspaper *Rech*).

cial-Democrats and Cadets is by no means the avoidance of the Black-Hundred danger (this opinion, even if it were sincere, is, in general, a false one); the blocs were meant to thwart the independent policy of the working class and subordinate that class to the hegemony of the liberals.

The essence of the dispute between the two wings of the Russian Social-Democratic Party is in deciding whether to recognise the hegemony of the liberals or whether to strive for the hegemony of the working class in the bourgeois revolution.

The fact that in twenty-two cities the Left, on the first agreement between the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks against the Cadets and despite the unprecedented difficulties with which their agitation was faced, obtained 41,000 votes, i.e., received more votes than the Octobrists, and over half as many as the liberals,—this fact is proof enough for the Bolsheviks that the democratic petty bourgeoisie in the cities follow the Cadets more from force of habit and because of the intrigues of the liberals than because of the hostility of these strata to the revolution.

Now let us examine the last curia, that of the land-owners. Here we find a clearly expressed preponderance of Rights—70.9 per cent of the electors are Rights. It is absolutely inevitable that, under the impact of the peasant struggle for land, the big landed proprietor should turn away from the revolution and towards counter-revolution.

If we now compare the composition of the electoral groups at the gubernia election meetings with the composition of the Duma from the standpoint of the political tinge of the deputies elected at those meetings, we shall see that Progressist is, to a considerable extent, only a name concealing the Lefts. There were 20.5% Lefts and 18.9% Progressists among the electors. Of the deputies, 38% belong to the Lefts! The Rights have only 25.7% deputies while they had 40% of the electors; but if we subtract electors from the peasantry from this figure (we have already shown that only agents of the Russian Government who falsified the information on the election could regard them as Rights), then we get $2,170 - 764 = 1,406$ belonging to the Right electors, i.e., 25.8%. And so the two results coincide. The liberal electors, apparently, concealed themselves

partly under the name of "non-party" and partly under the name of "Progressist", and the peasants, even under the name of "Rights".

A comparison with the non-Russian parts of Russia, with Poland and the Caucasus, provides fresh proof that the real motive force of the bourgeois revolution in Russia is not the bourgeoisie. In Poland there is no revolutionary peasant movement, no urban bourgeois opposition and there are practically no liberals. The revolutionary proletariat is opposed by a reactionary bloc composed of the big and the petty bourgeoisie. There, the National-Democrats were therefore victorious. In the Caucasus the revolutionary peasant movement is very strong, the strength of the liberals is almost equal to that in Russia, but the Lefts are the strongest party there: the percentage of Lefts in the Duma (53.6%) is approximately the same as the percentage of deputies from the peasant curia (49%). Only the workers and the revolutionary democratic peasantry can complete the bourgeois revolution. There is no agrarian problem in the Russian sense in highly developed capitalist Poland, and there is no revolutionary struggle on the part of the peasantry to confiscate the landed estates. The revolution, therefore, has no sound basis in Poland outside the proletariat. The class contradictions there are getting closer to the West-European type. We meet with the opposite in the Caucasus.

Here let us mention the fact that, according to Rech estimates, the 180 Lefts are distributed among the various parties in the following way: 68 Lefts, 9 Popular Socialists (the Right wing of the Trudoviks), 28 Socialist-Revolutionaries and 46 Social-Democrats.... Actually the last-named now number 65. The liberals try to minimise the number of Social-Democrats as far as possible.

These groups may be divided into two strata according to their class structure: the urban and, particularly, the rural democratic petty bourgeoisie have 134 deputies, and the proletariat, 46 deputies.

In general, we see that in Russia the class stratification of the various parties is expressed with unusual clarity. The big landed proprietors belong to the Black Hundreds, the monarchists and the Octobrists. The big industrialists

are represented by the Octobrists and the liberals. Land-owners in Russia are divided, according to the system of farming, into those that run their farms in a semi-feudal manner, employing the animals and implements of the peasants (the peasants are in bondage to the landlord), and those who now run their farms in the modern, capitalist manner. There are more than a few liberals among the latter. The urban petty bourgeoisie are represented by the liberals and the Trudoviks. The peasant petty bourgeoisie are represented by the Trudoviks, especially the Left wing of the group, the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The proletariat has its representative in the Social-Democrats. With an obvious lag in the capitalist development of Russia, this clear-cut division into party groups according to the class structure of society is only to be explained by the stormy revolutionary mood of an epoch in which parties are formed more quickly and class-consciousness grows and takes shape infinitely more quickly than in an epoch of stagnation or of so-called peaceful progress.

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THE PLATFORM OF REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY

I

The Party congress, as we know, is to be convened in a few weeks from now. We must most energetically set about preparations for the congress, get down to a discussion of the basic tactical problems on which the Party must take decisions at the congress.

The Central Committee of our Party has already outlined an agenda for the Congress, which has been announced in the press. The chief items on the agenda are: (1) The Immediate Political Tasks and (2) The State Duma. As far as the second item is concerned, its necessity is obvious and cannot give rise to objections. In our opinion, the first item is also essential, but should be worded somewhat differently, or, rather, should have its content somewhat changed.

For a general Party discussion on the tasks of the congress and the tactical problems it has to solve to begin immediately, a conference of representatives of the two metropolitan organisations of our Party and the editorial board of *Proletary* drew up, on the eve of the convocation of the Second Duma, the draft resolutions printed below.* We intend to give an outline of *how* the conference understood its tasks, *why* it gave first place to draft resolutions on certain questions, and *what basic ideas* were included in these resolutions.

* See pp. 133-44 of this volume.—Ed.

Item One: The Immediate Political Tasks.

In our opinion the question must not be presented to a congress of the R.S.D.L.P. *in this way* in the times we are living through. This is a revolutionary epoch. All Social-Democrats, irrespective of the groups they belong to, are agreed on this. The correctness of our postulate will be borne out by a glance at that part of the resolution adopted by the Mensheviks and the Bundists at the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in November 1906, which deals with *principles*.

In a revolutionary epoch *it is impermissible* to limit oneself to defining *immediate* political tasks, impermissible for two reasons. Firstly, in such epochs the *basic* tasks of the Social-Democratic movement are given first place, and they must be analysed in detail, not as is customary in times of "peaceful" and petty constitutional development. In the second place, *it is impermissible* to define the *immediate* political tasks, because a revolution is marked precisely by the possibility and inevitability of sharp changes, sudden turns, unexpected situations, and violent outbursts. To appreciate this, one has only to mention the possible and probable dissolution of the Left Duma and changes in the election law in the spirit of the Black Hundreds.

It was all very well for the Austrians, for instance, to define their "immediate" task as the struggle for universal suffrage, when there was every indication that the more or less peaceful epoch of uninterrupted and consistent constitutional development would continue. In our country, do not even the Mensheviks speak in the above resolution of the impossibility of a *peaceful* path, of the need to elect fighters to the Duma, and not petitioners? Do they not recognise the struggle for a constituent assembly? Try to imagine a European country with a settled constitutional system likely to endure for some time, in which such slogans as "constitutional assembly", the antithesis of "petitioner" and "fighter" in the Duma could find currency, and you will realise that the "immediate" tasks *cannot* be defined as they now are in the West. The more successful the work of the Social-Democrats and revolutionary bourgeois democrats in the Duma, the more probable will be an

outburst of struggle outside the Duma which will confront us with immediate tasks of a special kind.

No. It is not so much the immediate tasks as the proletariat's *basic* tasks at the present moment of the bourgeois revolution that have to be discussed at the Party congress. If this is not done, we shall find ourselves in the position of helpless people who lose themselves at every turn taken by events (as happened a number of times in 1906). In any case the "immediate" tasks cannot be defined, just as nobody can say whether the Second Duma and the Election Law of December 11, 1905," will last a week, a month or six months. So far, the basic tasks of the Social-Democratic proletariat in our revolution have not yet been elaborated by our Party as a whole. And without such an elaboration no mature, principled policy is possible, and no pursuit of the definition of "immediate" tasks can be successful.

The Unity Congress did not adopt a resolution with an appraisal of the present moment or a definition of the proletariat's tasks in the revolution, although the necessary drafts *were* presented by both trends in the Social-Democratic Party, and the question of the appraisal of the situation stood on the agenda and was *discussed* at the congress. Consequently, the importance of these questions was recognised by *everybody*, though the majority at the Stockholm Congress considered that *at that time* they had not been made sufficiently clear. An analysis of these questions must be resumed. We must examine: firstly, the nature of the present revolutionary situation from the standpoint of the general tendencies of social, economic and political development; secondly, the political grouping of classes (and parties) in Russia today; thirdly, the basic tasks of the Social-Democratic Labour Party in *this* situation and with *this* political grouping of the social forces.

We do not, of course, close our eyes to the fact that some Mensheviks (and perhaps the Central Committee) understood the question of the immediate political tasks to be simply one of supporting the demand for a Duma, i.e., a Cadet, ministry.

Plekhanov, with his customary—of course, highly praiseworthy—impetuosity in pushing the Mensheviks fur-

ther to the Right, has already risen in defence of this demand in *Russkaya Zhizn* (February 23).

We believe that this is an important but *subordinate* question, which Marxists cannot pose separately, without an assessment of the present situation in our revolution, without an assessment of the class content of the Constitutional-Democratic Party and its entire political role today. To reduce this question to pure politicising, to the "principle" of the ministry's responsibility to the Chamber in a constitutional system in general, would mean wholly abandoning the point of view of the class struggle and going over to the point of view of the liberal.

For this reason, our conference linked the question of the Cadet ministry with the assessment of the present situation in the revolution.

In the appropriate resolution we, first and foremost, begin, in the preamble, with the question which all Marxists recognise as basic, that of the economic crisis and the economic condition of the masses. The conference adopted the formula: "the crisis shows no signs of early abatement". This formula is probably far too cautious. But it is, of course, important for the Social-Democratic Party to establish indisputable facts, note the basic features, and leave a scholarly elaboration of it to Party literature.

We affirm that on account of the crisis (point two of the preamble) there has been a sharpening of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie (an undoubted fact, and the manifestations of this sharpening are common knowledge), and also a sharpening of the social struggle in the countryside. There are, in the countryside, no outstanding events that make themselves prominent, like lock-outs, but such government measures as the November agrarian laws⁷⁶ ("bribery of the peasant bourgeoisie") prove that the struggle is growing sharper, that the landlords are compelled to devote their efforts to splitting the peasantry in order to weaken the pressure exerted by the peasantry as a whole.

What these efforts will ultimately lead to we do not know. All "uncompleted" (Marx's expression) bourgeois revolutions "ended" with the defection of the well-to-do peasantry to the side of law and order. In any case, Social-

Democracy must do everything possible to develop the political consciousness of the widest strata of the peasantry, and make clear to them the class struggle that is going on in the countryside.

Further, the third point states the basic fact in the political history of Russia for the past year—the “rightward” swing of the upper and the “leftward” swing of the lower classes. We thought that, particularly in a revolutionary epoch, Social-Democracy should, at its congresses, *sum up* the periods of social development, *applying* its own Marxist methods of analysis to them and *teaching* other classes to glance back and view political events from the standpoint of *principle*, not from the standpoint of the interests of the moment or the achievements of a few days in the way the bourgeoisie do—the bourgeoisie actually despise all theory and are afraid of any class analysis of recent history.

The strengthening of the extremes means the weakening of the Centre. The Centre—that is the Cadets, not the Octobrists as some Social-Democrats (Martov among them) erroneously thought. What is the *objective* historical task of that party? That is a question the Marxists must answer if they want to remain true to their theory. The resolution answers: “*to halt* the revolution by offering concessions *acceptable* [since the Constitutional-Democrats favour a voluntary agreement] to the Black-Hundred landlords and the autocracy”. In Karl Kautsky’s well-known book *The Social Revolution* it was made perfectly clear that reform differs from revolution in that it preserves the power of the oppressor class which suppresses the insurrection of the oppressed by means of concessions *that are acceptable* to the oppressors and do not *destroy* their power.

The liberal bourgeoisie’s objective task in the bourgeois-democratic revolution is precisely that—to preserve the monarchy and the landlord class at the cost of “reasonable” concessions.

Is this task a feasible one? That depends on circumstances. The Marxist cannot admit that it is absolutely infeasible. But *such* an outcome of the bourgeois revolution signifies: (1) a minimum of freedom for the development of the productive forces of bourgeois society (the economic

progress of Russia would undoubtedly be more rapid if landed proprietorship were abolished by the revolution than if it were reformed as planned by the Cadets); (2) the basic needs of the popular masses would not be met and (3) it would be necessary to suppress those masses *by force*. The Cadets' "peaceful" constitutional development *cannot be effected* except by the suppression of the masses. This is something we must never forget, something we must make the masses fully conscious of. The Cadet "social peace" is peace for the land and factory owner, the "peace" of a *suppressed* peasants' and workers' insurrection.

Repressions by Stolypin's military courts and the Cadet "reforms" are the two hands of one and the same oppressor.

II

Eight days have elapsed since our first article on this subject was published, and a number of important events in political life have confirmed the truth of what we then said, and have cast the glaring light of an "accomplished *fact*" (or one that is still being accomplished?) on the urgent questions dealt with.

The Cadet swing to the Right has already made itself felt in the Duma. The Rodichevs' support of Stolypin in preaching moderation, caution, legality, tranquillity, and not arousing the people, and Stolypin's support for Rodichev, his famous "all-round" support, are now fact."

This fact has fully borne out the correctness of our analysis of the present political situation, an analysis made in the draft resolutions compiled between February 15 and 18, *before* the opening of the Second Duma. We refused to accept the Central Committee's proposal and to discuss "immediate political tasks". We showed that such a proposal was absolutely groundless in a revolutionary epoch, and we substituted the question of the fundamentals of socialist policy in the bourgeois revolution for the question of a policy for the moment.

And a week of revolutionary development has followed the pattern we anticipated.

On the last occasion, we examined the preamble to our draft resolution. The central feature of that part of the draft was a statement to the effect that the weakened party of the "Centre", that is, the bourgeois-liberal Constitutional-Democratic Party, was striving to halt the revolution by means of concessions acceptable to the Black-Hundred landowners and the autocracy.

It was only yesterday, as it were, that Plekhanov and his Right-wing following in the R.S.D.L.P. asserted that this Bolshevik idea, which we persistently defended throughout 1906 (and even earlier, ever since 1905, ever since the publication of the pamphlet *Two Tactics*), was a semi-fantastic surmise born of rebel views on the role of our bourgeoisie, or that it was to say the least an untimely warning, etc.

Today *everyone* can see that we were right. The "striving" of the Cadets is *beginning* to materialise, and even a newspaper like *Tovarishch*, which probably more than any other hates Bolshevism for its ruthless exposure of the Cadets, said, with reference to the rumours,* refuted by *Rech*, of negotiations between the Cadets and the Black-Hundred government, that "there is no smoke without fire".

We can only welcome this revival of "Bolshevik week" in *Tovarishch*. We can only mention that *history has confirmed the correctness of all our warnings and slogans*; history has exposed the thoughtlessness (thoughtlessness at best) of those "democrats"—and, unfortunately, of some Social-Democrats—who would not accept our criticism of the Cadets.

Who said, at the time of the First Duma, that the Cadets were bargaining with the government behind the backs of

* These lines had already been written when we read the following in the *Rech* leading article for March 13: "When the exact details of the notorious negotiations between the Cadets and the government in June of last year are published, the country will learn that if the Cadets can be reproached for anything in connection with these negotiations behind the 'backs of the people', it is for that obstinacy of which *Rossiia*⁷⁸ speaks." Of course, "when they are published"! But so far the Cadets, despite the challenges that have been made, have not published "exact details" of the negotiations in June 1906, or those of January 1907 (January 15—Milyukov's visit to Stolypin), or those of March 1907. Nevertheless the negotiations *behind the backs of the people* are a fact.

the people? The Bolsheviks did. And then it turned out that a personage like Trepov was in favour of a Cadet ministry.

Who conducted the most energetic campaign of all for the exposure of Milyukov's visit to Stolypin on January 15 at the height of the election struggle (allegedly a struggle) of the party of so-called people's freedom against the government? The Bolsheviks did.

Who, at the election meetings in St. Petersburg and during the first days of the Second Duma (see *Novy Luch*), recalled that in 1906 the loan of 2,000 million francs was actually a gift made to Dubasov & Co., with the indirect aid of the Constitutional-Democrats, who rejected Clemenceau's formal proposal to come out openly, in the name of the party, against that loan? The Bolsheviks did.

Who, *on the eve* of the Second Duma, made the exposure of the "*treacherous nature* of Constitutional-Democratic policy" the corner-stone of their policy of consistent (i.e., proletarian) democracy? The Bolsheviks did.

All talk of supporting the demand for a Duma ministry or a responsible ministry, or the demand to subordinate executive to legislative power, etc., was blown away like down by the first breeze that blew. Plckhanov's dream of making this slogan the signal for a decisive battle, or the means of educating the masses, proved to be the dream of a well-meaning philistine. Probably no one would now dare give such slogans serious support. Experience has shown—or, rather, is beginning to show—that the issue involved is by no means the "principle" of a fuller or more consistent implementation of "constitutional fundamentals", but the fact of a *deal made between the Cadets and the reactionaries*. Experience has shown that those were right who behind the liberal exterior of an allegedly progressive general principle, recognised and demonstrated the narrow class interests of the frightened liberal who gave pleasant names to disgusting and filthy things.

The correctness of the conclusions of our first resolution has, therefore, been confirmed much sooner than we could have expected, and confirmed much more satisfactorily—by history and not by logic, by deeds and not by words, by the events of the revolution and not by the edicts of the Social-Democrats.

First conclusion: "the political crisis that is developing before our eyes is not a constitutional but a revolutionary crisis leading to a direct struggle of the proletariat and the peasant masses against the autocracy."

Second conclusion, proceeding directly from the first: "the forthcoming Duma campaign must therefore be regarded merely as one of the episodes in the people's revolutionary struggle for power, and must be utilised as such."

What is the essential difference between a constitutional and a revolutionary crisis? The difference is that the former may be resolved on the basis of existing fundamental laws and institutions of the state, while the latter requires the smashing of those laws and feudal institutions. Until now, the idea expressed in our conclusions has been shared by all Russian Social-Democrats, irrespective of group.

It is only recently that there has been a growth of that tendency among the Mensheviks which inclines to the opposite view, to the view that all thought of a revolutionary struggle should be abandoned, that we should stop at the present "constitution", and use it as ground to work on. Here are some noteworthy points from the draft resolution on the attitude to the State Duma compiled by "Comrades Dan, Koltsov, Martynov, Martov, Negorev and others, with a group of practicians participating"; it was published in *Russkaya Zhizn*, No. 47* (and also as a separate leaflet):

"...(2) the task of the direct struggle for power that is becoming the central feature of the Russian revolution, is, under the existing alignment of social forces [?], reduced [?] mainly to the question [?] of the struggle for [?] popular representation;

"...(3) the elections to the Second Duma, by revealing a considerable number of consistent [?] supporters of the revolution, have shown that among the masses of the people there is a growing consciousness of the necessity for this [?] struggle for power...."

No matter how muddled and evasive the wording of these points may be, the trend is clearly visible—instead of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the

* February 24, 1907.

peasantry for power, *reduce* the tasks of the workers' party to that of the *liberal* struggle for the *existing* popular representation or on the basis of it. We must wait and see whether all Mensheviks, at the present moment or at the Fifth Congress, really accept this presentation of the question.

In any case, the rightward swing of the Cadets and Stolypin's "all-round" approval of them will soon compel the Right wing in our Party to make an issue of the question: either continue the policy of support for the Cadets and thereby irrevocably enter on the path of opportunism, or discontinue all support of the Cadets and accept the policy of the socialist independence of the proletariat and of the struggle for the liberation of the democratic petty bourgeoisie from the influence and hegemony of the Cadets.

The third conclusion drawn by our resolution is that, "as the party of the advanced class, the Social-Democratic Party cannot under any circumstances at present support the Cadet policy in general or a Cadet ministry in particular. The Social-Democrats must bend every effort to expose the treacherous nature of this policy to the masses; they must explain to them the revolutionary tasks confronting them; they must show the masses that only when they attain a high level of political consciousness and are strongly organised can possible concessions by the autocracy be converted from an instrument of deception and corruption into an instrument for the further development of the revolution."

We do not altogether deny the possibility of partial concessions, and do not say that we shall not take advantage of them. The text of the resolution does not leave any doubt on this score. It is also possible that a Cadet ministry will in some way or another come under the heading of "concessions by the autocracy". But the party of the working class, while not rejecting this "payment on account" (Engels's expression)," must under no circumstances forget the other particularly important aspect of the matter, which is often lost sight of by the liberals and opportunists—the role of "concessions" as *an instrument of deception and corruption*.

If the Social-Democrat does not want to turn into a bourgeois reformist, he must never forget this aspect of the matter. The Mensheviks unpardonably forget it when, in the aforementioned resolution, they say, "...Social-Democracy will support *all efforts* of the Duma to subordinate executive power to itself...". "Efforts of the Duma" means the efforts of the majority in the Duma. The Duma majority may, as experience has shown, be formed from Rights and Constitutional-Democrats *against* the Lefts. "The efforts" of such a majority could *subordinate* "executive power" to itself *in such a way* as to worsen the condition of the people, or deceive them outright.

Let us hope that the Mensheviks are merely over-enthusiastic in this respect: that they will not support *all* the efforts of the majority in the present Duma in this field. It is typical, of course, that prominent leaders of Menshevism *could* have accepted such a formulation.

The Cadets' swing to the Right actually compels *all* Social-Democrats, irrespective of group allegiance, to adopt the policy of refusing to support the Cadets, to adopt the policy of exposing their treachery, the policy of an independent and consistent revolutionary party of the working class.

HOW NOT TO WRITE RESOLUTIONS**

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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One must thank the Menshevik comrades for publishing in *Russkaya Zhizn*, No. 47 (February 24), the first draft of a resolution (prepared by Comrades Dan, Koltsov, Martynov, Martov, Negorev and others, with a group of practitioners participating). (It has also been published as a separate leaflet.) To prepare seriously for the Party congress, we must publish draft resolutions beforehand, and analyse them in detail.

The resolution deals with the attitude to the State Duma.
Point 1:

"At the present moment, after seven months' rule of the most unbridled dictatorship that has failed to meet with organised counteraction on the part of the terrorised masses, the activity of the State Duma, by arousing the interest of those masses in the political life of the country, can and must facilitate their mobilisation and the development of their political activity."

What do they mean by this? That it is better with a Duma than without one? Or is this an approach to the idea that the "Duma must be preserved"? It seems that this is actually the authors' idea. Only it is not expressed, but merely hinted at. Resolutions cannot be compiled of hints.

Point 2:

"The task of the direct struggle for power that is rising to [probably a misprint *—it should read "is becoming"] the central feature of the Russian revolution, is, under the existing alignment of social forces, reduced mainly to the question of the struggle for popular representation."

It was not for nothing that this point won praise from *Rech* (the leading article of February 27: "for Russian

* The two words are somewhat similar in Russian, one having the prefix *voz-* and the other the prefix *vy-*.—*Tr.*

Social-Democracy this is a tremendous step forward... the success of political consciousness"). And it is, indeed, really a monstrous point.

How can the task of the struggle for power be reduced to the *question* of the "struggle for popular representation"?! What is meant by "the struggle *for* popular representation"? What is this "existing alignment of social forces"? The previous point has only just said that the "seven months' rule of the most unbridled dictatorship has failed to meet with organised counteraction on the part of the terrorised masses". Surely the absence of the organised resistance of the masses during those seven months, accompanied by an obvious and extensive swing of the masses to the Left which was made clear by the elections at the end of the seven months, can tell us something about the "alignment of social forces".

This is some sort of almost unbelievable confusion in political thinking.

The alignment of social forces has obviously changed during the past half-year in the sense that the "Centre", the liberals, have weakened; the extremes, the Black Hundreds and the "Lefts" have grown stronger and more virile. The elections to the Second Duma proved this irrefutably. There is, therefore a *more revolutionary* alignment of social forces in consequence of the sharpening of political contradictions (*and economic contradictions, too—lock-outs, hunger strikes, etc.*). By what miracle could our Mensheviks draw the opposite conclusion that made them weaken the revolutionary tasks ("the struggle for power") and bring them down to the level of mere liberal tasks ("the struggle for popular representation")?

"An unbridled dictatorship" and a Left Duma—obviously the *opposite* conclusion is to be drawn from this; the liberal task of struggling on the basis of popular representation, or for the preservation of that representation, is a petty-bourgeois utopia because, by force of objective circumstances, such a task *cannot be carried out* without "a direct struggle for power".

Menshevik political thinking moves forward crabwise.

The conclusion to be drawn from the second point is this: the Mensheviks have abandoned the revolutionary

Social-Democratic position for the liberal position. The "nebulousness" of the conclusion of the second point ("the struggle for popular representation") *actually* expresses the idea of the liberal bourgeoisie who pretend that it is not they who are "terrorised" by the revolution but "the masses of the people who are terrorised", and use this as an excuse to reject the revolutionary struggle ("the direct struggle for power") in favour of the allegedly legal struggle ("the struggle for popular representation"). Stolypin will probably soon teach the Mensheviks the meaning of "the struggle for popular representation" under "the existing alignment of social forces!"

Point 3:

"The elections to the Second Duma, by revealing a considerable number of consistent supporters of the revolution, have shown that among the masses of the people there is a growing consciousness of the necessity for this struggle for power."

What is this? What does it mean? In Point 2 the substitution of the struggle for representation for the struggle for power was deduced from the existing alignment of social forces, and now a growing consciousness among the masses of the necessity for "*this*" struggle for power is deduced from the election results!

This, comrades, is muddled. It should be rewritten as something like the following. Point Two—"The elections to the Second Duma showed that among the masses of the people there is a growing consciousness of the necessity for a direct struggle for power." Point Three—"The striving of the liberal bourgeoisie to limit its political activity to a struggle on the basis of the present popular representation, therefore, expresses the hopeless stupidity of our liberals on the ideological side, and, on the material side, their striving (impracticable at the present moment) to halt the revolution by making a deal with reaction." If, in addition to this, our Marxists were to try and define, in Point 1, the economic causes that brought about this sharpening of political extremes among the people, they could have made something coherent out of it.

And then, what is meant by "consistent supporters of the revolution"? Apparently, what is meant here is petty-bourgeois democrats, mainly peasant democrats, i.e., the

Trudoviks (in the broad sense, including the Popular Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries), since the Second Duma differs from the First precisely in this respect. But, in the first place, this again is a hint, and resolutions are not compiled of hints. And, secondly, *it is all untrue*, comrades! For calling the Trudoviks "consistent supporters of the revolution" we ought formally to accuse you of *Socialist-Revolutionary heresy*. Only the proletariat can be the consistent (in the strict sense of the word) supporter of the bourgeois revolution, because the class of small producers, small proprietors, must *inevitably vacillate* between the proprietary urge and the revolutionary urge—for instance, the Socialist-Revolutionaries at the St. Petersburg elections wavered between the urge to sell themselves to the Cadets and the urge to give battle to the Cadets.

You will therefore agree with us, comrades, that we must express ourselves more cautiously—approximately in the way the Bolshevik resolution is worded (see *Novy Luch*, February 27):*

"... the Trudovik parties ... come *more or less close* to expressing the interests and viewpoint of the broad masses of the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie, *wavering* between submission to the leadership of the liberals [the elections in St. Petersburg, the election of a Cadet as Chairman of the Duma] and a determined struggle against landed proprietorship and the feudal state...."

Incidentally, we must mention that in this resolution, Comrade Koltsov (with other Mensheviks) places the Trudoviks among the consistent supporters of the revolution, but in *Russkaya Zhizn*, No. 49, that same Koltsov places them among the rural democrats, which, *as distinct from the urban democrats* (i.e., from the Cadets) "will in many cases defend old, outworn modes of production and social organisation". That doesn't sound very coherent, comrades!

Point 4:

"The presence of such consistent supporters of the revolution in the Duma, arousing and strengthening the confidence of the masses in that institution, makes it more easily possible for it to become the real centre of the people's struggle for liberty and power."

* See pp. 137-38 of this volume.—Ed.

The conclusion is a "pleasant" one, say what you will. But again the logic is lame. With this point the Mensheviks conclude the preamble to their resolution. *On this question* they do not utter a single word more in the resolution. And so the conclusion is a lame one.

If the "consistent supporters of the revolution" do not constitute a majority in the Duma, but only "a considerable number" (as is said—and rightly so—in Point 3), it is clear that there are also opponents of the revolution and *inconsistent* supporters of the revolution. That means that there is the "*possibility*" of the Duma as a whole "becoming a real centre" of *inconsistent* democratic politics and not of "the people's struggle for liberty and power".

In such a case one of two things would happen: (1) either the confidence of the masses in that institution would not be aroused and strengthened, but would be reduced and weakened, or (2) the political consciousness of the masses would be corrupted on account of their mistaking the policy of inconsistent supporters of the revolution for a consistent democratic policy.

From this it is perfectly clear that a conclusion, for some reason or other omitted by them, follows *inevitably* from the premises *put forward by the Mensheviks*—the party of the proletariat, of the consistent supporter of the revolution, must work persistently to ensure that those who are not fully consistent supporters of the revolution (the Trudoviks, for instance) should follow the working class *against* the inconsistent supporters of the revolution, particularly against the *notorious* supporters of *stopping* the revolution (the Cadets, for instance).

As a result of the absence of this conclusion in the Mensheviks' draft they are quite unable to be consistent. It amounts to this: *inasmuch* as there are a considerable number of "consistent supporters of the revolution" in the Duma, votes should be given to ... those who are known to be in favour of halting the revolution!

This doesn't sound very good, does it, comrades?

The concluding part of the resolution (taking it point by point) is as follows:

"Social-Democracy, while exposing the illusory conception that the State Duma is really a legislative body, explains to the masses,

on the one hand, the real nature of the Duma, which is actually an advisory body, and, on the other, the possibility and necessity of using that body, despite its imperfections, to serve the purpose of a further struggle for popular power, and participates in the legislative work of the Duma, being guided by the following principles:..."

This is a *weaker* expression of the idea that was *more strongly* expressed in the Fourth (Unity) Congress resolution in the part which speaks of "converting" the Duma into an "instrument of the revolution", of making the masses conscious of the "utter insuitability" of the Duma, etc.

"I. (a) Social-Democracy criticises, from the standpoint of the interests of the urban and rural proletariat and from that of consistent democratism, the proposals and bills of all non-proletarian parties, and puts forward its own demands and proposals in opposition to them; in this field it connects immediate political tasks with the social and economic needs of the proletarian masses and with the requirements of the working-class movement in all its forms.

"*Note.* Whenever circumstances demand it, Social-Democracy supports, as a lesser evil, those bills of other parties which, if put into force, could become an instrument in the hands of the masses for use in the revolutionary struggle to attain real democratic liberty...."

This note expresses the idea of the necessity for Social-Democrats to participate in *bourgeois-reformist* work in the Duma. Is it not too early for this, comrades? Have you yourselves not said that the concept of the Duma as a real legislative body is an illusory one? You want to support *those* bourgeois bills that could be of benefit to the further struggle *if they were put into force*.

Think over this condition—"if they were put into force". The purpose of your support is to facilitate the implementation of the "lesser evil". But it is not the Duma that implements it, but the Duma plus the Council of State⁸¹ plus the supreme authority! This means that there is *absolutely no* guarantee that by giving your support you are facilitating the implementation of the "lesser evil". And by supporting the "lesser evil", by voting for it, you are taking *upon yourselves*, upon the proletarian party, some small part of the responsibility for half-way bourgeois reformism, for what is, in essence, the Duma's work of *sham* legislation, which you yourselves admit to be sham legislation!

For what reason should you extend this risky "support"? There *is* the risk that it will cause a *direct* enfeeblement of that *revolutionary* consciousness of the masses to which you are yourselves appealing—and its *practical* value is "illusory"!

You are not writing a resolution on reformist work *in general* (in which case it would be necessary to say merely that Social-Democracy does not renounce it); you are writing about the *Second Duma*. You have already said that there are a considerable number of "consistent supporters of the revolution" in *this* Duma. You therefore have in mind a Duma with a party composition that is *already defined*. That is a fact. You know that in the present Duma there are not only "*consistent* * supporters of the revolution" but also "inconsistent supporters of reforms"—not only Lefts and Trudoviks but also Cadets, these last-named *in themselves* being stronger than the Rights (Cadets and their allies, the Narodowci among them, being about 150 against 100 Rights). With this situation in the Duma, *there is no need* for you to support the "lesser evil" for the sake of its implementation; it is quite enough for you *to abstain* in the struggle between the reactionaries and the "inconsistent supporters of reforms". The practical result (as far as the implementation of laws is concerned) will be the same, but as far as the ideological and political aspect is concerned, your undoubted gain will be the integrity, purity, consistency and conviction of your position as a party of the revolutionary proletariat.

Is this a circumstance that revolutionary Social-Democracy can afford to ignore?

The Meusheviki are looking upward instead of looking downward. They are looking more to the feasibility of the "lesser evil" by means of a deal between the "inconsistent supporters of reforms" and the reactionaries (for such is the real meaning of the implementation of bills) than to the development of political consciousness and of potentialities for struggle in the "consistent supporters of the revolution", of whom, according to their own words, "there

* I ask the reader to bear in mind the necessity for the correction to this word I made earlier in the article.

are a considerable number" in the Duma. The Mensheviks themselves are looking, and *are teaching the people to look*, for an agreement between the Cadets and the autocracy (the implementation of the "lesser evil", of reforms), and not to the possibility of turning the attention of the more or less "consistent supporters of the revolution" *to the masses*. This is a liberal, not a proletarian policy. This means that in word you are announcing the illusory nature of the Duma's legislative powers, and in deed are strengthening the people's faith in legislative reforms through the Duma and weakening their faith in revolutionary struggle.

Be more consistent and more honest, Menshevik comrades! If you are convinced that the revolution is over, if absence of faith in the revolution results from this conviction of yours (perhaps arrived at along scientific lines?), then there is no need to talk of revolution, then you must reduce *your* immediate aims to the struggle for reforms.

If you believe what you say, if you really believe that "a considerable number" of deputies to the Second Duma are "consistent supporters of the revolution", you should give *priority*, not to support (support that is useless in practice and harmful ideologically) for reforms, but to raising the level of the revolutionary consciousness of those supporters, to consolidating their revolutionary organisation and determination under the direct pressure of the proletariat.

Otherwise you would arrive at the height of illogicality and confusion; *in the name* of the development of the *revolution*, a working-class party does not, *by a single word*, define its tasks in respect of the more or less "consistent supporters of the revolution", but instead devotes a special note to the task of supporting the "lesser evil", the inconsistent supporters of *reforms*!

The "note" should be rewritten something like this: "In view of the fact that there are a considerable number of more or less consistent supporters of the revolution in the Duma, the Social-Democrats in the Duma must, when discussing those bills which the inconsistent supporters of reforms wish to implement, pay critical attention chiefly to the half-and-half nature and unreliability of those bills, to the agreement therein contained between the liberals

and the reactionaries, and to explaining to the more or less consistent supporters of the revolution the necessity for a decisive and ruthless revolutionary struggle. During the voting on those bills which constitute the lesser evil, the Social-Democrats abstain from voting and leave the liberals themselves to 'conquer' reaction on paper and to answer to the people for the implementation of 'liberal' reforms under the autocracy."

"...(b) The Social-Democrats make use of the discussion on various bills and on the state budget in order to expose, not only the negative sides of the existing regime, but also all the class contradictions of bourgeois society...."

An excellent aim. In order to expose the class contradictions of bourgeois society, the parties must be associated with classes. We must struggle against the "non-party", "single opposition" spirit in the Duma, and ruthlessly *expose* the narrow class character of, for instance, the Cadets, who claim *more than anybody to conceal* "class contradictions" by the catchword of "people's freedom".

We would like the Mensheviks not only to speak of exposing the class contradictions of bourgeois society (and "*not only*" of the infamy of the autocracy), *but also to do that....*

"...(c) On the question of the budget the Social-Democrats are guided by the principle: 'not a kopek for a non-responsible government'...."

A good principle, which would be really excellent if, instead of "non-responsible" some *other* word were used indicating, not the government's responsibility to the Duma (a fiction under the present "constitution"), but its "responsibility" to the supreme authority (this is not fiction but *reality*, since the people have no actual power, and the Mensheviks themselves speak of the impending "struggle for power").

It should read: "not a kopek for the government until all power is vested in the people".

"II. The Social-Democrats make use of the right to interpellation in order to expose to the people the true nature of the present government and the fact that all its actions are contradictory to the interests of the people; to explain the condition of the working class

in town and countryside, and the conditions of that class's struggle for the improvement of its political and economic position; to throw light on the role played, in respect of the working class, by the government and its agents and by the propertied classes and the political parties that represent them...."

A very good point. Only it is a pity that till now (March 19) our Social-Democrats in the Duma have made little use of the right to interpellation.

"...III. By maintaining the closest contact with the working-class masses in the course of this work, and striving, through their legislative activities, to give expression to the organised working-class movement, the Social-Democrats foster organisation of the workers, and of the masses of the people in general, to support the Duma in its struggle against the old regime and to create conditions enabling the Duma to carry its activities beyond the bounds of the fundamental laws that hamper it...."

First: one cannot speak of the "legislative" activities of the Social-Democrats. One should say "Duma activities".

Secondly: the slogan—"support the Duma in its struggle against the old regime"—does not in any way accord with the premises of the resolution, and is incorrect in essence.

The preamble to the resolution speaks of the revolutionary struggle *for power* and of the presence in the Duma of "a considerable number of consistent supporters of the revolution".

Why is the perfectly clear, revolutionary category of "struggle for power" changed here to a diffuse "struggle against the old regime", that is, to an expression that actually includes the *reformist* struggle? Should not the motives in the preamble be changed so that, in place of an "illusory" struggle for power, "the task of struggling for reforms" should be advanced?

Why should you speak here of *the masses* giving support to "the Duma" and not to the "consistent supporters of the revolution"? It appears that the Mensheviks call on the masses to support the *inconsistent* supporters of reforms! It doesn't sound very good, does it, comrades?

Lastly, the words about supporting the "Duma" in its struggle against the old regime *in effect* engender *completely incorrect* ideas. To support the Duma means to support the *majority* in the Duma. The majority is the *Cadets* plus

the Trudoviks. Which means that you, by implication, i.e., without saying so directly, are providing a *characteristic* for the Cadets—they “are struggling against the old regime”.

This characteristic is untrue and incomplete. Such things are not said by dropping half a hint. They have to be stated clearly and directly. The Cadets are *not* “struggling against the old regime”, but are trying to *reform that old regime*, to renew it, by coming to *an agreement*, as is now perfectly clear and obvious, with the old authorities.

Saying nothing about this in the resolution, keeping it in the shade, means lapsing from the proletarian into the liberal point of view.

“... IV. By this activity of theirs the Social-Democrats aid the development of the popular movement aimed at winning a constituent assembly, and will support, as a stage in this struggle of the people, all the efforts of the State Duma to subordinate the executive power to itself, in this way clearing the soil for the transfer of all state power into the hands of the people...”

This is the most important point in the resolution, and it contains the notorious slogan of a “Duma”, or “responsible” ministry. This point must be examined from the standpoint of its wording and of its meaning.

The point is worded in an extremely peculiar way. The Mensheviks must know that this is one of the most important questions. And they must know that this slogan has once *already been proposed* by the Central Committee of our Party—at the time of the First Duma—and that at that time *the Party did not accept the slogan*. This is so perfectly true that not even the Social-Democratic group in the *First Duma*—consisting, as we know, *exclusively* of Mensheviks and having as its leader such an outstanding Menshevik as Comrade Jordania—even that group did not accept the slogan of a “responsible ministry”, and *did not once* include it in any Duma speech!

It would seem that this is more than enough for a particularly attentive attitude to the question. But instead, we have before us the most carelessly worded point in a resolution, on the whole, insufficiently considered.

Why has this new, far more hazy formulation been selected instead of a *clear-cut* slogan of a “responsible

ministry" (Plekhanov in *Russkaya Zhizn*) or a "ministry of the Duma majority" (the resolution of the C.C. in the period of the First Duma)? Is this only a rephrasing of that same "responsible ministry", or is it something different? Let us examine these questions.

How could the Duma subordinate executive power to itself? Either legally, on the basis of the present (or a slightly changed) monarchist constitution, or illegally, "carrying its activities beyond the bounds of the fundamental laws that hamper it", overthrowing the old power, turning itself into a revolutionary convention, into a provisional government, etc. The first possibility is precisely that which is usually expressed by the words "a Duma, or responsible, ministry". The second possibility means active participation on the part of the "Duma" (i.e., the majority in the Duma) in the direct revolutionary struggle for power. There can be no other way of subordinating executive power to the Duma, and there is no sense in here raising the particular question of how the different ways could be interwoven; we are not confronted with the academic, scientific question of what situations are, in general, possible, but with the practical political question of what the Social-Democrats should, and should not, support in the Duma.

The conclusion to be drawn from this is obvious. The new wording seems to have been deliberately planned to *conceal* the essence of the point at issue, the real will of the congress, of which the resolution should be an expression. The slogan of a "responsible ministry" has been and still is the cause of sharp disputes between Social-Democrats. Support for revolutionary Duma measures has not only never given rise to sharp disputes, but has probably never led to any differences among Social-Democrats. What should be said about people who have proposed a resolution that *glosses over* differences by uniting the disputed and the indisputable in one general, diffuse formulation? What is to be said about people who have proposed that a decision of the congress should be recorded in words that do not decide anything but enable some readers to understand these words as meaning revolutionary measures by the Duma, "beyond the bounds", etc., and others to under-

stand by them a deal concluded between Milyukov and Stolypin on the Cadets joining the ministry?

The politest thing that can be said about people who act in this way is that they are retreating, casting a veil over the once openly expressed and clear-cut programme of support for a Cadet ministry.

In future, therefore, we shall disregard this muddled wording, which hopelessly confuses the issue. We shall speak only of *the essence* of the question, that of supporting the demand for a "responsible" (or a Cadet—which is the same thing) ministry.

How does the resolution motivate this necessity to support the demand for a Duma or responsible ministry? By the statement that "it is a stage in the people's struggle for a constituent assembly", that it is "a basis for the transfer of all power into the hands of the people". This is the *whole* of the motive. We shall answer it with a brief summary of our arguments against Social-Democracy supporting the demand for a Duma ministry.

(1) It is absolutely impermissible for a Marxist to confine himself to the abstract juridical contraposition of a "responsible" to a "non-responsible" ministry, a "Duma" ministry to an autocratic ministry, etc., in the way Plekhanov does in *Russkaya Zhizn* and in the way the Mensheviks have always done in their analysis of this question. It is a liberal-idealist, not proletarian-materialist, argument.

The class significance of the measures under discussion must be studied. If this is done, it will be understood that their content is a bargain, or an attempt at a bargain, between the autocracy and the liberal bourgeoisie to put an end to the revolution. That is precisely the objective economic significance of a Duma ministry. The Bolsheviks, therefore, had every right and reason to say that a Duma, or responsible, ministry is in actual fact a Cadet ministry. The Mensheviks were angry and shouted about trickery, juggling, etc. But they were angry because they did not want to *understand* the Bolshevik arguments, which *reduced* the juridical fiction (a Duma ministry would be "responsible" to the monarch rather than to the Duma, to the liberal landlords rather than to the people!) to its class basis. And no matter how angry Comrade Martov may get, no

matter how vehemently he may argue that even now the Duma is not a Cadet Duma, he cannot by a jot lessen the indisputable conclusion: *in essence*, the case is *precisely* one of a Cadet ministry, since that bourgeois liberal party is the *gist* of the matter. A possible coalition Duma ministry (Cadets, plus Octobrists, plus "non-party", plus, even, any kind of "Trudovik" or alleged "Left", etc.) would not in any way change the essence of the matter. To evade the essence of the matter in the way the Mensheviks and Plekhanov do means to evade Marxism.

Support for the demand for a Duma, or "responsible", ministry is, at bottom, support for Cadet policy in general and a Cadet ministry in particular (as was said in the first Bolshevik draft resolution for the Fifth Congress). Whoever is afraid to admit this is thereby admitting the weakness of his position, the weakness of the arguments in favour of Social-Democratic support for the Cadets in general.

We have always maintained, and still maintain, that the Social-Democrats cannot support a deal between the autocracy and the liberal bourgeoisie, a deal that aims at putting an end to the revolution.

(2) The Mensheviks always regard a Duma ministry as a step for the better, as something that will make the further struggle for the revolution easier, and the resolution under discussion clearly expresses this idea. But in this the Mensheviks are making a mistake, are being one-sided. A Marxist cannot guarantee the full victory of the present bourgeois revolution in Russia; to do so would be bourgeois-democratic idealism and utopianism. Our task is to strive for the full victory of the revolution, but we have no right to forget that there have been in the past, and there still can be, unfinished, half-and-half bourgeois revolutions.

The Mensheviks word their resolution as though a Duma ministry were an *essential* stage in the struggle for a constituent assembly, etc., etc. *This is quite untrue*. A Marxist *has no right* to examine a Duma ministry from this angle *alone*, ignoring the objective possibility of two types of economic development in Russia. A bourgeois-democratic coup is inevitable in Russia. But it is possible if the landlord system of economy is retained and gradually changed into a Junker-capitalist (Stolypin's and liberal agrarian

reform); it is also possible if the landlord system of economy is abolished and the land handed over to the peasantry (the peasant revolution, supported by the Social-Democratic agrarian programme).

The Marxist must examine the Cadet ministry from both angles and not from one alone—as a possible stage in the *struggle* for a constituent assembly, and as a possible stage in the *liquidation of the bourgeois revolution*. It is the intention of the Cadets and of Stolypin that the ministry *should* play the latter role; objective conditions are such that it *can* play both the latter and the *former* role.*

By forgetting the possibility (and the danger) of the liberals cutting short and stopping the bourgeois revolution, the Mensheviks are lapsing from the viewpoint of the class struggle of the proletariat into that of liberals, who paint the monarchy, land redemption payments, two chambers, the cessation of the revolution, etc., in such bright colours.

(3) Going over from the economic, class aspect of the question to the state, juridical aspect, it must be said that the Mensheviks regard a Duma ministry as a step towards parliamentarianism, as a reform that perfects the constitutional system and facilitates its use by the proletariat for its class struggle. This, again, is a one-sided point of view, one that sees only what pleases the eye. In the act of appointing ministers from the Duma majority (which is precisely what the Cadets wanted in the First Duma) one very significant feature of the reform is absent—there is no *legislative* recognition of certain *general* changes in the constitution. The act is to a certain extent individual, even personal. It depends on bargains, negotiations and conditions *behind the scenes*. No wonder *Rech now* (March 1907!) admits that in June 1906, there were negotiations between the Constitutional-Democrats and the government that are *still not* (!) subject to publication. Even the Cadet *Tovarishch*, which sings the Cadet tune, admitted the im-

* We make the *very best* assumption for Plekhanov and the Mensheviks, i.e., that the Cadets will put forward the demand for a Duma ministry. It is more probable that *they will not do so*. Then Plekhanov (and the Mensheviks) will be as ridiculous on account of his "support" for a slogan the liberals have not advanced, as he was with his "Duma with full powers".

permissibility of this game of hide and seek. And it is not surprising that (according to newspaper reports) Pobedonostsev could propose this measure—appoint liberal, Cadet ministers and then dissolve the Duma and replace the ministry! This would not be an abolition of the reform, or a change in the law—it would be a fully “constitutional act” by the monarch. By supporting the Cadet desire for a Duma ministry the Mensheviks were, against their own wishes and their own conscience, *in fact* supporting negotiations and deals behind the scenes, behind the backs of the people.

In so doing, the Mensheviks did not and could not obtain any “commitments” from the Cadets. They *gave* them support, on credit, and brought confusion and corruption into the consciousness of the working class.

(4) Let us make another concession to the Mensheviks. Let us imagine the best possible case, i.e., that the act of appointing the Duma ministers is not only a personal act, is not merely done for show, to deceive the people, but is the first step in real constitutional reform, *which actually does improve* the proletariat’s conditions of struggle.

Even so the Social-Democrats cannot be justified in coming out with a slogan supporting the demand for a Duma ministry.

You say that it is a stage on the way towards improvement, that it provides the ground for the future struggle? Let us suppose that it is. But would not universal, *but indirect*, suffrage also be a *probable* stage on the way towards improvement? Then why not announce that Social-Democrats support the demand for universal, *but indirect*, suffrage, as a “stage” in the struggle for the “tetrad formula”, as “ground for the transition” to that formula? Not only would the Cadets be with us in this, but even the Party of Democratic Reform¹² and part of the Octobrists! An “all-national” stage towards the people’s struggle for a constituent assembly—that is what Social-Democratic support for universal suffrage, *but indirect and not by secret ballot*, would mean!

In principle, there is absolutely no difference between supporting the demand for a Duma ministry and supporting the demand for universal suffrage that is indirect and not by secret ballot.

To justify the issue of the slogan of a "responsible ministry" by saying that it is a stage towards the better, etc., means failure to understand the fundamentals of the attitude of Social-Democracy to bourgeois reformism.

Every reform is a reform (and not a reactionary and not a conservative measure) only insofar as it constitutes a certain step, a "stage", for the better. But *every* reform in capitalist society has a *double* character. A reform is a concession made by the ruling classes *in order* to stem, weaken, or conceal the revolutionary struggle, in order to split the forces and energy of the revolutionary classes, to befog their consciousness, etc.

Therefore, revolutionary Social-Democracy, while by no means renouncing the use of reforms for the purpose of developing the revolutionary class struggle ("we accept payments on account"—*wir nehmen auch Abschlagszahlung*, said Frederick Engels⁸²), will under no circumstances make half-way bourgeois-reformist slogans "their own".*

To do so would be acting exactly as Bernstein would (Plekhanov will *have* to rehabilitate Bernstein in order to defend his present policy! No wonder Bernstein's periodical, *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, has such high praise for Plekhanov!); it would mean turning Social-Democracy into "*a democratic-socialist party of reform*" (Bernstein's notorious statement in his *Premises of Socialism*).

Social-Democracy regards reforms, and makes use of them, as a *by-product* of the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat.

And now we come to the last of our arguments against the slogan under discussion:

(5) In what way can Social-Democracy *actually* bring nearer the implementation of all kinds of reform in general, constitutional reforms in Russia in particular, and especially a Duma ministry with results beneficial to the proletariat? Can it do so by making the slogans of the bourgeois reformists "its own", or by decisively refusing to make such slogans "its own" and by continuing unswervingly to conduct the

* Plekhanov in *Russkaya Zhizn*: "...Social-Democratic deputies must make the above demand ["a responsible ministry"] *their own* in the interests of the people, in the interests of the revolution...."

revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat under the banner of complete, uncurtailed slogans? It is not difficult to answer this question.

By making bourgeois-reformist slogans that are always half-baked, always curtailed and always two-faced "our own", we are actually not strengthening but weakening the probability, possibility and proximity of the implementation of the reform. The real force giving rise to reforms is the force of the revolutionary proletariat, of its consciousness, solidarity and unwavering determination in the struggle.

These are the qualities of the *mass* movement that we weaken and paralyse by giving our bourgeois-reformist slogans to the masses. The usual bourgeois sophistry says that by conceding something from our revolutionary demands and slogans (for instance, by demanding a "Duma ministry" instead of "sovereignty of the people", or a constituent assembly as a "stage", etc.), we are making it *more* probable that this lesser measure will be *implemented*, since both the proletariat and part of the bourgeoisie will be in favour of it.

International Social-Democracy says that this is bourgeois sophistry, because we thereby lessen the probability of a reform being implemented; because, in trying to win the sympathies of the bourgeoisie, which continually makes concessions against its will, we are lessening the revolutionary consciousness of the masses, are blunting and corrupting that consciousness. We are adapting ourselves to the bourgeoisie, to *its* deal with the monarchy, and thereby harming the development of the revolutionary struggle of the masses. In consequence of all this, the reforms are either non-existent on account of these tactics or they are an unadulterated deception. The only *sound* basis for reforms, the one serious guarantee that they will not be fictitious, will be used for the benefit of the people, is the independent revolutionary struggle of the proletariat that *does not lower the level* of its slogans.

Since June 1906, the Mensheviks have been offering the masses a slogan in support of the demand for a Duma ministry. By so doing, they weaken and blunt the revolutionary consciousness of the masses, reduce the scope of agi-

tation, decrease the probability of this reform being implemented and the possibility of its being used.

We must increase revolutionary agitation among the masses; we must give wider scope to our full-fledged, uncurtailed slogans; we must develop them clearly—in *this way* we shall at best bring nearer the full victory of the revolution, and at worst we shall capture some half-concessions (such as a Duma ministry, universal, but indirect, suffrage, etc.) and give ourselves the possibility of turning them into a weapon of the revolution. Reforms are a *by-product* of the class struggle of the revolutionary proletariat. To make it “our own” business to obtain this by-product would mean lapsing into liberal bourgeois reformism.

* * *

The last point of the resolution:

“V. Regarding activities in the Duma as one of the forms of class struggle, the Social-Democratic group in the Duma retains complete independence, in each individual case entering into agreement with those parties that are interested in the struggle against the old regime for the triumph of political liberty, for aggressive action with those parties and groups whose aims at a given moment coincide with the aims of the proletariat, and for defensive action intended to preserve popular representation itself and its rights.”

The second part of this is as bad and outlandish as the first part (as far as the word “entering”) is good.

What is this ridiculous differentiation between “aggressive” and “defensive” action? Are our Mensheviks not recalling the language of *Ruskiye Vedomosti* in the nineties of the last century, when the liberals tried to prove that liberalism in Russia does the “protecting” and that reaction is “aggressive”? Just imagine: instead of the “old” division of political action into revolutionary and reformist, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, Marxists are offering us a new classification—“defensive” action “protects” what we have, “aggressive” action goes farther! Have you got a shred of conscience, Menshevik comrades? To what extent must one lose all feeling for the revolutionary class struggle before one can fail to notice the *vulgar* flavour of this differentiation between the “aggressive” and the “defensive”!

And how amusingly, like an object in a distorting mirror, does this helpless formulation reflect the *bitter* truth (bitter for the Mensheviks) that they will not openly admit! The Mensheviks are in the habit of talking about parties in general, and are afraid to name them or clearly delineate them; they are in the habit of casting the veil of generic names over them—"oppositional-democratic parties"—over Cadets and Lefts alike. Now they feel that a change is coming. They feel that the *liberals* are now actually capable of doing nothing more than *protect* (by means of genuflection, in the same way as *Russkiye Vedomosti* "protected" the Zemstvos⁸⁴ in the eighties!) the existing Duma and the existing (pardon the word) "constitution" of ours. The Mensheviks feel that the liberal bourgeoisie cannot and does not want to go farther (be "aggressive"—since such nasty terms exist!). And the Mensheviks have displayed this vague consciousness of the true in amusing and extremely confused wording that means literally that the Social-Democrats are capable, *at some time*, of entering into an agreement for action "whose aims" *do not* coincide with the aims of the proletariat!

This final chord of the Menshevik resolution, this amusing fear of telling *the truth* openly and clearly—i.e., that the liberal bourgeoisie, the Constitutional-Democrats, have completely ceased to help the revolution—magnificently expresses the whole spirit of the resolution under consideration.

INSTEAD OF AN AFTERWORD

The above lines had been written when I received the resolution passed by the February (1907) Conference of the League of the Estonian Area of the R.S.D.L.P.⁸⁵

Two Menshevik comrades, M. and A., spoke (presumably from the Central Committee) at this conference. During the discussion on the question of the State Duma they apparently tabled *that very resolution* that I have analysed above. It will be extremely instructive to see *what amendments* the Estonian Social-Democrat comrades made to this resolution. Here is the resolution in full, as passed by the conference:

ON THE ATTITUDE TO THE STATE DUMA

"The State Duma has neither the authority nor the force to satisfy the needs of the people because power is still in the hands of the enemies of the people, the tsarist autocracy, the bureaucracy and a handful of landlords. The Social-Democrats, therefore, must ruthlessly destroy the illusory hopes of the present State Duma having legislative powers, and make it clear to the people that only an authoritative all-national constituent assembly, freely elected by the people after the tsarist autocracy has been overthrown, will be capable of meeting the people's demands.

"For the purpose of developing the class-consciousness of the proletariat, for the political education of the masses of the people, for the development and organisation of the revolutionary forces, Social-Democracy must make use even of this impotent, helpless State Duma. In view of this, Social-Democracy participates in the activities of the State Duma on the following terms:

"I. Proceeding from the interests of the urban and rural proletariat and from the principles of consistent democratism, Social-Democracy criticises all proposals and bills submitted by the government and the bourgeois parties and also the state budget, and opposes them with its own demands and bills, and in so doing proceeds always from the demands and needs of broad masses of the people, and by such activity exposes the effectlessness of the existing system and the class contradictions of bourgeois society.

"II. Social-Democracy uses the right of interpellation in order to lay bare the essence and nature of the present government and to show the people that all the latter's activity is contrary to the interests of the people, in order to make clear the underprivileged position of the working class and throw light on the role played by the government and the ruling classes and by the parties they support, in respect of the working class. Among other things, Social-Democracy must struggle against the Cadet Party, with its compromises and treachery, and unmask its half-heartedness and hypocritical democratism in order to liberate the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie from its leadership and influence and compel them to follow the proletariat.

"III. In the State Duma, Social-Democracy, as the party of the working class, must always act independently. Social-Democracy must conclude no permanent agreements or pacts that might hamper its freedom of action with other revolutionary or opposition parties in the Duma. In individual cases, when the aims and measures of other parties coincide with those of Social-Democracy, the latter can and must enter into negotiations with other parties on those measures.

"IV. Insofar as the people cannot come to any agreements with the present feudal-minded government, and insofar as only an authoritative constituent assembly would be in a position to meet the people's demands and needs, the conference is of the opinion that the struggle for a ministry responsible to the present impotent Duma is not the task of the proletariat. The proletariat must fight under

the flag of a constituent assembly and not under that of a responsible ministry.

"V. While conducting this struggle, the Social-Democratic group in the State Duma must bind itself by the closest ties to the proletarian and other masses outside the Duma and, by assisting these masses to organise, must build up a revolutionary army for the overthrow of the autocracy."

No comment is required. In my article I have tried to show how resolutions like the one I have dealt with should not be written. In their resolution the Estonian revolutionary Social-Democrats have shown how unsuitable resolutions should be amended.

A NOTE ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE ESTONIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS ⁸⁶

Our correspondent has also sent us the *Rules of the League of the Estonian Area of the R.S.D. L.P.*, adopted at the conference. We are unable to print them owing to lack of space.

We call our readers' attention to the resolution on the Duma. It is quite obvious that the resolution of the Mensheviks, published in *Russkaya Zhizn*, No. 47, served as the basis for it; the influence exerted by the Mensheviks M. and A. was *confined to this*. The Estonian Social-Democrats have recast all the *militant parts* of the resolution in a *fine Bolshevik* spirit (especially the part about the Cadets and the "responsible ministry"). An excellent example of "amendments" to Menshevik resolutions!

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THE TERMS OF THE DEAL

St. Petersburg, March 21, 1907.

The situation has undergone considerable change since the leading article in *Proletary*, No. 14, * was written three weeks ago. The government and the Cadets, the Black-Hundred autocracy and the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie have taken a step towards one another, and are preparing to join hands and strangle the revolution by their joint efforts and, instead of land and freedom, hand out miserly doles to the people, condemning them to an existence of semi-starvation and semi-slavery. Let us examine more closely the situation now obtaining.

Two questions lie as heavy as a stone on the heart of the Black-Hundred autocracy—the budget, and the agrarian question. There can be no credits unless the budget is approved by the Duma. There can be no hope of even a brief period of calm unless the open ulcer of the land question is hidden, at least for the time being. The government will not dare dissolve the Duma without a budget and an agrarian law the latter has approved. The government is *afraid* to dissolve the Duma and, at the same time, is vociferating about dissolution and is putting into motion the entire Black-Hundred machinery of the Union of the Russian People so as to scare the timid and incline the wavering to compliance. It wants to try and drag concessions out of the Duma by gagging it with the threat of dissolution. Well, then it will see what is to be done with the disgraced, befouled and filth-bespattered “lofty” assembly. This explains the request to approve the budget and the

* See pp. 184-88 of this volume.—*Ed.*

assurances that the Minister of Finance does not even dream of requesting the State Duma to sanction a loan. This explains the correct tone of Mr. Vasilchikov's speeches to the effect that the government "will preserve the inviolability of those boundaries at which the interests of individuals, different groups and different social-estates meet" but, at the same time, "recognises its duty to extend that preservation only insofar as the boundaries mentioned coincide with the general interests of the state. *Wherever the boundaries do not coincide with those interests they must be shifted*". In these words, especially those we have stressed, there is undoubtedly a scarcely perceptible nod of the head in the direction of the Cadets, a slight hint at the possibility of Cadet "compulsory alienation".

How do the Cadets respond to all these scarcely perceptible advances? Oh, they are bending all their efforts to make the imperceptible perceptible, to make open and stated in full that which is hidden behind mysterious hints and reservations. They are therefore making incomparably more advances to the government, are opening up their hearts, although, with their customary caution, they are holding out their hands timidly and only half-way, in order to take hold of Mr. Stolypin's forefinger, condescendingly held out to them. In its March 18 issue, *Rech*, the Cadets' mouthpiece, proclaimed to the whole world that the "party of people's freedom" is concluding preparation of a new agrarian bill which will make this party "the best-armed for a *business-like* discussion of the land question", and that "the new presentation of the question has paid greater attention to what is generally known as the real alignment of forces". At the next day's session of the Duma, Deputy Kutler pronounced a truly "business-like" speech, in which he somewhat (though far from fully) raised the veil that has so far modestly covered the "realism" and "business-like character" of this new outcome of the Cadet Party's legislative efforts. In the present case, as far as can be understood, business-like realism boils down to, first of all, giving the peasants in many localities, instead of the "subsistence standard" * of land, a much smaller amount—

* See Note 98.—Tr.

"as much as is available", as Mr. Kutler very indefinitely puts it. Apparently it works out this way—that many millions of dessiatines of landowners' property may remain unalienated even under "compulsory alienation". This means "shifting the boundaries somewhat", as Mr. Vasilchikov puts it. The second feature typifying the "realism" of the new bill is outlined by Mr. Kutler in the following terms: "the lands that are to be transferred to the peasants" must "be made the absolute property of the peasants" so that "these lands will not under any circumstances be taken from them in the future", they will be "transferred to the peasants for their use in perpetuity and not temporarily", and in so doing it will be necessary "to limit only the right of alienation and of mortgage". All this again comes very close to the "intention" of the government, proclaimed through its mouthpiece, Mr. Vasilchikov, "to extend the advantages, accruing from the principles of property, to that tremendous area of peasant-owned land that has so far been deprived of those advantages". And, lastly, the third sign of the "business-like nature" of the new Cadet agrarian bill deserves special attention: formerly it was assumed that compensation for the land would be met by the Treasury, but now "a certain part of the expenses that occur as a result of the land reform must be met by the peasants themselves, to the extent of about one half". And in what way does this differ from the contribution of one half of the land redemption payments to be met by the peasants that was established by the government for 1906? The concord, in principle, between the Cadet agrarian bill and the "designs" of the government therefore becomes fairly obvious. The fact that the Cadet compulsory alienation of the land is pure fiction makes it still less open to doubt; who will do the "compelling" in the Cadet land committees when they will consist half of peasants and half of landlords, with government officials "reconciling" their interests? A clean deal! Not for nothing did the *Rech* commentator on Duma affairs say on March 20, with reference to Mr. Vasilchikov's speech: "this presentation of the question means that things are being tackled in business-like fashion". This is, indeed, the highest praise from the lips of the Cadets of today!

As far as the budget is concerned, the conciliatory stand taken by the Cadets towards the Black-Hundred autocracy is outlined with sufficient clarity in an editorial in that same March 20 issue of *Rech*. The rumour that "the party of people's freedom proposes rejecting the budget as a whole" is called "a patent lie", and the assurance is given that the "people's representatives will probably approve, with certain changes, the budget for 1907" and, lastly—listen to this, gentlemen!—it is asserted that "if the Duma is given proof that the Minister of Finance is prepared to go half-way in extending its rights [within the bounds of the "fundamental laws", of course—see above in the same article], this may engender among its members greater confidence in the government", and, indeed, "if the Duma had grounds for trusting the Minister of Finance it could agree to a formula that would be tantamount to *permission to borrow as much as is needed*" (our italics). This is a gem that worthily concludes the long list of disgraceful concessions, all this retailing of people's freedom—it had to be retail selling so that, in the end, the people's freedom could be sold wholesale.

Anyone with the patience to follow up all the details of this shameful deal between the Black Hundreds and the liberal bourgeoisie, insofar as they have become clear at the present moment, can no longer be in doubt—the counter-revolutionary forces are being organised to deal a final, mortal blow at the great emancipation movement, to crush strong and bold fighters and to deceive and remove the naïve, the timid and the vacillating. The Rights, the Polish *Koto*⁸⁷ and the Cadets are uniting in one body to deal that blow. The government is scaring the Cadets and the Trudoviks with the howling of the Black Hundreds—set at them by the government itself—who demand the dissolution of the Duma and the abolition of the "foul constitution". The Cadets are scaring the Trudoviks by reference to those same howls and by alleging that Stolypin intends to dissolve the Duma immediately. The Black-Hundred autocracy and the liberal bourgeoisie need all these threats and fears the better to come to an agreement behind the backs of the people, so that, having amicably shared the spoils, they may plunder the people. Trudoviks

of all shades—do not allow yourselves to be tricked! Stand guard over the interests of the people! Prevent this filthy deal between the Cadets and the government! Social-Democrat comrades! We are certain you will understand the situation, that you will stand at the head of all revolutionary elements in the Duma, that you will open the eyes of the Trudoviks to the shameful treachery of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. We are sure that from the rostrum of the Duma you will loudly and boldly expose this treachery to the whole people.

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THE MENSHEVIK TACTICAL PLATFORM

"The Tactical Platform for the Coming Congress, prepared by Martov, Dan, Starover, Martynov and others, with the participation of a group of Menshevik practitioners" has been issued as a separate leaflet.

The relation between this platform and the resolution on the State Duma, drawn up by the same Menshevik leaders and published in *Russkaya Zhizn*, No. 47, is not yet known. The leaflet we are speaking of does not say a single word as to whether it is proposed to work out in greater detail the tactical opinions expressed in it, in the form of draft resolutions, precisely on which questions, etc. This lack of clarity is regrettable because the "Tactical Platform" itself is worded very diffusely and indefinitely. To show this we are giving in full the last three theses of the platform; these outline the "current tasks of Social-Democracy in the immediate future"; we shall begin with the third thesis.

"...(3) The development of the independent political and organisational activities of the working-class masses on the basis of the defence of their interests as a class of wage-workers. Assistance by Party groups for the organisations that are being built up among wide sections of the proletariat on the basis of the struggle to satisfy their immediate trade, political and cultural needs, on the basis of struggle to retain and extend the concessions they have wrested from the old system."

Could you possibly imagine anything more diffuse, vague and empty? Is this a "tactical platform" for the 1907 congress, or is it an excerpt from a popular article on the tasks of the working class in general?

As we know, the agenda for the congress includes items on trades unions, a labour congress and councils of dele-

gates—these are all concrete questions of today, of the present stage of development of the working-class movement. And we are treated to platitudes and empty phrases about “independent activities”, as though there were a deliberate desire to *conceal their ideas* concerning the questions that have been presented by reality and by the Party! This is not a platform, comrades, but a *pro forma statement*. There already exists considerable Party literature on such questions as a labour congress, ranging from articles in the Party’s official paper *Sotsial-Demokrat*⁸⁸ to a number of pamphlets. A platform is drawn up to provide an answer that is to the point, and not to evade the issue.

“(2) A determined ideological struggle against all attempts to limit the class independence of the proletariat, against inculcation of reactionary petty-bourgeois illusions in proletarian consciousness, and against all tendencies leading to the substitution of anarchic terror and adventurous plotting for the organised class struggle.”

Wrathfully put. Clearly the authors wanted to give vent to their ire. That, of course, is their right, and we would be the last to complain of sharpness in a polemic. Polemise as trenchantly as you like, only say plainly what you mean. Your second point, however, says absolutely nothing definite. It “is aimed”, as one may guess, at the Bolsheviks, but it *misses the mark* on account of its diffuse wording. All Bolsheviks would, of course, agree to subscribe in full to the condemnation of *anarchic* terror, “adventurous plotting”, “reactionary petty-bourgeois illusions” and “attempts to limit class independence”.

Let us give the Menshevik comrades some good advice. If you want to engage in sharper polemics with the Bolsheviks, comrades, and want to “wound” them more seriously, then please compile resolutions that will be *unacceptable* to us. You must *open* all the parentheses and not cast a new veil over questions presented long ago! Take an example from us: our draft resolution on non-party political organisations says *outright* that we are against *certain definite* proposals of Axelrod’s, against *certain definite* trends expressed in certain literary works by members of the Party. Whatever you may blame us for in our draft resolution, it will certainly not be for lack of clarity, or for avoiding the *substance* of the dispute.

"...(1) The awakening of the political initiative of the proletarian masses by the organisation of their planned intervention in political life in all its manifestations.

"In pursuance of this, Social-Democracy, while calling on the proletariat to support all progressive classes in their joint struggle against reaction, rejects all lasting alliances with any part of the non-proletarian classes, and, wherever sections of these classes differ among themselves, supports in each individual case those actions that are in conformity with social progress. Social-Democracy directs its revolutionary criticism both against the counter-revolutionary strivings of the liberal bourgeoisie and against the utopian and reactionary prejudices of agrarian petty-bourgeois socialism."

We deliberately left this point until last, it alone, relatively speaking, having some content, since it *touches* on the fundamental principles of the differences between the Bolshevik and Menshevik tactics. But then, again, it only "touches upon" them, again far too much padding and not enough concrete material! The first two sentences are truisms that might well have been discussed in the press in 1894-95, but it is really awkward to speak of such things in 1907. And even these truisms are worded very carelessly, for instance, Social-Democracy rejects all "alliances" in general with other classes, and not only "lasting" ones.

The third sentence is the only one dealing with fundamentals of tactics. Only here the veil is at least raised sufficiently to reveal the outlines of the concrete phenomena of our times.

Here Social-Democracy is contrasted to: (1) the counter-revolutionary *strivings* of the liberal bourgeoisie; (2) the utopian and reactionary *prejudices* of agrarian petty-bourgeois socialism. The instruction offered to the Party consists in criticism of them both *in equal measure*.

Let us examine these two comparisons and the significance of this instruction.

It is not quite clear what the comrades mean by the "counter-revolutionary strivings of the *liberal* bourgeoisie". It would have been proper to speak of the liberal bourgeoisie, without any further definition, in 1897 but not in 1907. The Menshevik comrades are astonishingly belated; we now have political *parties* in Russia that have revealed themselves in the First Duma, and partly in the Second! What sort of "tactical platform" is this that still *does not even notice* these definite parties in Russia?

It is difficult to believe that the Octobrists are referred to as liberal bourgeois. The comrades obviously have a party of the *Constitutional-Democrat* type in mind (the Party of Democratic Reform, perhaps the Party of Peaceful Renovation, as a phenomenon of the same type). We are convinced of this also by the use of the word "strivings", because we do not see any strivings in the spirit of counter-revolution on the part of the Octobrists—their entire policy has now become counter-revolutionary.

And so the matter is one of Cadet *counter-revolutionary "strivings"*, i.e., that the Cadets are *already beginning* to conduct *practical* politics in a *counter-revolutionary* spirit.

This fact is undoubtedly true. A frank and definite admission of it would undoubtedly bring closer together the two now hostile trends in Russian Social-Democracy. The need for a "revolutionary criticism" of such strivings is also beyond dispute.

To continue. The reactionary *strivings* of the liberals are contrasted with the reactionary "*prejudices* of agrarian petty-bourgeois socialism".

We are completely at a loss. How can *classes* (liberal bourgeoisie) be compared and contrasted with *theories* (socialism), or *practical politics* (strivings) with *views* (prejudices)?? This is illogical in the highest degree. In a *tactical platform*, if it is to hold together, the contrasting should be of (1) one class with another—for example, the liberal bourgeoisie with the democratic (or reactionary?) peasantry; (2) one policy with another—for example, counter-revolutionary with revolutionary; (3) one set of theories, views and prejudices with another. This is so absolutely obvious, so extremely elementary, that one cannot but wonder whether this lack of logic in the Mensheviks is accidental, or whether lack of logical clarity reflects unclear political thinking.

It is beyond doubt that the "socialism" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Trudoviks and the Popular Socialists is full of utopian and reactionary prejudices. This, of course, has to be said when these parties are being assessed, as it was said by the Bolsheviks in their draft resolutions for the Fourth and Fifth congresses. By repeating this

indubitable concept in such an illogical combination, the Mensheviks were apparently seizing on the first argument that came their way, in order to justify their *policy* of support for the Cadets. Actually they could not avoid giving a motive for this policy and attempting to justify it in the text of the platform under examination. The liberal bourgeoisie's attitude to the peasantry in the Russian bourgeois revolution has now been *touched upon* by the Mensheviks. This is great progress, of course. After the experience of the First and (partly) the Second Duma, one can no longer limit oneself to merely referring to the notorious "Black-Hundred danger" fiction as an argument in defence of election agreements with the Constitutional-Democrats, voting for a Cadet chairman, and supporting Cadet slogans. The general question, already presented by the Bolsheviks in the pamphlet *Two Tactics* (July 1905)* *must be raised*—the question of the attitude of the liberal bourgeoisie and the peasantry to the Russian revolution. What is it that the Mensheviks now say, in substance, on this question?

"Urban bourgeois democrats in Russia have not subordinated the entire economy to themselves and are, therefore, not capable of independent revolutionary initiative, as was the case in bourgeois revolutions in previous centuries; at the same time the peasantry, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the small producers, are only just beginning to emerge from the economic and social conditions of pre-bourgeois production, and are, therefore, still less suited for the role of an independent leader of the revolution."

This is the *sole* attempt to base the Menshevik policy towards the liberals and the peasantry on an *economic analysis*! "The peasantry are *still less* suitable than the urban bourgeois democrats..."—and these words "still less" are supposed to *justify* the policy of supporting the Cadets.

Why "still less"? Because the peasantry "are only just beginning to emerge from the economic and social conditions of pre-bourgeois production". A motive that is obviously unsatisfactory. If the peasantry are "only just beginning to emerge" it is "*the survivals of the feudal system that are a heavy burden borne directly by the peasantry*" which prevent them from emerging. These words are from the first

* See present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 15-140.—Ed.

paragraph of our Party's agrarian programme. The circumstance that the heavy burden of the survivals of serfdom is borne directly by the peasants makes a *more profound*, extensive and acute revolutionary movement against the existing system necessary and inevitable among the peasantry than among the liberal bourgeoisie. There can be no question of either the liberal bourgeoisie or the peasantry being suitable *leaders* of the revolution*; the relative ability of the liberals and the peasants to display "independent revolutionary initiative", or, to be more exact, independently to participate in the *further development* of the revolution has been assessed *quite incorrectly* by the Mensheviks.

The Menshevik point of view on the political role of the peasantry contradicts those basic postulates of our agrarian programme that are agreed upon by the *whole* party, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks alike.

First: as we have said "the survivals of the feudal system are a heavy burden borne directly by the peasantry". Consequently, in the present bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia, the peasantry *must be* more revolutionary than the liberal bourgeoisie, because the strength, durability, viability and acuteness of the revolutionary movement depend on the force of the oppressive conditions of the old order, of that which has outlived itself.

Secondly: in our agrarian programme we demand "the confiscation of private landed properties". We do not demand anything of the sort, anything that even remotely

* Generally speaking, we heartily welcome the fact that in their platform the Mensheviks have *raised* the question of the proletariat's role as *the leader* of the revolution. It is extremely desirable that this question should be discussed at the congress and a resolution adopted on it. The Mensheviks give a feeble explanation of the peasantry being unsuitable as leader of the revolution. It is not because the peasantry are only "just beginning to emerge" from serfdom, but because the main conditions of *petty production* (in agriculture and industry) compel the petty producer to *vacillate* between "order" and "property" on the one hand, and the struggle against the old order on the other. In the same way, the Mensheviks have missed the main reason for the liberal bourgeoisie being unreliable—fear of the proletariat, the need to rely on the old order's instruments of power to defend themselves against the "encroachments of the proletariat", as the Bolshevik resolution says.

approximates such a radical *economic* measure, for the liberal bourgeoisie. Why? Because no objective conditions exist that would call forth a struggle among the liberal bourgeoisie for the *confiscation* of a very considerable part of the property that is "legitimate" from the standpoint of the old order. We all *recognise* the existence of these objective conditions among the peasantry, because the Marxists do not demand confiscation out of sheer love for ultra-revolutionary measures, but because they are conscious of the hopeless position of the peasant masses. The incomparably greater depth of the peasantry's bourgeois-democratic revolutionary spirit follows inevitably from this premise in our agrarian programme.

Thirdly: our agrarian programme speaks of "support for the revolutionary acts by the peasantry up to and including the confiscation of the landlords' lands". This is a clear recognition of the need for a definite attitude to the direct revolutionary struggle of the peasants, to "acts" of a mass character that cover a huge area and involve a tremendous section of the country's population. Nothing similar to these *revolutionary acts* is to be found among the *urban* bourgeoisie, not only among the "liberal", i.e., the middle and some of the big bourgeoisie, but also among the democratic petty bourgeoisie. The Social-Democratic Labour Party has never promised, and could never have promised, any "support" for any sort of "confiscation" plans made by the urban bourgeoisie. From this, it can be seen how *erroneous* is the usual Menshevik argument about the "progressive urban" and "backward rural" bourgeoisie, an argument that is *hinted at* in the platform under review. The argument is based on a misunderstanding of our programme's fundamental ideas on the question of the struggle against the survivals of serfdom, a struggle that constitutes the economic content of the bourgeois revolution in Russia.

Fourthly: the political history of Russia for the past year, especially the First Duma and the elections to the Second Duma, has shown clearly that the peasantry, despite all their lack of development, their lack of unity, etc., were able to lay down *immediately* the beginnings of the formation of *political* parties (the "Trudovik" Group, etc.) that are undoubtedly *more democratic* than the liberal-

bourgeois parties (the Constitutional-Democrats among them). This is borne out by a comparison of the Constitutional-Democrats' bill on the agrarian question with that of the "104", or a comparison of the attitude of the Cadets and the Trudoviks towards freedom of assembly and the composition of local land committees, or a comparison of the Cadet press, which is calming the people and quenching the revolutionary movement with the water of constitutional phrases, and the Trudovik press (*Izvestia Krestyanskikh Deputatov*,⁸⁹ etc.), which is revolutionising, in the democratic sense, fresh sections of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie.

In short, however we approach the question, it must be recognised that the Mensheviks' comparative assessment of the liberals and the Trudoviks is *absolutely wrong*.

The source of this error is a failure to understand the bourgeois revolution that is taking place in Russia's agriculture. This revolution may have two forms—either the retention of landed proprietorship by ridding it of its feudal features and of the bondage of peasant labourers, or the abolition of landed proprietorship through confiscation of that property and transfer of the land to the peasants (in the form of nationalisation, division, "municipalisation", etc., etc.).*

A bourgeois revolution in Russian agriculture is inevitable. And that revolution will remain bourgeois (contrary to the teachings of the Narodniks) even in the second case. However, the revolution may occur either in the first or the second form, depending on whether the democratic revolution is victorious or whether it remains unfinished—whether the peasant masses or the liberal landlords and factory owners will decide the course and outcome of the revolution.

A bourgeois revolution for the purpose of preserving landed proprietorship is being carried out by Stolypin and

* I draw readers' attention in particular to the fact that I have deliberately avoided touching on the disputed questions of the Social-Democratic agrarian programme (division, nationalisation, municipalisation), and have taken only that which has been formally adopted by the Party Congress, and which does not, in effect, give rise to disputes or group divisions among Social-Democrats.

the liberals (the Constitutional-Democratic Party)—by Stolypin in the crudest Asiatic forms that are well able to fan the flames of struggle in the countryside and stimulate the revolution. The liberals are afraid of this and, as they do not wish to risk everything, are in favour of concessions, but of such concessions as would *preserve* landed proprietorship; it is sufficient to recall compensation for the land and, most important of all, the formation of local land committees from landlords and peasants *in equal number*, with *agents of the government* as chairmen! Local land committees of such composition mean preservation of landlord *domination*. Compensation payments for the land mean the strengthening of the peasant bourgeoisie and the enslavement of the peasant proletariat. It is this basic, *economic* solidarity between the Stolypin agrarian reform and that of the Cadets that the Mensheviks fail to understand.

Stolypin and the Cadets disagree on *the extent* of the concessions and on the method (crude or with finesse) of conducting the reform. Stolypin and the Cadets are both for the *reform*, that is, they are for the preservation of landlord *domination* through *concessions to the peasants*.

The proletariat and the peasantry are for the *revolution*, for the *abolition* not only of landlord domination but of *all* landed proprietorship.

We can put an end to the revolution by means of insignificant concessions made by the landlords, says Stolypin.

We can put an end to the revolution only by means of more substantial concessions made by the landlords, say the liberals (the Cadets included).

We want to carry the revolution through to the end, and abolish landed proprietorship, say the peasants and workers.

To deny that the agrarian programmes are thus related means to deny our own agrarian programme, which speaks of "the confiscation of privately-owned land" and "support for the revolutionary acts by the peasantry up to and including the confiscation of the landlords' lands".

To recognise this relationship is to recognise the tactical line of Social-Democracy—the proletariat must carry the democratic peasantry with it, against the autocracy and against the liberals.

It is, therefore, no accident that the Mensheviks are wavering in all their tactics; they are inevitably doomed to vacillation as long as they recognise the present agrarian programme. Some of them would like to change the word "confiscation" for "alienation", thereby *quite consistently* expressing the next stage in opportunism, since they realise the *necessity* to make their Cadet policy conform to the Cadet formulation of the agrarian programme.

This, however, has not yet taken place. It is something that influential Menshevik leaders do not even risk proposing in advance, openly and directly. For them, vacillation in policy is the inevitable outcome.

They have to conduct a policy of support for the Cadets, without daring to announce it openly! Support for the demand for a "Duma ministry", and blocs with the Cadets on account of a fictitious Black-Hundred danger, and voting for a Cadet chairman in the Duma—all these are only individual manifestations of the policy of support for the Cadets, the policy of subordinating the proletariat to the hegemony of the liberals.

But the Mensheviks do not risk defending this policy openly. And the false position they occupy compels them, against their will and consciousness, to "invent" fictitious arguments, such as the "Black-Hundred danger" at the elections, or the fiction that a "Duma ministry" is not a half-way pseudo-reform concealing an attempt at a deal between the Black-Hundred camarilla and the Cadets, or that by taking our 60 or 70 votes away from Golovin (who obtained 356 against 102) we "risked" sinking the Cadets, etc., etc.

This false position compels them to *paint* the Cadets in *bright colours*. They avoid giving this party a *direct* characteristic in accordance with its class composition and its class *backing*. They avoid an assessment of Russian bourgeois parties by the congress. Instead of "liberal bourgeoisie" they speak of "urban bourgeois democracy".

This *absolutely incorrect* description of the Cadets* is defended by one argument, very plausible at first sight—

* The platform under discussion *does not say* outright that the Cadets are a party of urban bourgeois democrats, but this is the sense

the election statistics show it is from the big towns that the majority of Cadet electors come. This argument is groundless: in the first place, the elections to the Second Duma in the twenty-two big towns where, *according to Rech*, there was a Left bloc gave the Cadets 74,000 votes and the Lefts 41,000. And so, despite the Lefts' amazing weakness in legal propaganda (the complete absence of a daily press, the complete absence of open offices, etc.), the Trudoviks and Social-Democrats won more than a third of the votes from the Cadets! Consequently the Constitutional-Democrats represent the *upper stratum* of the urban bourgeoisie, i.e., the liberal bourgeoisie in particular, and not urban "*democrats*" in general. Secondly: for a long time the liberal bourgeoisie of all countries carried with them numerous elements from the lower strata of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie, but that did not by any means make them a *democratic* party, a party of the *masses*. The struggle between the socialists and the liberals for *democratic* leadership of the mass of the impoverished urban petty bourgeoisie is a long and difficult one. To declare forthwith that the Cadets are "urban democrats" is to *reject* that struggle, to reject the cause of the *proletariat*, and to hand it over to the liberals. Thirdly, to deny that the liberal *landowners* constitute yet another of the *class supports* of the Cadet Party means distorting generally known political and economic facts—both the composition of the Cadet group in the Duma and, especially, the close connection between the bourgeois intelligentsia, lawyers, etc., and the landowners, and the dependence of the former on the latter. The Cadet agrarian policy *is* the policy of the liberal landowner. The fewer the liberals among the landowners, the more rapidly does the Cadet agrarian policy turn into the pious wishes for "social peace" expressed by the impotent bourgeois intellectual. The Cadets do not

of the whole text and of all the conclusions. The "explanations" of the Menshevik press are identical. What has remained unsaid in the platform only stresses again and again how very essential it is to place before the congress the question of the class content of the various bourgeois parties and our attitude to them. There can be no consistent tactics unless this is done.

turn "democratic" by continuing to dream of conciliation and an amicable agreement between the Octobrist landowner and the Trudovik peasant.*

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The fundamental error in determining the relations between the liberal bourgeoisie and the peasantry runs like a scarlet thread through the entire Menshevik "tactical platform". Here is another of their formulations of this erroneous idea:

"The proletariat, left entirely to itself and insufficiently supported [!] by urban democrats, was inclined [after the October-December period] to minimise the progressive role that, in general, falls to the lot of those democrats in the present revolution, and, in conformity with this, adopted a one-sided, hostile stand towards it.... In consequence of this incorrect understanding by the proletariat of the historic role of the urban bourgeoisie, the proletariat has begun one-sidedly to place all its revolutionary hopes on the movement of the peasantry which is appearing on the stage of history."

This is a wonderful passage that deserves to go down in history as a description of the "self-forgetfulness" of part of Russian Social-Democrats in 1907.

This is, in effect, an avowal of contrition made by Social-Democrats to the liberals—neither more nor less! Just think of it—at the time of the Second Duma, when there is a clearly expressed sharpening of political extremes between the Black Hundreds and the Left wing of the

* It will be remembered that the Right-wing Cadets, Mr. Struve among them, proposed electing the Octobrist Kapustin and the Trudovik Berezin vice-chairmen of the Second Duma. I am ready to call this plan a "masterly" manifestation of liberal "wit". And this is how matters actually stand *objectively*: it is the *historic mission* of the Cadet to reconcile the Octobrist landowner with the Trudovik peasant. The Left-wing Cadets did not want a demonstration of this because of their fear of the Lefts. This is, however, an indisputable fact. The objective state of affairs makes it the historic mission of the Cadets to put an end to the revolution through the reconciliation of the Octobrist landowners and the Trudovik peasants. And vice versa—the Russian revolution can remain uncompleted, not brought to its final stage, only if it were found possible jointly "to satisfy" the basic economic interests of both the Octobrist landlords and the Trudovik peasants.

Duma, when there is a revolutionary crisis, the maturing of which nobody will risk denying, when there is an obvious swing to the Right of the weakened liberal "Centre" (Cadets), when the liberals have been shouldered aside by the democratic peasants at the elections—Social-Democrats are to be found who *publicly repent* to the *liberals* of their "one-sided hostility" to them, repent of *minimising* their progressive role! What is this, eh? Is it a tactical platform, carefully thought out and weighed prior to the congress by eminent leaders of the Social-Democratic Labour Party, or the whining of petty-bourgeois intellectuals who are getting nostalgic in the proletarian surroundings so uncongenial to them?

"The proletariat adopted a one-sided, hostile stand towards urban democracy...." What was this expressed in? Let us go over the political events of the last year in our minds. In the boycott? But that was, firstly, prior to the Unity Congress, and the authors of the platform are reviewing events that followed it. And, secondly, what have "urban democrats" to do with it? No, apparently the boycott is not meant. It must be the question of support for the demand for a Duma ministry and of blocs with the Cadets. Here, of course, the *proletariat* displayed a hostile attitude towards the *Cadets* but not by any means towards urban democracy.

And who, within the Party, gave expression to this hostile attitude of the *proletariat*? The Bolsheviks....

The authors of the platform have accidentally told a great truth—in their war against support for the "Duma" ministry demand and against blocs with the Cadets, the Bolsheviks were expressing the policy of the *proletariat*. This is true. It is only the petty-bourgeois section of the workers' party that dreams of softening the hostile attitude to the liberals.

... The proletariat is "insufficiently supported by urban democrats..."

First: here the error in confusing the liberals (Cadets) with urban democracy stands out with particular clarity. According to *Rech* figures, there was a "Left election bloc" in twenty-two cities—these also including Menshevik organisations. In these cities the proletariat was undoubt-

edly supported to a considerable extent by *urban democrats*, against the Cadets (41,000 votes for the Left bloc, 74,000 for the Cadets). The conclusion to be drawn from this is certainly not in favour of the Mensheviks; the proletariat can and must attract to its side urban (and rural) petty-bourgeois democrats, against the liberal bourgeoisie.

Secondly: when the Mensheviks speak of *insufficient* liberal support for the proletariat, do they understand the *value* of liberal support for the proletariat? Their platform is being written in 1907, and not altogether outside of time and space, no matter how much they try to give it the least concrete and most aerial character. Between 1902 and 1904 and even 1905, until the month of October, both Mr. Struve and the liberals in general frequently announced their support for the proletariat, and actually did give their support in the onslaught on the autocracy.

But after October 1905? The Mensheviks cannot but know that *in December and after December* the liberals turned their backs on the proletariat and ceased giving support to its revolutionary struggle.

We may well ask: By whom and towards whom was a one-sided hostility displayed?

By the proletariat towards the liberals?

Or by the liberals towards the proletariat and towards the revolution?

Or by the Mensheviks towards the tactics of the proletarian class struggle?

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When the Mensheviks go so far as to speak of "one-sided hostility", they are contraposing, as clearly as possible, two views on the Russian revolution after October 1905. The liberal view—the view of the Russian followers of those German Treitschkes⁹⁰ who announced that 1848 was "a year of madness"—is that the proletariat assumed a one-sided, hostile stand towards liberalism, towards constitutional legality, towards the monarchist constitution, towards compensation for the land, etc.

The view of the *proletariat*—similar to the view of all European socialists on European bourgeois revolutions—

is that the liberal bourgeoisie assumed a one-sided, hostile stand towards the revolution, towards freedom, towards democracy, etc.

The Mensheviks are trying to divert the working-class party from the second view to the first.

The working-class party will parry every such attempt on the part of the Mensheviks by trying to divert the Mensheviks from the working-class party to the liberals.

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We do not by any means wish to say that the Mensheviks are, in general, trying to turn the working-class party into an appendage to the liberals. The difference between the opportunists inside the workers' party and the liberals outside its ranks is this: the former continue to serve their party sincerely but in so doing adopt an unstable and incorrect tactical stand that *leads* to the political subordination of the proletariat to liberalism.

The "unfortunate" quality possessed by this stand is that the Mensheviks, in their desire to attack the Bolsheviks, actually attack the proletariat and the proletarian attitude to the revolution. This happens each time the attacks of the Mensheviks are really grounded in principle, i.e., when they deal with the reasons for the two different sets of tactics. Attacks that are not grounded in principle are another matter; they have only to be briefly mentioned for the reader to be confronted by the question: Is this a platform we have before us or a polemical article by a liberal?

We read in the "platform", for example, that the "proletarian masses [*sic!*] are inclined to believe in the forthcoming political miracle of a sudden [! !] insurrection that will come about irrespective [! !] of the internal development of the proletariat itself and with one blow [! !] will replace the autocracy by the political rule of the working classes".

Up to now only the liberal newspapers have attributed *such* things in *such* a form to the "proletarian masses". What made the Mensheviks speak about an uprising at all,

is something we cannot understand. But such talk of an uprising in a tactical platform that does not contain another word about an uprising except the sentence quoted cannot but evoke the question: instead of "Menshevik platform", should we not say hereafter "liberal platform"?

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DRAFT FOR A SPEECH ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN THE SECOND STATE DUMA "

Gentlemen, a number of speakers have addressed the Duma and outlined the basic views of the different parties on the question of the land. It is time to start summing up. It is time to give ourselves clear-cut and precise answers to the questions: What is the essence of the dispute? What makes the land question such a difficult one? What are the basic views of all the main parties whose representatives have spoken in the Duma? In what do the various parties differ decisively and irrevocably on the land question?

Four principal views on the agrarian question have been laid before the house by representatives of the four main parties or party trends. Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky outlined the views of the Rights, using that word to mean jointly the Octobrists, monarchists, etc. Deputy Kutler outlined the views of the Cadets, the so-called "people's freedom party". Deputy Karavayev outlined the views of the Trudoviks. Further details were added by Deputies Zimin, Kolochnikov, Baskin and Tikhvinsky, who, in essence, are in agreement with Karavayev. Lastly my comrade Tsereteli outlined the views of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Minister Vasilchikov, the government representative, gave us the government's view which, as I shall show later in my speech, boils down to a reconciliation of the views of the Rights and those of the Cadets.

Let us see what the views of these four political trends on the agrarian question consist in. I shall take them in the same order as that in which they spoke in the Duma, i.e., I will begin with the Rights.

The basic view of Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky is that of all the so-called "monarchist" parties and of all Octobrists, the view of the majority of Russian landowners. Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky expressed it superbly in the words: "And so, gentlemen, *abandon the idea of increasing the area of peasant-owned land*, other than in exceptional cases where the land is really overcrowded" (I quote from the report in the newspaper *Tovarishch*, which is the fullest, since the verbatim reports have not yet been published).

This was well said; it was straightforward, clear and simple. *Abandon the idea* of increasing the peasants' land—this is the real view of *all* the Right parties, from the Union of the Russian People to the Octobrists. And we are well aware that this is the view of the mass of Russian landowners and those of other nations inhabiting Russia.

Why do the landlords advise the peasants *to abandon the idea* of extending the peasant-owned land? Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky provides the explanation—it is because landlord farming is better organised, more "cultured" than peasant farming. The peasants, he says, are "dull, backward and ignorant". The peasants cannot, if you please, get along without the guidance of the landlords. "As the priest is, so is his parish," was the way Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky wittily put it. Apparently he firmly believes that the landlord will always be *the priest* and the peasants will always be *the sheep of his flock* and allow themselves *to be shorn*.

But will it always be so, Mr. Svyatopolk-Mirsky? Will it always be so, Messrs. Landlords? May you not be mistaken in this. Is it not because they were too "backward and ignorant" that the peasants have, until now, remained "the sheep in the flock"? Today, however, we see that the peasants are becoming *politically conscious*. The peasant deputies to the Duma are not attaching themselves to the "Rights" but to the Trudoviks and Social-Democrats. Speeches like that made by Svyatopolk-Mirsky will help the most backward peasants understand where the truth lies, and whether it is possible for them to support those parties that advise the peasants *to abandon the idea* of extending peasant-owned lands?

For that reason I welcome from the bottom of my heart the speech made by Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky and also the future speeches on that question that will be made by all speakers from the Right benches. Continue in the same vein, gentlemen! You are helping us splendidly to open the eyes of the most backward peasants!

They say that landlord farming is more cultured than peasant farming ... that the peasants cannot get along without the landlord's guidance.

But I will tell you that the whole history of landed proprietorship and landlord farming in Russia, all the data on landlord farming prove that the "guidance" of the landlords has always meant and today still means the unbridled coercion of the peasants, the endless denigration of peasant men and women, the most unconscionable and shameless exploitation (that word means "plunder" in Russian) of peasant labour, exploitation never seen anywhere else in the world. Such oppression and abuse, such poverty as that endured by the Russian peasant, is not to be found, not only in Western Europe, but even in Turkey.

My comrade Tsereteli has already spoken of the way in which inhabited estates were handed out to the favourites and hangers-on of court "circles". I want to focus your attention on the question of *farming* touched upon by Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky, who spoke of the vaunted "culture" of the landlords.

Does that deputy know what the peasants call "*labour service*" or "*squirism*"? Or what *labour-service farming* is called in the science of economics?

The farming of a landed estate by labour service is the direct descendant, the direct survival, of the *serf-owning*, *corvée* farming of the landlords. What was the essence of the serf system of farming? The peasants obtained an *allotment* from the landlord to feed their own families, and in return had to work three days (and sometimes more) on the land of the proprietor. Instead of paying the worker in money as is now the case everywhere in the towns, the landlords paid *in land*. The peasant was barely able to subsist from the allotment he received from the landlord. And for this bare ration the peasant and all his family had to till the landlord's land, using the peasant's own horses

and the peasant's own implements or "stock". Such is the essence of serf farming—a beggarly allotment of land instead of payment for labour; the tilling of the landlord's land, using the peasant's labour and the peasant's implements; the compulsory labour of the peasant under threat of the landlord's cudgel. Under this system of farming the peasant himself had to become a *serf*, because without *coercion* nobody in possession of an allotment would have worked for the landlord. And what serfdom meant to the peasants—that they themselves know far too much about; it is too firmly fixed in their memories.

Serfdom is *considered* to have been abolished. In actual fact, however, the landlords retain so much power (thanks to the lands they have acquired by plunder) that today they still keep the peasant in serf dependence—*by means of labour service*. Labour service is the serfdom of today. When, in his speech on the government declaration, my comrade Tsereteli spoke of the serf-owning nature of landed proprietorship and of the entire existing state power in Russia, one of the newspapers that fawns on the government—the paper is called *Novoye Vremya*—raised an outcry about Deputy Tsereteli having spoken a lie. But that is not so; the deputy of the Social-Democratic Labour Party was speaking the truth. Only an ignoramus or a mercenary ink-slinger could deny that labour service is a direct survival of serfdom, and that landlord farming in our country is kept going by labour service.

What, in essence, is labour service? It boils down to this: the landlord's land is not tilled with the landlord's implements and not by hired labourers, but with the implements of the peasant who is *in bondage* to his landlord neighbour. And the peasant has to go into bondage because the landlord cut off the best lands for himself, planted the peasant on sandy wasteland and pushed him on to a beggarly allotment. The landlords took so much land for themselves that it is not only impossible for the peasant to run a farm but there is not even room "for a chicken to run around in".

The gubernia committees of landlords, in 1861, and the landlords who were civil mediators (apparently they were called "civil" because they were civil to the landlords) "

emancipated the peasants in such a way that *one-fifth* of the peasants' land was cut off by the landlords! They *emancipated* the peasants in such a way that the peasant was forced to pay *treble the price* for the allotment that remained in his possession after this plunder! It is no secret to anybody that according to the "*land redemption*" scheme of 1861 the peasant was compelled to pay *much more than* the land was worth. It is no secret to anybody that the peasant was at that time forced to *redeem* not only the peasant land but also *the peasant's emancipation*. It is no secret to anybody that the "philanthropy" of the *state* redemption scheme consisted in the Treasury filching *more* money from the peasant for the land (in the form of redemption payments) *than it gave to the landlord*! This was a fraternal alliance between the landlord and the "liberal" civil servant to rob the peasant. If Mr. Svyatopolk-Mirsky has forgotten all this, the peasant, *for sure*, has not forgotten it. If Mr. Svyatopolk-Mirsky does not know this, then let him read what Professor Janson wrote *thirty years ago* in his *Essay on the Statistical Investigation of Peasant Allotments and Payments* and which has been repeated a thousand times since then in all our literature on economic statistics.

The peasant was "emancipated" in *such a way* in 1861 that he ran straight into the landlord's *noose*. The peasant is so downtrodden on account of the land seized by the landlords that he must either die of starvation or give himself into bondage.

And in the twentieth century the "free" Russian peasant is still forced to give himself into bondage to his landlord neighbour *in exactly the same way* as the "smerdi" (as the peasants were called in *Russkaya Pravda*) gave themselves into bondage in the eleventh century and "registered themselves" as belonging to the landlords!

Words have changed, laws have been promulgated and repealed, centuries have elapsed, but things remain essentially the same as they were. Labour service is the bonded dependence of a peasant who is forced to till his landlord neighbour's soil with his own implements. Labour-service farming is the same renovated, refurbished and reshaped *serf* farming.

In order to make my meaning clear, I will cite an example from the countless number that fills our literature on peasant and landlord farming. There is a very extensive publication, issued by the Department of Agriculture, that deals with the early nineties and is based on data *obtained from farmers* concerning the landlord farming system in Russia (*Agricultural and Statistical Data Obtained from Farmers*. Published by the Department of Agriculture, Issue V, St. Petersburg, 1892). These data were analysed by Mr. S. A. Korolenko (not to be confused with V. G. Korolenko); that Mr. S. A. Korolenko was no progressive writer but a reactionary civil servant. In his book of analysis, you may read, on page 118:

"In the south of Yelets Uyezd (Orel Gubernia), side by side with the work of labourers employed by the year, a substantial part of the land on big landlord estates is tilled by peasants in payment for land which they rent. *Former serfs* [note that, Mr. Svyatopolk-Mirsky] *continue* to rent land *from their former landlords* and, in payment for it, till the landlords' land. Such villages are *still* called [mark this!] the '*corvée*' of such-and-such a landlord."

This was written in the nineties of the last century, *thirty years* after what was called the "emancipation" of the peasants. *Thirty years* after 1861, the same "*corvée*" existed, the same cultivation of the land of the *former* landlords with the implements of the peasant!

Perhaps the objection will be raised that this is an individual case. But anyone who is acquainted with landlord farming in the central black-earth belt of Russia, anyone who has the slightest acquaintance with Russian economic literature, will have to admit that this is no exception, but *the general rule*. In the *Russian* gubernias proper, where the *true Russian* landlords are in the majority (not for nothing are they so dear to the hearts of the *true Russian* people on the Right benches!) *labour-service farming predominates* to this day.

I can refer you, for instance, to a well-known scientific work, the book *The Influence of Harvests and Grain Prices*, compiled by a number of scholars. The book appeared in 1897. It shows the preponderance of *labour-service* farming in the following gubernias: Ufa, Simbirsk, Samara, Tam-

bov, Penza, Orel, Kursk, Ryazan, Tula, Kazan, Nizhni-Novgorod, Pskov, Novgorod, Kostroma, Tver, Vladimir, and Chernigov, i.e., in 17 *Russian gubernias*.

The preponderance of labour-service farming—what does that mean?

It means that the landlord's land is cultivated with the same peasant implements, by the labour of the poverty-stricken, ruined and enslaved peasant. And here you have that "culture" of which Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky spoke, and of which all those who defend the landlords' interests speak. The landlords, of course, possess better cattle, which live better in the master's sheds than the peasant does in his own cottage. The landlord, of course, gets a better harvest because the landlords' committees as long ago as 1861 took good care to cut the best lands off from the peasant holdings and register them in the landlords' names. One can speak of the "culture" of the Russian landlords' farms only by way of ridicule. On a large number of estates there is *no* landlord farming *whatsoever*; the same peasant system of farming is carried on, the land is ploughed by the peasant's sorry nag and tilled with the peasant's old and unsuitable implements. In no European country does serf farming still survive on big landed estates and latifundia, carried on with the aid of bonded peasants—in no other country, except Russia.

Landlord "culture" is the preservation of landlord serf-ownership. Landlord culture is usury perpetrated against the impoverished peasant, who is fleeced and enslaved for a dessiatine of land, for pasture, for water for his cattle, for firewood, for a pood of flour loaned to the hungry muzhik in winter at extortionate interest, for a ruble begged by the peasant's family....

And those gentlemen on the Right benches talk about the Jews exploiting the peasants, about Jewish usury! But thousands of Jewish merchants would not skin the Russian muzhik in the way the true Russian, Christian landlords do! The interest claimed by the worst usurer is not to be compared with that claimed by the true Russian landlord, who hires a muzhik in winter for summer work or who forces him to pay for a dessiatine of land in labour, money, eggs, chickens, and God alone knows what else!

That may seem like a joke, but it is a bitter joke that is too close to the truth. Here is an *actual* example of what a peasant pays for *one* dessiatine of land (the example is taken from Karyshev's well-known book on peasant rentings): for one dessiatine of land the peasant must cultivate one and a half dessiatines, bring the landlord ten eggs and a hen and in addition provide one day's female labour (see p. 348 of Karyshev's book).⁴⁴

What is that? "Culture", or the most shameless feudal exploitation?

Those who want to make Russia and Europe believe that our peasants are hostile to culture are telling a blatant lie, are slandering the peasants. They are not speaking the truth! The Russian peasants are struggling for freedom, against *feudal* exploitation. The peasant movement is spreading ever more widely, ever more boldly, and the struggle of the peasants against the landlords has been the sharpest *precisely* in the *true Russian* gubernias, where *true Russian* serfdom, *true Russian* labour service, bondage and abuse of the impoverished and debt-ridden peasantry is strongest and most deep-rooted!

Labour service is not preserved by force of law—by law the peasant is "free" to die of starvation!—it is maintained by force of the peasant's *economîc dependence*. No laws, no prohibitions, no "supervision" or "tutelage" can do anything whatsoever against labour service and bondage. There is only one way to get rid of this ulcer on the body of the Russian people—the *abolition of landed proprietorship*, because in the overwhelming majority of cases it is still *serf* proprietorship, the source and the mainstay of *feudal* exploitation.

All and any talk of "aid" for the peasants, of "improving" their condition, of "helping" them acquire land and other similar speechifying that the landlords and civil servants are so fond of, all this boils down to hollow pretexts and subterfuges, as long as it evades *the principal question*—whether or not to preserve landed proprietorship.

That is the kernel of the whole issue. And I must give special warning to the peasants and the peasant deputies—*evasion of the real substance* of the issue must not be allowed. You must trust in no promises, no fine words, until the

most important thing has been made clear—will the landed estates remain the property of the landlords or will they pass into the peasants' hands? If they remain the property of the landlords, labour service and bondage will remain. Constant hunger and want for millions of peasants will also remain. The torment of gradual extinction from starvation—that is what the retention of landed proprietorship means for the peasants.

To show what the real nature of the agrarian question is, we must recall some of the chief figures on the distribution of landed property in Russia. The latest statistical data available on land ownership in Russia refer to the year 1905. The Central Statistical Committee gathered them in the course of a special investigation, the full results of which have not yet been published. However, the chief results are known to us from the newspapers. European Russia is considered to have an area of about 400 million dessiatines. Of the 395.5 million on which preliminary data are available, 155 million belong to the state, the imperial family," the church and church institutions, 102 million belong to private persons, and 138.5 million are peasant allotments.

At first glance it might seem that the state has the greatest share so that the question is not one of landlords' lands.

This is a frequently occurring mistake that should be eliminated once and for all. It is true that the state owns 138 million dessiatines, *but almost all that land* is in the northern gubernias—Archangel, Vologda and Olonets, in places where *farming is impossible*. The government itself, according to the precise figures of the statisticians (I refer you, for example, to Mr. Prokopovich and his book *The Agrarian Question in Figures*) could not find more than slightly over seven million dessiatines of state lands that could be given to the peasants.

One cannot, therefore, speak seriously of state-owned lands. Nor need one speak about peasant migration to Siberia. This question has been made clear enough by the Trudovik speaker in the Duma. If the landlord gentlemen really believe in the advantages of migration to Siberia, let them go to Siberia themselves! The peasants would most likely agree to that.... But they would probably regard

as sheer mockery the proposal that the neediness of the peasants should be remedied with Siberia.

In respect of the Russian gubernias, and the central black-earth gubernias in particular, where the peasants are the most needy, the matter is *precisely one of the landlords' lands* and no others. And Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky is wasting his time talking about "exceptional cases where the land is really overcrowded".

Overcrowding on the land is the rule and not the exception in central Russia. And the peasants are overcrowded because the landlord gentlemen have accommodated themselves far too spaciously, because they give themselves too much room to move. "Peasant overcrowding" is the result of the seizure of land masses by the landlords.

"Land hunger" for the peasant means "land surfeit" for the landlord.

Here, gentlemen, are the plain and simple figures. Peasant land allotments total 138.5 million dessiatines. Privately-owned land amounts to 102 million dessiatines. How much of this last amount belongs to *big* estate owners?

Seventy-nine and a half million dessiatines belong to owners possessing *more than 50* dessiatines each.

And how many owners does this huge area of land belong to? *Less than 135,000* (the exact figure is 133,898).

Think well over these figures: 135,000 people out of a hundred odd million inhabitants of *European* Russia own *almost eighty million* dessiatines of land!!

And side by side with this, twelve and a quarter million peasant family allotments total 138.5 million dessiatines.

The average per big landowner, per (for simplicity's sake we'll say) landlord, is *594* dessiatines.

The average per peasant household is *eleven and one-third* dessiatines.

And this is what Mr. Svyatopolk-Mirsky and others of his ilk call "*exceptional cases of overcrowding on the land*". How can there be anything but *universal* "overcrowding" of the peasants when a handful of rich people numbering 135,000 have 600 dessiatines each and millions of peasants have 11 dessiatines per farm? How can there be anything but peasant "land hunger" when there is such a tremen-

dously excessive *surfeit of land* in the hands of the landlords?

Mr. Svyatopolk-Mirsky advised us "*to abandon the idea*" of increasing the amount of land owned by the peasants. But no, the working class will not abandon that idea. The peasants will not abandon that idea. Millions and tens of millions of people *cannot* give up that idea, or *abandon the struggle* to achieve their goal.

The figures I have quoted show clearly what that struggle is about. Landlords, with an *average* of 600 dessiatines per estate, are struggling for their wealth, for their incomes that probably total more than 500 million rubles a year. The biggest landlords are often the highest officers of the state as well. Our state, as my comrade Tsereteli has already in all justice said, protects the interests of *a handful of landlords* and not the interests of the people. No wonder the majority of the landlords and the whole government are struggling furiously against the demands of the peasants. History does not know any cases of the ruling and oppressing classes voluntarily relinquishing their right to rule and to oppress, their right to huge incomes from enslaved peasants and workers.

The peasants are struggling to free themselves from bondage, from labour service, from feudal exploitation. The peasants are struggling for an opportunity to live just a little bit like human being. And the working class gives *full* support to the peasants against the landlords, gives its support in the interests of the workers themselves, who also bear the burden of landlord oppression; it gives its support in the interests of our entire social development that is being held back because of landlord oppression.

In order to show you, gentlemen, what the peasantry can and *must* achieve by their struggle, I will make a small calculation.

"The time has come to have recourse to the eloquence of figures," Mr. Vasilchikov, the Minister of Agriculture, has said, "facts and reality, rather than to words, to make this question clear." I am in the fullest agreement with the minister. Yes, yes, gentlemen, that is how it is—more figures, more figures on *the extent of l-a-n-d-l-o-r-d* owner-

ship of land and on the sizes of the allotments owned by the peasants. I have already quoted figures showing *how much* "surplus" land the landlords own. Now I will give the figures on the extent of the *peasant* need for land. On the average, as I have said, each peasant household owns eleven and one-third dessiatines of allotment land. But this *average* figure *conceals* the peasants' need for land, because most peasants possess an allotment of land that is *below the average*, and an insignificant minority have more than the average.

Out of twelve and a quarter million peasant households, 860,000 (in round figures) have allotments amounting to *less than five dessiatines per household*. Three million, three hundred and twenty thousand have *from five to eight dessiatines*. Four million, eight hundred and ten thousand have *from eight to twenty dessiatines*. Only one million, one hundred thousand households have *from twenty to fifty dessiatines* and only a quarter of a million have *more than fifty dessiatines* (these last-named probably do not have more than seventy-five dessiatines per household on the average).

Let us assume that 79.5 million dessiatines of landlords' land is used to extend peasant holdings. Let us assume that the peasant—in the words of the Reverend Tikhvinsky, a supporter of the Peasant Union—does not want to *denude* the landlord of his land and will leave *fifty dessiatines* to each landlord. This is probably too high a figure for such "cultured" gentlemen as our landlords, but, for the time being, we can take this figure as an example. Deducting fifty dessiatines for each of the 135,000 landlords would leave *seventy-two* million dessiatines that could be freed for the *peasants*. There is no reason to deduct the forests from this figure (as some writers do, for example Mr. Prokopovich, whose figures I have used several times) because forest land also produces an income which cannot possibly be left in the hands of a small group of landlords.

To this seventy-two million add the cultivable state lands (about 7.3 million dessiatines), *all* the lands of the *imperial family* (7.9 million dessiatines), the church and monastery lands (2.7 million dessiatines), and you will get a

total of about ninety million dessiatines.* This total amount is sufficient to expand the aggregate land owned by the poorest peasant households to no less than sixteen dessiatines per household.

Do you realise what that means, gentlemen?

That would be a tremendous step forward, that would deliver millions of peasants from starvation; that would raise the living standard of tens of millions of peasants and workers, would give them greater opportunities to live more or less like human beings, in the way more or less cultured citizens of a "cultured" state live, and not in the way the dying race of modern Russian peasantry is living. That would not, of course, deliver all the working people from all forms of poverty and oppression (for that it would be necessary to transform capitalist into socialist society) but it would go a very long way towards making easier their struggle for such deliverance. Over six million peasant households, more than half of the total number of peasants, possess, as I have said, less than eight dessiatines per household. The land they own would be more than doubled, almost trebled.

This means that half the peasantry, always impoverished, hungry, and undercutting the price of the labour of the workers in the towns, at the factories—half the peasants would be able to feel that they are human beings!

Can Mr. Svyatopolk-Mirsky, or others of his ilk, seriously advise millions of workers and peasants to abandon the idea of a way out of an unbearable, desperate situation, a way out that is quite possible, practicable and near at hand?

But it is not only a matter of the land owned by the greater part of the poor peasant households possibly being almost trebled at the expense of the landlords' surfeit of land. In addition to these six million poor households, there are almost five (to be exact, 4.8) million peasant households owning from eight to twenty dessiatines. There is no doubt that no less than three out of the five million live in poverty on their beggarly allotments. These three mil-

* An exact calculation (in case of questions) is given at the end of Notebook 3."

lion households, too, could raise their holdings to *sixteen dessiatines per household*, i.e., increase the holding by a half, and some could even double it.

On the whole, it works out that *nine million households* out of a total of 12.25 million could greatly improve their condition (and improve the condition of the workers, whom they would stop undercutting!) at the expense of the land of the *landlord gentlemen*, who have too great an excess of land and who are too accustomed to the *serf system of farming!*

This is what we are told by the figures on the relative dimensions of *large-scale landlord ownership* and *insufficient peasant holdings*. I am very much afraid these facts and figures will not be to the liking of that lover of facts and figures, Mr. Vasilchikov, the Minister of Agriculture. Did he not say to us in his speech, immediately after expressing a desire to use figures:

"... In connection with this, one cannot but express the apprehension that *those hopes* which many people place in the implementation of such reforms [i.e., extensive land reforms] will, *when confronted with the figures*, lose all chance of being realised...."

Your apprehension is groundless, Mr. Minister of Agriculture! It is precisely *confrontation with the figures* that should give the peasants' hopes of deliverance from labour service and feudal exploitation every chance of being realised in their entirety! And no matter how unpleasant these figures may be for Mr. Vasilchikov, the Minister of Agriculture, or for Mr. Svyatopolk-Mirsky and other landlords, *these figures cannot be refuted!*

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I shall now proceed to the objections that may be raised against the peasants' demands. And, strange as it may seem at first glance, in analysing the objections to the peasants' demands I must in the main deal with the arguments of Mr. Kutler, representative of the so-called "people's freedom" party.

The necessity for this does not arise out of any desire on my part to argue with Mr. Kutler. Nothing of the sort.

I should be very glad if those who champion the peasants' struggle for land had *to argue* against the "Rights" *only*. Throughout his speech, however, Mr. Kutler *objected*, in substance, to the peasants' demands as put forward by the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks: he objected both directly (for instance, he disputed the proposal made by my comrade Tsereteli on behalf of the entire Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party) and *indirectly* by pointing out to the Trudoviks the need to curtail, need to limit their demands.

Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky did not actually expect to convince anybody. In particular, he was far from expecting that he could convince the peasants. He was not trying to convince, but was *expressing his will*, or, more correctly, the will of most landlords. In simple and direct terms, the "speech" made by Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky boils down to *no increase whatsoever* in the amount of land owned by the peasants.

Deputy Kutler, on the contrary, was all the time using his powers of persuasion, *trying to convince* mainly the peasants to renounce that which he declared to be impracticable and excessive in the Trudovik draft, and which, in the draft of our Social-Democratic Party was not only impracticable but even "the greatest injustice", to use the words in which he expressed himself, concerning the proposal made by the representative of Social-Democracy.

I shall now analyse Deputy Kutler's objections and the main basis for those views on the agrarian question, those drafts for agrarian reforms, that are defended by the so-called "people's freedom" party.

Let us begin with what Deputy Kutler, in his argument against my Party comrade, called "the greatest injustice". "It seems to me," said the representative of the Cadet Party, "that the abolition of private property in land would be the greatest injustice, as long as the other forms of property, real and personal estate, still remain!..." And then farther: "Since nobody proposes to abolish property in general, it is essential that the existence of property in land be in every way recognised."

That is the line of argument followed by Deputy Kutler, who "refuted" Social-Democrat Tsereteli by stating

that "other property [other than landed property] was also acquired in a manner that was, perhaps, even less praiseworthy". The more I think over Deputy Kutler's argument, the more I find it—how shall I express it mildly?—strange. "It would be unjust to abolish property in land if other forms of property are not abolished...."

But, gentlemen, kindly remember your own postulates, your own words and plans! You yourselves proceed from the fact that *certain* forms of landed property are "unjust", and so unjust that they require a special law on the ways and means of abolishing them.

So what does this actually amount to? To saying that it is "the greatest injustice" to abolish *one form* of injustice without abolishing others?? That is what Mr. Kutler's words amount to. This is the first time I have been confronted by a liberal, and such a moderate, sober, bureaucratically-schooled liberal at that, who proclaims the principle of "*everything or nothing*"! For, indeed, Mr. Kutler's argument is based entirely on the principle of "*everything or nothing*". I, as a revolutionary Social-Democrat, must positively declare against such a method of argument....

Imagine, gentlemen, that I have to remove two heaps of rubbish from my yard. I have only one cart. And no more than one heap can be removed on one cart. What should I do? Should I refuse altogether to clean out my yard on the grounds that it would be the greatest injustice to remove one heap of rubbish because they cannot both be removed at the same time?

I permit myself to believe that anyone who *really* wants to clean out his yard *completely*, who sincerely strives for cleanliness and not for dirt, for light and not for darkness, will have a different argument. If we really cannot remove both heaps at the same time, let us first remove the one that can be got at and loaded on to the cart immediately, and then empty the cart, return home and set to work on the other heap. That's all there is to it, Mr. Kutler! Just that and nothing more!

To begin with, the Russian people have to carry away on their cart all that rubbish that is known as feudal, landed proprietorship, and then come back with the empty cart to

a cleaner yard, and begin loading the second heap, begin clearing out the rubbish of capitalist exploitation!

Do you agree to that, Mr. Kutler, if you are a real opponent of all sorts of rubbish? Let us write it into a resolution for the State Duma, using your own words: "recognising, jointly with Deputy Kutler, that capitalist property is no more praiseworthy than feudal landlord property, the State Duma resolves to deliver Russia first from the latter in order later to tackle the former".

If Mr. Kutler does not support this proposal of mine I shall be left with the firm conviction that, in sending us from feudal property to capitalist property, the "people's freedom" party is merely sending us from Pontius to Pilate," as the saying goes, or, to put it more simply, is seeking evasion, saving itself by flight from a clear statement of the question. We have never heard that the "people's freedom" party wants to struggle for socialism (and is not *the struggle against capitalist property a struggle for socialism?*). But we have heard a lot, a very great deal, about that party wanting to struggle for freedom, for the people's rights. But now, when the question on the order of the day is not one of the immediate introduction of socialism but of the immediate introduction of *freedom*, and freedom from *serfdom*, Mr. Kutler suddenly refers us to questions of socialism! Mr. Kutler declares the abolition of landed proprietorship based on labour service and bondage to be "the greatest injustice"—and this for the reason, *exclusively* for the reason, that he has remembered the injustice of capitalist property.... Have it as you will—it is rather strange.

I have believed until now that Mr. Kutler is not a socialist. Now I have become convinced that he is not a democrat at all, that he is no champion of people's freedom—of real freedom, not people's freedom in inverted commas. Nobody in the world will agree to call or consider democrats those people who, in an epoch of struggle for freedom, qualify as "the greatest injustice" the abolition of that which is destroying freedom, which is oppressing and suppressing freedom....

Mr. Kutler's other objection was not directed against the Social-Democrat but against the Trudovik. "It seems

to me," said Mr. Kutler, "that it may be possible to imagine the political conditions under which the land nationalisation bill [he is referring to the project of the Trudovik Group; Mr. Kutler described it inaccurately but that is not the important thing at the moment] might become law, but I cannot imagine there being, in the near future, political conditions under which such a law could actually be implemented."

Again, an astonishingly strange argument, but not in any way strange from the standpoint of socialism (nothing of the sort!) or even from the standpoint of the "right to land" or any other "Trudovik" principle—no, it is strange from the point of view of that very same "people's freedom" we hear so much about from Mr. Kutler's party.

Mr. Kutler has all the time been trying to convince the Trudoviks that their bill is "impracticable", that they are wasting their time by pursuing the aim of "radically reforming existing land relations", and so on and so forth. We now see clearly that Mr. Kutler sees this *impracticability* as due to nothing else but *the political conditions* of the present day and the immediate future!!

You will excuse me, gentlemen, but this is really some sort of fog, some unpardonable confusion of concepts. It is because we discuss and propose *changes* to better had conditions that we here call ourselves representatives of the people and are considered members of a legislative assembly. And in the thick of a discussion on the question of changing one of the very worst conditions, the objection is raised: "impracticable ... either now ... or in the near future ... political conditions".

One of the two, Mr. Kutler—either the Duma is itself *a political condition*, in which case it is unworthy of a democrat to adapt himself, to readjust himself to whatever curtailments may arise out of *other* "political conditions", or else the Duma is not a "political condition" but merely an ordinary office that has to take into consideration what may or may not please those more highly placed—and in the latter case we have no reason for posing as representatives of the people.

If we are representatives of the people, we must say what the people are thinking and what they want, and not that

which is agreeable to the higher-ups or some sort of "political conditions". If we are government officials, then I am perhaps prepared to understand that we shall declare in advance that anything is "impracticable" which the powers that be have given us to understand is not to their liking.

... "*Political* conditions..."! What does that mean? It means: military courts, an augmented secret police, lawlessness and lack of civil rights, the Council of State and other equally sweet *in-sti-tu-tions* of the Russian Empire. Does Mr. Kutler want to adapt his agrarian reform to *what is practicable under military courts*, augmented secret police and the Council of State? I should not be at all surprised if Mr. Kutler were to be rewarded for that, not with the sympathy of the people, of course, but with a medal for his servility!

Mr. Kutler *is able to imagine* the political conditions under which the bill to nationalise the land could become law.... Of course he can! A man who calls himself a democrat *has been unable to imagine* democratic political conditions.... But the task of a democrat who is counted among the representatives of the people is not only to give *himself* a picture of all kinds of good and bad things, but to give the *people* truly popular projects, declarations and expositions.

Mr. Kutler should not think of suggesting that I propose departing from the law or infringing it in the Duma.... I am not proposing anything of the sort! There is no law that prohibits speaking in the Duma about democracy and tabling really democratic agrarian bills. My colleague Tsereteli did not infringe any law when he introduced the declaration of the Social-Democratic group, which speaks of "the alienation of land without compensation", and about *a democratic state*.

Mr. Kutler's arguments in their entirety boil down to this—since ours is not a democratic state there is no need for us to present democratic land bills! No matter how you twist and turn Mr. Kutler's arguments, you will not find a grain of *any other* idea, of *any other* content, in them. Since our state serves the interests of the landowners we must not (*representatives of the people must not!*) include anything

displeasing to the landowners in our agrarian bills.... O no, Mr. Kutler, that is not democracy, that is not people's freedom—it is something very, very far removed from freedom and not very far removed from servility.

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Now let us look at what Mr. Kutler actually did say about his party's land bill.

In speaking of land, Mr. Kutler first raised objections to the Trudoviks on the question of the "subsistence standard" and on the question of whether land suffices. Mr. Kutler took the "1861 standard" which, he said, is lower than the subsistence standard and informed the Chamber that "*according to his approximate calculation*" (the Duma had not heard a word about this calculation and knows absolutely nothing about it!) even for the 1861 standard another 30 million dessiatines would be required.

I would remind you, gentlemen, that Deputy Kutler spoke *after* Karavayev, representative of the Trudovik Group, and raised the objection specifically to him. But Deputy Karavayev stated in the Duma, *directly and explicitly*, and then made it known to the public in a special letter to the newspaper *Tovarishch* (March 21), that *up to 70 million dessiatines* would be required to raise peasant holdings to the subsistence standard. He also said that the total of the state, crown, church and privately-owned lands comes to that figure.

Deputy Karavayev did not indicate the source from which he made his calculation and did not acquaint the Duma with the method employed to arrive at this figure. My calculation, based on a source that I can name exactly and which is, furthermore, the very latest official publication of the Central Statistical Committee, gives a figure that is *higher than 70 million dessiatines*. Of the privately-owned lands alone, 72 million dessiatines are available to the peasants, while the crown, state, church and other lands provide more than 10 million and up to 20 million dessiatines.

In any case, the fact remains—in raising objections to Deputy Karavayev, Deputy Kutler tried to prove that there *is not sufficient* land to help the peasants, but *could not*

prove it since he gave *unsubstantiated*, and, as I have shown, *untrue* figures.

In general I must warn you, gentlemen, against abuse of the concepts "labour standard"⁸⁸ and "subsistence standard". Our Social-Democratic Labour Party takes the much more correct line of avoiding all these "standards". "Standards" introduce something of officialdom, of red tape, into a vital and militant political question. These "standards" confuse people and *hide* the real nature of the issue. To transfer the dispute to these "standards" or even to discuss them *at the present moment* is truly a case of dividing up the skin before the bear is killed and, furthermore, dividing that skin up verbally in a gathering of people who will probably *not* divide up the skin *at all* when we kill the bear.

Don't you worry, gentlemen! The peasants will divide up the land themselves once it falls into their hands. The peasants can easily divide it; the thing is to get hold of it. They will not ask anybody how to divide it, nor will they allow *anybody* to interfere with their division of the land.

All these speeches about how to divide the land are sheer empty talk. We are a *political body*, not a surveyor's office or a boundary commission. We have to help the people solve *an economic and political problem*; we have to help the peasantry in their struggle against the landlords, against a class that lives by feudal exploitation. And this vital, urgent problem is *befogged* by chatter about "standards".

Why befogged? Because, instead of the *real* question of whether or not 72 million dessiatines should be taken from the landowners for the peasantry, the *extraneous* question of "farming standards" is being discussed, a question that in the final analysis is by no means important. This facilitates evasion of the issue and makes it easy to avoid a real answer. Disputes on subsistence, on labour, or any other standards you like, only serve to confuse the *basic issue*: should we take 72 million dessiatines of the landlords' land for the peasants, or not?

Attempts are being made to show whether there is sufficient or insufficient land for one standard or another.

What is this demonstrating for, gentlemen? Why these empty speeches, why this muddy water in which it is easy for some people to fish? Is it not clear enough that there is

no use arguing about that which does not exist, and that the peasants do not want any sort of imaginary land, but *the land of the neighbouring landlord* that they are already familiar with? It is not about "standards" that we have to talk, but about *landlords' land*, not about any of your standards and whether any of them is sufficient, but about *how much* landlords' land there is. Everything else is nothing but evasion, excuses and even attempts to throw dust in the peasants' eyes.

Deputy Kutler, for instance, avoided the real point at issue. Trudovik Karavayev at least went straight to the point: *70 million dessiatines*. And how did Deputy Kutler answer *that*? He did not answer *that point*. He confused the issue with his "standards", i.e., he simply avoided giving an answer to the question of *whether he and his party agree to hand over all the landlords' land to the peasants*.

Deputy Kutler took advantage of Deputy Karavayev's error in not having raised the question clearly and sharply enough, and *avoided the point at issue*. That, gentlemen, is the hub of our problem. Whoever *does not agree* to hand over literally *all* the landlords' land to the peasants (remember, I made the proviso that each landowner be left with 50 dessiatines so that nobody would be ruined!) *does not stand for the peasants and does not really want to help the peasants*. For if you allow the question of *all* the landlords' land to be befogged or shelved, *the whole issue is in doubt*. The question then arises—*who* will determine *the share* of the landlords' land that is to be given to the peasants?

Who will decide it? Out of 79 million, 9 million is a "share" and so is 70 million. Who will decide it *if we do not, if the State Duma does not decide it clearly and with determination*?

It was not without reason that Deputy Kutler kept quiet on this question. Deputy Kutler toyed with the words "compulsory alienation".

Don't allow yourselves to be fascinated by words, gentlemen! Don't fall under the spell of a pretty turn of phrase! Get to the bottom of things!

When I hear the expression "compulsory alienation", I always ask myself: *who is compelling whom*? If millions of peasants compel a handful of landlords to submit to the interests of the nation, that is very good. If a handful of

landlords compel millions of peasants to subordinate their lives to the selfish interests of that handful, that is very bad.

That is the *insignificant* question that Deputy Kutler managed to evade! With his arguments about "impracticability" and "political conditions" he, *in actual fact*, was even calling on the people to *reconcile themselves* to their subordination to a handful of landlords.

Deputy Kutler spoke immediately after my comrade Tsereteli. Tsereteli, in the declaration of our Social-Democratic group, made *two* definite statements that provide a clear solution to precisely this problem, the main, fundamental problem. The first statement—the transfer of the land to a *democratic* state. "Democratic" means that which expresses the interests of the masses of the people, not of a handful of the privileged. We must tell the people, clearly and forthrightly, that *without* a democratic state, without political liberty, without a fully authoritative representation of the people, there *cannot* possibly be *any* land reform to the advantage of the peasants.

The second statement—the need for a *preliminary* discussion of the land question in equally democratic *local committees*.

How did Deputy Kutler answer that? *He did not*. Silence is a poor answer, Mr. Kutler. You kept silent *precisely* on the question of whether the peasants will compel the landlords to make concessions to the people's interests, or whether the landlords will compel the peasants to put a fresh noose of more ruinous compensation round their necks.

You cannot be allowed to ignore such a question.

In addition to the Social-Democrat, the Popular Socialists (Deputy Baskin) and the Socialist-Revolutionaries (Deputy Kolokolnikov) spoke in the Duma on the subject of local committees. The local committees have been spoken of in the press for a long time, they were also spoken of in the First Duma. That is something we must not forget, gentlemen. We must make quite clear to ourselves and to the people why so much has been said on this question and what its present significance is.

The First State Duma discussed the question of local land committees at its fifteenth session, May 26, 1906. The question was raised by members of the Trudovik Group, who

presented a written statement signed by thirty-five members of the Duma (including two Social-Democrats, I. Savelyev and I. Shuvalov). The statement was first read at the fourteenth session of the Duma on May 24, 1906 (see page 589 of the Verbatim Report of Sessions of the First State Duma); the statement was then printed and discussed two days later. I will read you the *most important* parts of the statement in full.

"...It is necessary to set up local committees immediately; they should be elected on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage, by secret ballot, for the needful preparatory work, such as—the elaboration of subsistence and labour standards of land tenure as applicable to local conditions, the determination of the amount of cultivable land and the amount of it that is rented, tilled with the farmer's own or with other's implements, etc. In view of the need to adapt the land law as fully as possible to the multiplicity of local conditions, it is advisable for the committees to take an active part in the general discussion on *the very fundamentals of the land reform*, detailed in the various bills submitted to the Duma..." The Trudoviks therefore proposed the *immediate* election of a commission and the immediate elaboration of the necessary bill.

How was this proposal greeted by the various parties? The Trudoviks and the Social-Democrats gave it *unanimous* support in their periodicals. The so-called "people's freedom" party spoke categorically in its chief organ *Rech*, on May 25, 1906 (i.e., the day after the first reading of the Trudovik bill in the Duma), *against the Trudovik bill*. *Rech* said *straight out* that it feared that such land committees might "*shift the solution of the agrarian problem to the Left*".*

"We shall try, insofar as it depends on us," wrote *Rech*, "to preserve the *official* and specifically business character of the local land committees. And for the same reason, we believe that to choose the committees by universal suffrage would mean to prepare them, not for the peaceful solution of the land question on the spot, but for something very different. The guidance of the general direction to be taken by the re-

* See newspaper *Vperyod*,⁹⁹ No. 1 for May 26, 1906; leading article—"The Cadeis Are Betraying the Peasants", signed: *G. Al-sky*.

form must remain in the hands of the state; representatives of state power, therefore, must have their places in the local committees, if not for purposes of making decisions, at least for the purpose of exercising control over the decisions of local bodies. Then, again within the general fundamentals of the reform, *there must be represented in the local committees, as far as possible on an equal footing, those conflicting interests* that can be reconciled without contravening the state significance of the reform in question, and without converting it into an act of unilateral violence that might end in the complete failure of the whole matter."

This is quite clear and definite.

The "people's freedom" party gives an estimate of the proposed measure *in substance*, and opposes it. The party does not want local committees elected by universal, direct, equal and secret ballot, but committees in which a handful of landlords and thousands and tens of thousands of peasants would have equal representation. *Representatives of state power* should participate for reasons of "control".

Let the peasant deputies give good thought to this statement. Let them realise the essence of the matter, and explain it to the peasants.

Try to get a picture, gentlemen, of what it really means. In the local committees landlords and peasants are represented *on an equal footing*, and there is *a representative of the government to exercise control*, to "reconcile" them. That means one-third of the votes for the peasants, one-third for the landlords, and one-third for government representatives. And the highest state dignitaries, all those who have control over state affairs, are themselves among *the wealthiest landowners*! In this way the landlords will "exercise control over" both the peasants and the landlords! *Landowners* will "reconcile" peasants and landowners!

Oh yes, there would no doubt be "compulsory alienation"—*compulsory* alienation of the peasants' money and labour by the *landlords*, in exactly the same way as the landlords' gubernia committees in 1861 cut off one-fifth of the peasants' land and imposed a price for the land that was double its real value.

An agrarian reform of *this type* would mean nothing more than *selling* to the peasants, at *exorbitant prices*, the worst

lands and those that the landlords do not need, in order to place the peasants in *still greater* bondage. "Compulsory alienation" of this sort is far worse than a voluntary agreement between landlord and peasant, because one half of the votes would go to the peasants and the other half to the landlords in the case of a voluntary agreement. According to the Cadet idea of compulsory alienation the peasants would have *one-third* of the votes and the landlords *two-thirds*—one-third because they are landlords and another third because they are government officials!

Nikolai Gavrilovich Chernyshevsky, the great Russian writer and one of Russia's first socialists, who was brutally persecuted by the government till his dying day, wrote the following about the "emancipation" of the peasants and the *land redemption payments* of 1861 of accursed memory: it would have been better for the peasants and landlords to come to a voluntary agreement than to be "emancipated and pay redemption fees for the land" through the gubernia landlords' committees.* In the case of a voluntary agreement on the purchase of land it *would not have been possible* to extract as much from the peasants as has been extracted by means of the government's "reconciliation" of peasants and landlords.

The great Russian socialist proved to be right. Today, forty-six years after the famous "emancipation with redemption payments", we know the results of that *redemption operation*. The market price of the land that went to the peasants was 648,000,000 rubles, and the peasants were forced to pay 867,000,000 rubles, 219,000,000 rubles *more* than the land was worth. For half a century the peasants have suffered, have languished in hunger, and have died on those land allotments, weighted down by such payments, oppressed by the government's "reconciliation" of peasants and landlords—until the peasantry has been reduced to its present intolerable condition.

The Russian liberals want to repeat this sort of "*reconciliation*" of peasants and landlords. Beware, peasants! The workers' Social-Democratic Party warns you—decades of

* It would be a good thing to find the exact quotation; I think it is from "Letters Unaddressed", and elsewhere.¹⁰⁰

new torment, hunger, bondage, degradation and abuse are what you will inflict on the people if you agree to this sort of "reconciliation".

The question of local committees and redemption payments constitutes the keypoint of the agrarian problem. Every care must be taken to ensure that here *there should be no* obscurity, that nothing should be left unsaid, and that there is no beating about the bush, and no provisos.

When this question was discussed in the First State Duma on May 26, 1906, Cadets *Kokoshkin* and *Kotlyarevsky*, who spoke against the Trudoviks, confined themselves to provisos and beating about the bush. They kept harping on the fact that the Duma could not immediately *decree* such committees, although nobody had proposed any such decrees! They said that the question was bound up with a reform of the election law and local self-government; that is, they simply delayed the important and simple matter of setting up local *committees* to help the Duma solve the agrarian problem. They spoke of the "distortion of the course of legislation", of the danger of creating "eighty or ninety local Dumas" and said that "actually there was no need to set up such bodies as local committees", etc., etc.

All these are nothing but excuses, gentlemen, one long evasion of a question that the Duma must *decide* clearly and definitely: will a democratic government have to solve the agrarian problem, or should the present government? Should the peasants, i.e., the majority of the population, predominate in the local land committees, or should the landlords? Should a handful of landlords submit to the millions of the people, or should millions of working people submit to a handful of landlords?

And don't try to tell me that the Duma is impotent, helpless and without the necessary powers. I know all that very well. I would willingly agree to repeat that and underscore it in any Duma resolution, statement or declaration. The rights of the Duma, however, do not enter into the present question, for none of us has even thought of making the slightest suggestion that would contravene the law on the rights of the Duma. The matter in hand is this—the Duma must clearly, definitely and, most important of all,

correctly express the real interests of the people, must tell them the truth about the solution of the agrarian problem, and must open the eyes of the peasantry so that they recognise the snags lying in the way of a solution to the land problem.

The will of the Duma, of course, is still not law, that I am well aware of! But let anybody who likes do the job of limiting the Duma's will or gagging it—*except the Duma itself!* And the Duma's decision, of course, will meet with every known type of counteraction, but that will never be a justification for those who beforehand begin to twist and turn, bow and scrape, adapt themselves to the will of others, and make the decision of the people's representatives fit in with the wishes of just anybody.

In the final analysis, it is not the Duma, of course, that will *decide* the agrarian question, and the decisive act in the peasants' struggle for land will not be fought out in the Duma. If we really wish to be *representatives of the people*, and not liberal civil servants; if we really want to serve the interests of the people and the interests of liberty, we *can* and *must help* the people by explaining the question, by formulating it *clearly*, by telling them the *whole* truth with no equivocation and no beating about the bush.

To be of real help to the people, the Duma decision must give the clearest possible answer to the *three basic* aspects of the land problem that I set forth in my speech, and which Deputy Kutler evaded and confused.

Question number one—that of the 79,000,000 dessiatines of landlords' land and of the need to transfer no less than 70,000,000 of them to the peasants.

Question number two—*compensation*. The land reform will be of some real advantage to the peasants only if they obtain it *without paying compensation*. Compensation would be a fresh *noose* around the neck of the peasant and would be an unbearably heavy *burden* on the whole of Russia's future development.

Question number three—that of the democratic state system that is necessary to implement the agrarian reform, including, in particular, *local land committees, elected by universal, direct, equal and secret ballot*. Without it the land reform will mean compelling the peasant masses to enter

into bondage to the landlords, and not compelling a handful of landlords to meet the urgent demands of the whole people.

I said at the beginning of my speech that Mr. Vasilchikov, the Minister of Agriculture, *was reconciling* the "Rights" and the "Cadets". Now that I have made clear the significance of the question of 70,000,000 dessiatines of landlords' land, of compensation and, *most important of all*, of the composition of the local land committees, it will be sufficient for me to quote *one* passage from the minister's speech:

"Taking this stand," said the minister, referring to the "inviolability of the boundaries" of landed property and the "shifting" of them only "in the interests of the state"—"taking this stand, *and admitting the possibility of the compulsory shifting of boundaries in certain cases*, we believe that we are not shaking ... the basic principles of private property...."

Have you given *proper consideration* to these significant words of the minister's, gentlemen? They are worth pondering over.... You must ponder over them.... Mr. Kutler fully convinced the minister that there is nothing *inconvenient* for the landlords in the word "*compulsory*".... Why not? *Because it is the landlords themselves who will do the compelling!*

* * *

I hope, gentlemen, that I have succeeded in making clear our Social-Democratic attitude to the "Right" parties and to the liberal Centre (the Cadets) in respect of the agrarian question. I must now deal with one important difference between the views of the Social-Democrats and those of the Trudoviks in the broad sense of that word, i.e., all the parties that base themselves on the "labour principle", which includes the Popular Socialists, the Trudoviks in the narrow sense of the word, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

From what I have already said, it can be seen that the Social-Democratic Labour Party gives its full support to the peasant masses in their struggle against the landlords for land, and for emancipation from feudal exploitation. There are not, there cannot be, more reliable allies for the peasantry in this struggle, than the proletariat, which has

made the greatest number of sacrifices to the cause of winning light and liberty for Russia. The peasantry have not, and cannot have, any other means of ensuring the satisfaction of their just demands than that of joining the class-conscious proletariat, which is struggling under the red banner of international Social-Democracy. Everywhere in Europe liberal parties have betrayed the peasantry and have sacrificed their interests to those of the landlords; and as I showed by my analysis of the liberal, Cadet programme, the same thing is happening here in Russia.

In previous parts of my speech, I have frequently touched on the differences in the views of the Trudovik Group and those of the Social-Democrats on the agrarian question. Now I must examine one of the principal views of the Trudovik Group.

For this purpose, I shall permit myself to take the speech made by the Reverend Tikhvinsky. Gentlemen! The Social-Democrats do not share the views of the Christian religion. We believe that the *real* social, cultural and political significance and content of Christianity is *more truly* expressed by views and aspirations of such members of the clergy as Bishop Eulogius, than by those of such as the Reverend Tikhvinsky. That is why, on the basis of our scientific, materialist philosophy to which all prejudice is alien, on the basis of the general aims of our struggle for the freedom and happiness of all working people, we Social-Democrats have a negative attitude towards the doctrines of Christianity. But, having said that, I consider it my duty to add, frankly and openly, that the Social-Democrats are fighting for complete freedom of conscience, and have every respect for any sincere conviction in matters of faith, provided that conviction is not implemented by force or deception. I consider it all the more my duty to stress this point since I am going to speak of my differences with the *Reverend* Tikhvinsky—a peasant deputy who deserves all respect for his sincere loyalty to the interests of the peasants, the interests of the people, which he defends fearlessly and with determination.

Deputy Tikhvinsky supports the land bill of the Trudovik Group; it is based on *equalitarian principles* of land tenure. In support of this bill, Deputy Tikhvinsky said:

"This is the way the peasants, the way the working people look at the land: the land is God's, and the labouring peasant has as much right to it as each one of us has the right to water and air. It would be strange if anyone were to start selling, buying or trading in water and air—and it seems just as strange to us that anyone should trade in, sell or buy land. The Peasant Union and the Trudovik Group wish to apply the principle—all the land to the working people. With regard to compensation for the land—how the above is to be effected, by means of compensation or by simple alienation without compensation, is a question that does not interest the labouring peasantry...."

That is what Deputy Tikhvinsky said in the name of the Peasant Union and the Trudovik Group.

The error, the profound error, of the Trudoviks is their *not* being interested in the question of compensation and that of *ways of implementing* the land reform, although whether or not the peasantry will achieve liberation from landlord oppression *actually* depends on this question. They are interested in the question of the sale and purchase of land and in that of the equal rights of all to land, although that question *has no serious significance* in the struggle for the real emancipation of the peasantry from the oppression of the landlords.

Deputy Tikhvinsky defends the point of view that land must not be bought or sold, and that all working people have an equal right to the land.

I am well aware that this viewpoint springs from the most noble motives, from an ardent protest against monopoly, against the privileges of rich idlers, against the exploitation of man by man, that it arises out of the aspiration to achieve the liberation of all working people from every kind of oppression and exploitation.

It is for this ideal, the ideal of socialism, that the Social-Democratic Labour Party is struggling. It is, however, an ideal that cannot be achieved by the equalitarian use of land by small proprietors, in the way Deputy Tikhvinsky and his fellow-thinkers dream of.

Deputy Tikhvinsky is prepared to fight honestly, sincerely and with determination—and, I hope, to fight to the end—against the power of the landlords. But he has forgotten another, still more burdensome, still more oppressive

power over the working people of today, *the power of capital, the power of money.*

Deputy Tikhvinsky has said that the sale of land, water and air seems strange to the peasant. I realise that people who have lived all their lives, or almost all their lives in the countryside, should acquire such views. But just take a look at modern capitalist society, at the big cities, at the railways, coal and iron mines and factories. You will see how the wealthy have seized the air and the water and the land. You will see how tens and hundreds of thousands of workers are condemned to deprivation of fresh air, to work underground, to life in cellars and to the use of water polluted by the neighbouring factory. You will see how fantastically the price of land goes up in the cities, and how the worker is exploited, not only by the factory owners, but also by house owners who, as everybody knows, get much more out of apartments, rooms, corners of rooms and slums inhabited by workers than out of apartments for the wealthy. And, indeed, what is the sale and purchase of water, air and land when the whole of present-day society is based on the purchase and sale of *labour-power*, i.e., *on the wage slavery* of millions of people!

Just consider it: can you imagine equalitarian land tenure or prohibiting the sale and purchase of land as long as the power of money, the power of capital, continues to exist? Can the Russian people be delivered from oppression and exploitation if the right of every citizen to an equal-sized piece of land is recognised, when, at the same time, a handful of people own tens of thousands and millions of rubles each, and the mass of the people remain poor? No, gentlemen. As long as the power of capital lasts, no *equality* between land-owners will be possible, and any sort of ban on the purchase and sale of land will be impossible, ridiculous and absurd. Everything, not merely the land, but human labour, the human being himself, conscience, love, science—everything must *inevitably be for sale* as long as *the power of capital* lasts.

In saying this, I have absolutely no desire to weaken the peasants' struggle for land, or belittle its significance, its importance or its urgency. I do not intend anything of the sort. I have said, and I repeat, that this struggle is a just and necessary one, that the peasant, in his own interests, and in

the interests of the proletariat, and in the interests of social development as a whole, *must* throw off the feudal oppression of the landlords.

Class-conscious workers wish to strengthen the peasants' struggle for land, not weaken it. Socialists do not strive to check this struggle, but *to carry it further*, and for this purpose shake off all naïve faith in the possibility of putting petty proprietors on an equal footing, or of banning the sale and purchase of land, as long as exchange, money and the power of capital exist.

Worker Social-Democrats give their full support to the peasants against the landlords. But it is not petty ownership, even if it is equalitarian, that can save mankind from the poverty of the masses, from exploitation and from the oppression of man by man. What is needed for that is a struggle for the destruction of capitalist society, and its replacement by large-scale socialist production. This struggle is now being conducted by millions of class-conscious Social-Democrat workers in all countries of the world. It is only by joining in this struggle that the peasantry can, having got rid of their first enemy, the feudal landlord, conduct a successful struggle against the second and more terrible enemy, the power of capital!

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FINE WORDS—FOUL DEEDS

The agrarian debates in the State Duma are highly instructive. The speeches of the leaders of the various parties must be gone into in greater detail, and a thorough insight obtained into their content.

Without doubt, the attitude to landed proprietorship is the gist of the agrarian question. The peasants are fighting against landed proprietorship, trying to obtain land for themselves. What is the attitude of the various parties to this struggle?

The Social-Democrats have put forward the direct and open demand for *alienation without compensation*. In his speech, Tsereteli, a Social-Democratic representative, forcibly revealed the falseness of the defence of landed property "rights", explained that it originated as plunder, showed up the boundless hypocrisy of the speeches on private property as an inalienable right, and refuted the Prime Minister, who by "state interests" understood, *not the interests of the people, but the interests of that handful of landlords with whom the state authorities are closely linked*.

Add to this the proposal made by Comrade Tsereteli at the end of his speech to relegate the question to local land committees (elected, of course, by universal, direct, equal and secret ballot) for examination, and you will get a complete and definite picture of the proletarian position on the land question. The right of the landlords to land is denied. The method of the reform is clearly defined—local committees, which means the domination of peasant interests over those of the landlords. Alienation without compensation means the full defence of the interests of the peasants, and an implacable struggle against the class avarice of the landlords.

Now let us turn to the Trudoviks. Karavayev did not put forward with full clarity and definiteness the principle of "alienation without compensation". The representative of the peasants was less determined in presenting the people's demands to the landlords than was the representative of the workers. The demand to hand the question over to local committees was not put clearly; no protest was made against the scheme of the liberals (the Cadets) to relegate the discussion on this acute question to a commission, so as to keep it farther away from the people, farther from the light of publicity, farther from free criticism. Despite all these shortcomings in the Trudovik's speech, as compared with that of the Social-Democrat, we have to admit that the Trudovik defended the cause of the peasants against the landlords. The Trudovik opened the eyes of the people to the miserable condition of the peasantry. He disputed the arguments put forward by Yermolov and other defenders of the landlord class, who tried to deny the need to extend peasant holdings. He defined the minimum needs of the peasantry at 70,000,000 dessiatines of land, and explained that there are more than 70,000,000 dessiatines of landlord, crown and other lands available to meet the needs of the peasants. The tenor of the Trudovik speech was—we repeat, despite the shortcomings we have stressed—an appeal to the people, an effort to open the eyes of the people....

Let us take Cadet Kutler's speech. An entirely different picture immediately unfolds before us. We feel that we have moved from the camp of the fully consistent (Social-Democrat) or somewhat vacillating (Trudovik) defenders of the peasants *against* the landlords, into *the camp of the landlords*, who realise the inevitability of "concessions" but are bending every effort to make the concessions *as small as possible*.

Kutler spoke of his "agreement" with the Trudoviks, of his "sympathy" for the Trudoviks, *only* to sugar the pill of *immediate* curtailments, cuts, abridgements, which, he says, must be made in the Trudoviks' draft. Kutler's speech was, indeed, full of arguments *against* the Social-Democrats and against the Trudoviks.

To give weight to our words, let us analyse Kutler's speech step by step.

Introduction. A curtsey to the Trudoviks. The Cadet agrees with the basic idea, he warmly sympathises, *but... but...* the draft of the Trudovik Group "is not confined to the simple and obvious aim of *alleviating* peasant land-hunger. It goes farther, it attempts to *re-create radically* all existing land-law relations" (all quotations from the report in *Tovarishch*).

And so we get "sympathy" for the muzhik *in word*, *curtailment* of the muzhik's demands *in deed*. The word is for the muzhik, the deed for the landlord.

And on top of this, Kutler assures the Duma that the Trudovik does not confine himself to a *simple and obvious* aim! Think of it, reader: the Trudovik speaks forthrightly of *70,000,000 dessiatines of land*. They have to be transferred from the landlords to the peasants. And that is not "simple", that is not "obvious"!!

For "clarity" you have to speak about the labour standard, about the subsistence standard, about the allotment standard of 1861. And Mr. Kutler talks and talks and talks. He fills his listeners' heads with a spate of words on all those worthless questions in order to draw the conclusion: "in my opinion ... there are 30,000,000 dessiatines lacking" to bring the peasant allotments up to the 1861 standard, and that standard is still below the subsistence standard. That is all. That is all he has to say on the extent of the need, and its satisfaction.

But is this an answer to the *70,000,000* dessiatines? You are simply prevaricating, worthy knight of "the people's freedom", and telling us old wives' tales! Should *70,000,000* dessiatines of land go to the peasants, or not? Yes or no?

And, to disclose the nature of these evasions still more clearly, we shall add to the Trudovik's reference the summarised figures of the *latest* land statistics. Investigations undertaken in 1905 show a total of 101,700,000 dessiatines of land in private hands. Of these, 15,800,000 belong to various associations; 3,200,000 dessiatines belong to owners of plots not bigger than 20 dessiatines; 3,300,000 dessiatines belong to owners of plots between 20 and 50 dessiatines; *79,400,000* dessiatines belong to owners of *more than 50* dessiatines each. Those latter number altogether 133,898. The *average* area belonging to each of them, therefore, is

594 dessiatines. Suppose we were to leave each of these gentlemen 50 dessiatines. That would make 6,900,000 dessiatines. Deduct 6,900,000 from 79,400,000 dessiatines and we get *72,500,000 dessiatines of available landlords' land, to say nothing of crown, state, church, monastery and other lands*.

We see that the Trudovik still did not correctly define the amount of land that the peasantry could and should receive, although his figure of 70,000,000 dessiatines was close to the truth.

So please take the trouble to give a simple and clear answer, my Cadet gentlemen: should *70,000,000 dessiatines* of land be transferred from the landlords to the peasants? Yes or no?

Instead of giving a direct answer, the former minister and present liberal hypocrite wriggles like the devil at mass, and exclaims pathetically:

"Is not that right [the right to land according to the Trudovik draft] a right to enter premises in which all the places are occupied?"

Very nice, isn't it? The question of *the 70,000,000 dessiatines* is bypassed. The liberal gentleman answers the peasants—the premises are occupied.

Having dealt summarily with the *unpleasant* question of the 70,000,000 dessiatines (ignorant fellows, those muzhiks! bothering us with their 70,000,000), Kutler began to raise objection to the Trudoviks in respect of the "practical feasibility" of land nationalisation.

All that is merely malicious tittle-tattle, because if the 70,000,000 dessiatines are left to the landlords there will be *nothing to nationalise*! But Mr. Kutler speaks only to *conceal his thoughts*.

What is the nature of his objection to the nationalisation of the land?

"It seems to me that it may be possible to imagine the political conditions under which the land nationalisation bill might become law, but I cannot imagine there being, in the near future, political conditions under which such a law could actually be implemented."

Weighty and convincing. The liberal civil servant, who has been kowtowing all his life, *cannot imagine* political conditions under which legislative power would belong

to representatives of the people. It is usually the case—our dear liberal is hinting—for power over the people to belong to a handful of landlords.

Yes, that's how it is. That's how matters stand in Russia. We are, however, talking about the struggle for people's freedom. The question under discussion is precisely that of *how to change* the economic and "political conditions" of landlord rule. And you *object* by making reference to power now being in the hands of the landlords, and by stating that backs have to be bent lower:

"It is groundless and unjust to complicate the simple and indisputably valuable task of helping the peasant population...."

You've got to know your own limits!

And Mr. Kutler talks on and on, saying that instead of the "unfeasible" nationalisation, all that is necessary is "to extend peasant land tenure".

When it was a question of the *extension* of peasant *land-ownership* (and not *land tenure*, sir!) by 70,000,000 dessiatines of *landlords'* land—then Kutler went over to the question of "nationalisation". And from the question of "nationalisation" he went back to that of "extension".... It may happen, he thinks, that they won't remember *the 70,000,000 dessiatines!*

Mr. Kutler is an out-and-out defender of private property in land. He declares that its abolition would be "the greatest injustice".

"Since nobody proposes to abolish property in general, it is essential that the existence of property in land be in every way recognised."

Since we cannot take two steps forward *this very day*, then "it is essential" to refuse to take a simple step forward! Such is the logic of the liberal. Such is the logic of landlord avarice.

It might at first sight seem that the one point in Mr. Kutler's speech that touched on the defence of peasant and not landlord interests was the recognition of *compulsory alienation* of privately-owned land.

But anyone who trusted *the sound* of those words would be making a serious mistake. Compulsory alienation of the

landlords' land would then and only then be of benefit to the peasants if *the landlords were compelled* to hand over a great deal of land to *the peasants*, and to hand it over cheaply. And what if *the landlords compel the peasants* to pay dearly for miserable patches of land?

The words "compulsory alienation" mean precisely nothing if there is no *actual* guarantee that the landlords will not swindle the peasants.

Not only does Mr. Kutler fail to propose a *single one* of those guarantees but, on the contrary, his whole speech, his whole Cadet position, *precludes them*. The Cadets do not want action outside the Duma. They frankly call for local committees with an *undemocratic composition*—representatives from the peasants and landlords in equal numbers, with a government chairman! That means nothing but the landlords coercing the peasants.

Add to this that the valuation of the land will be made by those same *landlord* committees, that the Cadets are already today (see the end of Kutler's speech) foisting *one half* of the payment for the land on the peasants (the *peasants will also* pay the other half in the form of increased taxation!) and you will see that the Cadets' *fine words conceal foul deeds*.

The Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks spoke in the Duma for the peasants, the Rights and the Cadets for the landlords. That is a fact, and no evasions or fine phrases will cover it up.

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THE DUMA AND THE APPROVAL OF THE BUDGET

Approval of the budget by the Duma is a question of extremely serious political significance. According to the letter of the law, the Duma's rights are insignificant, and the government is not bound by the Duma's consent to its actions. In fact, however, the government does in certain measure depend on the Duma's approval of the budget; everybody admits this, it is particularly stressed by the liberal bourgeoisie—the Cadets—who are inclined to substitute flamboyant phrases about that dependence for a definition of the modest bounds of that modest dependence. The government needs money, a loan is essential. And it will either be unable at all to float a loan without the Duma's direct or indirect consent, or, if it is able to do so, it will be with great difficulty and on such adverse terms that the situation will be considerably worsened.

Under such conditions, it is quite obvious that the Duma's discussion of the budget and voting on it will have double political significance. In the first place, the Duma must open the eyes of the people to all the methods employed in that organised robbery, that systematic, unconscionable plunder of national property by a handful of landlords, civil servants and all kinds of parasites, plunder which is called "the state economy" of Russia. To explain this from the Duma rostrum is to help the people in their struggle for "people's freedom" that the Balalaikins¹⁰¹ of Russian liberalism chatter so much about. Whatever fate has in store for the Duma and whatever the immediate steps and "intentions" of the government may be—in any case, only

the political consciousness and good organisation of the masses of the people will, *in the final analysis*, decide the outcome of the struggle for freedom. He who does not realise this has no right to call himself a democrat.

Secondly, ruthless and *open* criticism of the budget and consistently democratic voting on it are of importance to Europe and European capital, even to the wide strata of European middle and petty bourgeoisie who lend money to the Russian Government of the Stolypins. Bankers and other magnates of international capital lend money to Messrs. Stolypin & Co. to get profit out of it, in the same way as any other usurer "risks" his money. If they are not certain that the money lent will be safe and the proper interest received, no love of "law and order" ("Russia" is a welcome example of graveyard law and order for a European bourgeoisie scared by the proletariat) would compel the Rothschilds, Mendelsohns and others to open their purses. Whether the European financial magnates' faith in the durability and solvency of the firm of Stolypin & Co. will be strengthened or weakened, depends to a great extent on the Duma. Even the bankers would not be in a position to loan thousands of millions if the majority of the European bourgeoisie had no faith in the Russian Government. And these bourgeois masses are being systematically deceived by venal bourgeois newspapers throughout the world, which have been bribed by the bankers and the Russian Government. The bribing of widely-circulating European newspapers in favour of the Russian loan is a "normal" phenomenon. Even Jaurès was offered 200,000 francs to withdraw from a campaign against the Russian loan; such is the high value our government places on the "public opinion" of even those strata of the French petty bourgeoisie that are capable of sympathising with socialism.

The petty-bourgeois masses of Europe have only the smallest possibility of *ascertaining* the true state of Russian finances, the real extent of the Russian Government's solvency—it would be more accurate to say they have scant means of arriving at the truth. The *entire* European public will *immediately* learn of the discussion and *decisions* of the Duma, so that in this respect the voice of the Duma is of tremendous significance. Nobody else could do so much to

deprive Stolypin & Co. of European financial support as the Duma can.

The duty of the "oppositional" Duma proceeds automatically from this. *Only* the Social-Democrats have done their duty. It is admitted by the semi-Cadet *Tovarishch* that the Social-Democrats, in Deputy Alexinsky's budget speech, posed the question in a more principled manner than anybody else. And, contrary to the opinion of the semi-Cadet *Tovarishch*, the Social-Democrats acted correctly by introducing a clear, direct, and well-defined declaration on the impermissibility of *Social-Democrats* approving such a budget as that of Russia. There could be added to the declaration an exposition of the socialist view of the budget of a bourgeois class state.

Only the extreme Left Narodniks, i.e., the Socialist-Revolutionaries, supported the Social-Democrats. The peasant democratic mass, the Trudoviks and Popular Socialists, wavered as usual between the liberal party and the proletariat; the petty property-owner is drawn to the bourgeoisie although the unbearable burden of feudal and fiscal "pressure" forces him to the side of the fighting working class.

As long as the Trudoviks support them, the liberals continue to rule the Duma. When the socialists point out the treacherous role of the Cadets on the budget question, they answer with poor jokes or phrases in the *Novoye Vremya*, Menshikov¹⁰² manner, such as Struve's exclamation about the spectacular gesture of the Social-Democrats, etc.

But neither their jokes, their prevarication nor their pompous phrases will enable them to get away from the fact that *both* tasks for the *democrats*, indicated by us above, have been trampled in the mud by bourgeois liberalism.

As we have often had occasion to explain, the liberals' betrayal of the revolution is not merely a private arrangement, not treachery on the part of individuals, but the policy of a class, a policy of self-interested reconciliation with reaction, and of support, direct and indirect, for that reaction. And this is precisely the policy that the Cadets are pursuing on the budget question. Instead of explaining the truth to the people, they are *distracting* the attention of the people, and are putting into the foreground their civil service "men in mufflers", such as Kutler. Instead of explain-

ing the truth to Europe, they are strengthening the position of the government; they are mouthing trivialities instead of criticism and thereby refusing to confirm for the benefit of Europe the fact of Stolypin & Co.'s bankruptcy.

Formerly the Cadets conducted this cowardly, miserable philistine policy in secret. During the Second Duma election campaign in St. Petersburg, the Social-Democrats explained to public meetings that in the spring of 1906 the Cadets had *assisted* the government in borrowing 2,000 million francs to finance shootings, military courts and punitive expeditions. Clemenceau told the Cadets that he would raise a campaign against the loan if the Cadet Party would formally announce that the loan was unacceptable to the Russian people. The Cadets *refused to do so*, thus helping in the acquisition of funds for the counter-revolution. They say nothing about that matter. But in the Duma today the secrets are out. They are openly carrying on the same indescribably despicable business in the Duma.

It is high time to expose it, in all its details, from the Duma rostrum, and to tell the people the whole truth.

THE CUCKOO PRAISES THE ROOSTER *

The Cadets praise *Novoye Vremya*. The *Novoye Vremya* crew praise the Cadets. The "people's freedom" party is pleased with the minister's concluding speech on the budget. This party, which is always pleased with all ministers, is now pleased with the consent of the Cadets, as leaders of the Duma "Centre", to approve the budget of the Duma-dissolving ministry.

"If it were necessary to prove that the general discussion on the budget in the State Duma had not been fruitless," *Rech* (March 28) pompously opens its editorial, "the finance minister's concluding speech would be a most brilliant proof of it."

What is that brilliant proof?

The proof is—"not a shadow had remained" of the minister's former "arrogantly didactic and irritably ironical tone".... The minister's reply was correct in form, and in content it revealed "*a tribute of respect* for the power of Duma criticism"; the minister mollified the Duma with the assurance that it had greater rights than it had seemed to have; he paid compliments to the "people's freedom" party, compliments which "the overwhelming majority of the Duma deserved for its subsequent voting" (for agreeing to send the budget to a commission).

Yes, indeed, these are the Cadets' brilliant proofs of the "*non-fruitlessness*" of the Duma debates. The fruit does not consist in the faintest trace of serious improvement in the real state of affairs. Nor is it that the masses of the people

* From the fable by Ivan Krylov (1769-1844). The English equivalent is, roughly, a mutual admiration society.—*Ed.*

have learned something and understood certain aims concealed behind the constitutional tinsel. Nothing of the sort. The fruit consists in the minister having become more decent, more obliging; he is more obliging to those who, in the name of "the people's representation", consent to all sort of compromises.

The liberals consent to prostitute the people's representation to underpin the foundations of Black-Hundred rule. On *these* terms, the government of Stolypin & Co. consents not to dissolve the Duma (*for the time being...*). Both sides are filled with joy and mutual admiration.

Today's *Novoye Vremya*, while missing no opportunity to revile the Cadets for the "Jewish" composition of the commission on religious faiths, at the same time publishes a long dissertation by its Duma reporter on the reasons for its being inadvisable to dissolve the Duma. "Even from the standpoint of the extreme Right, it would be inexpedient and harmful to dissolve the Duma at the present moment." The election law cannot be changed without a coup d'état, and if a new Duma is elected in accordance with the existing election law it is possible that "we may lose the present Centre of the Second State Duma". According to the *Novoye Vremya* reporter, that Centre "begins at the Octobrists and stretches through the Party of Peaceful Renovation, the non-party deputies, the Poles and Cadets, as far as the Trudoviks". "Undoubtedly the present Centre holds a strictly constitutional-monarchist viewpoint and has, up to now, made every effort to engage in organic work. *In any case we shall be deprived of that Centre* [if the Second Duma is dissolved]. *We shall be deprived, therefore, of a budget approved by the Duma*, for I assume it to be beyond all measure of doubt that the budget introduced by the ministry—with a few *insignificant* [mark this!] changes—will be adopted by the Second Duma."

That is what *Novoye Vremya* says. The argument is extraordinarily clear. It is an excellent exposition of the point of view of *the extreme Rights*, who at the same time *now wish to save the Duma*.

In the upper circles of the ruling oligarchy there is a struggle between two tendencies—one that wants the Duma dissolved and the other that would preserve it for the time

being. The first of these policies is one that *Novoye Vremya* has long since evolved, explained, defended and, from time to time—or rather at all times—still continues to defend. The ruling oligarchy, however, has another policy. There will always be time to dissolve the Duma, and if it approves the budget it may be easier to obtain a loan. And so it is more advantageous to wait. The threat of dissolution remains, and “we” shall keep the pressure of this threat constantly on the Cadets, which will force them, in a way obvious to everybody, to shift to the Right.

The latter policy is undoubtedly more subtle, and better from the standpoint of the reactionary landlords’ interests. The former policy is crude, coarse and hasty. The latter is better planned because the dissolution is “held in reserve”, while *the liberals are being used by the government*. For the Duma to approve the budget is almost equivalent to consenting to endorse a bill of exchange for a bankrupt. It is more expedient to get *both* the bill *extended* for a further term *and* the Duma dissolved, than to dissolve the Duma at once without attempting to get the bill extended.

Apart from the approval of the budget there may, of course, be other similar bills of exchange. Have not the Cadets, from the landlords’ standpoint, already *improved* their agrarian bill? Let that bill pass through the Duma; then let it go to the Council of State for consideration and *further improvement*. If “we” dissolve the Duma at that moment, we shall have *two*, and not one, *endorsed* bills of exchange. “We” shall possibly be able to obtain from Europe, not one thousand, but two thousand million. One thousand million in the event of the State Duma approving the budget, i.e., *on the basis* of “a state economy that *has passed* through the fire of a strictly constitutional test”. The other thousand million in the event of a “great agrarian reform *passing* through the fire of the strictly constitutional creative activities of popular representative body”.

The Council of State will make *slight* corrections to the Cadet agrarian bill, a bill that is already overflowing with the most diffuse phrases that define nothing. *In actual fact* everything depends on the composition of the local land committees. The Cadets are *against* the election of these committees by universal, direct, equal and secret ballot.

The Cadets favour *equal* representation of landlords and peasants, with control by the government. The government and the landlords do not risk anything in adopting *the basic idea* of this superb liberal bill, for *such* committees, with the benevolent co-operation of the Council of State, Stolypin & Co., will no doubt, will most certainly, turn "compulsory alienation" of the landlords' land into compulsory enslavement of the muzhik by means of new and ruinous compensation payments for the sand, swamps and tree-stumps set aside for them.

Such is the real significance of the government policy and the policy of the Cadets. By their treachery the liberals are helping the landlords put through a smart deal. If the peasants—the "Trudoviks"—continue to follow in the wake of the liberals, despite the warnings of the Social-Democrats, the muzhik will inevitably be fooled by the landlord with the help of the liberal lawyers.

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INTELLECTUALIST WARRIORS AGAINST DOMINATION BY THE INTELLIGENTSIA

Issue No. 13 of *Narodnaya Duma*¹⁰³ published an endlessly long resolution on mass workers' organisations and a labour congress; the resolution is a draft for the forthcoming congress, compiled by a group of publicists and Mensheviks engaged in practical activities. The names of the publicists are not mentioned, and in this it differs from other Menshevik resolutions (on the State Duma and the "tactical platform"). And so it is not known whether this lapse is accidental or whether it indicates a different grouping of the Mensheviks on the given question. We recall that such a fervent Menshevik and champion of the labour congress as El stated that "only part of the Mensheviks have a more or less sympathetic attitude to the labour congress" (p. 82 of the collection *The All-Russian Labour Congress. For the Current Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.*).

But let us go over to the contents of the resolution. It falls into two parts—A and B. In the preamble to the first part there are endless platitudes on the benefit of the organisation and uniting of the mass of the workers. "For the sake of importance", as Bazarov¹⁰⁴ said, organisation is converted into *self-organisation*. It is true that this word does not actually express anything or contain any definite idea, but it is nevertheless a favourite with the champions of the labour congress! There is no need to explain that this "self-organisation" is only an intellectualist device to cover up the dearth of real organisational ideas—it would never have entered the head of a worker to invent "self-organisation"....

The preamble criticises Social-Democracy for the "dominant and determining role played in it by the intelligentsia

as compared to its proletarian elements". An interesting criticism. We shall not, for the time being, analyse its real socio-historical significance—that would lead to too great digression from the present subject. We merely ask—comrades "publicists and Mensheviks engaged in practical activities", why not begin with yourselves? Why does not the physician heal himself? That which you call "the dominant and determining role of the intelligentsia" is apparent in every sentence of your resolution! Why *should not your* "intelligentsia" begin by withdrawing and allowing the "proletarian elements" to draft the resolution? What guarantee is there that in the "self-organisations" projected by you, by the "*publicists and Mensheviks engaged in practical activities*", the phenomenon will not be repeated?

Larin, El and many other champions of the labour congress, give Social-Democracy a "dressing-down" for *forcing* resolutions *through*. And to drive such criticism home, *the publicists* "force through" long new, boring and cloying periods on "self-organisation".... What a picture!

The resolution notes the "ideological and *political* influence" of the Russian Social-Democratic Party (i.e., the R.S.D.L.P., or has a broader term been *deliberately* used to include Prokopovich, Kuskova, Posse and others?) on the advanced strata of the proletariat, and speaks of the desirability of "*uniting the forces*" of Russian Social-Democracy "*with the politically conscious elements of the proletariat*" (A, Point 6).

Try for once *to think over* the words you use to compile your phrases, comrades! Can there be a "politically conscious" proletarian who is *not a Social-Democrat*? If there cannot be, then your words boil down to empty tautology, to turgid and pretentious trivialities. Then you should speak of extending the R.S.D.L.P. to include real Social-Democrats who have not yet joined its ranks.

If there can be, then you are calling the proletarian Socialist-Revolutionary a politically conscious proletarian. It would be ridiculous to deny his "*political consciousness*"! And so what follows is that, under cover of grandiloquent words about the "self-organisation" and "independence" of a *class* party, you are *actually* preaching the *disorganisation* of the proletariat by inducting *non-proletarian* ideologists, by

confusing real independence (Social-Democracy) with non-independence, with dependence on bourgeois ideology and bourgeois politics (Socialist-Revolutionaries).

You were making for one destination, but reached another....¹⁰⁵

This is just like the old intellectual Economists of the 1895-1901 period, who foisted on the workers their narrowness, their uncertainty, their cowardice, their scurrying about under the flag of "self-organisation", the "pure working-class" movement, etc.!¹⁰⁶

The conclusion drawn by Part A: "The congress recognises the Russian Social-Democracy's most important current task to be work done hand in hand with the advanced elements of the working-class masses [which means *also* hand in hand with *worker Socialist-Revolutionaries* and not *against* them?] for the consolidation of the latter in an independent organisation, no matter how politically modest the character it bears, or may be compelled to bear, by force of circumstances of time and place."

What is there in this that is definite, concrete, or goes beyond the bounds of intellectualist *plaints*. What is it all about? Nobody knows.

Let us take consumers' societies. They undoubtedly express *consolidation* of the workers. Their character is *politically modest* enough. Are they "*independent*" organisations? That depends on the point of view. To the Social-Democrats, workers' associations are really independent when they are imbued with the *Social-Democratic* spirit, and not only imbued with the "spirit", but are also tactically and politically connected with Social-Democracy—either by entering the Social-Democratic Party or by *affiliation* to it.

On the contrary, the syndicalists, the *Bez Zaglaviya* group,¹⁰⁷ Posse's¹⁰⁸ supporters, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the "non-party [*bourgeois*] Progressists", call only those workers' associations *independent* that *do not enter* the Social-Democratic Party and are *not affiliated* to it, are not linked up with Social-Democracy, and with Social-Democracy alone, in their actual politics, in their tactics.

This difference in the two points of view has not been invented by us. It is generally recognised that these two points of view exist, that they are mutually *exclusive*, and

that they are in conflict everywhere and on every occasion when workers are for any reason "associated". They are irreconcilable points of view, because, to the Social-Democrat, "non-partisanship" (in tactics and in politics in general) is only a screen and is, therefore, a particularly harmful way of *subordinating* the workers to *bourgeois* ideology and bourgeois politics.

The outcome: In its conclusion the resolution said absolutely nothing on the essence of the matter. At best its conclusion is hollow phrase-mongering. At worst, it is harmful phrase-mongering, misleading to the proletariat, overshadowing the *ABC of Social-Democratic* truth, opening wide the door to any declassed bourgeois, such as those who have for a long time been doing considerable damage to the *Social-Democratic* working-class movement in all European countries.

How should the resolution be corrected?

The empty phrases should be discarded. It should be said simply that Social-Democracy must support the organisation of various workers' associations, for example, consumers' societies, with due and constant regard for every workers' association serving as a centre *precisely of Social-Democratic* propaganda, agitation and organisation.

That would, indeed, be a "politically modest" but *business-like* and *Social-Democratic* resolution. And you, gentlemen, you intellectualist warriors against the "dominant and determining role of the intelligentsia", you have put forward not the proletarian cause, but intellectualist phrase-mongering.

We shall deal with the second part (B) of the resolution next time.

ANGRY EMBARRASSMENT

THE QUESTION OF THE LABOUR CONGRESS

The second part (B) of the resolution under examination* deals with the question of the labour congress.

The Mensheviks have written so much and said so much on this question that it would not be a bad thing to get a resolution that really summed up matters and removed all misunderstanding and differences in explaining the idea, a resolution that gave a clear and definite Party directive. Suffice it to say that the latest list of Russian literature on the labour congress (the above-mentioned pamphlet *The All-Russian Labour Congress*) names fifteen pamphlets and journals that treat the subject in a Menshevik light.

Let us see what this "discussion" has yielded.

Point One of the preamble:

"Mass workers' organisations, coming into being and growing on the soil only of trade union, local [?] and group [?] needs and requirements in general [?], if not under the influence of proletarian Social-Democratic parties or organisations, have, when left to themselves, a direct tendency to narrow the mental and political horizons of the working-class masses to the narrow sphere of trade and, in general, of the particular interests and day-to-day requirements of separate strata or groups of the proletariat."

What *mass* organisations can grow on the soil of *group* needs, the Lord alone knows. By group, something small is always meant, something diametrically opposed to the mass. The authors of the resolution string words together without thinking of concrete, definite content.

* See the analysis of the first part in *Nashe Ekho*, No. 5. ¹⁰⁰ (See pp. 316-19 of this volume.—Ed.)

What then does this mean—mass organisations on the soil of *local* needs? What sort of organisation the authors have in mind is again not clear. If they are talking about such organisations as consumers' societies, co-operatives, etc., their distinctive feature is certainly not their *local* character. The Mensheviks' love of platitudinous phrases, their evasion of the *concrete* exposition of a question, is a purely intellectualist trait. It is at root alien to the proletariat, and harmful from the standpoint of the proletariat.

In their literal meaning the words "mass workers' organisations on the soil of *local* needs and requirements" include *Soviets of Workers' Deputies*. This is a type of mass workers' organisation well known in Russia in a revolutionary epoch. We may say in all truth that an article on the labour congress, and on mass working-class organisations in general, rarely manages without mention of that type of organisation. As if ridiculing the demand for a precise and concrete exposition of definite ideas and slogans, the resolution *does not say a word* about Soviets of Workers' Deputies, *not a word* about Soviets of Workers' Delegates, etc.

But what we are being offered is some sort of incomplete *criticism* of some sort of *local* mass organisations, criticism that does not touch on the question of their *positive* significance, the conditions under which they function, etc.

Furthermore, no matter how you may correct, piece by piece, this monstrously clumsy first point of the preamble, there will still remain the general, fundamental error. Not only trade union, not only local, not only group, but also mass *political* organisations that are not local "have a tendency to narrow the political horizon of the workers", if they are not "under the influence of proletarian Social-Democratic parties".

It was the authors' idea that the first point of the preamble should explain the transition to "the all-Russian labour congress"; local, trade union and other organisations, they wanted to say, narrow the horizon, but *now* we have the all-Russian labour congress, etc. The highly-respected "writers and Mensheviks engaged in practical work" have, however, lost all touch with logic, because the influence of Social-Democracy, or the absence of such influence, is possible in *both* cases! Instead of a comparison we get confusion....

Point Two of the preamble:

"The idea of convening an all-Russian labour congress for the purpose of initiating the political association of Russian workers, an idea that has met with sympathy in working-class circles, will introduce an element of unity into the organisational activities of the working-class masses, and will bring into the foreground of their field of vision the common interests of the working class and its tasks in the present Russian revolution."

In the first place, is it true that the notorious "idea" has met with sympathy in working-class circles? Point Five of the preamble to the same resolution says that "the urge of the workers themselves towards its [the labour congress] convocation *has not yet been manifested* by any serious practical steps on their part by way of preparation for it".

Here the truth has slipped out. We have a heap of *intellectualist* writings about the labour congress, and no serious practical steps on the part of the *workers themselves*. The attempt to blame this intellectualist invention on to the workers is a failure.

Let us go on. What is the labour congress? Its aim is to "initiate the political association of Russian workers".

And so the R.S.D.L.P. has not initiated such an association, nor did the Rostov demonstration of 1902, or the October strikes of 1903, or January 9, 1905, or the October strike in 1905 initiate it! Up to now we have had some history, now we have none! Association has only been "initiated" by Axelrod & Co. having thought up a labour congress. Can you beat that?

What is meant by a "*political*" association of the workers? If the authors have not invented some new terminology specially for the present resolution, it means *association around a definite political programme and tactics*. Around which specifically? Surely our intellectuals must know that all over the world there have been *political associations* of the workers under the banner of *bourgeois politics*. Perhaps this does not apply to Holy Russia? Perhaps in Holy Russia any political association of workers is automatically a Social-Democratic association?

The poor authors of the resolution are floundering so helplessly because they *have not dared* say straight out what

idea really underlies the labour congress, an idea that has long been postulated by its more sincere or younger and more hot-headed champions. The idea is that the labour congress is to be a *non-party* labour congress. Would it, after all, have been worth while talking about a *party* labour congress?

Our Mensheviks, however, were afraid to tell the *truth* openly and forthrightly—"a non-party, political association of workers...".

The end of this point reads: the idea of calling the congress "will introduce an element of unity into the organisational activities of the working-class masses, and will bring into the foreground of their field of vision the common interests of the working class and its tasks...". First organisational activities and then *tasks*, i.e., programme and tactics! Don't you think you should argue the other way round, comrades "publicists and Mensheviks engaged in practical work"? Think it over—can you *unify* organisational activities if there is no *unified* conception of the interests and tasks of the class? When you have thought it over, you will see that you cannot.

Different parties have a *different* understanding of the common interests of the working class and its tasks in the present revolution. Even in the single R.S.D.L.P. these tasks are differently understood by the Mensheviks, by Trotsky's supporters, and by the Bolsheviks. Think it over, comrades: how can these differences *not affect* the labour congress? how can they *not come out* there? how can they not be complicated by differences with the anarchists, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Trudoviks, etc., etc.? Can the "idea of convening a labour congress" or its convocation *eliminate* those differences?

And so the promise made by the authors of the resolution that "the idea of convening a labour congress will introduce an element of *unity*, etc." is either the innocent dreaming of a very young intellectual who is carried away by the latest book he has read, or else demagogy, i.e., the luring of the masses by promises that cannot be fulfilled.

You are wrong, comrades. It is the real struggle that unites. It is the development of parties, their continued struggle inside parliament and outside of it that unites, it is the gen-

eral strike, etc., that unites. But the experiment of convening a non-party congress will not introduce any real unity, or establish uniformity in the understanding of "interests and tasks".

It can, of course, be said that the struggle of different parties at the labour congress would lead to a wider field of action for the Social-Democrats and to their victory. If that is the way you look at the labour congress, you should say so straight out, and not promise the milk and honey of "an element of unity". If you do not say this in straightforward fashion, you run the risk of workers, misled and blinded by promises, coming to the congress for *the unification of politics* and actually finding gigantic, *irreconcilable* differences in politics, finding that the immediate unity of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Social-Democrats, etc., is *impossible*, and then *going away disappointed*, going away cursing the intellectuals who have deceived them, cursing "politics" in general, cursing socialism in general. The inevitable outcome of such disappointment will be the cry, "Down with politics! Down with socialism! They disunite and do not unite the workers!" Some sort of primitive forms of pure trade-unionism or naïve syndicalism will gain strength from this.

Social-Democracy, of course, will *in the end* overcome everything; it will withstand all tests, and will unite all workers. Is that, however, an argument in favour of a policy of adventurous risk?

Point Three of the preamble:

"By introducing into the disunited organisational attempts of the socially active [what loud-sounding words they use!] masses of the proletariat such a unifying concrete aim as the convention of a general labour congress [no longer an all-Russian but a general congress! i.e., general party or non-party? Don't be afraid, comrades!], propaganda and agitation in favour of the convention will, in its turn, give a strong impetus to the urge of those strata towards self-organisation [i.e., that means *without the influence of Social-Democracy*, doesn't it? otherwise it would not be self-organisation], and will increase their activity in that direction."

That is known as running from Pontius to Pilate. Point Two: the labour congress will introduce an element of unity. Point Three: unity for the concrete aim of a labour congress will give an impetus to self-organisation. What is this self-organisation for? For the labour congress. What is the labour congress for? For self-organisation. What is this super-literary resolution against the rule of the intelligentsia for? For the self-satisfaction of the intelligentsia.

Point Four:

"In view of the growing popularity of the idea of the labour congress in working-class circles, a passive and, in particular, a hostile attitude on the part of parties [?? a misprint? the Social-Democratic Party?] towards attempts to put it into effect would open up the widest vistas for unprincipled adventurers to lead the workers onto a false path, and would force them into the embraces of demagogues."

An exceptionally irate point. Its content speaks of angry embarrassment. They themselves are not certain whom they should attack, so they are directing their fire against their own ranks.

I take the fifth, the latest issue of *Otgoski*.¹¹⁰ E. Charsky writes against Y. Larin: Y. Larin "has suddenly discovered an organisational panacea" ... "an unexpected recipe" ... "a muddle".... "Y. Larin does not notice that he is proposing, by a 'conscious' act, to perpetuate the sporadic nature of the revolution, which is directly hostile to the cause of the class unification of the working masses. And it is in the interests of the labour congress that all this is being done...". "In any case, we have before us very favourable soil for all sorts of 'land demagogy'.... The conclusion of Comrade Larin's confused thinking."

That would seem to be enough. Larin is accused by the *Mensheviks* of both demagogy and adventurism, since "recipe", "panacea" and similar compliments denote precisely adventurism.

So they were aiming at one, and hit another. Verily, his own received him not. And please note further, that if the authors of the resolution qualify Larin as adventurist and demagogue, El & Co. go further than Larin. El writes frankly

(*All-Russian Labour Congress*, Moscow, 1907) that there are *two tendencies* on the labour congress question, and that *they*, the Moscow Mensheviks, agree neither with the St. Petersburg Mensheviks (p. 10) nor with Larin. The St. Petersburg Mensheviks want a congress only of the working-class vanguard, and that is simply "a variation of a party congress" (pp. 10-11). In St. Petersburg, Larin "is considered a heretic and conniver" (p. 10). Larin wants an "all-Russian labour party". The Moscow Mensheviks want *an all-Russian workers' union*.

We may well ask: if Larin has received such "handling" from *Otgoski*, how are we to qualify El, Ahmet Ts., Arkhangel'sky, Solomin & Co.? It turns out that both Larin and the Moscow Mensheviks come under the irate fourth point!

But if you are angry, comrades, and your resolution condemns the "*false path*", it is at least your duty to show where the *true path* lies. Otherwise your angry embarrassment will become quite ridiculous. However, after rejecting both the "all-Russian workers' union" and "the all-Russian labour party" you *do not say a single word* about the practical purposes for which *you* want a labour congress!

Demagogues and adventurers are capable of convening a labour congress for false purposes. *Therefore* we Social-Democrats must show a sympathetic attitude towards the labour congress, setting that congress *no aims at all....* In all truth, that Menshevik resolution is a real collection of all manner of incongruities.

Point Five:

"on the other hand, questions of the tasks of the labour congress, and of ways and means of preparing it, are still little explained in Social-Democratic circles [but they have been explained sufficiently for Larin and the Moscow Mensheviks *to have indicated clearly* the tasks of the congress and the ways and means. It's no use hiding your head under your wing, comrades from St. Petersburg. That won't make the ducklings hatched by Axelrod come out of the puddle on to dry land!], that the urge of the workers themselves towards its convocation has not yet been manifested by any serious practical steps on their part by way of preparation for it, and that the congress will only be a real and not a

sham expression of the collective will of the politically conscious strata of the proletariat and serve the cause of their class unity in the event of its convocation being prepared by their own independent organisational activity with the increased planned co-operation of the Party."

That is called descending from the sublime to the ridiculous. Larin and the young Moscow Mensheviks were just beginning to display "independent activity" when the St. Petersburg Mensheviks shouted: Hold on! You are not yet the one who expresses the collective will! You have not yet done enough explaining! The convocation of the (*non-party*) congress has still not been prepared by greater co-operation from the *Party*!

Poor Comrades El, Ahmet Ts. & Co.! They were getting along so well, with such attractive youthful verve; they published two whole collections of articles on the labour congress, analysed the problem from all angles, explained its "general-political" and its organisational significance, the attitude to the Duma, the attitude to the Party, and the attitude to the "petty-bourgeois elemental force"—when suddenly Axelrod's help brought such a change about!

We are afraid that if, until now, Larin alone revolted (remember: "heretic and conniver") against *hidebound Menshevism*,* the revolt will now develop into an *insurrection*.... Axelrod promised independent action and a genuinely labour congress against the rule of the intelligentsia—and now the St. Petersburg publicists are taking decisions and *explaining* that this independent action must be understood as being permitted by that selfsame much maligned "intellectualist" party!

* * *

It is not to be wondered at that the conclusions drawn from such a preamble should be of the strangest:

"Proceeding from all these premises, the R.S.D.L.P. congress proposes to workers and intellectuals [really? how kind that is on the part of the fighters against "domination" by the intelligentsia!] to engage [but not in the

* See present edition, Vol. 11, p. 359-60.—*Ed.*

way Larin and Ahmet did!] in an all-round discussion of questions relating to the programme and tasks of the labour congress, to propaganda, agitational and organisational work for its preparation, and to ways and means of convening it.

"The Party congress at the same time considers it the duty of Party institutions to render every support to propaganda, agitational and organisational attempts at preparing the labour congress; it considers hostile agitation against such attempts to be impermissible in principle, since such hostility strives to preserve and strengthen the obsolete Party regime in Russian Social-Democracy that is no longer compatible with the present level of development, the demands of the proletarian elements grouped inside and around the Party, and the demands of the revolution."

What can you call that if not angry embarrassment? What can you do but laugh at such a resolution?

The Party congress forbids the defence of *the obsolete Party regime*, which regime the congress itself confirms!

The Party congress *does not propose any* reform of the obsolete regime, it even *postpones* the notorious "labour congress" (for the purpose of an inconceivable "political association") and at the same time *makes it a duty to support "attempts"*!

This is genuine, impotent, intellectualist grumbling; I am not satisfied with the present obsolete Party regime; I do not want to preserve and strengthen it! Excellent. You don't want to preserve it, so propose definite changes and we shall willingly discuss them. Please be kind enough to say what sort of labour congress you think desirable. This has not yet been made clear—the urge has not been manifested—the convocation has not been prepared. We must *get down to a discussion*. Excellent. It really is not worth while writing resolutions about "*getting down to a discussion*", my dear comrades, since we have already been discussing for *too long* a time. But a workers' party is not a club for the exercise of intellectualist "discussions"—it is a fighting proletarian organisation. Discussions are all right in their way, but we have to live and act. In which sort of *party organisation* is it permitted to live and act? in the old kind? Don't you dare defend the former obsolete

organisation; don't you dare preserve and strengthen it! Excellent, etc.

It is a tale without an end. The intellectual is peeved and angry at his own irresoluteness, his own embarrassment.

Such is "hidebound Menshevism's" last word.

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While wandering all round it, the Menshevik publicists have safely avoided the issue that has become urgent enough to be raised in practice and in literature—an independent Social-Democratic workers' party, or its *replacement* by (variant: its subordination to) a non-party political organisation of the proletariat?

Our Bolshevik resolution poses the question openly and gives a *direct* and definite answer to it. It is useless to evade the issue, no matter whether you do so because of embarrassment or because of well-meaning "reconciliation". It is useless to evade the issue because the *substitution* has been proposed, and *work to effect that substitution* is going on. The intellectualist Menshevik hens have hatched out ducklings. The ducklings have swum away. The hens *must* choose—on water or on land? The answer they have given (that answer could be accurately translated as: neither on water nor on land but *in the mud*) is no answer; it is postponement, procrastination.

Axelrod could not hold Larin back. Larin could not hold back El, Ahmet Ts. & Co. This latter company cannot hold back the anarcho-syndicalists.

On water or on land, gentlemen?

We want to keep on dry land. We can prophesy for you, that the greater the zeal, the greater your determination in crawling through the mud, the sooner will you return to dry land.

"To extend and strengthen the influence of the Social-Democratic party among the broad masses of the proletariat" we do not propose replacing Social-Democracy by "a labour party" of the non-partisan type, or "an all-Russian workers' union" that is above all parties, or a labour congress for unknown aims, but something simple and modest, something to which all project-mongering is alien—"efforts must be

increased, on the one hand, to organise trade unions and conduct Social-Democratic propaganda and agitation within them, and, on the other hand, to draw still larger sections of the working class into the activities of all types of Party organisations" (the final point of the Bolshevik resolution).

This has become too "obsolete", *too boring*, for our blasé intellectuals. Let them get on with their projects; we shall go with the workers, even at the "labour congress" (if it is held), and will show them *in practice* the correctness of our forecasts and—and then we shall return with the disappointed workers (or rather those who have become disappointed in certain intellectualist leaders) to "obsolete" work in trade unions and in Party organisations of all types.

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How is this "labour congress" tendency in our Party to be explained? Here we can only briefly mention three reasons that are, in our opinion, fundamental: (1) intellectualist-philistine weariness with the revolution; (2) a peculiarity of Russian Social-Democratic opportunism that is developing historically towards subordinating the "purely working-class" movement to the influence of the bourgeoisie; (3) the undigested traditions of the October revolution in Russia.

Re Point One. Some of the labour congress champions reveal weariness with the revolution, and a desire, at all costs, to legalise the Party and discard anything like a republic, the dictatorship of the proletariat and so on. A legal labour congress is a convenient means of attaining this. Hence (and also to some extent for the second reason) the sympathy of the Popular Socialists, the *Bez Zaglaviya* Bernsteinians (from *Tovarishch*, etc.) and the Cadets for such a congress.

Re Point Two. Take the first historical form adopted by Russian Social-Democratic opportunism. The beginning of a mass working-class movement (the second half of the nineties of the last century) gave rise to this opportunism in the shape of *Economism* and *Struvism*. At that time, Plekhanov and Axelrod and all the old *Iskra* supporters explained the connection between them time and again. The famous *Credo* by Prokopovich and Kuskova (1899-1900) expressed

this connection very clearly—let the intelligentsia and the liberals conduct the political struggle, and the workers the economic struggle. The political working-class party is an invention of the revolutionary intellectual.

In this classic *Credo* there is a clear expression of the historical, class meaning of the intellectualist infatuation with a “purely working-class” movement. Its meaning is the subordination of the working class (for the sake of “purely working-class” tasks) to *bourgeois* politics and *bourgeois* ideology. This “infatuation” of the intellectuals expressed the capitalist tendency to subordinate immature workers to the liberals.

Today, at a higher stage of development, we see *the same thing again*. Blocs with the Cadets, in general, the policy of supporting the Cadets, and a non-party labour congress are two sides of the same medal, connected in the same way as liberalism and the purely working-class movement are connected in the *Credo*. *In effect*, the non-party labour congress expresses the same capitalist tendency to *weaken* the class independence of the proletariat and *subordinate* that class to the bourgeoisie. This tendency is clearly displayed in the plans to replace Social-Democracy with a *non-party* workers’ organisation, or its *subordination* to the latter.

Hence the sympathy of the Popular Socialists, the *Bez Zaglaviya* group, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and others, for the idea of a “labour congress”.

Re Point Three. The Russian bourgeois revolution has created a specific type of mass organisation of the proletariat that does not resemble the usual European organisations (trade unions or Social-Democratic parties). These organisations are the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies.

By schematically developing similar institutions into a system (as Trotsky has done), or sympathising in general with the revolutionary enthusiasm of the proletariat and being infatuated with the “fashionable” phrase “revolutionary syndicalism” (as some Moscow supporters of the labour congress are), it is easy to approach the idea of a labour congress in the revolutionary and not in the opportunist way.

That, however, is an uncritical attitude to great and glorious revolutionary traditions.

The Soviets of Workers' Deputies and similar institutions were *actually* organs of the insurrection. Their strength and their success depended entirely on the strength and success of the insurrection. Only when the insurrection developed, was their inception no mere bagatelle, but a great exploit of the proletariat. In the event of a new upsurge of the struggle, in the event of its transition to *that phase*, such institutions, of course, are inevitable and desirable. But their historical development must not consist in a schematic development of local Soviets of Workers' Deputies up to an all-Russian labour congress, but in the conversion of embryonic organs of revolutionary power (for the Soviets of Workers' Deputies were such) into central organs of victorious revolutionary power, into a revolutionary provisional government. Soviets of Workers' Deputies and their unification are essential for the victory of the insurrection. A victorious insurrection will inevitably create *other* kinds of organs.

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Russian Social-Democracy, of course, should not forswear non-participation in a labour congress because the revolution is developing in a highly zigzag fashion and may produce the most varied and unusual situations. It is, however, one thing to study attentively the conditions of the revolution as it ebbs and flows and to attempt to use those conditions, and quite another to engage in confused or anti-Social-Democratic project-mongering.

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Signed: N. Lenin

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THE AGRARIAN QUESTION AND THE FORCES OF THE REVOLUTION

The newspaper *Trudovoi Narod*, organ of the Trudoviks and members of the Peasant Union, has defined the alignment of forces in the Duma on the land question, that "life or death question" for the peasantry.

"The Trudoviks (100), Popular Socialists (14), and Socialist-Revolutionaries (34), 148 in all, may act together on the land question, to uphold the interests of the working people. Assuming that the Social-Democrats (64) will join them on many points of that question, *the total will be 212.*

"All these will be opposed by the Constitutional-Democrats (91), the Polish Koto (46), Independents (52), Octobrists and Moderates (32), *221 in all.*

"Thus there is a preponderance of votes against. And we have counted neither the Moslems (30) nor the Cossacks (17); it is likely that, at the very best, one half will side with the Left, and the other half with the Right. In any case there are more votes against the Trudoviks' land law than for it."

The enumeration omits the monarchists (22), but their inclusion only bears out the inference drawn by the Trudoviks.

This conclusion is of interest in two respects: firstly, it throws light on the fundamental question of the alignment of social forces in the present Russian revolution, and secondly, it helps to clarify the significance, for the liberation movement, of the Duma and the struggle in the Duma.

All Social-Democrats are convinced that, in its social and economic content, the present revolution is a *bourgeois* revolution. This means that it is proceeding on the basis of capitalist production relations, and will inevitably

result in a further development of those same production relations. To put it more simply, the entire economy of society will still *remain* under the domination of the market, of money, even when there is the broadest *freedom* and the peasants have won a complete victory in their struggle for the *land*. The struggle for land and freedom is a struggle for the conditions of existence of bourgeois society, for the rule of *capital* will remain in the most democratic republic, irrespective of how the transfer of "all the land to the people" is effected.

Such a view may seem strange to anyone unfamiliar with Marx's theory. Yet it is not hard to see that it is the correct view—one need but recall the great French Revolution and its outcome, the history of the "free lands" in America, and so on.

The Social-Democrats by no means wish to minimise the tasks of the present revolution, or to belittle its significance, by calling it a bourgeois revolution. On the contrary. The struggle of the working class against the capitalist class cannot develop on a wide enough scale and end in victory until the older historical enemies of the proletariat are overthrown.

Hence, the principal task of the proletariat at present is to win the broadest freedom and bring about the most complete destruction of landlord (feudal) landed proprietorship. Only by doing this, only by completely smashing the old, semi-feudal society through democratic action, can the proletariat rise to full stature as an independent class, lay full emphasis on its specific (i.e., socialist) tasks, as distinct from the democratic tasks common to "all the oppressed", and secure for itself the most favourable conditions for an unrestricted, sweeping, and intensified struggle for socialism. If the bourgeois-democratic liberation movement stops half-way, if it is not carried through, the proletariat will have to spend a great deal more of its forces on general democratic (i.e., bourgeois-democratic) tasks than on its own class, proletarian, i.e., socialist, tasks.

But can the socialist proletariat accomplish the bourgeois revolution independently and as the guiding force? Does not the very concept "bourgeois revolution" imply that it can be accomplished only by the bourgeoisie?

The Mensheviks often fall into this error, although, as a viewpoint, it is a caricature of Marxism. A liberation movement that is bourgeois in social and economic content is not such because of its motive forces. The motive force may be, not the bourgeoisie, but the proletariat and the peasantry. Why is this possible? Because the proletariat and the peasantry suffer even more than the bourgeoisie from the survivals of serfdom, because they are in greater need of freedom and the abolition of landlord oppression. For the bourgeoisie, on the contrary, complete victory constitutes a danger, since the proletariat will make use of full freedom against the bourgeoisie, and the fuller that freedom and the more completely the power of the landlords has been destroyed, the easier will it be for the proletariat to do so.

Hence the bourgeoisie strives to put an end to the bourgeois revolution half-way from its destination, when freedom has been only half-won, by a deal with the old authorities and the landlords. This striving is grounded in the class interests of the bourgeoisie. It was manifested so clearly in the German bourgeois revolution of 1848 that the Communist Marx spearheaded proletarian policy against the "compromising" (the expression is Marx's) liberal bourgeoisie.¹¹¹

Our Russian bourgeoisie is still more cowardly, and our proletariat far more class-conscious and better organised than was the German proletariat in 1848. In our country the full victory of the bourgeois-democratic movement is possible only despite the "compromising" liberal bourgeoisie, only in the event of the mass of the democratic peasantry following the proletariat in the struggle for full freedom and all the land.

The Second Duma offers still more striking confirmation of this view. Even the peasants have now realised that the liberal bourgeoisie, the Constitutional-Democrats, belong to the Right, and the peasants and the workers to the Left. True, the Trudoviks, Popular Socialists, and Socialist-Revolutionaries constantly vacillate between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and as often as not are *in reality* political *hangers-on* of the liberals (the voting for Golovin, the "tactics of silence", agreement to refer the budget to a commission, etc., etc.¹¹²). This vacillation is not accidental. It springs from the class nature of the petty bourgeoisie.

Why must the Constitutional-Democrats be included among the Rights in a question as pressing as that of the land? Because the Constitutional-Democrat agrarian policy is essentially a *landlord* policy. The "compulsory alienation" advocated by the Constitutional-Democrats actually means *the landlords compelling the peasants to pay ruinous compensation*, for in fact both the amount of these payments and rates of taxation *are determined by the landlords*; the landlords and officials will constitute the majority in the local land committees (in the First Duma the Constitutional-Democrats were opposed to the election of these committees by universal ballot), and in the central all-Russian legislature the landlords will be predominant through the Council of State, etc. Cadet "liberalism" is the liberalism of the bourgeois lawyer who *reconciles* the peasant with the landlord, and does that *to the advantage of the landlord*.*

Take the second question. The Constitutional-Democrats and the Rights constitute a majority in the Duma. "*What is the way out?*" asks *Trudovoi Narod*. The answer is simple: the "way out" is to rise above Duma discussions which lead nowhere.

This would be necessary even if the Left had a majority in the Duma, for the Duma is powerless, and the Council of State would, in the interests of the landlords, "*improve*" any project passed by the Duma. And it is necessary now—not from any subjective party viewpoint, but in the objective historical sense; *unless this is done*, the land question can be settled *only* in favour of the landlords.

Nashe Ekho, No. 7,
April 1, 1907

Published according
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* In view of what *Rech* said about the landlord affiliation of the Constitutional-Democrats being only a platform catchword, we must add this: we estimated 79 unmistakable Constitutional-Democrats from the well-known book *Members of the Second State Duma* (St. Petersburg, 1907); of these 20 are landlords. We can name *Tuchkov, Boguslavsky, Bychkov, Bakunin, Rodichev, Bogdanov, Salazkin, Tatarinov, Stakhovich, Ikonnikov, Savelyev, Dolgorukov, Chelnokov, Golovin*, both *Pereleshins, Volotsky, Iordansky, Chernosvitov*. The underlined are Marshals of the Nobility,¹¹² Rural Superintendents¹¹³ or chairmen of Zemstvo Boards.¹¹⁵

AN ANAEMIC DUMA OR AN ANAEMIC PETTY BOURGEOISIE

A gradual increase is taking place in the number of daily periodicals with a stand more Left than that of the Cadets. The voice of the Left section of the Duma, the section between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats, is becoming more audible.

The latest addition is the daily press of the Popular Socialists. Their newspaper, *Obshchestvennoye Dyelo* (Sunday, April 1) immediately adopted a highly characteristic and noteworthy tone of plaint, regret and repentance.

What do they complain of? They complain that the Duma is "anaemic" (i.e., in plain Russian, bloodless and spineless).

What do they regret? The lengthy supremacy of the slogan "Save the Duma".

What do they repent of? Of their support for Cadet tactics.

It is true that this repentance is far from being real, sincere and full—it is not, as the saying goes, fully confessed and half redressed. The repentance of the Popular Socialists is so insincere that in their first, or repentance, issue they reply to us with a malicious statement to the effect that we, the Bolshevik Social-Democrats, "solve differences by calling our opponent ignorant, pitiful", etc., and that we are "*inaccurate in our facts*" in ascribing "entry on to the path of conciliation" to our opponent.

We should not, of course, have taken up our readers' time with this question of the sincerity of the Narodnik repentance had it not become very intimately and directly connected with questions that have a decisive importance in

assessing the Second Duma as a whole—more than that, in assessing the entire Russian revolution.

The Narodniks are three groups in the Duma united on a number of basic questions and conducting a more or less united common policy. These groups in some way or another reflect the interests and views of a vast mass of the Russian people.

The majority of this category of deputies are peasants, and it can scarcely be disputed that the peasant masses have most precisely expressed their needs (and their prejudices) through this category of Duma deputies, and through no other. It follows, therefore, that the policy of the Narodniks in the Duma is connected with the question of the policy of the peasant masses, without whose participation there can be no talk of victory for the emancipation movement.

The Popular Socialists are stating an obvious and disgraceful falsehood to the effect that the Social-Democrats solve differences by vilification or by falsely ascribing conciliation to the Trudoviks (i.e., the Narodniks). This is untrue, gentlemen, because the Social-Democrats, *from the very outset* of the Second Duma's activities, and quite independently of the Narodniks and the struggle against them, *had already produced* that assessment of the notorious slogan "Save the Duma" towards which you are now hobbling.

"'Save the Duma!'" wrote our colleague N. R., ¹¹⁸ on February 21, "is the cry that is constantly escaping the lips of the bourgeois electors and is being repeated in the bourgeois press, and not only the Cadet press but also such 'Left' periodicals as *Tovarishch*.... The secret of the Duma's salvation has long been revealed by the Black-Hundred and Octobrist press and by the government. The Duma can easily be saved if it is 'able to function' and is 'obedient to the law', i.e., if it slavishly prostrates itself to the government, and does not venture anything more than timid requests and degrading petitions. The Duma can easily be saved if it betrays the cause of national emancipation, and sacrifices that cause to the Black-Hundred gang. The Duma, therefore, can only be saved if power remains in the old hands. That must be clear to everybody; that must not be forgotten. But can the Duma possibly be saved when treachery is the price to be paid? Social-Democracy answers that question clearly and loudly: Never! The proletariat and the peasantry have no use for a treacherous Duma. Not without reason did the Moscow peasantry declare in their mandate to their deputy: 'Let them dissolve you, but do not betray the will of the people'. If the Duma is to be mainly concerned with avoiding irritation of the government, it will lose the confidence of

the people and will not fulfil the tasks it has been charged with—to assist as far as possible in organising the masses of the people for victory over reaction and for the triumph of the emancipation movement.... Only the strong are feared. And respect too is only for the strong. Hysterical cries of ‘Save the Duma’ are unworthy of a free people and its elected representatives.”

This was written *the day after* the Second Duma was opened. And, it would seem, it is written clearly enough.

The Narodniks who, in their literature, in their general politics and in the Duma, represent the interests of various strata of the petty bourgeoisie, petty proprietors (in the towns and, especially, in the countryside — i.e., the peasantry), have now begun to understand that the Social-Democrats were speaking the truth. Events have *proved the correctness* of our policy.

But in order “not to come too late”, in order not to become a politician who is wise after the event, learning from events is not enough. You must *understand* the course taken by events, understand the *basic* relations between classes, which *determine* the policies of the various parties and of the entire Duma.

“Save the Duma” is a Cadet slogan that gives expression to Cadet policy. What is it, in essence? It means an agreement with the reactionaries against the people’s demands. How is this agreement expressed? By submitting to those institutions and those limits of activity that are fixed by the reactionaries. By turning the demands of liberty and the demands of the people into miserable, pitiful, false “reforms” that *are kept within* those limits. Why do the Social-Democrats call this liberal policy treacherous? Because the defeat of all unsuccessful bourgeois revolutions has always been possible only because the liberals have come to an agreement with the reactionaries, i.e., because of their *actually* going over from people’s freedom to reaction. Liberal reformism during the revolution is a betrayal of people’s freedom. It is brought about not by accident, but by the class interests of the bourgeoisie and part of the landlords, who *fear* the people, especially the working class.

The slogan “Save the Duma” is of importance because it is a clear expression of the *general* line of this treacherous policy. Individual manifestations of it are: the tactics of

silence in response to the declaration, the curtailment of the tasks set the food and unemployment commissions, the curtailment of speeches in the Duma, the replacement of the Duma by commissions, the relegation of the budget to a commission, etc.

As representatives of the petty bourgeoisie, the Narodniks *have supported, and are still supporting*, this Cadet policy. The Narodniks voted for Golovin instead of abstaining from voting. The Narodniks participated in the pitiful "tactics of silence", and so did both the Popular Socialists *and the Socialist-Revolutionaries*. Only under the repeated pressure of the Social-Democrats did the Narodniks *begin to draw away* from the Constitutional-Democrats. But even now the Trudoviks, the Popular Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries are wavering in all their policies, for *they do not understand the task* of the struggle against the Cadets and of their exposure from the Duma platform.

This wavering is due to *the anaemic state of the petty bourgeoisie*.

This "anaemia" of the petty bourgeoisie, partially due to its weariness from the revolution and partially to its wavering and unstable (social) character, is the chief cause of the "anaemic state of the Duma". And so we say to the Narodniks—it's no use blaming the mirror if your looks are no good.

Don't be anaemic in your politics, break off your connections with the Cadets; stick determinedly to the proletariat; leave it to the liberals *to save* the Duma, and you yourselves openly, boldly and firmly *save* the interests and traditions of the emancipation movement—then your repentance will indeed mean "half redressing"!

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BANALITY TRIUMPHANT, OR S.R.'s APE THE CADETS

Yesterday we said that the Narodniks seemed to have come to their senses after the Duma had been in existence for a month and had begun—I would not say to “understand”, but at least to sense, the ignominy of the notorious Cadet slogan, “Save the Duma!” We showed in that article that the Cadet slogan is no accident but the expression of a policy determined by the profound class interests of the bourgeoisie and the landlords.*

Today the leading Cadet newspaper *Rech* (April 3) devotes its editorial to that problem. “The sharp protests made during the past few days by the Left newspapers against the tactics of ‘saving the Duma’ are a rather alarming symptom,” says the Cadet leading article.

That is how matters stand. We are glad the Cadets have also noticed that the Narodniks repent the “saving of the Duma”. That means that the observations we made yesterday were not wrong, that there really is a *movement* among the petty bourgeoisie from the liberal landlords towards the working class. Good luck to them!

The “save the Duma” tactics are praised by the Cadet *Rech* in terms that deserve to be preserved in perpetuity as a gem of banality. Just listen to this: “If the Duma lives on, is it not the consciously produced fruit of *your* [the opposition’s] efforts? It is the first tangible result of the intervention of your will in events. This *absence* of facts is in

* See pp. 337-40 of this volume.—*Ed.*

itself a fact of tremendous importance; it is your implementation of a plan you have prepared and put into force."

It is a pity Shchedrin did not live until the "great" Russian revolution. He would no doubt have added a fresh chapter to *The Golovlyov Family* in which he would have depicted Judas Golovlyov comforting the flogged, humiliated, hungry and enslaved muzhik in the following words: "You expect improvement? You are disappointed at the lack of change in a way of life based on hunger, the birch, the knout, and shooting down of the people? You complain of the 'absence of facts'? You ingrate! Is not the absence of facts in itself a fact of the utmost importance? Is it not the conscious result of the intervention of your will that the Lidvals still rule as before, that the muzhiks submit calmly to being flogged, instead of harbouring harmful dreams of the 'poetry of struggle'?"

It is hard to hate the Black Hundreds; feelings have died in the same way as they die, it is said, in war-time after a long series of battles, after the long experience of shooting at people and spending a long time among bursting shells and whistling bullets. War is war—and an open, universal and *customary* war is going on against the Black Hundreds.

This Judas Golovlyov of a Cadet, however, is capable of inspiring the most burning feeling of hatred and contempt. The "liberal" landlord and bourgeois advocate is listened to; even the peasants listen to him. He really does throw dust in the eyes of the people and stupefy them!...

You *cannot* fight against the Krushevans with words, with the pen. You have to fight against them in another way. To fight against counter-revolution with the pen, with words, would mean, first and foremost, to expose those disgusting hypocrites who, in the name of "people's freedom", in the name of "democracy", laud political stagnation, the silence of the people, the humiliation of the citizen turned philistine, and "the absence of facts". You must fight against those liberal landlords and bourgeois advocates, who are fully satisfied that the people are silent and they themselves are able, fearlessly and with impunity, to play at "statesmen" and to apply the balm of appeasement to those who "tactlessly" express indignation at the rule of counter-revolution.

Can one possibly fail to reply in the most scathing terms to speeches such as the following?

"The day when debates in the Taurida Palace will seem as much an inevitable item of the day's proceedings as lunch in the afternoon and theatre in the evening, when the day's programme will not interest all collectively, but will have special interest for different groups [!], when debates on general policy will become an exception and exercises in abstract rhetoric will actually be impossible on account of the absence of an audience—that day may be welcomed as the day of the final triumph of representative rule in Russia."

There's a Judas Golovlyov for you! The day when those who have been flogged lose consciousness and are silent instead of engaging in "debates", when the landlords will be as certain of their old power (*strengthened* by "liberal" reforms) as the liberal Judases are of their lunch in the afternoon and their theatre in the evening, that day will be the day of the final triumph of "people's freedom". The day when reaction is finally triumphant will be the day of the final triumph of the constitution....

That is the way it was with all betrayals by the bourgeoisie in Europe. *That is the way it will be ...* but will it be like that in Russia, gentlemen?

The Judases try to clear themselves by showing that even among the parties of the Left there have been, and still are, supporters of "salvation". Fortunately, this time it is not the Social-Democrat who is among those misled by the Judases, but the Socialist-Revolutionary. The Cadets quote passages from the Tammerfors speech of some Socialist-Revolutionary, who called for "collaboration" with the Cadets, and disputed the timeliness or need to fight against them.

We do not know of that speech, or whether *Rech* is quoting accurately.

But we do know the *resolution* of the last congress of Socialist-Revolutionaries—not some individual speech—and that resolution *really does express* the stultification of the petty bourgeois who has been stupefied by the liberal Judas.

This resolution was printed in the official organ of the Socialist-Revolutionaries¹¹⁷ (issue No. 6, March 8, 1907), and it turns out that the old passages from it, those dating back to February, are correctly quoted by the newspapers.

There it actually says in black and white: "The Congress [of the S.R.'s] is of the opinion that strict party alignments within the Duma, with each group acting on its own in isolated fashion, and bitter strife among the groups, might completely paralyse the activity of the opposition majority, and thus discredit, in the minds of the working classes, the very idea of popular representation". At that time (February 22) *Rech* praised that banality. At that time, too (February 23), we threw some light on it, and showed the petty-bourgeois origin and treacherous liberal significance of such a congress resolution.*

Whether some Socialist-Revolutionary leader will be killed politically by the Judas kiss is of no interest to us. But *the Cadet resolution* of the S.R. congress must be a thousand times exposed to the workers so as to warn wavering Social-Democrats and to break any connection between the proletariat and the supposedly revolutionary S.R.'s.

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* See pp. 165-69 of this volume.—*Ed.*

THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP AND APRIL 3 IN THE DUMA

We have to return once again to the incident that was enacted in the State Duma in connection with question asked regarding the killings and tortures in Riga Prison and with the arraignment of seventy-four people before a military court. This has to be done, we say, because, amongst other things, *Narodnaya Duma* has for some reason or other seen fit to obscure the real meaning of the events and thereby to aggravate that extremely unfavourable impression created by the conduct of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma on this question.

It is true that *Narodnaya Duma* also speaks of this first question day in the Duma by saying that the first attempt was a failure; it is true that *Narodnaya Duma* points out, apropos of this, that "the Duma groups are still poorly adapted to parliamentary procedure", but that is not what matters. It is our opinion that the Social-Democratic group has revealed, not *parliamentary* but purely *political* inexperience in this matter. It is no misfortune that the Social-Democratic group sometimes gets caught in some "formal trap" (*Narodnaya Duma's* words) or another; the misfortune is that it sometimes quite unnecessarily surrenders its positions and does not carry a well-commenced struggle to the end, does not *consolidate* victory behind it when there is every possibility of so doing.

Such was the case when a reply was made to the government declaration, and the Social-Democratic group, for no reason at all, surrendered a good half of its victory ... to Mr. Stolypin; this is what happened on April 3, in connection with the question asked about the Riga horrors.

The Cadets are against questions that have to be answered without notice.¹¹⁸ That is only natural; an urgent question, especially one on such a matter as that of the government using military courts in their war against the people, always contains elements of a "demonstrative act", of pressure brought to bear on the ministers. An urgent question on such a matter is undoubtedly one of those "facts", one of those "acts" on the part of the Duma that do not come under the heading of "lunch in the afternoon" or "theatre in the evening", to which the servile *Rech* is so anxious to liken the Duma itself. Is it possible that this poison, produced by Cadet decomposition, can affect the Left in the Duma, including even the Social-Democratic group? We are unwilling to admit this, yet....

"No *urgent* question is needed," Mr. Rodichev whines servilely from the rostrum. "An urgent question in the present instance might wound the ministers' pride."

We are not in the least surprised at such speeches on the lips of a Cadet Mirabeau, who so painstakingly plays his role of representative of the *tas de blagueurs** in the Duma.

Deputy Djaparidze (Social-Democrat) gave a splendid answer to Rodichev. "It is our duty," he reminded the Cadet flunkies, "to say our word when the hand of the executioner is raised over his victim."

Then Kuzmin-Karavayev took the floor and read a telegram he had received from the local satrap in Riga, Meller-Zakomelsky—that same Meller-Zakomelsky whose name Siberian mothers still use to scare their children with. The telegram was most insolent, and full of crude jibes: "... in Riga there has been no reason to arraign either 74, or 70 or even 4 people; so far there is nobody to save".

Deputy Alexinsky opposed to this telegram another, received from progressive Riga electors, which said that the arraignment before a military court was being arranged.

Deputy Alexinsky, who insisted with good reason on the urgency of the question, was followed by the Trudovik and the Socialist-Revolutionary groups, which supported the demand of urgency.

* Gang of chatterboxes.

Then *the Cadets began to withdraw*. Pergament did not even put forward an argument, but *requested* the Duma Left not to insist on urgency, offering *on behalf of the Questions Commission* to put this question through the commission within twenty-four hours. Only, he begged, don't insist on a reply from the floor.

Bulgakov, the unctuous mystic, then spoke and, to achieve the same rejection of urgency, asked that no party passion be brought into the question. Mr. Bulgakov would have done well first to explain to his party colleagues that in such matters servility is permissible to an even lesser degree than in others, and will *naturally* arouse party passions to the *paroxysms* nobody desires.

After Bulgakov came Kiesewetter, bringing another step towards the Left, another minor concession. Kiesewetter proposed passing the question on to the commission so that it could be handled "*out of turn*".

Delarov of the Popular Socialists spoke in favour of urgency.

In other words, the entire Left was against the Cadets with a unanimity rare in the Duma. It became clearer that the issue would be a political one, and that the struggle begun against Cadet servility would have to be carried through to its conclusion. Read A. Stolypin's "Notes" in *Novoye Vremya* for April 4. How he showers praises on the Cadet Party! How he attacks his allies, the "Rights", to make them realise, at long last, that in such cases they must not speak so sharply, or scare the Cadets from the path of conciliation they are now following! "Sincerity and seriousness", he pleased to note, were heard by Mr. Stolypin "in the speeches of the Cadets" on that day!

And then, when the Social-Democratic group already had victory within its grasp, Tsereteli got up and said that the group withdrew its motion of urgency. Why? What were the motives? There was absolutely no reason to suppose that a question passed on to a commission would be more effective than a question answered from the floor. And, of course, nobody will risk saying that it would.

Tsereteli had no grounds whatsoever for his statement. It amounts to lambasting oneself in the fullest sense of the word. The day of April 3 does not stand to the credit of the

Social-Democratic group. And, we repeat, this is not a case of *parliamentary* inexperience. It is a case of that political flaccidity, that indecisiveness of the Social-Democratic group, which has made itself felt on several previous occasions, and has prevented the group from becoming the real leader of the entire Duma Left. We must not close our eyes to this, but must strive to get rid of it!

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THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

I

An article with the above title in yesterday's *Narodnaya Duma* is an example of a calm, clear, simple exposition of the real differences in principle among the Social-Democrats. It is as pleasant and useful to conduct a dispute on such a basis, as it is unpleasant and impossible to answer the hysterics of *Privet*¹¹⁹ or *Otgoloski*.

To get down to business. Differences have arisen over the appraisal of the Cadets and the Narodniks. With regard to the Cadets, according to the perfectly correct opinion of *Narodnaya Duma*, the differences boil down to the question of *whom they represent*. "The middle and petty, mainly urban, bourgeoisie," answers *Narodnaya Duma*. "The economic basis of these parties is provided by a section of the middle landlords and the middle bourgeoisie, especially the bourgeois intelligentsia, while a section of the urban and rural petty-bourgeois democrats still follow these parties merely by force of tradition and because they are deliberately deceived by the liberals."*

Clearly the Mensheviks are more optimistic in their assessment of the Cadets than we are. They gloss over or deny their links with the landlords, while we stress them. They stress their links with the urban democratic petty bourgeoisie, while we consider those links extremely weak.

As far as the landlords are concerned, *Narodnaya Duma* says that our statement in *Nashe Ekho*, No. 7, is naïve—the statement in which we estimated twenty landlords, not in the *past* (that was a mistake on the part of *Narodnaya*

* See p. 137 of this volume.—Ed.

Duma) but in the *present* Cadet group in the Duma.* There are millionaires and high-ranking officials even among the Social-Democrats, says *Narodnaya Duma* ironically.

Feeble irony! Everybody realises that the Singers, Aronses and Nalivkins are instances of individuals going over from the bourgeoisie to the proletariat. But, gentlemen, would you seriously insist that twenty landlords (out of the seventy-nine members forming the Constitutional-Democratic group, i.e., a *quarter*) are individual followers of sixty bourgeois intellectuals, and not vice versa? Will you insist that it is the landlords who are conducting a liberal-intellectualist policy and not the liberal intellectuals who are conducting the policy of the landlords? Your joke about Singer and Comrade Nalivkin—that was nothing more than a nice little joke to cover up a hopeless position.

The composition of the Cadet Duma group, of course, is not the main proof, but merely a symptom. The main proof lies, first of all, in the history of landlord liberalism in Russia (as *Narodnaya Duma* admits); secondly—and this is the main thing—it lies in an analysis of the *present-day* policy of the Constitutional-Democrats. "The Cadet agrarian policy is *essentially* [note this] a landlord policy" (*Nashe Ekho*, No. 7). "Cadet 'liberalism' is the liberalism of the bourgeois lawyer who reconciles the peasant with the landlord, and does that to the advantage of the landlord" (*ibid.*).**

Narodnaya Duma has no answer to this argument.

To continue. How do they demonstrate the class links between the Constitutional-Democratic Party and the urban democratic petty bourgeoisie? By using election statistics—the towns return mostly Cadets, that is a fact. But it is no proof. In the first place, our election law gives preference to the *non-democratic* strata of the urban bourgeoisie. Everybody knows that the popular assemblies express *more precisely* the views and temper "of the *democratic* petty bourgeoisie of the towns". Secondly, the Cadets are stronger and the Lefts weaker in the urban curias of the big cities than in those of the small towns. This is shown by the statistics on electors. Hence it follows that the Cadets represent,

* See p. 336 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** *Ibid.*—*Ed.*

not the democratic petty bourgeoisie, but the liberal middle bourgeoisie. The bigger the town, the sharper the antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and the stronger the Cadets in the urban (bourgeois) curia, as compared with the Lefts. Thirdly, in twenty-two big cities where there was a Left bloc, the Rights obtained 17,000 votes, the Octobrists 34,000, the Cadets, 74,000, and the Lefts 41,000 votes. It was possible *at one go* to deprive the Cadets of such a large number of votes, only because they are *not* democrats. Everywhere, all over the world, liberal lawyers have deceived the democratic petty bourgeoisie, and have been exposed by the socialists.

"Is it true," asked *Narodnaya Duma*, "that our middle and petty bourgeoisie are already interested in the suppression of the revolution so as to break down the forces of the proletariat, which constitute a direct threat to them?" And itself answers: "It is definitely not true."

These words provide a *definitely untrue* expression of *our* views. This, comrades, means polemics without principles. You know very well that we distinguish between the counter-revolutionary nature of the Cadets and that of the Octobrists; that we do not include *the petty bourgeoisie* in our accusation of counter-revolutionariness; that we believe that the Cadet landlords fear not only the workers, but the peasants as well. You are distorting, not objecting.

The next argument by *Narodnaya Duma* actually is an objection. The Cadets become more moderate and more reactionary as the revolution declines, and not as it rises, i.e., not because of their counter-revolutionary nature but because of their weakness. The Cadets' tactics, says *Narodnaya Duma* in italics "*are not the tactics of counter-revolutionary strength but the tactics of revolutionary impotence*".

It thus appears that the Cadets are revolutionaries too, but only impotent revolutionaries. A monstrous conclusion to draw. To arrive at this howling incongruity, they had to argue from a radically erroneous premise. That error is the denial of the landlord character of the Cadets (in Russia the *landlord* is counter-revolutionary either in the Black-Hundred and Octobrist manner, or in the Cadet manner) and the denial of the fact that bourgeois *intellectuals* predominate among the Cadets. If we rectify these two errors,

we get the correct conclusion: *the tactics of the Constitutional-Democrats are the tactics of landlord counter-revolution and bourgeois-intellectual impotence.* The landlords are a counter-revolutionary force. So are the big bourgeoisie. The bourgeois intellectual and the liberal government official are their cowardly servants, who hide their servility to counter-revolution behind a mask of "democratic" hypocrisy.

It is not true that the Cadets "shifted to the Right" only with the decline, not with the upsurge, of the revolution. Remember *Nachalo*,¹²⁰ comrades from *Narodnaya Duma*. Remember articles in the spirit of "Witte Is the Agent of the Bourse, Struve Is the Agent of Witte". Those were excellent articles! And those were excellent times—we did not then disagree with the Mensheviks in our assessment of the Cadets.... To provide a correct picture of the Cadets' attitude to the upsurge, or upsurges, of the revolution, we must say—*when the revolution shows itself in the streets, the Cadet shows himself in the minister's ante-chamber.*

Struve went to Witte in November 1905. Somebody from the Cadets visited somebody from the Black Hundreds in June 1906. Milyukov went to Stolypin on January 15, 1907. As it was, so will it be....

* *
*

Giving an economic basis for its views on the Cadets, *Narodnaya Duma* concludes:

"Owing to the Russia's poor urban development and the dominant influence of big enterprises in urban industry, our urban middle and petty bourgeoisie has too small an influence on the general economic life of the country to feel itself the independent political force that those classes in England and France at one time felt themselves to be...." Very good and perfectly correct. Only it *does not* apply to *the Cadets*. And, furthermore, thereby disappears that allegedly Marxist counterposing of "big urban progressive" and "petty rural backward" bourgeoisie that has often been used in an attempt to justify Menshevik tactics.... "They cannot make the proletariat their tool because the proletariat is already fighting under its own Social-Democratic banner...."

Very true! "This is the source of all its wavering, of all its indecisiveness, in the struggle against the autocratic semi-feudal system...." Again very true, but it does not apply to the Cadets, it applies to the *Trudovik* parties and groups who find their support not only in the rural but in the urban petty bourgeoisie!

"This relative weakness of urban bourgeois democracy also explains the fact that as soon as our bourgeois democrats begin shifting to the Left they immediately lose the urban soil under their feet and become entangled in the peasant-Narodnik swamp...."

True, a thousand times true! We did not even dare dream of such complete confirmation of Bolshevik tactics on the part of *Narodnaya Duma*. "As soon as our bourgeois democrats begin shifting to the Left, they become Narodniks." That is exactly how it is—*Left* bourgeois democrats *are* Narodniks. The Cadets only pretend to be democrats; actually they are not democrats at all. Therefore, insofar as the proletariat have to carry on the bourgeois revolution in the company of bourgeois democracy, they are so far fated to act in a political "bloc" in the broad sense of the term, that including not only electoral and not only parliamentary agreements, but also joint action without any agreement *with the Left*, that is, the Narodnik, petty bourgeoisie, against the Black Hundreds and against the Cadets!

Quod erat demonstrandum.

Next time we will talk to *Narodnaya Duma* specifically about the Narodniks.

II*

If we recognise that the "Narodniks are the Left neighbours of the Cadets", that they "constantly waver between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats", this must inevitably lead to a recognition of the Bolshevik policy—compel the Narodniks to take the side of Social-Democracy, against the Black Hundreds and against the Constitutional-Democrats.

The Mensheviks are trying to weaken the inescapable conclusion to be drawn from their admissions, or to avoid

* Since the government has suppressed *Narodnaya Duma* we shall, as far as possible, eliminate direct polemics with that paper, and deal with Marxism's assessment of Narodism in principle.

it by reference to the fact that the peasantry, while being "*more revolutionary and more democratic*" than the liberals, are, at the same time, "imbued with reactionary social utopias" and are striving to "turn back the wheel of history in the sphere of economy".

This argument, common enough in our Social-Democratic literature, contains a big error from the standpoint of logic and of economic history. Here yards are compared with pounds, the reactionary nature of peasant ideas about the socialist revolution is compared with the reactionary nature of liberal politics in the bourgeois revolution.

If the peasants undoubtedly favour reactionary utopias in respect of the tasks of socialism, the liberal bourgeoisie, in respect of *those same* tasks, favours reactionary excesses similar to those of June 1848 or May 1871.

If, in the *present*, i.e., the bourgeois, revolution, the peasants and their ideologists, the Narodniks, conduct a reactionary policy as compared with the liberals, a Marxist would never recognise the Narodniks as being more to the Left, more revolutionary and more democratic than the liberals.

Obviously there is something wrong here.

Compare the agrarian policy of the liberals with that of the Narodniks. Does it contain features that are at present economically reactionary? In both parties the urge to limit mobilisation of land ownership is reactionary. The bureaucratic nature of the Cadet agrarian policy (landlord-bureaucratic land committees) makes its reactionary nature much more dangerous *in practice* and immediately. And so, on this point the comparison does not favour the liberals.

"Equalitarianism" in land tenure.... The idea of the equality of small producers is reactionary because it is an attempt to seek in the past and not in the future the solution of the tasks of the socialist revolution. The proletariat does not bring with itself the socialism of equality for petty proprietors, but the socialism of large-scale socialised production. But that same idea of equality is the fullest, most consistent and most decisive expression of bourgeois-democratic tasks. Those Marxists who have forgotten this are advised to turn to Volume I of Marx's *Capital* or to Engels's *Anti-Dühring*. The idea of equality most completely

expresses the struggle against all the survivals of the serf-owning system, the struggle for the broadest and purest development of commodity production.

Our people frequently forget this when they speak of the reactionary nature of Narodnik "equalitarian" agrarian projects.

It is not only ideologically that equality expresses the most complete implementation of the conditions of free capitalism and commodity production. Materially too, in the sphere of the economic relations of an agriculture emerging from the state of serfdom, the equality of petty producers is a condition for the broadest, most complete, free and rapid development of capitalist agriculture.

This development has been proceeding in Russia for a long time. It has been accelerated by the revolution. The only question is—will it follow, say, the Prussian type (the retention of landlord farming with the *Knecht* in bondage and paying "according to a just estimate" for a starvation minimum of land), or the American type (the abolition of landlord farming and the transfer of all the land to the farmers).

That is the basic problem of our entire bourgeois-democratic revolution, the question that will decide its defeat or victory.

The Social-Democrats demand the transfer of all the land to the peasants without compensation, i.e., they struggle determinedly for the second type of capitalist development, the type that is advantageous to the people. In the peasants' struggle against the feudal-minded landlords, the idea of equality is the strongest ideological impetus in the struggle for land—and the establishment of equality between petty producers is the most complete abolition of all and every survival of serfdom. The idea of equality, therefore, is the most revolutionary idea for the peasant movement, not only because it stimulates the political struggle, but also because it stimulates the economic purging of agriculture of serfdom's survivals.

Insofar as the Narodniks hold the opinion that equality may be maintained on a basis of commodity production and that that equality may be an element of the development to socialism, their views are erroneous and their socialism

reactionary. That is something every Marxist should know and remember. The Marxist, however, would be unfaithful to his historical analysis of the specific tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution if he were to forget that this very idea of equality and the many different equalitarian plans are the fullest possible expression of the tasks of the bourgeois revolution, *not* the socialist, and that they express the tasks, not of the struggle against capitalism, but of the struggle against the rule of the landlords and bureaucracy.

One alternative is evolution of the Prussian type—the serf-owning landlord becomes a Junker; the landlords' power in the state is consolidated for a decade; monarchy; "military despotism, embellished in parliamentary forms" instead of democracy; the greatest inequality among the rural and non-rural population. The second alternative is evolution of the American type—the abolition of landlord farming; the peasant becomes a free farmer; popular government; the bourgeois-democratic political system; the greatest equality among the rural population as the starting point of, and a condition for, free capitalism.

Such are the historical alternatives that are coloured by the hypocrisy of the Cadets (who would lead the country along the first path) and the socially reactionary utopianism of the Narodniks (who would lead the country along the second path).

It is obvious that the proletariat must devote all its efforts to supporting the latter path. Only by so doing will the labouring classes speedily get rid of the last bourgeois illusions—for the socialism of equality is the last bourgeois illusion of the petty proprietor. Only in that case will the masses of the people, learning from reality and not from books, speedily gain practical experience of the impotence of all types of equalitarian plans, impotence in face of the power of capital. Only in that case will the proletariat speedily shake off "Trudovik" (i.e., petty-bourgeois) traditions, rid itself of the bourgeois-democratic tasks that inevitably devolve upon it now, and devote itself *entirely* to its own, truly class (i.e., socialist) tasks.

It is only failure to understand the relationship between bourgeois-democratic and socialist tasks that leads some

Social-Democrats to fear the consummation of the bourgeois revolution.

Only failure to understand the tasks and essential nature of the bourgeois revolution can give rise to arguments like the following: "It [our revolution] has not, in the final analysis, been engendered by the interests of the peasants, *but* [??] by the interests of developing bourgeois society", or, "this revolution is bourgeois and, *therefore* [!??] it cannot proceed under a peasant banner and peasant leadership" (*Narodnaya Duma*, No. 21, April 4). From this it seems that peasant farming in Russia does not rest on a bourgeois basis, but on some other! The interests of the peasant masses are precisely the interests of the most complete, rapid and extensive "development of bourgeois society", a development of the "American" and not the "Prussian" type. It is exactly for this reason that the bourgeois revolution *may proceed* "under peasant leadership" (more correctly: under proletarian leadership, if the peasants, wavering between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats, in general *follow* the Social-Democrats). The bourgeois revolution under the leadership of the bourgeoisie can only be an unconsummated revolution (i.e., strictly speaking, not revolution but reform). It can be a real revolution only under the leadership of the proletariat and the peasantry.

PREFACE
TO THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION OF
LETTERS BY JOHANNES BECKER,
JOSEPH DIETZGEN, FREDERICK ENGELS,
KARL MARX, AND OTHERS
TO FRIEDRICH SORGE AND OTHERS

Written on April 6 (19), 1907

Published in 1907 in the book
Letters by Johannes Becker, Joseph Dietzgen,
Frederick Engels, Karl Marx, and Others
to Friedrich Sorge and Others.
Published by P. G. Dauge,
St. Petersburg
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the text in the book

The collection of letters by Marx, Engels, Dietzgen, Becker and other leaders of the international working-class movement in the last century, here presented to the Russian public, is an indispensable complement to our advanced Marxist literature.

We shall not here dwell in detail on the importance of these letters for the history of socialism and for a comprehensive treatment of the activities of Marx and Engels. This aspect of the matter requires no explanation. We shall only remark that an understanding of the letters published calls for acquaintance with the principal works on the history of the International (see Jaekkh, *The International*, Russian translation in the *Znaniye* edition), and also the history of the German and the American working-class movements (see Franz Mehring, *History of German Social-Democracy*, and Morris Hillquit, *History of Socialism in the United States*), etc.

Nor do we intend here to attempt to give a general outline of the contents of this correspondence or an appreciation of the various historical periods to which it relates. Mehring has done this extremely well in his article, *Der Sorgesche Briefwechsel* (*Neue Zeit*, 25. Jahrg., Nr. 1 und 2),* which will probably be appended to the present translation by the publisher, or else will be issued as a separate Russian publication.

Of particular interest to Russian socialists in the present revolutionary period are the lessons which the militant proletariat must draw from an acquaintance with the intimate aspects of the activities of Marx and Engels in the

* "The Sorge Correspondence", *Neue Zeit*, 25th year, Nos. 1 and 2.—Ed.

course of nearly thirty years (1867-95). It is, therefore, not surprising that the first attempts made in our Social-Democratic literature to acquaint readers with the letters from Marx and Engels to Sorge were also linked up with the "burning" issues of Social-Democratic tactics in the Russian revolution (Plekhanov's *Sovremennaya Zhizn* and the Menshevik *Otkliki*¹¹). And we intend to draw our readers' attention particularly to an appreciation of those passages in the published correspondence that are specially important from the viewpoint of the present tasks of the workers' party in Russia.

In their letters, Marx and Engels deal most frequently with the pressing problems of the British, American and German working-class movements. This is natural, because they were Germans who at that time lived in England and corresponded with their American comrade. Marx expressed himself much more frequently and in much greater detail on the French working-class movement, and particularly the Paris Commune, in the letters he wrote to the German Social-Democrat Kugelmann.*

It is highly instructive to compare what Marx and Engels said of the British, American and German working-class movements. Such comparison acquires all the greater importance when we remember that Germany on the one hand, and Britain and America on the other, represent different stages of capitalist development and different forms of domination of the bourgeoisie, as a class, over the entire political life of those countries. From the scientific point of view, we have here a sample of materialist dialectics, the ability to bring to the forefront and stress the various points, the various aspects of the problem, in application to the specific features of different political and economic conditions. From the point of view of the practical policy and tactics of the workers' party, we have here a sample of the way in which the creators of the *Communist Manifesto* defined the tasks of the fighting proletariat in accordance with the different stages of the national working-class movements in the different countries.

* See *Letters of Karl Marx to Dr. Kugelmann*, Russian translation edited by N. Lenin, with a foreword by the editor. St. Petersburg, 1907. (See pp. 104-12 of this volume.—Ed.)

What Marx and Engels criticise most sharply in British and American socialism is its isolation from the working-class movement. The burden of all their numerous comments on the Social-Democratic Federation in Britain and on the American socialists is the accusation that they have reduced Marxism to a dogma, to "rigid [*starre*] orthodoxy", that they consider it "a credo and not a guide to action",¹²² that they are incapable of adapting themselves to the theoretically helpless, but living and powerful mass working-class movement that is marching alongside them. "Had we from 1864 to 1873 insisted on working together only with those who openly adopted our platform," Engels exclaimed in his letter of January 27, 1887, "where should we be today?"¹²³ And in the preceding letter (December 28, 1886), he wrote, with reference to the influence of Henry George's ideas on the American working class:

"A million or two of working men's votes next November for a bona fide working men's party is worth infinitely more at present than a hundred thousand votes for a doctrinally perfect platform."

These are very interesting passages. There are Social-Democrats in our country who have hastened to utilise them in defence of the idea of a "labour congress" or something in the nature of Larin's "broad labour party". Why not in defence of a "Left bloc"? we would ask these precipitate "utilisiers" of Engels. The letters the quotations are taken from refer to a time when American workers voted at the elections for Henry George. Mrs. Wischnewetzky—an American woman married to a Russian and translator of Engels's works—had asked him, as may be seen from Engels's reply, to give a thorough criticism of Henry George. Engels wrote (December 28, 1886) that *the time had not yet arrived* for that, the main thing being that the workers' party should begin to organise itself, even if not on an entirely pure programme. Later on, the workers would themselves come to understand what was amiss, "would learn from their own mistakes", but "any thing that might delay or prevent that national consolidation of the workingmen's party—on no matter what platform—I should consider a great mistake...".¹²⁴

It goes without saying that Engels had a perfect understanding, and frequently spoke, of the absurdity and *reaction-*

ary character of Henry George's ideas, from the socialist point of view. The Sorge correspondence contains a most interesting letter from Karl Marx dated June 20, 1881, in which he characterised Henry George as an ideologist of the radical bourgeoisie. "Theoretically the man is utterly backward" (*total arri re*), wrote Marx.¹²⁵ Yet Engels was not afraid to join with this socialist reactionary in the elections, so long as there were people who could tell the masses of "the consequences of their own mistakes" (Engels, in the letter dated November 29, 1886).¹²⁶

Regarding the Knights of Labour, an organisation of American workers existing at that time, Engels wrote in the same letter: "The weakest [literally: rottenest, *faulste*] side of the Knights of Labor was their political neutrality.... The first great step, of importance for every country newly entering into the movement, is always the constitution of the workers as an independent political party, no matter how, so long as it is a distinct workers' party."¹²⁷

It is obvious that from this nothing at all can be deduced in defence of a leap from Social-Democracy to a non-party labour congress, etc. But whoever would escape Engels's accusation of reducing Marxism to a "dogma", "orthodoxy", "sectarianism", etc., must conclude from it that a joint election campaign with radical "social-reactionaries" is sometimes permissible.

But what is more interesting, of course, is to dwell not so much on these American-Russian parallels (we had to refer to them so as to reply to our opponents), as on the fundamental features of the British and American working-class movements. These features are: the absence of any big, nation-wide, democratic tasks facing the proletariat; the proletariat's complete subordination to bourgeois politics; the sectarian isolation of groups, of mere handfuls of socialists, from the proletariat; not the slightest socialist success among the working masses at the elections, etc. Whoever forgets these fundamental conditions and sets out to draw broad conclusions from "American-Russian parallels", displays the greatest superficiality.

If Engels laid so much stress on the workers' economic organisations in these conditions, it was because the most firmly established democratic systems were under discus-

sion, and these confronted the proletariat with purely socialist tasks.

Engels stressed the importance of an independent workers' party, even with a poor programme, because he was speaking of countries where there had formerly been not even a hint of the workers' political independence and where, in politics, the workers mostly dragged along behind the bourgeoisie, and still do.

It would be making mock of Marx's historical method to attempt to apply conclusions drawn from such arguments to countries or historical situations where the proletariat has formed its party prior to the liberal bourgeoisie forming theirs, where the tradition of voting for bourgeois politicians is absolutely unknown to the proletariat, and where the immediate tasks are not socialist but bourgeois-democratic.

Our idea will become even clearer to the reader if we compare Engels's opinions on the British and American movements with his opinions on the German movement.

Such opinions, of the greatest interest, abound in the published correspondence too. And running like a scarlet thread through all these opinions is something vastly different—a warning against the “Right wing” of the workers' party, a merciless (sometimes—as with Marx in 1877-79—a *furious*) war against *opportunism* in Social-Democracy.

Let us first corroborate this by quoting from the letters, and then proceed to an appraisal of this fact.

First of all, we must here note the opinions expressed by Marx on Höchberg and Co. In his article *Der Sorgesche Briefwechsel*, Franz Mehring attempts to tone down Marx's attacks—as well as Engels's later attacks—against the opportunists and, in our opinion, rather overdoes it. As regards Höchberg and Co., in particular, Mehring insists on his view that Marx's judgement of Lassalle and the Lassalleans was wrong. But, we repeat, what interests us here is not an historical assessment of whether Marx's attacks against particular socialists were correct or exaggerated, but Marx's assessment *in principle*, of definite *trends* in socialism in general.

While complaining about the German Social-Democrats' compromises with the Lassalleans and Dühring (letter of October 19, 1877), Marx also condemns the compromise

"with a whole gang of half-mature students and super-wise diploma'd doctors [in German "doctor" is an academic degree corresponding to our "candidate" or "university graduate, class I"], who want to give socialism a 'higher, idealistic' orientation, that is to say, to replace its materialistic basis (which demands serious objective study from anyone who tries to use it) by modern mythology with its goddesses of Justice, Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. Dr. Höchberg, who publishes the *Zukunft*, is a representative of this tendency, and has 'bought his way' into the Party—with the 'noblest' intentions, I assume, but I do not give a damn for 'intentions'. Anything more miserable than his programme of the *Zukunft* has seldom seen the light of day with more 'modest presumption'." (Letter No. 70.)¹²⁸

In another letter, written almost two years later (September 19, 1879), Marx rebutted the gossip that Engels and he stood behind *J. Most*, and gave Sorge a detailed account of his attitude towards the opportunists in the German Social-Democratic Party. *Zukunft* was run by Höchberg, Schramm and Eduard Bernstein. Marx and Engels *refused* to have anything to do with such a publication, and when the question was raised of establishing a new Party organ with the participation of this same Höchberg and with his financial assistance, Marx and Engels first demanded the acceptance of their nominee, Hirsch, as editor-in-chief, to exercise control over this "mixture of doctors, students and *Kathedersocialists*"¹²⁹ and then addressed a circular letter directly to Bebel, Liebknecht and other leaders of the Social-Democratic Party, warning them that they would openly combat "such a vulgarisation [*Verluderung*—an even stronger word in German] of Party and theory", if the Höchberg, Schramm and Bernstein trend did not change.

This was the period in the German Social-Democratic Party which Mehring described in his *History* as "A Year of Confusion" ("*Ein Jahr der Verwirrung*"). After the Anti-Socialist Law, the Party did not at once find the right path, first swinging over to the anarchism of Most and the opportunism of Höchberg and Co. "These people," Marx wrote of the latter, "nonentities in theory and useless in practice, want to draw the teeth of socialism (which they have fixed up in accordance with the university recipes) and partic-

ularly of the Social-Democratic Party, to enlighten the workers or, as they put it, to imbue them with 'elements of education' from their confused half-knowledge, and above all to make the Party respectable in the eyes of the petty bourgeoisie. They are just wretched counter-revolutionary windbags."¹³⁰

The result of Marx's "furious" attack was that the opportunists retreated and—made themselves scarce. In a letter dated November 19, 1879, Marx announced that Höchberg had been removed from the editorial committee and that all the influential leaders of the Party—Bebel, Liebknecht, Bracke, etc.¹³¹—had *repudiated* his ideas. *Sozial-Demokrat*, the Social-Democratic Party organ, began to appear under the editorship of Vollmar, who at that time belonged to the revolutionary wing of the Party. A year later (November 5, 1880), Marx related that he and Engels constantly fought the "miserable" way in which *Sozial-Demokrat* was being conducted, and often expressed their opinion *sharply* ("wo-*bei's oft scharf hergeht*"). Liebknecht visited Marx in 1880 and promised that there would be an "improvement" *in all respects*.¹³²

Peace was restored, and the war never came out into the open. Höchberg withdrew, and Bernstein became a revolutionary Social-Democrat—at least until the death of Engels in 1895.

On June 20, 1882, Engels wrote to Sorge and spoke of this struggle as being a thing of the past: "In general, things in Germany are going splendidly. It is true that the literary gentlemen in the Party tried to cause a reactionary ... swing, but they failed miserably. The abuse to which the Social-Democratic workers are being everywhere subjected has made them still more revolutionary than they were three years ago.... These people [the Party literary people] wanted at all costs to beg and secure the repeal of the Anti-Socialist Law by mildness and meekness, fawning and humility, because it has made short shrift of their literary earnings. As soon as the law is repealed ... the split will apparently become an open one, and the Vierecks and Höchbergs will form a separate Right wing, where they can, from time to time, be treated with, until they finally land on their backsides. We announced this immediately

after the adoption of the Anti-Socialist Law, when Höchberg and Schramm published in the *Yearbook* what was a most infamous judgement of the work of the Party and demanded more cultivated [*"gebildetes"* instead of *gebildetes*—Engels is alluding to the Berlin accent of the German writers], refined and elegant behaviour of the Party."¹³²

This forecast of Bernsteinism, made in 1882, was strikingly confirmed in 1898 and subsequent years.

And after that, and particularly after Marx's death, Engels, it may be said without exaggeration, was untiring in his efforts to straighten out what was being distorted by the German opportunists.

The end of 1884. The "petty-bourgeois prejudices" of the German Social-Democratic Reichstag deputies, who had voted for the steamship subsidy (*"Dampfersubvention"*, see Mehring's *History*), were condemned. Engels informed Sorge that he had to correspond a great deal on this subject (letter of December 31, 1884).¹³⁴

1885. Giving his opinion of the whole affair of the *"Dampfersubvention"*, Engels wrote (June 3) that "it almost came to a split". The "philistinism" of the Social-Democratic deputies was "*colossal*". "A petty-bourgeois socialist parliamentary group is inevitable in a country like Germany," said Engels.¹³⁵

1887. Engels replied to Sorge, who had written to him, that the Party was disgracing itself by electing such deputies as Viereck (a Social-Democrat of the Höchberg type). Engels excused himself, saying that there was nothing to be done, the workers' Party could not find good deputies for the Reichstag. "The gentlemen of the Right wing know that they are being tolerated only because of the Anti-Socialist Law, and that they will be thrown out of the Party the very day the Party again secures freedom of action." And, in general, it was preferable that "the Party should be better than its parliamentary heroes, than the other way round" (March 3, 1887). Liebknecht is a conciliator—Engels complained—he always uses phrases to gloss over differences. But when it comes to a split, he will be with us at the decisive moment.¹³⁶

1889. Two international Social-Democratic congresses in Paris. The opportunists (headed by the French Possibi-

lists¹³⁷) split away from the revolutionary Social-Democrats. Engels (who was then sixty-eight years old) flung himself into the fight with the ardour of youth. A number of letters (from January 12 to July 20, 1889) were devoted to the fight against the opportunists. Not only they, but also the Germans—Liebknecht, Bebel and others—were flagellated for their conciliatory attitude.

The Possibilists had sold themselves to the French Government, Engels wrote on January 12, 1889. And he accused the members of the British Social-Democratic Federation (S.D.F.) of having allied themselves with the Possibilists.¹³⁸ "The writing and running about in connection with this damned congress leave me no time for anything else" (May 11, 1889). The Possibilists are busy, but our people are asleep, Engels wrote angrily. Now even Auer and Schippel are demanding that we attend the Possibilist congress. But "at last" this opened Liebknecht's eyes. Engels, together with Bernstein, wrote pamphlets (they were signed by Bernstein but Engels called them "our pamphlets") against the opportunists.¹³⁹

"With the exception of the S.D.F., the Possibilists have not a single socialist organisation on their side in the whole of Europe. [June 8, 1889.] They are consequently falling back on the non-socialist trade unions" (this for the information of those who advocate a broad labour party, a labour congress, etc., in our country!). "From America they will get one *Knight of Labor*." The adversary was the same as in the fight against the Bakuninists¹⁴⁰: "only with this difference that the banner of the anarchists has been replaced by the banner of the Possibilists: the selling of principles to the bourgeoisie for small-scale concessions, especially in return for well-paid jobs for the leaders (on the city councils, labour exchanges, etc.)." Brousse (the leader of the Possibilists) and Hyndman (the leader of the S.D.F. which had joined with the Possibilists) attacked "authoritarian Marxism" and wanted to form the "nucleus of a new International".

"You can have no idea of the naïveté of the Germans. It has cost me tremendous effort to explain even to Bebel what it all really meant" (June 8, 1889).¹⁴¹ And when the two congresses met, when the revolutionary Social-Demo-

crats outnumbered the Possibilists (*who had united with the trade-unionists, the S.D.F., a section of the Austrians, etc.*), Engels was jubilant (July 17, 1889).¹⁴² He was glad that the conciliatory plans and proposals of Liebknecht and others had failed (July 20, 1889). "It serves our sentimental conciliatory brethren right that, for all their amicableness, they received a good kick in their tenderest spot. This may cure them for some time."¹⁴³

...Mehring was right when he said (*Der Sorgesche Briefwechsel*) that Marx and Engels did not have much idea of "good manners": "If they did not think long over every blow they dealt, neither did they whimper over every blow they received." "If they think their needle pricks can pierce my old, thick and well-tanned hide, they are mistaken,"¹⁴⁴ Engels once wrote. And they assumed that others possessed the imperviousness they had themselves acquired, Mehring said of Marx and Engels.

1893. The chastisement of the Fabians, which suggests itself when passing judgement on the Bernsteinians (for did not Bernstein "evolve" his opportunism in England making use of the experience of the Fabians?). "The Fabians here in London are a band of careerists who have understanding enough to realise the inevitability of the social revolution, but who could not possibly entrust this gigantic task to the raw proletariat alone, and are therefore kind enough to set themselves at the head. Fear of the revolution is their fundamental principle. They are the 'educated' *par excellence*. Their socialism is municipal socialism; not the nation but the community is to become the owner of the means of production, at any rate for the time being. This socialism of theirs is then presented as an extreme but inevitable consequence of bourgeois liberalism; hence their tactics, not of decisively opposing the Liberals as adversaries but of pushing them on towards socialist conclusions and therefore of intriguing with them, of permeating liberalism with socialism—not of putting up socialist candidates against the Liberals but of fastening them on to the Liberals, forcing them upon the Liberals, or swindling them into taking them. They do not of course realise that in doing this they are either lied to and themselves deceived or else are lying about socialism.

"With great industry they have published, amid all sorts of rubbish, some good propagandist writing as well, this in fact being the best the English have produced in this field. But as soon as they get on to their specific tactics of hushing up the class struggle, it all turns putrid. Hence their fanatical hatred of Marx and all of us—because of the class struggle.

"These people have of course many bourgeois followers and therefore money...."¹⁴⁵

HOW THE CLASSICS ESTIMATED
INTELLECTUALIST OPPORTUNISM
IN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY

1894. The Peasant Question. "On the Continent," Engels wrote on November 10, 1894, "success is developing the appetite for more success, and catching the peasant, in the literal sense of the word, is becoming the fashion. First the French, in Nantes, declare through Lafargue not only ... that it is not our business to hasten ... the ruin of the small peasants, which capitalism is seeing to for us, but they add that we must directly protect the small peasant against taxation, usury, and landlords. But we cannot co-operate in this, first because it is stupid and second because it is impossible. Next, however, Vollmar comes along in Frankfort and wants to bribe the *peasantry as a whole*, though the peasant he has to deal with in Upper Bavaria is not the debt-ridden small peasant of the Rhineland, but the middle and even the big peasant, who exploits male and female farmhands, and sells cattle and grain in quantity. And that cannot be done without giving up the whole principle."¹⁴⁶

1894, December 4. "...The Bavarians, who have become very, very opportunistic and have almost turned into an ordinary people's party (that is to say, the majority of leaders and many of those who have recently joined the Party), voted in the Bavarian Diet for the budget as a whole; and Vollmar in particular has started an agitation among the peasants with the object of winning the Upper Bavarian big peasants—people who own 25 to 80 acres of land (10 to 30 hectares) and who therefore cannot manage without wage-labourers—instead of winning their farmhands,"¹⁴⁷

We thus see that for more than ten years Marx and Engels systematically and unswervingly fought opportunism in the German Social-Democratic Party, and attacked intellectualist philistinism and the petty-bourgeois outlook in socialism. This is an extremely important fact. The general public know that German Social-Democracy is regarded as a model of Marxist proletarian policy and tactics, but they do not know what constant warfare the founders of Marxism had to wage against the "Right wing" (Engels's expression) of that Party. And it is no accident that soon after Engels's death this concealed war became an open one. This was an inevitable result of the decades of historical development of German Social-Democracy.

And now we very clearly perceive the two lines of Engels's (and Marx's) recommendations, directions, corrections, threats and exhortations. The most insistent of their appeals to the British and American socialists was to merge with the working-class movement and eradicate the narrow and hidebound sectarian spirit from their organisations. They were most insistent in teaching the German Social-Democrats to beware of succumbing to philistinism, "parliamentary idiocy" (Marx's expression in the letter of September 19, 1879),¹⁴⁸ and petty-bourgeois intellectualist opportunism.

Is it not typical that our Social-Democratic gossips should have begun cackling about the recommendations of the first kind while remaining silent, holding their tongues, about the second? Is not *such* one-sidedness in appraising the letters of Marx and Engels the best indication of a certain Russian Social-Democratic ... "one-sidedness"?

At the present moment, when the international working-class movement is displaying symptoms of profound ferment and vacillation, when the extremes of opportunism, "parliamentary idiocy" and philistine reformism have evoked the other extremes of revolutionary syndicalism—the general line of Marx's and Engels's "corrections" to British and American and to German socialism acquires exceptional importance.

In countries where there are *no* Social-Democratic workers' parties, *no* Social-Democratic members of parliament, and *no* systematic and steadfast Social-Democratic policy either

at elections or in the press, etc.—in such countries, Marx and Engels taught the socialists to rid themselves *at all cost* of narrow sectarianism, and *to join* with the working-class movement so as *to shake up* the proletariat *politically*. For in the last thirty years of the nineteenth century the proletariat displayed *almost no* political independence either in Britain or America. In these countries—where bourgeois-democratic historical tasks were almost entirely non-existent—the political arena was *completely* held by a triumphant and self-satisfied bourgeoisie, unequalled anywhere in the world in the art of deceiving, corrupting and bribing the workers.

To think that these recommendations, made by Marx and Engels to the British and American working-class movements, can be simply and directly applied to Russian conditions is to use Marxism not in order to achieve clarity on its *method*, not in order *to study* the concrete historical features of the working-class movement in definite countries, but in order to pay off petty, factional, and intellectualist scores.

On the other hand, in a country where the bourgeois-democratic revolution was still unconsummated, where “military despotism, embellished with parliamentary forms” (Marx’s expression in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*)¹⁴⁹ prevailed, and still does, where the proletariat had long ago been drawn into politics and was pursuing a Social-Democratic policy—in such a country what Marx and Engels most of all feared was parliamentary vulgarisation and philistine derogation of the tasks and scope of the working-class movement.

It is all the more our duty to emphasise and give prominence to *this* side of Marxism, in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia, because in our country a vast, “brilliant” and rich liberal-bourgeois press is vociferously trumpeting to the proletariat the “exemplary” loyalty, parliamentary legality, the modesty and moderation of the neighbouring German working-class movement.

This mercenary lie of the bourgeois betrayers of the Russian revolution is not due to accident or to the personal depravity of certain past or future ministers in the Cadet

camp. It stems from the profound economic interests of the Russian liberal landlords and liberal bourgeois. And in combating this lie, this "stupefying of the masses" (*Massenverdummung*)—Engels's expression in his letter of November 29, 1886),¹⁵⁰ the letters of Marx and Engels should serve as an indispensable weapon for all Russian socialists.

The mercenary lie of the liberal bourgeois holds up to the people the exemplary "modesty" of the German Social-Democrats. The leaders of these Social-Democrats, the founders of the theory of Marxism, tell us:

"The revolutionary language and action of the French have made the hypocrisy of Viereck and Co. [the opportunist Social-Democrats in the German Reichstag Social-Democratic group] sound quite feeble" (this was said in reference to the formation of a labour group in the French Chamber and to the Decazeville strike, which split the French Radicals from the French proletariat¹⁵¹). "Only Liebknecht and Bebel spoke in the last Socialist debate and both of them spoke well. We can with this debate once more show ourselves in decent society, which was by no means the case with all of them. In general it is a good thing that the Germans' leadership of the international socialist movement, particularly after they sent so many philistines to the Reichstag (which, it is true, was unavoidable), is being challenged. *In Germany everything becomes philistine in peaceful times; and therefore the sting of French competition is absolutely necessary....*" (Letter of April 29, 1886.)¹⁵²

These are the lessons to be learnt most thoroughly by the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, which is predominantly under the ideological influence of German Social-Democracy.

These lessons are taught us not by any particular passage in the correspondence of the greatest men of the nineteenth century, but by the whole spirit and substance of their comradely and frank criticism of the international experience of the proletariat, a criticism to which diplomacy and petty considerations were alien.

How far all the letters of Marx and Engels were indeed imbued with this spirit may also be seen from the following relatively specific but extremely typical passages.¹⁵³

In 1889 a young and fresh movement of untrained and unskilled labourers (gasworkers, dockers, etc.) arose in Britain, a movement marked by a new and revolutionary spirit. Engels was delighted with it. He referred exultingly to the part played by Tussy, Marx's daughter, who conducted agitation among these workers. "... The most repulsive thing here," he says, writing from London on December 7, 1889, "is the bourgeois 'respectability' which has grown deep into the bones of the workers. The division of society into innumerable strata, each recognised without question, each with its own pride but also its inborn respect for its 'betters' and 'superiors', is so old and firmly established that the bourgeois still find it fairly easy to get their bait accepted. I am not at all sure, for instance, that John Burns is not secretly prouder of his popularity with Cardinal Manning, the Lord Mayor, and the bourgeoisie in general than of his popularity with his own class. And Champion—an ex-lieutenant—intrigued years ago with bourgeois and especially with conservative elements, preached socialism at the parsons' Church Congress, etc. And even Tom Mann, whom I regard as the best of the lot, is fond of mentioning that he will be lunching with the Lord Mayor. If one compares this with the French, one realises what a revolution is good for after all."¹⁵⁴

No comment is needed.

Another example. In 1891 there was danger of a European war. Engels corresponded on the subject with Bebel, and they agreed that in the event of Russia attacking Germany, the German socialists must desperately fight the Russians and any allies of the Russians. "If Germany is crushed, then we shall be too, while at best the struggle will be such a violent one that Germany will only be able to maintain herself by revolutionary means, so that very possibly we shall be forced to take the helm and stage a 1793." (Letter of October 24, 1891.)¹⁵⁵

Let this be noted by those opportunists who shouted from the house-tops that "Jacobin" prospects for the Russian workers' party in 1905 were un-Social-Democratic! Engels squarely suggested to Bebel the possibility of the Social-Democrats having to participate in a provisional government.

Holding such views on the tasks of Social-Democratic workers' parties, Marx and Engels naturally possessed the most fervent faith in a Russian revolution and its great world significance. We see this ardent expectation of a revolution in Russia, in this correspondence, over a period of nearly twenty years.

Take Marx's letter of September 27, 1877. He is quite enthusiastic about the Eastern crisis¹⁵⁶: "Russia has long been standing on the threshold of an upheaval, all the elements of it are prepared.... The gallant Turks have hastened the explosion by years with the thrashing they have inflicted.... The upheaval will begin *secundum artem* [according to the rules of the art] with some *playing at constitutionalism, et puis il y aura un beau tapage* [and then there will be a fine row]. If Mother Nature is not particularly unfavourable towards us, we shall yet live to see the fun!"¹⁵⁷ (Marx was then fifty-nine years old).

Mother Nature did not—and could not very well—permit Marx to live "to see the fun". But he *foretold* the "playing at constitutionalism", and it is as though his words were written yesterday in relation to the First and Second Russian Dumas. And we know that the warning to the people against "playing at constitutionalism" was the "living soul" of the boycott tactics so detested by the liberals and opportunists....

Or take Marx's letter of November 5, 1880. He was delighted with the success of *Capital* in Russia, and took the part of the members of the Narodnaya Volya organisation against the newly-arisen General Redistribution group.¹⁵⁸ Marx correctly perceived the anarchistic elements in their views. Not knowing and having then no opportunity of knowing the future evolution of the General-Redistribution Narodniks into Social-Democrats, Marx attacked them with all his trenchant sarcasm:

"These gentlemen are against all political-revolutionary action. Russia is to make a somersault into the anarchist-communist-atheist millennium! Meanwhile, they are preparing for this leap with the most tedious doctrinairism, whose so-called *principes courent la rue depuis le feu Bakountine*."¹⁵⁹

We can gather from this how Marx would have appreciated the significance for Russia of 1905 and the succeeding

years of *Social-Democracy's* "political-revolutionary action".*

There is a letter by Engels dated April 6, 1887: "On the other hand, it seems as if a crisis is impending in Russia. The recent attentates rather upset the apple-cart...." A letter of April 9, 1887, says the same thing.... "The army is full of discontented, conspiring officers. [Engels at that time was impressed by the revolutionary struggle of the *Narodnaya Volya* organisation; he set his hopes on the officers, and did not yet see the revolutionary spirit of the Russian soldiers and sailors, which was manifested so magnificently eighteen years later] I do not think things will last another year; and once it [the revolution] breaks out [*losgeht*] in Russia, then hurrah!"¹⁶¹

A letter of April 23, 1887: "In Germany there is persecution after persecution [of socialists]. It looks as if Bismarck wants to have everything ready, so that the moment the revolution breaks out [*losgeschlagen werden*] in Russia, which is now only a question of months, Germany could immediately follow her example."¹⁶²

The months proved to be very, very long ones. No doubt, philistines will be found who, knitting their brows and wrinkling their foreheads, will sternly condemn Engels's "revolutionism", or will indulgently laugh at the old utopias of the old revolutionary exile.

Yes, Marx and Engels made many and frequent mistakes in determining the proximity of revolution, in their hopes in the victory of revolution (e.g., in 1848 in Germany), in their faith in the imminence of a German "republic" ("to die for the republic", wrote Engels of that period, recalling his sentiments as a participant in the military campaign for a Reich constitution in 1848-49¹⁶³). They were mistaken in 1871 when they were engaged in "raising revolt in Southern France, for which they [Becker writes "we", referring to himself and his closest friends: letter No. 14 of July 21,

* Incidentally, if my memory does not deceive me, Plekhanov or V. I. Zasulich told me in 1900-03 about the existence of a letter from Engels to Plekhanov concerning *Our Differences* and the character of the impending revolution in Russia. It would be interesting to know exactly whether there was such a letter, whether it still exists, and whether the time has come to publish it.¹⁶⁴

1871] sacrificed and risked all that was humanly possible...". The same letter says: "If we had had more means in March and April we would have roused the whole of Southern France and would have saved the Commune in Paris" (p. 29). But *such* errors—the errors of the giants of revolutionary thought, who sought to raise, and did raise, the proletariat of the whole world above the level of petty, commonplace and trivial tasks—are a thousand times more noble and magnificent and *historically more valuable and true* than the trite wisdom of official liberalism, which lauds, shouts, appeals and holds forth about the vanity of revolutionary vanities, the futility of the revolutionary struggle and the charms of counter-revolutionary "constitutional" fantasies....

The Russian working class will win their freedom and give an impetus to Europe by their revolutionary action, full though it be of errors—and let the philistines pride themselves on the infallibility of their revolutionary inaction.

April, 6, 1907

THE DUMA AND THE RUSSIAN LIBERALS

St. Petersburg, April 10.

The mood of what is known as Russian "society" is one of depression, dismay and perplexity. The article by F. Malover¹⁶⁴—who made an extremely apt choice of a pseudonym—in the Sunday issue of *Tovarishch* (April 8) is an instructive and typical manifestation because it correctly reflects that mood.

Mr. Malover's article is called "The Duma and Society". By society is here understood, in accordance with the old Russian use of the word, a handful of liberal government officials, bourgeois intellectuals, bored rentiers and similar haughty, self-satisfied, and idle members of the public, who fancy themselves the salt of the earth, proudly call themselves the "intelligentsia", create "public opinion", etc., etc.

It seems to Mr. Malover that "the campaign against the Duma, to be observed during the past few days in the columns of the Left press, is extremely risky". That is the main idea behind the article. Mr. Malover's argument is a reference to the mood of society. Society is fatigued, "waves aside" politics, does not protest against abuses, and reads "light" novels in the libraries or buys them in the shops. "The environment is flaccid" ... "for the Duma to revive, the country must revive." "The Duma could, of course, at any moment die an heroic death, but, judging by rumours in circulation, this would only be to the advantage of its involuntary godmothers. And what would the people gain from that, other than a new election law?"

We have quoted these passages because they are *typical* of most Russian liberals and all the intellectual backrooms of liberalism.

Note that in the final sentence the word "people" has slipped in in place of "society"! Mr. Malover, sly even towards himself (as are all intellectualists of little faith), has falsified his own argument and has tried to make it appear that it is the notorious "society" that really determines the "support from without" or the attitude of the *masses*. Despite the skilfulness of the counterfeit, it has not passed: and he has had to substitute "the people" for "society". And all the dust that the members of "society" have accumulated in stuffy and fusty chambers so carefully screened off and protected from the street, flies up in a cloud immediately the door leading to the "street" is opened. The dry-as-dust sophistry that they fancy is "intellectual" and "well-educated" is laid bare for all to see.

Thesis: the campaign of the *Lefts* against the Duma is risky.

Proof: *society* is fatigued and waves politics aside, preferring light novels.

Conclusion: the *people* would gain nothing from the heroic death of the Duma.

Political slogan: "nobody now has any doubts, it would seem, that the political struggle of the immediate future can only be for the consolidation and extension of the rights of the Duma as the one [!] weapon still in the hands of the people [!], with which to struggle against the government".

The logic of counter-revolutionary hypocrites cloaked in the noble mantle of scepticism and satiated indifference is truly incomparable, is it not?

Thesis: we, "society", are sitting in the mud. You, the *Lefts*, want to try and clean up the mud. Leave it alone, the mud does not bother us.

Proof: we are weary of attempts (not made by us) to clean up the mud. Our ideas about cleaning up are indecisive.

Conclusion: it is risky to touch the mud.

The arguments of the Malovers are of great significance for, we repeat, they truly reflect the mood that, in the final analysis, springs from the struggle of the classes in the Russian revolution. The fatigue of the bourgeoisie and its yearning for "light" literature constitute a phenomenon that is not accidental, but inevitable. The grouping of the population by parties—that was the most important lesson

and the revolution's most important political acquisition at the time of the elections to the Second Duma—tellingly revealed, on a nation-wide scale, the turn to the Right taken by broad sections of the landlords and bourgeoisie. "Society" and "the intelligentsia" are simply a miserable, pitiful, basely cowardly appendage to the upper ten thousand.

The greater part of the bourgeois intelligentsia live with, and are fed by, those who have drawn away from politics. Only a few intellectuals enter the propaganda circles of the workers' party, those who from experience know the "*ravenous hunger*" of the masses of the people for political books, newspapers and socialist knowledge. But of course such intellectuals, even if they do not go to an heroic death, lead the really heroic life of hard work of the poorly-paid, half-starved, constantly fatigued "rank-and-file Party worker" who is overworked beyond all belief. *Such* intellectuals find reward in getting away from the dung-heap of "society" and in not having to think of the indifference of *their* audience to social and political problems. And, indeed, an "intellectual" who cannot find himself an audience that is not indifferent to those problems as much resembles a "democrat" or an intellectual in the best sense of the word, as a woman who sells herself by marrying for money resembles a loving wife. Both are variations of officially respectable and perfectly legal prostitution.

The Left parties are really Left, and deserve that name, only insofar as they express the interests and reflect the psychology, *not* of "society", *not* of a bunch of whining intellectualist trash, but the lower strata of the people, the proletariat and a certain section of the petty bourgeois masses, both urban and rural. The Left parties are those whose audiences are *never* indifferent to social and political problems any more than a hungry man can be indifferent to the problem of a crust of bread. "The campaign against the Duma" of those Left parties is a reflection of a definite tendency among the lower strata of the people, it is an echo of a certain—what shall we call it?—mass irritation with the self-satisfied Narcissuses who are infatuated with the dung-heaps about them.

One such Narcissus—Mr. Malover—writes: "The psychology of the masses of the people, in the period we are

living in is an absolutely unknown quantity, and nobody can be sure that these masses will react to the dissolution of the Second Duma differently from the way they reacted to the dissolution of the First Duma."

In what way does this differ from the psychology of an honest woman in bourgeois society who says: "Nobody can say for sure that it is not for love I am marrying the one who pays me most"?

And your own feelings, madame, will they not serve to make anybody sure of it? And you, Malover & Co., do you not feel yourselves to be particles of the "masses of the people"? Do you not feel yourselves participants (and not mere onlookers)? Are you not conscious of being makers of the general mood, of being those who make for progress?

The bourgeoisie "cannot say for sure" that the proletariat will go forward from defeat to victory. The proletariat *is sure* that the bourgeoisie will distinguish itself by identical baseness both in the defeats and in the victories of the people in the struggle for freedom.

Let Social Democrats who are given to vacillation and doubt learn from the examples of the Malovers, learn to understand the *reactionary* nature today, not only of talk about the "one-sided hostile" stand taken by the Social-Democrats towards the liberals, but also of talk about a "nation-wide" revolution (headed by the Malovers!?).

FRANZ MEHRING ON THE SECOND DUMA

In a recent issue of *Die Neue Zeit*,* journal of the German Social-Democrats, there appeared a leading article bearing the usual mark of its usual leader writer, Franz Mehring. The author notes that in the usual discussion on the budget the Social-Democratic speakers, Singer and David, took advantage of the opportunity to prove how steadfastly Social-Democracy, supposedly defeated at the last elections, is defending its proletarian position. The German liberals, on the contrary, those who at the last elections had joined forces with the government against the clerical Centre and against the Social-Democrats, found themselves in the pitiful position of humiliated allies of reaction. "The liberal bourgeoisie," says Mehring, "are playing the role of an obedient slave [the German *Dirne* actually means "prostitute"] of the Ost-Elbe Junkers, for the sake of pitiful doles given by the latter."

We quote these sharply-spoken words verbatim, to give our readers a clear picture of the difference in tone and content between the Social-Democratic presentation of the question of the liberals in Germany and the presentation that is frequently to be met with in the Russian Cadet newspapers. It will be remembered that those papers sang a quite different tune in respect of the outcome of the German elections, spoke of the mistakes of the Social-Democrats who, it was said, had ignored bourgeois democracy and adopted "a one-sided hostile position" towards it, etc.

* No. 23 (25. Jahrg., Bd. 1) (*New Times*, No. 23. 25th year, Vol. 1.—*Ed.*), March 6, 1907.

All this is *en passant*. What we are interested in here is not Mehring's assessment of German liberalism, but his assessment of the Russian Duma and *Russian liberalism*, whose slogans ("Save the Duma", conduct "positive work") he analyses with wonderful clarity and aptness.

Here is a complete translation of the second part of the article.

GERMAN LIBERALISM AND THE RUSSIAN DUMA

"... To understand the immeasurable insignificance of those debates* it is worth while glancing back some sixty years to the United Landtag in Berlin, when the bourgeoisie first girded their loins for the parliamentary struggle. Even in those days the bourgeoisie did not cut a heroic figure. Karl Marx pictured it thus: '...without faith in itself, without faith in the people, grumbling at those above, trembling before those below, egoistic towards both sides and conscious of its egoism, revolutionary in relation to the conservatives and conservative in relation to the revolutionists, distrustful of its own mottoes, phrases instead of ideas, intimidated by the world storm, exploiting the world storm; no energy in any respect, plagiarism in every respect; common because it lacked originality, original in its commonness; dickering with its own desires, without initiative, without faith in itself, without faith in the people, without a world-historical calling; an execrable old man, who saw himself doomed to guide and deflect the first youthful impulses of a robust people in his own senile interests—sans eyes, sans ears, sans teeth, sans everything.'¹⁶⁵

"Despite all that, however, the bourgeoisie of that day was able to keep the purse under its thumb and withhold the incomes of the King and the Junkers until its own rights were ensured; it preferred to be subjected to the disfavour of the King rather than surrender its birthright to help the royal bankrupt.

"Compared with the present-day free-thinkers, the liberals of the United Landtag were much more far-sighted. They laughed at the chatter about 'positive work' and pre-

* The budget debates in the Reichstag.

ferred to hold up a matter so important to the welfare of the country as the building of the eastern railway rather than renounce their constitutional rights.

"There is all the greater reason for recalling those times, since the end of the budget debate in the Reichstag coincided with the opening of the Second Russian Duma. There is no doubt that the parliamentary history of the Russian revolution has so far more closely resembled that of the Prussian revolution of 1848 than that of the French revolution of 1789; the history of the First Duma in many respects strikingly resembles that of the notorious 'assembly of conciliators' that at one time held its sessions in a Berlin theatre, resembles it even in respect of the ineffective appeal not to pay taxes, issued by the Constitutional-Democratic majority after the dissolution, an appeal that disappeared into thin air. And in Prussia, too, the new Landtag convened by the government bore a more marked oppositional tinge, like the present Russian Duma, and was then dispersed a month later by armed force. There is no lack of voices prophesying a similar fate for the new Russian Duma. The over-wise liberals come out with the excellent advice: save the Duma, and win the confidence of the people by 'positive work'. As understood by those who give it this is about the most foolish advice that could have been offered the new Duma.

"History does not approve of repetition, and the new Duma is a product of a revolution that differs greatly from the second Prussian Parliament. It was elected under such pressure that, by comparison, the infamy and baseness of the 'imperial falsehood league' could well be called mild. The Left is no longer dominated by the Constitutional-Democrats in the present Duma, but has been strengthened by a powerful socialist group. Nor is it easy to dissolve the Duma now. Tsarism would not have engaged in that process of exerting pressure at the elections, as wearisome as it was disgusting, if the question of the dissolution of the Duma had depended entirely on the tsarist government. For its creditors, tsarism needs a popular representation that can save it from bankruptcy, and it would, furthermore, have been impossible, even if things had not been so bad, to elaborate a more pitiful electoral system and exercise still more brutal pressure at the elections.

"In that respect Prussian reaction held another big trump card in 1849; by annulling universal suffrage and introducing the three-class system of elections, it obtained the so-called popular representation that did not offer any effective resistance and was nevertheless something in the nature of a guarantee to the creditors.

"The Russian revolution has shown, through the elections to the new Duma, that it has much wider and deeper scope than the German revolution then had. It is also quite certain that the revolution has not elected the new Duma by chance, but has every intention of making use of it. But the revolution would be betraying itself if it were to listen to the wise counsels of the German liberals, and tried to obtain the confidence of the people by 'positive work' as those liberals understood it; if the revolution were to act in that way it would be taking the same road of lamentation and disgrace that German liberalism has been following for the past sixty years. That which this amazing hero regards as 'positive work' would only lead to the new Duma helping tsarism extricate itself from the clutch of its financial troubles, and would receive in return a pitiful dole in the shape of such 'reforms' as the ministry of a Stolypin can hatch.

"We shall make clear the concept of 'positive work' by an historical example. When the National Assembly effected the emancipation of the French peasantry in a single summer night in 1789, the mercenary genius and adventurer Mirabeau, constitutional democracy's most celebrated hero, baptised the event with the catchword 'disgusting orgy', but in our opinion it was 'positive work'. The emancipation of the Prussian peasants, on the contrary, which dragged along at a snail's pace for sixty years—from 1807 to 1865—during which an infinite number of peasant lives were brutally and ruthlessly sacrificed, was what our liberals call 'positive work' and proclaim from the house-tops. In our opinion, that was a 'disgusting orgy'.

"And so, if the new Duma wants to fulfil its historic task it must undoubtedly engage in 'positive work'. On this issue there is a gratifying unanimity. The only question is: what sort of 'positive work' is it to be? For our part, we hope that the Duma will prove to be a weapon of the Russian revolution that gave it birth."

* * *

This article of Mehring's, whether we like it or not, gives rise to some thinking about the present trends in Russian Social-Democracy.

In the first place, we cannot help noting that the author compares the Russian revolution of 1905 and the following years, to the German revolution of 1848-49, and the First Duma, to the famous "assembly of conciliators". This last expression comes from Marx. That is what he called the German liberals of that day in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*.¹⁶⁶ This appellation has gone down in history as a model of proletarian thinking in its assessment of a bourgeois revolution.

Marx gave the name of "conciliators" to the German liberals of the revolutionary epoch, because bourgeois-liberal political tactics were at that time based on the "theory of conciliation", the conciliation of the Crown with the people, of the old authorities with the forces of the revolution. These tactics expressed the class interests of the German bourgeoisie in the German bourgeois revolution; the bourgeoisie were afraid to carry on the revolution to its consummation; they feared the independence of the proletariat, feared the full victory of the peasantry over their medieval exploiters, the landlords, whose farming still retained many feudal features. The class interests of the bourgeoisie forced them to come to terms with reaction ("conciliation") against the revolution, and the liberal intellectuals who founded the "theory of conciliation" used it to cover up their apostasy from the revolution.

The excellent passage quoted by Mehring shows how Marx lashed out at bourgeois conciliation in a revolutionary epoch. Anybody who is familiar with Mehring's edition of the writings of Marx and Engels in the forties, especially the articles from the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, knows, of course, that very many *similar* passages could be quoted.

Let those who, like Plekhanov, attempt by reference to Marx to justify the tactics of the Right wing of the Social-Democrats in the Russian bourgeois revolution give this some thought! The arguments of such people are based on ill-chosen quotations; they take generalisations on support

for the big bourgeoisie against the reactionary petty bourgeoisie and apply them uncritically to the Russian Cadets and the Russian revolution.

Mehring provides such people with a good lesson. Anybody who wants Marx's advice on the tasks of the proletariat in the bourgeois revolution should take *precisely* his statements concerning the epoch of the German bourgeois revolution. It is not for nothing that our Mensheviks so timidly avoid those statements. In them we see the most complete and most clear expression of that ruthless struggle against the bourgeois *conciliators* that our Russian Bolsheviks are conducting in the Russian revolution.

At the time of the German bourgeois revolution Marx considered the basic tasks of the proletariat to be—carrying on the revolution to its consummation, the winning of the leading role by the proletariat, the exposure of the bourgeois conciliators' treachery and the capture of the masses of the people, especially the peasantry,* from the influence of the bourgeoisie. This is an historic fact that can be ignored or evaded only by those who take Marx's name in vain.

Mehring's assessment of "positive work" and "disgusting orgy" has an intimate, inseverable connection with this.

This parallel of his is such a well-aimed thrust at the Russian liberals, the Cadets, who are now engaged in the Second Duma in approving the budget of the military-court-backed autocracy, that Mehring's words would only be weakened if anything of substance were added to them.

We counterpose Mehring's presentation of the question to that of the Right wing of the German Social-Democrats. Readers will, of course, know that Mehring and the entire editorial board of *Die Neue Zeit* are on the side of revolutionary Social-Democracy. The opposite or opportunist stand is held by the Bernsteinians. Their chief press organ is *Sozialistische Monatshefte*. In the last issue of that journal (April 1907) there is an article by Mr. Roman Streltsov entitled "The Second Russian Parliament". The article is overflowing with wrathful mouthings against the Bolsheviks, whom the author, apparently for greater venom, calls

* "The German bourgeoisie will betray *their natural allies, the peasantry*," said Marx in 1848, in assessing the role of the peasantry in the bourgeois revolution.¹⁸⁷

"Leninians". How conscientious this Streltzow is in keeping the German public informed, can be seen from the fact that he quotes the sharpest passages from Lenin's pamphlets written at the time of the St. Petersburg elections, but *keeps silence* about the treacherous *split* arranged by the Mensheviks, the split which caused the struggle!

But all this is *en passant*. What is important to us is the way the question is presented in principle by the Bernsteinian. The Mensheviks, *especially Plekhanov*, come in for praise as *the realist wing* of Russian Social-Democracy. *Vorwärts*, central organ of German Social-Democracy, has been reprimanded by the "realist" for a sentence to the effect that the people have not sent advocates (*Fürsprecher*) but leading fighters (*Vorkämpfer*) to the Second Duma—"Vorwärts apparently has the same rosy view of the present situation in Russia as the Leninians" (p. 295 of the above-mentioned issue).^{*} The author's conclusion is clear and definite. "Therefore," he writes, in concluding his article, "saving the Duma [*Erhaltung der Duma*] is so far the purpose of the opposition taken as a whole." Further—the socialists must not "waste their forces in a completely useless struggle against the Cadets" (p. 296, *ibid.*).

We will leave it to our readers to make the comparison between Mehring's way of thinking about the "disgusting orgy" and the Streltzows' way of thinking about the "Save the Duma" slogan.

Such a comparison is well capable of replacing commentaries on the Bolshevik and Menshevik policies in the present Duma—commentaries on the Bolshevik and Menshevik draft resolutions on the attitude to the State Duma.

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Signed: K. T.

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to the text in the collection

^{*} Incidentally, it may be worth while adding that we are, in any case, profoundly and heartily grateful to Mr. Streltzow for his effort to denigrate the Bolsheviks in the eyes of German Social-Democracy. Mr. Streltzow does this so well that we could not wish for a better ally for the propagation of Bolshevism among German Social-Democrats. Keep it up, Mr. Streltzow!

LARIN AND KHRUSTALEV 108

The first issue of the Menshevik newspaper *Narodnaya Gazeta* (April 10) contained an article by Comrade G. Khrustalev on the labour congress; it was an aggressive, extremely interesting, and excellent article (from the Bolshevik point of view). We say it was excellent because in his writings the Menshevik Khrustalev is as helpful—if not more helpful—to us as the Menshevik Larin. We are equally grateful to both of them, and shall therefore analyse their ideas by comparing them with each other.

You will recall what Y. Larin was advocating in his pamphlet *A Broad Labour Party and a Labour Congress*. A broad labour party, as conceived by Larin, should embrace something like 900,000 of the 9,000,000-strong Russian proletariat. The "signboard" has to come down—the party must not be Social-Democratic. The Social-Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionaries must merge. The new party must be, in point of fact, a "non-partisan party" (Larin's own words). The Social-Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries must play the role of "propaganda bodies within a broad party".

Larin's plan, as anybody can see, is perfectly clear-cut, and his idea for a labour congress is distinguished by the absence of anything left unsaid or of the vagueness that Axelrod's plan abounds in. For this clarity of thought we Bolsheviks have given praise to the guileless Comrade Larin, and compared it to the vagueness of "hidebound Menshevism" (Larin's words). At the same time we say that Larin's plan is an opportunist adventure, because merging with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and a "non-partisan party" cannot lead to anything but confusion in the

minds of the workers and difficulties for the Social-Democratic organisation.

Now let the reader weigh Comrade Khrustalev's plan attentively. He says straight out: "The party should not itself undertake the work of calling the congress." "Initiative in convening it should come from the trade unions and special committees formed to convene the congress."

How should these committees be formed?

Comrade Khrustalev does not give a direct answer to this question. The following passage, however, contains an answer that is clear enough, even if indirect.

"What composition of the congress is anticipated? Will any qualifications be established?" he asks, and gives this answer. "Since we are trying to broaden the organisation, we are by that token against any restrictions. At the congress there will be a place for every elected representative of the workers. Trade unions, consumers' associations, workers' funds, workers' mutual benefit societies, factory committees, committees set up specifically for the organisation of the congress, deputies elected from factories where there are no factory committees—all these should be represented at the all-Russian labour congress. Such will be its composition."

That is perfectly clear. "Against any restrictions"—let anybody come who is in any way elected by workers. The author does not tell us where to *draw a line between* "workers" and all sorts of office employees (commercial, postal, telegraph, railway, etc., employees), and peasants belonging to our Social-Democratic organisations and to "consumers' societies". From his point of view, this is, probably, a mere technical detail; "against any restrictions"! so why restrict the petty-bourgeois element?

But let us continue. Comrade Khrustalev has given us a clear definition of the composition of the congress. He has also made himself clear on the purposes of the congress. "In all cases," he writes, "the labour congress committees and the local Social-Democratic organisations will exist side by side."

"...The first organisational unit is the factory committee. In their activities, the factory committees, elective and accountable to their electors, embrace broad strata of the proletariat through their participation in all aspects of factory life, from the settlement of conflicts between labour and capital, the planned leadership of economic strikes, finding work, etc., up to and including the organisation of funds, clubs, lectures, and libraries.

"The factory committees of one town or one industrial centre constitute the labour congress committee. Its purpose includes the leadership, extension and deepening of the trade union and co-operative movement, the organisation of aid for the unemployed, bringing pressure to bear on the municipal authorities to organise public works, agitation against rising food prices, relations with the Duma commission on aid for the unemployed, *discussion, on the spot, of all parliamentary bills affecting the interests of the working class* [author's italics]; in the event of a reform of local self-government—the conduct of an election campaign, etc.

"The labour congress is only the guiding and directing body of the whole movement. Such is approximately the general plan. Events will, of course, lead to the introduction of amendments."

That is perfectly clear. Non-party factory committees. Non-party labour congress committees. A non-party labour congress. "Through these committees and with them as a medium," says Comrade Khrustalev, "the party will obtain a powerful means of influencing the entire working class."

In what way does this differ from Larin's plan, may we ask? *It is exactly the same plan* expressed in slightly different words. In practice it is exactly the same reduction of Social-Democracy to "a propaganda body within a broad party", because Comrade Khrustalev's "plan" has, *in point of fact, left no other role to Social-Democracy*. In exactly the same way as Larin, he leaves the political activity of the working class to a "non-partisan labour party", since "*the discussion of all bills*", "*the conduct of an election campaign, etc.*", all come under the heading of political activity of the working class.

Larin is only more truthful and frank than Khrustalev, but actually they both propose and pursue the aim of "destroying the Social-Democratic Labour Party and setting up in its place a non-party political organisation of the proletariat". This is precisely what is said in the first point of that Bolshevik resolution on non-party labour organisations that aroused Comrade Khrustalev's ire and led him to call us prosecuting counsel, etc.

Comrade Khrustalev is also angry because he feels it necessary to evade the question bluntly presented in our resolution: who should lead the struggle of the proletariat, the *Social-Democratic* party or a "*non-party* political organisation of the proletariat"? Who should be the "guiding and directing body" in bringing pressure to bear on the munic-

ipal authorities, in relations with the Duma commission (Comrade Khrustalev said nothing about *the Social-Democratic group in the Duma!* Was that accidental or was it a "providential slip of the tongue" on the part of a man who has a vague feeling that the non-party "labour congress committees" would enter into relations with the Social-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Trudoviks indiscriminately?), in discussing bills, in conducting an election campaign, etc.?

There was nothing left for Comrade Khrustalev to do but display his anger when this question was put to him, since it would have been awkward for him to admit that the proletariat's political activities should be guided by non-party "committees". "Who of the Social-Democrats," he asks wrathfully, "has conducted, or is now conducting, agitation for the convening of an anti-party congress? The opponents will be unable to give a single name." Do not get so angry, Comrade Khrustalev, we *have indicated* a number of names in the first point of our resolution and we could now add to them *the name of Comrade G. Khrustalev*. Actually Comrade Khrustalev, like Larin, is agitating for *a broad Trudovik party*.^{*} We say a Trudovik party, not a workers' party, because (1) neither Larin nor Khrustalev excludes Trudovik, i.e., petty-bourgeois, democracy from the composition of non-party political organisation (delegates to the labour congress, for example, from "consumers' associations"; or the motto "against all restrictions") and (2) the non-partisanship of a workers' political organisation would inevitably mean the merging of the Social-Democratic and Trudovik points of view.

Comrade Khrustalev writes: "The organisations built up by Zubatov and Gapon¹⁶⁹ rapidly got rid of their police flavour and conducted a purely class policy." They got rid of that *because of* the politically conscious participation of the organised *Social-Democratic* party that would never agree to handing over the political leadership of proletarians to non-party organisations. It would seem that

^{*} This expression is used by Comrade G. Lindov who gave reasons for and proved its accuracy in his article "Labour Congress", published in the collection *Questions of Tactics*.

Comrade Khrustalev draws a distinction between "purely class" politics and *Social-Democratic* politics. We should very much like him to explain this idea *candidly*.

"There will be a labour congress," Comrade Khrustalev enjoins us, "and the Social-Democrats will participate in it." Of course we shall, if there is a congress. We participated in the Zubatov and Gapon workers' movements in order to fight for Social-Democracy. We shall participate in the Trudovik labour congress in order to fight for Social-Democracy against the Trudoviks and Trudovik *non-party* ideas. This argument is not to the advantage of the old Gapon trend, or of the new non-party spirit.

Comrade Khrustalev appeals to "Bolshevik workers", and in so doing tries to set them at loggerheads with the Bolsheviks, who have been agitating against the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. We do not intend to make any answer to that sally. We refer to Trotsky, who is "non-group". Let Comrade Khrustalev read his book *In Defence of the Party*; let him open it at the article entitled, § 2, "Mr. Prokopovich's Malignant Impartiality", page 82. When Comrade Khrustalev has read that article he will be ashamed of having hidden factional sallies behind a non-factional labour congress.

In two words we shall show politically conscious workers that the leading role of *non-party* committees in the *politics* of the proletariat (the election campaign, etc.) is a purely intellectualist whimsicality that would lead to *excessive* squabbling and bickering and, after the squabbling and bickering, "back to Social-Democracy".

In conclusion let us again thank Comrade Khrustalev for the clarity and completeness of his propaganda for the labour congress. Larin and Khrustalev are the Bolsheviks' best allies against Axelrod.

REORGANISATION AND THE END OF THE SPLIT IN ST. PETERSBURG

Readers will already have learned from the legal daily press that the reorganisation of the St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P., so long since contemplated by the majority of local Party members, has now been completed. A specially elected conference of all members of the local organisation gathered on March 25, 1907,¹⁷⁰ discussed the St. Petersburg Committee's reorganisation plan (published in *Proletary*, No. 15) and the Mensheviks' counter-plan (published in *Russkaya Zhizn*, No. 51), and adopted the St. Petersburg Committee's plan with some insignificant amendments.

In essence these organisational rules boil down to adherence to consistent democratic centralism. The highest body in the organisation is the *conference*, elected by direct ballot by all members of the Party (there are two-stage elections only in cases of insuperable difficulties) with a fixed rate of representation (the first conference was attended by delegates elected at the rate of one per fifty Party members). The conference is a standing institution. It meets not less than twice a month and is the supreme body of the organisation. It is re-elected twice a year.

The conference elects the St. Petersburg Committee *from among all Party members*, and not only from those working in some particular district of the local organisation.

This type of organisation eliminates any disproportion in the representation of the districts and—this is the main thing—instead of the unwieldy, multi-stage, undemocratic system of electing the St. Petersburg Committee from representatives of the districts, real unity of all Party members

is created, since they are united by a single guiding conference. The composition of the conference makes possible and inevitable the participation of the majority of outstanding workers in the guidance of all the affairs of the entire local organisation.

The conference has already put the new type of organisation into effect, has declared itself a standing institution, elected a new St. Petersburg Committee of nineteen comrades, and held two meetings (or rather, it has gathered twice for a meeting) for the solution of all current problems.

To characterise the Menshevik plan for reorganisation that the conference rejected, we shall mention one circumstance, the most important one. That plan also envisaged a similar conference at the head of the organisation (calling it a council). According to that plan, however, the St. Petersburg Committee, the executive body of the conference, is eliminated altogether! "The city council," says the Menshevik plan, "is divided into a number of commissions (propaganda, agitation, literature, trade union, financial, etc.) for the conduct of current business." And "the representation of the organisation in other parties, and relations with the central institutions of our Party are entrusted to a presidium" of five members elected by the council.

One may easily imagine how effective an organisation would be if its *current affairs* were conducted by separate commissions and not by a single executive body of the conference! In this case democratic *centralism* is turned into a fiction; in point of fact this is a step towards Larin's famous plan to reduce the role of the Social-Democratic Party to that of a *propaganda body* among working-class masses united as little as possible in a single organisation. It goes without saying that this Menshevik plan was immediately rejected. It now remains for us to ask its authors to acquaint us with the experience gained by *Menshevik* committees or organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. functioning on such principles.

To continue. It is extremely important to note that the new conference of the St. Petersburg organisation *has put an end to the St. Petersburg split*. It is known that the Mensheviks brought about the split in St. Petersburg during the elections to the Second Duma, by leaving (for allegedly

formal reasons) the conference held on January 6, 1907, the conference that decided the question of the R.S.D.L.P. election campaign in St. Petersburg. The elections to the new conference that first met on March 25 were conducted under the *direct* control of a *special* commission appointed by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. *specifically* for that purpose, which included a Central Committee member from the Lettish Social-Democrats. The conference held on March 25 (and still functioning, since, as we have said, it declared itself a standing institution) is, therefore, the *first* Social-Democratic conference in St. Petersburg for the past year, constituted *without the slightest dispute* on the correctness of the representation, the legality and number of mandates, etc.

Such a fact has hitherto *never been known* in St. Petersburg, with its most severe struggle between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Both the boycott conference (February 1906)¹⁷¹ and the conference on the question of supporting the demand for a "Duma" ministry (June 1906)¹⁷² gave the Bolsheviks the victory, but both had to begin with disputes over the correctness of the representation.

It will, therefore, be highly instructive to make use of these *undisputed* data, undisputed for the first time, on the strength of the two sections of Social-Democracy in St. Petersburg, to make clear to ourselves the real causes and real significance of the split, now over and done with, that occurred before the St. Petersburg elections. It will be remembered that the Mensheviks justified the split on formal grounds—first, incorrect representation at the conference on January 6 (the Bolsheviks were accused of exaggerating the number of votes, especially those of the shop-assistants, and of the unlawful annulment of Menshevik mandates); and secondly, the refusal of the conference to accede to the Central Committee's demand to divide into an urban and a gubernia conference.

In preceding issues of *Proletary* it has already been explained with sufficient clarity that the second "justification" actually boils down to *the participation* of the Central Committee (its Menshevik part) in engineering the St. Petersburg split. This will be easily understood by members of our Party in other cities as well, for they know full well that

the Central Committee has *nowhere* demanded the division of city conferences into urban and gubernia, *nor could it have done so*. The Central Committee needed this demand in St. Petersburg in the form of an ultimatum *in order to split* the St. Petersburg organisation and help the break-away Mensheviks to begin (or continue) negotiations with the Cadets.

The first of these "justifications" of the split, however, remains quite vague and debatable to all members of our Party except those in St. Petersburg. They are not in a position to judge the correctness of the representation at the January 6 conference, or the actual relation of Bolshevik and Menshevik forces in St. Petersburg. It is beyond the power of the Social-Democratic press to give documentary proofs of this because only a special commission could collect and analyse the documents. Thanks, however, to the verified and undisputed figures of the representation at the March 25 conference, we are able to show all our Party how much truth there was in the Menshevik justification of the split in St. Petersburg prior to the elections. For this purpose it is only necessary *to compare the figures, by districts*, of the number of Social-Democrats voting for the Bolsheviks and for the Mensheviks at the elections to the January 6 conference and to the March 25 conference.

The data on the voting at the elections to the March 25 conference are *unquestionable*; they have been verified by a Central Committee commission and accepted by both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks.

To have *indisputable* data on the voting at the elections to the January 6 conference, *we shall take the Menshevik figures*. When the thirty-one Mensheviks walked out of the conference on January 6, they issued a special statement in the form of a pamphlet entitled "Why Were We Compelled to Leave the Conference? (Statement by Thirty-One Mensheviks, Submitted to the Central Committee)". We discussed this pamphlet in *Proletary*, No. 12.* We shall now take the "figures on the composition of the electors to the Conference of St. Petersburg Organisation" (the January 6 conference) *printed* on pages seven and eight of that pamphlet.

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* See pp. 29-32 of this volume.—Ed.

Here *the number of those voting* for the Bolsheviks* and for the Mensheviks are given for each of the eleven districts, all votes, furthermore, being subdivided into undisputed and disputed, and the latter into those disputed by the Bolsheviks and those disputed by the Mensheviks.

There is no need for us to give all the details of these subdivisions. In the notes, we shall deal specifically with *all* the amendments introduced by the Mensheviks. For purposes of comparison, we shall take the *total* "number of votes" cast for the Bolsheviks and for the Mensheviks, in other words, we shall add the undisputed to the disputed votes and, by comparing these figures with the number of votes cast for the March 25 conference, every Party member will be able to see for himself *what* was incorrect in the elections to the January 6 conference, and *who was responsible* for the incorrectness.

In the pamphlet of the thirty-one Mensheviks there are no tabulated figures for the twelfth, shop-assistants', district of the St. Petersburg organisation. In the text (page 4) they said that the Central Committee had given the 313 organised shop-assistants the right to elect five representatives, allowing not one per fifty members (the usual rate), but one per sixty members, in view of the undemocratic nature of the elections. On these grounds, the Mensheviks refused to recognise the shop-assistants' votes *altogether*. Since one of the five representatives was a Menshevik and four were Bolsheviks, we shall assume sixty-three votes for the Mensheviks and two hundred and fifty for the Bolsheviks.

Next, we shall divide the twelve St. Petersburg districts of the Social-Democratic organisation into six undisputed and six disputed. The latter include those districts in which *more than half* the votes cast for the Bolsheviks or Mensheviks *were disputed* by either the Bolsheviks or the Mensheviks at the conference. The districts concerned are: Vyborg (of the 256 Menshevik votes, 234 were challenged by the Bolsheviks as questionable), City (of the 459 Menshevik votes, 370 disputed by the Bolsheviks), Moscow (of

* These figures are again subdivided into Bolshevik and dissident votes ("platform of the revolutionary bloc"). Both are Bolsheviks, who argued among themselves whether there should be a Left bloc or a purely Social-Democratic election list.

the 248 Menshevik votes, 97 disputed by the Bolsheviks, 107 by the Mensheviks; 185 Bolshevik votes disputed,* *all* by Mensheviks), Railway (of 21 Bolshevik votes, 5 disputed; of 154 Menshevik votes, 107 disputed); Estonian (all the 100 Bolshevik votes disputed by the Mensheviks), and shop-assistants (313 votes *challenged in their entirety* by the Mensheviks, who declared that these votes, and these alone, had not been cast at all; it was alleged that the leadership and not the members of the organisation had voted).

The undisputed districts were Vasilyevsky Ostrov, Narva, Okruzhnoi, Latvian (in these four districts all votes were undisputed), Neva (of 150 *Bolshevik* votes, 15 were disputed; of 40 *Menshevik* votes, 4 were disputed) and Petersburg (of 120 votes for the *Mensheviks*, 22 were disputed).

The data on the number of votes cast in each district gives us the following table:

St. Petersburg Organisation, R.S.D.L.P.		Conference of January 6 Votes cast for:			Conference of March 25 Votes cast for:		
Districts		B-vik	M-vik	Total	B-vik	M-vik	Total
Undisputed Districts	Vasilyevsky Ostrov .	329	339	668	798	435	1,233
	Petersburg	161	120	281	528	254	782
	Narva	24	6	30	202	231	433
	Neva	150	40	190	585	173	758
	Okruzhnoi	451	63	514	737	—	737
	Latvian	117	47	164	100	—	100
<i>Total</i>		1,232	615	1,847	2,950	1,093	4,043
Disputed Districts	Vyborg	97	256	353	155	267	422
	City	220	459	679	701	558	1,259
	Moscow	185	248	433	331	83	414
	Railway	21	154	175	29	105	134
	Estonian	100	—	100	150	—	150
	Shop-Assistants . . .	250	63	313	300	50	350
<i>Total</i>		873	1,180	2,053	1,666	1,063	2,729
<i>Grand Total . . .</i>		2,105	1,795	3,900	4,616	2,156	6,772

* In all cases, by disputed votes are meant those that the other side considered not entirely correct, unverified, exaggerated, but not altogether fictitious. At the January 6 conference, the Bolsheviks decided to decrease the rate of representation for *all* disputed votes, allotting *them* one delegate per 75 members instead of one delegate per fifty members.

The following conclusions may be drawn from these data.

(1) St. Petersburg Social-Democratic workers displayed much greater interest in the reform of the St. Petersburg organisation (the purpose of the March 25 conference) than in the Duma elections in the urban curia (the purpose of the January 6 conference).

The number of members of the Social-Democratic organisation *could not* have changed very considerably in the course of two and a half months. The harsh conditions in which meetings were held and votes counted were no better, but probably worse in March than before, in our police-ridden country (there were no university meetings; persecution of the workers had increased).

The number of *voting* members of the Social-Democratic organisation increased by more than half, more than sixty-six per cent (from 3,900 to 6,772).

(2) The preponderance of Bolsheviks over Mensheviks was *incomparably greater* when a greater number of votes were cast than it had been with a smaller number of votes. On January 6 the Mensheviks obtained 1,795 votes out of 3,900, or 46 per cent; on March 25 they obtained 2,156 out of 6,772, or 32 per cent.

(3) In the undisputed districts (the first six) a greater number of votes were cast for both *Bolsheviks* and *Mensheviks* (the increase in the number of votes cast for the former being much greater). *In the disputed districts (the following six) the number of votes cast for the Bolsheviks increased and the number cast for the Mensheviks decreased.*

The number of votes cast for the *Bolsheviks* increased from 873 to 1,666. The number cast for the *Mensheviks* fell from 1,180 to 1,063. The preponderance of the *Mensheviks* in the disputed districts *proved non-existent.*

This fact settles the question of which side was to blame for the split.

The second election, which confirmed the results of the first and was verified by the Central Committee's special commission, showed that in the disputed districts the number of votes claimed by the Bolsheviks was actually *less* than the real number, while that claimed by the Mensheviks was *greater* than the real number!

The Mensheviks stated, verbally and in print, that the Bolsheviks had exaggerated the number of votes in the disputed districts. The Bolsheviks accused the Mensheviks of the same thing. The second election produced a greater number of votes for the Bolsheviks and fewer for the Mensheviks. Is it possible to imagine more convincing and more decisive proof that the Bolsheviks were right?

This conclusion cannot be refuted either by reference to the fortuitous nature of the data taken by districts, or by saying that on January 6 we lumped the disputed and undisputed votes. The first objection falls to the ground because we did not take separate districts but *groups* of districts, and compared six districts with six, specifically to preclude *any* references to fortuity. The data for individual districts (the Moscow District, for instance!) would be ten times more favourable to us.

The second objection falls to the ground because we deliberately took the *Menshevik* figures as our basis, and the Mensheviks made insignificant corrections to them. In the opinion of the thirty-one, as expressed in their pamphlet (page 7) only the following votes "should actually not be confirmed"—15 of the 150 Bolshevik votes in the Neva District and all the Estonian Bolshevik votes; 107 out of the 248 Menshevik votes in the Moscow District, and 41 out of 154 Menshevik votes in the Railway District, which amounts to only 115 Bolshevik and 143 Menshevik votes. The shop-assistants' votes (the entire 313) were all rejected by the Mensheviks. It is easy to see that these amendments do not affect our conclusions.

The March 25 conference, the elections to which were verified by a special commission appointed by the Central Committee and recognised by all as indisputable, *has proved* that, in the dispute over representation at the January 6 conference, the Bolsheviks, whose preponderance proved very substantial, were right; the preponderance of the Mensheviks was completely disproved. An attempt to object to our argument may, of course, be made by reference to the fact that the March 25 conference took place after the election campaign and, therefore, reflected the shift of Social-Democratic workers over to the side of the Bolsheviks on this question, a shift that occurred after Jan-

uary 6, 1907. Such an objection will naturally not weaken, but rather strengthen (although in a somewhat different way), the responsibility of the Mensheviks for the split over the elections.

Responsibility for the St. Petersburg split over the elections to the Second Duma *rests entirely on the Mensheviks*. We have always maintained this to be so, and we undertook to prove it to the Party as a whole.

We have now submitted our final proofs.

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ON THE QUESTION OF A NATION-WIDE REVOLUTION

In a certain sense of the word, it is only a nation-wide revolution that can be victorious. This is true in the sense that the unity of the overwhelming majority of the population in the struggle for the demands of that revolution is essential for victory to be won. This overwhelming majority must consist either entirely of one class, or of different classes that have certain aims in common. It is also true, of course, that the present Russian revolution can be victorious only if it is nation-wide *in that specific sense* of the word that the conscious participation of the overwhelming majority of the population in the struggle is essential for victory to be won.

That, however, is the limit of the conventional truthfulness of the catchword of a "nation-wide" revolution. No further conclusions can be drawn from this concept, which is nothing but a truism (only an overwhelming majority can be victorious over an organised and dominant minority). For this reason it is fundamentally incorrect and profoundly un-Marxist to apply it as a general formula, as a model, a criterion of tactics. The concept of a "nation-wide revolution" should tell the Marxist of the need for a precise analysis of those varied interests of *different* classes that coincide in certain definite, limited common aims. Under no circumstances must this concept serve to *conceal* or overshadow the study of the class struggle in the course of any revolution. Such use of the concept of "nation-wide revolution" amounts to a complete rejection of Marxism and a return to the vulgar phraseology of the petty-bourgeois democrats or petty-bourgeois socialists.

This truth is frequently forgotten by our Social-Democratic Right wing. Still more frequently do they forget that *class relations in a revolution change with the progress of that revolution*. All real revolutionary progress means drawing broader masses into the movement; consequently—a greater consciousness of class interests; consequently—more clearly-defined political, party groupings and more precise outlines of the class physiognomy of the various parties; consequently—greater replacement of general, abstract, unclear political and economic demands that are vague in their abstractness, by the *varying* concrete, clearly-defined demands of the different classes.

For instance, the Russian bourgeois revolution, like any other bourgeois revolution, inevitably begins under the common slogans of “political liberty” and “popular interests”; only in the course of the struggle, the concrete meaning of those slogans becomes clear to the masses and to the different classes, only to the extent that a practical attempt is made to implement that “liberty”, to give a *definite* content even to such a hollow-sounding word as “democracy”. Prior to the bourgeois revolution, and at its onset, all speak in the name of democracy—the proletariat and the peasantry together with urban petty-bourgeois elements, and the liberal bourgeoisie together with the liberal landlords. It is only in the course of the class struggle, only in the course of a more or less lengthy historical development of the revolution, that the different understanding of this “democracy” by the different classes is revealed. And what is more, the deep gulf between the interests of the different classes is revealed in their demands for *different* economic and political measures, in the name of one and the same “democracy”.

Only in the course of the struggle, only as the revolution develops, is it revealed that one “democratic” class or stratum does not want to go, or cannot go, as far as another, that while “common” (allegedly common) objectives are being achieved, fierce skirmishes develop around the *method* by which they are to be achieved, for example, on the degree, extent or consistency of freedom and power of the people, or the manner in which land is to be transferred to the peasantry, etc.

We have had to recall all these forgotten truths so as to enable the reader to understand the dispute that recently took place between two newspapers. This is what one of them, *Narodnaya Gazeta*, wrote against the other, *Nashe Ekho*.

"'The grouping of the population by party,' wrote *Nashe Ekho*, 'that important political lesson and the revolution's most important political acquisition at the time of the elections to the Second Duma, showed clearly by nation-wide facts that broad strata of the landlords and bourgeoisie are swinging to the Right.' Quite true. But the mood and the mandates which the 'Left' deputies—Socialist-Revolutionaries, Trudoviks, and Popular Socialists—have brought with them from their localities also 'showed clearly' on a nation-wide scale that the 'people' are at present steeped in Cadet 'constitutional illusions' to a considerable degree, that the 'people' place excessive hopes on the independent activities of the Duma, that they are excessively concerned with 'saving' the Duma. That is the obvious fact that the *Nashe Ekho* writers failed to notice. They did notice *whom* the people sent to the Duma, but not *what* they were sent there *for*. But in that case, will *Nashe Ekho* not agree that, in proposing that the proletariat ignore 'nation-wide' tasks, it is proposing that it isolate itself, not only from bourgeois 'society', but also from the petty-bourgeois 'people'?"

This is an extremely instructive and noteworthy tirade, which conceals three major opportunist errors; first, the results of the elections are contrasted with the mood of the deputies, which is substituting the deputies' mood for that of the people, and reverting from the more profound, extensive and basic to the shallower, narrower and derivative.* Secondly, the question of a firm and sustained political line and tactics for the proletariat is replaced by the question of an assessment of some "mood" or another. Thirdly—and *this is most important*—for the sake of the vulgarly democratic fetish of a "nation-wide revolution", the proletariat is scared with the bogey of "isolation" from the "petty-bourgeois people".

We shall deal with the first two errors as briefly as possible. The elections affected the masses, and showed, not only their fleeting mood but their *profound interests*. It is alto-

* As far as "mandates" are concerned, we reject that argument completely. Who makes a count of revolutionary and opportunist instructions and mandates? Who does not know how many newspapers have been suppressed for publishing revolutionary instructions?

gether unworthy of Marxists to revert from class interests (expressed by the party grouping at the elections) to a fleeting mood. The mood of the deputies may be one of gloom, while the economic interests of the masses may call forth a mass struggle. An assessment of "mood", therefore, may be necessary to determine *the moment* for some action, step, appeal, etc., but certainly not to determine proletarian *tactics*. To argue differently would mean replacing sustained proletarian tactics by unprincipled dependence on "mood". And all the time, the point at issue was that of a *line* and had nothing to do with a "moment". Whether or not the proletariat has at present recovered (and *Narodnaya Gazeta* does not think so) is of importance in deciding *the "moment" for action*, but not in determining the tactical *line of action* of the working class.

The third error is the most profound and the most important—the fear of "isolating" the Social-Democrats or the proletariat (which is the same thing) from the petty-bourgeois people. That is really a most improper fear.

Social-Democracy *must* isolate itself from the petty-bourgeois people inasmuch as the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Trudoviks and Popular Socialists are really trailing along in the wake of the Constitutional-Democrats—and that is happening — and indeed has happened very frequently beginning with the voting for Golovin, and continuing with the famous tactics of sepulchral silence, etc. For there must be one of two things; either the vacillation of the petty bourgeoisie is, in general, an indication of the shaky nature of the petty bourgeois, and the difficult and arduous development of the revolution, but does not signify that it has ended, or that its forces are exhausted (which is our opinion). Then, by isolating itself from all and every vacillation and wavering in petty-bourgeois people, the Social-Democratic proletariat *educates* them for the struggle, trains them in preparation for the struggle and develops their political consciousness, determination, firmness, etc. Or else, the wavering of the petty-bourgeois people means the finale of the present bourgeois revolution (we believe such a view to be *wrong*, and none of the Social-Democrats have directly and openly defended it, although extreme Right-wing Social-Democrats are undoubtedly inclined to do so). Then,

again, the Social-Democratic proletariat *must also* isolate itself from the wavering (or treachery) of the petty bourgeoisie, in order to educate the working-class masses in class-consciousness, and prepare them for a more planned, firm and decisive participation in the next revolution.

In both cases and in all cases, the Social-Democratic proletariat must isolate itself from the petty-bourgeois people, *which is steeped in Cadet illusions*, and do so unconditionally. The proletariat must in all cases pursue the firm, sustained policy of a truly revolutionary class, without allowing itself to be flustered by any reactionary or philistine cock-and-bull stories, whether these are about nation-wide tasks in general, or about a nation-wide revolution.

It is possible that, given a certain combination of forces or a concurrence of unfavourable conditions, the overwhelming part of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois strata may be infected, for the time being, with servility, slavishness or cowardice. That would be "nation-wide" cowardice, and the Social-Democratic proletariat *isolates* itself from it in the interests of the working-class movement as a whole.

**APROPOS OF THE MINUTES
OF THE NOVEMBER MILITARY AND COMBAT
CONFERENCE OF THE RUSSIAN
SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR
PARTY ¹⁷³**

No. 20 of *Narodnaya Duma* (April 3, 1907) carried the following item: "The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. has addressed the following letter to Party organisations. 'A few days ago a booklet was published under the title of *Minutes of the First Conference of Military and Combat Organisations*.* To prevent all possible misunderstanding, the Central Committee deems it essential to make the following explanations on this matter. (1) The conference was called by representatives of a number of military and combat organisations, not only without the consent of the Central Committee but even in spite of its vehement protest, that body being of the opinion that the unification of combat organisations in any form whatsoever would be impermissible. (2) The Technical Group at the Central Committee was not given the consent of that body for participation in the "conference", and the member of the group who went so far as to participate has been soundly reprimanded by the Central Committee for doing so without its knowledge. To this must be added that the military organisations of the Baltic Area took part in the conference contrary to a deci-

* The real title, *abridged* by the Central Committee, reads: "... organisations of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, (Conference) held in November 1906" (St. Petersburg, 1907. Price 60 kopeks. 168 pp. + IV).

sion of the Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of the Latvian Area.”

The reader will see from this that our Central Committee is very angry and anxious to denigrate a certain conference in the eyes of the Party, and to conceal the point at issue behind a list of formal discrepancies.

We advise all Party members to acquaint themselves with the exceedingly interesting *Minutes of the Military and Combat Organisations of the R.S.D.L.P.* so as to convince themselves of the amusing nature of the Central Committee's wrath and dissatisfaction. We, for our part, deem it essential to give at least a brief assessment of this book (and of the “conflict” arising out of it).

Let us begin with the formal aspect of the matter mentioned in the Central Committee's wrathful statement. The conference was called despite its protest, for the Central Committee was “of the opinion that the unification of combat organisations in any form whatsoever would be impermissible”. This is very wrathful, but illogical to the point of incoherence. If it does not, in general, regard *the conference* as a “form of unification”, then it completely misses the target. If a meeting (“conference”) of combat organisations is *also* impermissible as a “form of unification”, then we ask ourselves in perplexity—how can representatives of *Party* organisations be forbidden to *confer* so long as they *are* Party organisations that have not been dissolved either by the Party Congress or the Central Committee? Apparently the Central Committee is afraid to express its real idea (the desire to dissolve all combat organisations), and is therefore wrathful in an amusing manner. Would it really not have been natural to expect objections *in substance* to *certain steps or decisions* taken by the conference instead of the outcry: “The meeting is not permitted”? This outcry is meant to prevent the presentation of the problem as it really stands?—that is a thought that occurs to one of its own accord.

Let us now look into the history of the way the conference of military and combat organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. was convened. Last autumn there was a conflict on this issue between the St. Petersburg military organisation and the Central Committee. The former called the conference of

military and *combat organisations*, and in doing so referred to "the right to call conferences *granted* to local organisations by Party Rules".* The Central Committee opposed the initiative of the St. Petersburg military organisation, and was against allowing combat organisations to attend. It so turned out that *two* conferences were held: (1) the *October* conference of military organisations *only*, at which representatives of the Central Committee were present; (2) the *November* Conference of military and *combat organisations* without the participation of a Central Committee representative (although the Central Committee *appointed* one of its members to attend *that* conference as well). Representatives of *eight* military organisations participated in the *October* conference. The November conference was attended by *eleven* military and *eight* combat organisations. Representatives of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and other Party officials attended *both* conferences in a consultative capacity.

The resolutions of the *October* conference were published by the Central Committee in the above-mentioned pamphlet (*Brief Extract*). The resolutions of the *November* conference were published in *Proletary*, No. 9, and were later included in the publication *Minutes*, issued as a separate booklet. The Central Committee's protest, with which we opened this article, refers to the *November* conference.

It stands to reason that the fact of there having been two conferences should be condemned. That is undoubtedly an undesirable event in a single party. Leaving the formal aspect aside, we pose the question of the *substance* of the conflict that was responsible for *two* conferences; was the participation of combat organisations in the conference useful or harmful? We read in the resolution of the October conference: "... there is an urgent need for the Party to call a conference devoted specifically to military organisations, to discuss the question of preparing the troops to participate in the armed struggle of the people, a conference that has nothing to gain from the participation of representatives of

* See the Central Committee's publication *Brief Extract from the Minutes of the First Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisations Conducting Activities Among the Troops*, a pamphlet of thirteen pages issued by the Central Committee Press.

combat groups" (page 4 of the Central Committee's pamphlet). That was all. Those were the motives in their entirety.

The incorrectness of these motives is palpable. Let us assume that everything bad that can be said against combat organisations is true. But it is a fact that they did participate in former attempts at an insurrection. For that reason alone it would be useful and even necessary to consult them. It would be useful *to make* their *harmful* tendencies *known* to the Party, and *expose* such-and-such activities of theirs at a conference attended by them. The Central Committee and *every* member of the conference could and should have done this. The decisions of the conference were *not in any way* binding upon anybody, and were certainly not obligatory either for the Central Committee or for the local committees. Under such conditions, *fear* of a joint meeting is simply ridiculous.

And if the Central Committee now forthrightly condemns a conference with representatives of combat organisations participating, *without condemning* any one of the resolutions of the conference with equal forthrightness, that must mean that the conference *disproved* the Central Committee's assumptions!

To deal immediately with the decisions of the conference, let us take, for instance, its resolution on *the tasks of combat organisations*. Here we read: "The Conference of Military and Combat Organisations recognises the main tasks of combat organisations to be (1) dissemination of a correct conception of an armed uprising and explanation of the concrete conditions under which an armed uprising may arise, proceed, and be successfully consummated, because even among Party officials there exist the vaguest and most incorrect conceptions of an armed uprising; (2) the technical preparation of everything necessary for the successful conduct of an armed uprising; (3) the organisation, for bold action, of cadres of politically conscious workers, grouped around the R.S.D.L.P.; (4) assistance in the organisation, for combat purposes, of the revolutionary-democratic sections of the population, and in strengthening the fighting leadership of Social-Democracy among those sections."

Thus, the main task of the combat organisations is declared to be, first and foremost, "*the dissemination of a correct*

conception of an armed uprising". This idea is repeated in much sharper form in the resolution on the role of military and combat organisations during an armed uprising: "the role of the combat organisations is to develop a correct conception of the armed uprising among the masses of the people".

And so our Menshevik Central Committee considers a conference *on this* to be impermissible? Or was it anxious to hide behind the bureaucratic screen—"no collective activities are permissible, or even a conference"—*in order* to rid itself of the unpleasant duty of giving the Party a *definite* explanation of *which* of the tasks of the combat organisations it considers correct, and which incorrect?

The fact of the matter is that a truly pharisaic attitude to the combat organisations is prevalent among the Mensheviks; they have nothing against taking advantage of any of the "results" of the activities of *non-Party* combat organisations, but they spread old wives' tales about *Party* combat organisations that enable them to *evade altogether* the question of methods of disseminating among the masses the correct conception of the armed uprising, etc.

Among such tales there is, for example, the one now current that the combat groups (following in the wake of the Bolsheviks) exaggerate the significance of the *technique* of insurrection.

Excellent, gentlemen! You accuse us of exaggerating the significance of "technique", do you? Would you care to read two resolutions—those of the Menshevik (October) and the Bolshevik (November) military Social-Democratic conferences—to get at the truth of the matter?

On work among officers. Resolution of the Menshevik (October) conference:

"The conference recognises that revolutionary propaganda among officers is an important task both because the work of the Social-Democratic military-revolutionary organisation among officers can greatly facilitate our work among the troops in peace-time, and also because at the time of an armed uprising revolutionary officers can serve as the technical leaders of the insurrection. The conference, therefore, recommends to the military-revolutionary organisation that it devote great attention to work among officers, striving as far as possible to convert them into politically conscious supporters of the Social-Democratic Party" (p. 13 of the Central Committee's pamphlet).

The resolution of the Bolshevik (November) conference:

"Whereas: (1) the class, social composition of the corps of officers and their interests as a professional military caste compel them to strive for the retention of the regular army and the under-privileged position of the people; (2) in view of this, the officers, as a body, play a reactionary part in the present bourgeois-democratic revolution; (3) the existing oppositionally-minded groups of officers do not play an active part and (4) at the same time it is possible that individual officers may come over to our Party and they may, in view of their specialised knowledge and special military training, render considerable services during an uprising of the army and its defection to the side of the people, and also in technical preparations for an armed uprising,

"the conference of military and combat organisations recognises: (1) that they cannot build up an independent Social-Democratic military organisation among the officers; (2) that it is essential to use the existing oppositionally-minded groups of officers for purposes of information and in order to draw into our Party military and combat organisations individuals who can serve as instructors and practical leaders" (*Minutes*, p. 132).

The Mensheviks *do not say a word about the class composition* of the corps of officers, or about its role during *the whole course* of the bourgeois revolution. The *central feature* of the Bolshevik resolution is an assessment of both the one and the other. That is the first point. The Mensheviks have *nothing but technique*, since *all* proof of the "*importance*" of work among the officers is reduced to nothing but the fact that such work "could facilitate" our activities among the troops (provide us with quarters? or with legal cover?) and could then provide technical leaders. The Bolsheviks give *subordinate* place to technique, as services rendered by "individual officers", and give prominence to proof that the workers' party cannot build up an "*independent Social-Democratic organisation*" among the officers. That is the second point. The ideas of the Mensheviks—petty-bourgeois in nature because they fear to show the class connections between the corps of officers and the bourgeoisie—are complemented by the timidity of the conclusion drawn—"as far as possible convert them into politically conscious supporters of the Social-Democratic Party". The Bolsheviks give a frank proletarian assessment of a stratum that is, *on the whole*, reactionary, and this leads to a decisive conclusion: use oppositionally-minded officers "for purposes of information" and draw only

"individual officers" into *our Party* military and combat organisations. That is the third point.

After that, it may well be asked what else but old wives' tales can one call the Menshevik chatter about the exaggeration of the significance of technique by the Bolsheviks in general, and the Bolshevik combat groups in particular? As we have seen, this chatter has actually served, on the one hand, to cover up the narrow Menshevik view concerning the corps of officers, and, on the other hand, the purely intellectualist, *opportunist* fear of assessing the bourgeois class character of the composition of the corps of officers and of introducing into the work among the troops the idea of the class difference between the mass of "rank-and-file" soldiers drawn from the peasants and workers, and the handful of sons of the aristocracy or of the bourgeoisie, who worm themselves into the aristocracy through military service.

It was not only the Menshevik participants in the tiny October conference who displayed this "technical" and petty-bourgeois opportunist view of the corps of officers. We find that our Menshevik Central Committee shares this view; we have only to recall the famous *fourth* letter to organisations (the period when the Duma was dissolved) where the slogan "for the Duma" as an organ of power that could convene a constituent assembly, was justified by an effort at adaptation to the interests and level of political consciousness "of the middle bourgeoisie and *corps of officers*". In that letter, the Central Committee went so far as to say that *the victory* of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies in the struggle for power would lead only to the military dictatorship of the army that had gone over to the side of the people! For, you see, without the "liberal" officers, the troops would not be able, even jointly with the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, to ensure anything else but a military dictatorship!

This petty-bourgeois view with regard to the corps of officers is also displayed by Plekhanov, the ideological leader of the Mensheviks. Throughout 1906 we saw the efforts he made to accuse the Bolsheviks of exaggerating the significance of the technical tasks of the uprising. What aspect of the uprising did our esteemed Comrade Plekhanov write about during that time? Was it about the insurrection's

roots in the masses, or the role of the peasant and proletarian elements in the insurrection? Nothing of the sort. All that time Comrade Plekhanov wrote *only* about *one* letter from one *liberal* officer, in *Dnevnik*, No. 7 (August 1906),¹⁷⁴ whom he with the greatest politeness "corrected" for his bourgeois views on the "men" and on the "tranquil" nature of the period of Witte's Ministry, etc. "I even think," wrote Comrade Plekhanov, "that only [note that "only"!] the participation of officers in the military organisations will put an end to these *outbreaks* [of soldiers and sailors] that are an unplanned and unproductive waste of energy needed by the revolution." You see the strength behind it—*only* the participation of officers will put an end to the outbreaks! Without the officers there will be no end to the "*unplanned*" waste of energy by the foolish muzhik. And when the Bolshevik combat groups meet in conference and wish to give the Social-Democratic Party a modest piece of advice—let the *main* task of the combat organisations be that of imparting military knowledge to the *masses*, of teaching them to understand the course of the insurrection and the conditions for its *planned* conduct—then the Pharisees of hide-bound Menshevism begin to shout, What a narrowly technical conception of "planning"! What an "impermissible" conference of combat groups, contrary to the will of the Central Committee!

But enough of the Pharisees—let us get back to the minutes. In *one* place we found, not "modest advice" to the Social-Democratic Party, but pretentious and clumsy project-mongering. That was in the report made by Comrade Izarov¹⁷⁵ on the role of the Party during the armed uprising. Here Comrade Izarov really did go to absurd extremes, such as the division of Party organisations into three main types—military, combat and proletarian! He even went so far as to offer "plans" to form "military-combat councils" with *an equal number* of delegates from the three types of organisation (p. 95), etc. It goes without saying that we Bolsheviks *will always* hold aloof in the *most decisive manner* from such "*combatism*". The unconditionally dominant character and deciding voice belong to the general proletarian organisation; the *complete* subordination of all military and combat organisations to it, the *necessity* to base those same com-

bat organisations *entirely* on cadres of workers who are Social-Democratic Party members (or, perhaps, even *replace the combat organisation by a Party militia*) — to us there is no shadow of doubt in all this.

But if Comrade Izarov's absurd excesses are brought against us for factional purposes, we would ask such "critics" to remember that the *Bolshevik military and combat conference did not accept Izarov's extremes*. The best refutation of the calumnies directed against our combat groups is the fact that they *themselves* at their own conference, simply pushed Izarov's project-mongering aside. In order that *their* voice on the question of the role of the Social-Democratic Party in an insurrection *should not* be regarded as pretentious imposition or dictating, etc., they *themselves* turned their conference on this point into a *private meeting* (see *Proletary*, No. 9, and *Minutes*, p. 116). It was only at this private meeting that they passed a resolution without a suggestion of project-mongering *à la* Izarov, but with only a point about "ensuring the closest connection and co-operation between general-proletarian, military and combat organisations". In addition, the resolution on the tasks of military organisations *particularly* stresses "the *subordination of all the work*" to "the political leadership of general-proletarian organisations" (*Proletary*, No. 9, *Minutes*, p. 137). If the Bolshevik combat organisations alone were able to correct Izarov, one may well realise that the Central Committee had good reason for apprehension when confronted with a general meeting of the military and combat organisations of the whole Party.

Space does not permit us to deal in such detail with other aspects of the work of the conference. We must mention that *almost half* of this thick book is devoted to work among the troops (pp. 10-49) and former attempts at an armed uprising (pp. 53-59, 64-79). This is very valuable material, and all politically conscious Social-Democratic workers will thank the military and combat conference for its initiative in gathering and preparing this material. We note the report made by Comrade Varin¹⁷ "on former attempts at an armed uprising"; in this report prominence is given to a study of the armed uprising *as a specific form of the mass movement*, a special form of the class struggle of the prole-

tariat. Stress is laid on the historic moment when the struggle between certain classes is sharpened to the extreme, as a condition for the uprising. The role of various classes is examined—the dependence of the movement among the troops upon the alignment of social forces, the indivisibility of the political and military aspects of the uprising, the significance of “broad democratic organisations of the masses of the people” as a prerequisite for a provisional revolutionary government, etc. The *study* of such problems is, of course, rather more difficult than the writing of “tactical platforms” containing Cadet phrases about “faith of the proletarian masses in the miracle of a spontaneous insurrection” (see the “Tactical Platform” of Martov & Co.).

Lastly, let us note the discussion on current affairs, with the splendid speech by Comrade Ilyan¹⁷ who, in November 1906, at the military and combat conference, proved able to express a view on the *Second Duma* that has been fully confirmed by events. “I shall permit myself to touch upon the Duma,” he said. “We shall have a composition that will differ completely from that of the past Duma. What we shall have is mobilised revolution and mobilised reaction. Particularly in view of its expectations not having been fulfilled, the peasantry will send a more revolutionary element than it did to the First Duma. No doubt the proletariat will do the same.... Our trouble is that some Social-Democrats are striving to fill up the Duma with some sort of intermediate stratum of liberals” (p. 84 of the *Minutes*).

At the *combat* conference they were better able to assess *politics* than were Plekhanov and the Menshevik Central Committee in November 1906.

It goes without saying that in a newspaper article we cannot deal fully with the contents of the *Minutes*. We shall conclude by giving readers our earnest advice to *study* them—advice to those Social-Democrats who are capable of discussing questions of an insurrection without any liberal sniggering.

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REPORT
TO THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.
ON THE ST. PETERSBURG SPLIT
AND THE INSTITUTION OF THE PARTY TRIBUNAL
ENSUING THEREFROM ¹⁷⁸

As you will have learned from bourgeois newspapers (*Tovarishch*, et al.), the Central Committee of our Party has instituted a Party tribunal to examine my activities, specifically, my pamphlet *The St. Petersburg Elections and the Hypocrisy of the Thirty-One Mensheviks*,* which appeared at the time of the split in the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation during the elections to the Second Duma.

The tribunal has been constituted of three members representing me, three from the thirty-one Mensheviks, and three members of a Presidium nominated by the central committees of the Latvian and Polish Social-Democratic parties and the Bund. I have submitted to that tribunal a counter-charge of impermissible conduct against the thirty-one Mensheviks and against Comrade *Dan* (a member of the editorial board of the Central Organ and, through the Central Organ, a member of the Central Committee). The counter-indictment was supported on the one hand by a meeting of 234 St. Petersburg Bolshevik members of the Party (their resolution, together with their report giving a résumé of the whole matter, was published in *Proletary*, No. 13), and on the other hand by the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic Conference (minus the seceding Mensheviks). The resolution of this conference was published in *Proletary*, No. 14.¹⁷⁹

See pp. 33-44 of this volume.—*Ed.*

In its capacity of an institution set up by the Central Committee, the tribunal did not consider itself justified in indicting the thirty-one Mensheviks and Comrade Dan, and turned to the same Central Committee for a definition of its competency on the question of the counter-indictment. At a special session the Central Committee again examined this question, and confirmed that the present tribunal had been instituted exclusively for the examination of Lenin's case and that the arraignment of other persons before the tribunal depended entirely on the Central Committee, which, of course, deemed it its duty to arraign before the tribunal all persons against whom the present tribunal would formulate a charge of impermissible conduct. The composition of the new tribunal was again left entirely to the discretion of that same Central Committee.

Thus we get a tangle of glaring incongruities and contradictions. The Menshevik Central Committee is playing the role of an institution that brings up for trial and also determines both the composition of the tribunal and its competency. A counter-indictment has been submitted against the leader of the Menshevik section of the Central Committee. The very same persons, it seems, appoint the tribunal, are themselves prosecutors and also decide the question of what to do with a counter-indictment *against themselves!*

Obviously such arrangements are not capable of inspiring respect for the Party. Only the Party Congress can unravel this tangle of incongruities. I therefore appeal to the Congress with a request: grant the tribunal full judicial powers directly from the Congress; make the tribunal in every way independent of the Central Committee, which (its Menshevik section) is clearly interested in the case; grant the tribunal the right to examine the case in all its aspects, without any restrictions and to indict any Party members and any Party institutions, not excluding the Menshevik section of the Central Committee, etc.

For an explanation of the case to members of the R.S.D.L.P. Congress, I append (1) the full text of my speech for the defence (or for the prosecution of the Menshevik section of the Central Committee) that I delivered at the first session of the tribunal. (The tribunal held only two sessions and

examined only three of several dozen witnesses. The tribunal was interrupted by the Congress.) (2) A brief summary of the real history of the St. Petersburg split.

I. SPEECH FOR THE DEFENCE (OR FOR THE PROSECUTION
OF THE MENSHEVIK SECTION
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE)
DELIVERED AT THE PARTY TRIBUNAL

Comrade judges, the Central Committee has charged me with *having made a statement* (in the press) *impermissible in a Party member*. That is what is said in the decision of the Central Committee instituting the Party tribunal. I shall begin directly with the substance of the matter: I shall read out in full the "declaration" which the Central Committee "submits for consideration by the tribunal".

"The Central Committee declares that the pamphlet, *The St. Petersburg Elections and the Hypocrisy of the Thirty-One Mensheviks*, signed by Comrade Lenin, directly charges the thirty-one members of the St. Petersburg organisation with having entered into negotiations with the Cadet Party 'for the purpose of selling workers' votes to the Cadets', and the Mensheviks with having 'bargained with the Cadets to get their man into the Duma, in spite of the workers, with the aid of the Cadets'.

"The Central Committee declares that the appearance of such an accusation in the press, particularly on the eve of the elections, was certain to cause confusion in the ranks of the proletariat, cast suspicion upon the political integrity of Party members, and will be utilised by the enemies of the proletariat in their struggle against Social-Democracy.

"Being of the opinion that such a statement is impermissible in a Party member, the Central Committee submits Lenin's conduct to consideration by a Party tribunal."

Such is the full text of the indictment. First of all I will observe that there is an important *error* of fact, which I shall ask the tribunal to correct on the basis of the *text* of the pamphlet incriminating me. Specifically: in the pamphlet it is stated plainly and definitely that I accuse *not only* the thirty-one Mensheviks, *but also Comrade Dan, i.e., a member* of the Central Committee.

In drawing up its decision the Central Committee *must have known* that Comrade Dan is a member of the Central Committee (he may even have taken part in the discussions of the question, or in the decision to indict me for accusing

him), and that I accuse not only the thirty-one, but Dan as well. It appears, therefore, that the Central Committee *deliberately* excluded *its own member* from the number whom I accused. Here, in addition to the error of fact, the indictment contains something worse, something intolerable, and I shall later make a detailed appraisal of *this* aspect of the case, and shall try to explain *precisely this aspect*, using all of the material that comes before the tribunal in the course of the trial.

I now pass on to the substance of the charge.

The Central Committee quotes two passages from my pamphlet, and I must analyse each of them as fully as possible. I am aware, of course, that the question at issue is the *whole* of the above-mentioned pamphlet, and not merely these passages. But, following the example of the Central Committee, I take these as the main and principal parts.

The first passage is taken from the very beginning of the pamphlet. I shall take the liberty of reading a whole page to show the context of this passage.

"The newspaper *Tovarishch* has today (January 20) published"—I want to remind you that this took place *five* days before the formation of the Left bloc in St. Petersburg and *sixteen days* before the elections to the State Duma in the city of St. Petersburg—"lengthy excerpts from the manifesto of the thirty-one Mensheviks who seceded from the socialist organisation on the eve of the St. Petersburg elections."*

I emphasise that the very first sentence in the pamphlet brings to the fore the fundamental fact of *the split* in St. Petersburg on the eve of the elections. I lay stress on this circumstance, because I shall have to refer to its importance many times later on.

I continue the quotation:

"First of all, let us briefly recall the actual history of what the Menshevik seceders from the Social-Democrats have done since they walked out of the Conference...." A few days before the pamphlet we are now discussing appeared, I published another pamphlet entitled *Social-Democracy and the St. Petersburg Elections* and also a pamphlet

* See p. 33 of this volume.—Ed.

*When You Hear the Judgement of a Fool (From the Notes of a Social-Democrat Publicist).** Almost the whole issue of the latter pamphlet was confiscated by the police. Only a few copies were saved, and I am referring to it so that the tribunal may study the picture of the events of the time in their entirety, and not in fragments.

"(1) After breaking away from the Social-Democrat workers, they entered into a bloc with the petty bourgeoisie (the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Trudoviks and the Popular Socialists) in order jointly to bargain with the Cadets for seats. The written agreement under which the seceding Social-Democrats joined the petty-bourgeois bloc *was concealed from the workers* and from the public.

"However, we still had hopes that this agreement would eventually be published, and the secret revealed."

I draw the attention of the tribunal to the fact that in the pamphlet in which I accuse Dan and the thirty-one Mensheviks, I emphasise from the very beginning that the written agreement was concealed from the workers.

Let us proceed:

"(2) As a constituent part of the petty-bourgeois bloc (incorrectly styled the 'Left bloc' by the newspapers), the breakaway Mensheviks bargained with the Cadets for three places out of the six for this bloc. The Cadets offered two seats. They could not come to terms. The meeting between the petty-bourgeois 'conference' (this expression is not ours—we borrow it from the newspapers) and the Cadets was held on *January 18*. Both *Rech* and *Tovarishch* reported it. *Rech* announces today that no agreement was reached (although we must, of course, be prepared to hear that negotiations are still being conducted behind the scenes).

"So far the Mensheviks have made no announcement in the press concerning their '*operation*' for the sale of workers' votes to the Cadets."

That is the position regarding the first passage. I wrote these words against the Mensheviks on the very day that *I for the first time* learned from the newspapers that the attempt of the Mensheviks and the Narodniks to form a bloc with the Cadets *against* the majority of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation had failed; but I at once made the reservation that I could not regard the agreement as having been *finally* abandoned and that it was necessary to be prepared *for the worst*—the continuation of

* See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 431-55 and pp. 456-74,—*Ed.*

the negotiations "*behind the scenes*". Why did I consider then (and I still think that the view I then held was correct) that it was necessary to be prepared for the worst? Because it was a wrong step to conceal from the public a written agreement between the Mensheviks and the petty-bourgeois bloc, a step unworthy of a socialist and inevitably giving rise to the worst suspicions.

What was meant by the "sale" of workers' votes to the Cadets? Some jokers told me that they understood me to have said sale *for money*. This jest is not devoid of wit. But a literate person who read in earnest the whole of the pamphlet, and not disjointed passages from it, would, of course, see at once from the context, from all the preceding and subsequent passages, that what is referred to is a sale *not for money, but for seats in the Duma*. The "bargaining" and "sale" imply, of course, a barter of political and not economic equivalents, of seats for votes, not of money for votes.

The question arises: was it worth while bothering with such a clear and obvious circumstance?

I am profoundly convinced that it was, for this point brings us squarely to the elucidation of the question presented by the Central Committee—of statements that are permissible and impermissible in the press.

If the passage in the pamphlet we are examining had read: the thirty-one were selling workers' votes to the Cadets for money—that would have been imputing shameful and criminal acts to an opponent. Anyone making such an imputation would deserve to be tried, and certainly not for "carrying confusion into the ranks of the proletariat", but for *libel*. That is perfectly clear.

On the other hand, if the passage in question had stated: the thirty-one spoke in favour of *adding* workers' votes to Cadet votes on the condition that the Social-Democrats were assured seats in the Duma that would be an example of loyal and properly conducted polemics, permissible in Party members.

What is the difference between *this* last-quoted wording and the one I chose? The difference is in the tone, that tone which makes the whole music. Exactly. The wording is calculated to evoke in the reader hatred, aversion and con-

tempt for people who commit such deeds. Such wording is calculated not to convince, but to break up the ranks of the opponent, not to correct the mistake of the opponent, but to destroy him, to wipe his organisation off the face of the earth. This wording is indeed of such a nature as to evoke the worst thoughts, the worst suspicions about the opponent and indeed, as contrasted with the wording that convinces and corrects, it "carries confusion into the ranks of the proletariat".

I may be asked: well, do you admit that such wording is *impermissible*? I shall answer, Yes, certainly, *but only with the following little proviso*—impermissible in members of a *united* party. This proviso represents the crux of the matter. The accusation which the Central Committee advances against me is wrong. I shall say more, it is dishonest, precisely because *the Central Committee remains silent* about the fact that at the time the pamphlet was written a united party *did not exist* in the organisation from which it emanated (not formally, but in essence), and whose aims it served. It is dishonest to advance a charge of publishing statements in the press "impermissible in a Party member" at a time when *a split* has taken place in the Party.

A split means a rupture of all organisational ties between the two party groups concerned; it shifts a conflict of ideas from within the bounds of a single organisation to somewhere outside it, from correcting and convincing comrades to destroying their organisation, to inciting the masses of the workers (and the masses of the people generally) to oppose the breakaway organisation.

What is impermissible in members of a united party is permissible and obligatory for sections of a party that has been split. It is wrong to write about Party comrades in a language that systematically spreads among the working masses hatred, aversion, contempt, etc., for those who hold other opinions. But *one may and must write* in that strain about an organisation that has seceded.

Why must one? Because when a split has taken place it is one's duty to *wrest* the masses from the leadership of the seceding section. I am told—you carried confusion into the ranks of the proletariat. My answer is—I purposely and deliberately carried confusion into the ranks of that section

of the St. Petersburg proletariat which followed the Mensheviks who seceded on the eve of the elections, *and I shall always act in that way whenever a split occurs.*

By my sharp and discourteous attacks on the Mensheviks on the eve of the St. Petersburg elections, I actually succeeded in causing that section of the proletariat *which trusts and follows the Mensheviks* to waver. That was my aim. That was my duty as a member of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation which was conducting a campaign for a Left bloc; because, *after the split, it was necessary*, in order to conduct that campaign, to rout the ranks of the Mensheviks who were leading the proletariat in the footsteps of the Cadets; *it was necessary* to carry confusion into their ranks; it was necessary to arouse among the masses hatred, aversion and contempt for these people who had *ceased* to be members of a united party, had become political enemies, and were trying to put a spoke in the wheel of our Social-Democratic organisation in its election campaign. Against *such* political enemies I then conducted—and in the event of a repetition or development of a split *shall always conduct*—a struggle of *extermination*.

If, after the split which the Mensheviks engineered in St. Petersburg, we had not carried confusion into the ranks of that section of the proletariat which *followed the lead of the Mensheviks*, we should not have been able to carry on our Left bloc election campaign. My only regret is that, being away from St. Petersburg, I did *not sufficiently* contribute to this cause of *wresting* the masses from the influence of the breakaway Mensheviks; for given a more zealous and rapid execution of this task, the Left bloc would have gained a victory in St. Petersburg. The statistics of the election results prove this.

The basic logical (and, of course, not only logical) error in the indictment is that the question of the split is craftily evaded, the fact of the split is hushed up, and attempts are made to apply demands, legitimate from the standpoint of party unity, to conditions in which there is *no* unity, *no* united party, and what is more—I shall prove this later on—when absence of unity and of a united party lies at the door of the accusing Central Committee itself, which organised and covered up the split.

If anyone were to use what is permissible in an internal Party struggle as a measure of struggle based on a split, a struggle directed against the Party from without or (in case of a local split) against the given Party organisation, he would have to be regarded either as being childish naïve or a hypocrite. From the organisational point of view, a split signifies a rupture of *all* organisational ties, i.e., the transition from a struggle to convince comrades within the organisation, to a struggle *to destroy* the hostile organisation, destroy its influence over the masses of the proletariat. From the psychological standpoint it is perfectly obvious that the severance of all organisational ties between comrades *already* signifies an *extreme degree* of mutual bitterness and hostility, which has grown into hatred.

Moreover, in the St. Petersburg split there were two special circumstances which intensified the sharpness and the ruthlessness of the struggle tenfold.

The first circumstance was the role of the Party's Central Committee. According to Party Rules, its duty is to unite, and any local split should lead, not to a struggle on the basis of that split, but to a complaint being lodged with the Central Committee, or, more broadly speaking, to an appeal to the Central Committee for help in getting unity restored. *In reality*, on the eve of the elections in St. Petersburg, the Central Committee acted as the initiator of and participant in the split. It is precisely this circumstance, worked out in detail and supported by documentary evidence in the preamble to the decision of the Conference to present a counter-indictment, that compels us to regard the St. Petersburg split as a *dishonest* split. I shall refer to this separately later on, and I shall insist that the tribunal take up the questions which follow from the juridical nature of this indictment presented by the accused against the accuser.

The second circumstance is the election campaign in St. Petersburg at the time of the split. If a split occurs at a time when there is no immediate, open, mass political action, or when the Party generally is not engaged in some political action, it may not always be necessary to wage an *immediate* and merciless war of extermination. But if such mass action is in progress—elections, for instance—and if it is necessary

at all costs immediately to intervene in the elections and conduct them in one way or another, a split must immediately and unfailingly call forth a war of extermination, a war to determine *who* is to conduct the elections—the local Social-Democratic organisation or the group that has seceded from it. Given such a split, it is impossible even for a moment to postpone the task of wresting the masses from the influence of the secessionists, of smashing their organisation, and of politically nullifying them. It is only thanks to the ruthless force of the Bolshevik onslaught against the Mensheviks *after* the latter had seceded on January 6, that we achieved an election campaign in the capital that was relatively united, conducted more or less on Party lines, and bore at least some semblance to a Social-Democratic campaign.

They say—fight, but not with a poisoned weapon. This is a very fine and striking expression, to be sure. But it is either a fine platitude or else it expresses in a vague and nebulous fashion the very same idea of a struggle, one that sows in the masses hatred, aversion and contempt for the opponents—of a struggle that is impermissible in a united party, but inevitable and necessary when a split has occurred, because of the very nature of the split, i.e., the idea I set forth in the beginning of my speech. However much you twist this sentence or metaphor, you will not be able to squeeze a grain of real sense out of it besides this very difference between the loyal and properly conducted method of fighting by means of argument within the organisation, and the method of fighting by means of a split, i.e., by destroying the enemy organisation, by rousing among the masses hatred, aversion and contempt for this organisation. It is the dishonest splits that are poisoned weapons and not the war of extermination which results from a split that has already taken place.

Are there any limits to a permissible struggle stemming from a split? No Party standards set limits to such a struggle, nor can there be such limits, for a split implies that the Party has ceased to exist. It is ridiculous even to think it possible to fight by Party methods, by means of Party decisions, etc., against the methods of struggle that arise out of a split in the Party. The limits of a struggle stemming from a split are not Party limits, but general political limits,

or rather general civil limits, the limits set by criminal law and nothing else. If you have broken away from me, you cannot demand more of me than you demand of the Cadet, the Socialist-Revolutionary, or any man in the street, etc.

I shall further illustrate my idea with a graphic example. The next issue of *Proletary* will contain a report on the elections in the city of Kovno, sent by a local correspondent. The correspondent is very much dissatisfied with the bloc concluded by the Bund with the *Dostizhentsi*,¹⁰⁰ against the Lithuanian Social-Democrats, and sharply criticises the Bund. What sort of criticism is permissible for members of a united party? The dissatisfaction should have been expressed somewhat as follows: the Bundists acted incorrectly by forming a bloc with the Jewish bourgeoisie against the socialists of another nation; this behaviour reveals the influence of petty-bourgeois nationalist ideas, etc. As long as we belong to the same party as the Bund, a pamphlet directed against them and distributed in large quantities on the eve of an election and describing the Bundists as traitors to the proletariat would be absolutely impermissible. But *what if* the case of 1903 were repeated—generally speaking, history does not repeat itself, and I am only taking a hypothetical case—and the Bund secedes from the Party. Could anyone then seriously raise the question of the impermissibility of pamphlets calculated to instil in the Bundist working masses hatred, aversion and contempt for their leaders, and describing these leaders as bourgeois in disguise, as those who had sold themselves to the Jewish bourgeoisie and were trying to get their men into the Duma with the latter's assistance, etc.? Anyone who made such a complaint would be ridiculed to his face—do not cause splits, do not use the "poisoned weapon" of a split; but if you do, then do not complain if he who raises the poisoned sword perishes by the poisoned sword!

After all that has been said above, there is no need to dwell at length on the second passage quoted. It reads: "The Mensheviks bargained with the Cadets to get their man into the Duma, in spite of the workers, with the aid of the Cadets—such is the simple explanation of all these peregrinations from the Social-Democrats to the petty-bour-

geois bloc and from the petty-bourgeois bloc to the Cadets.”* If you analyse this passage formally, and superficially, from the standpoint of a *united* party, you will certainly say—in referring to Party members you should have said “conducting negotiations” and not “bargaining”, “to secure the election of” instead of “get”, a “Social-Democrat deputy” instead of “their man”, and so on. But would such an “analysis” of the quotation, or such an “opinion” of the method of expression, evoke anything but a smile? Is it not clear that the use of the most offensive and contemptuous mode of expression, which puts everything in the worst light, not in the best, is a method of fighting that stems from a split, of fighting *for the extermination* of the organisation which *disrupts* the political campaign of the local Social-Democratic proletariat? To complain about the offensive, insulting, and insidious character of the expressions used would be the same as if a *strike-breaker* were to complain of the bitterness displayed towards him by strikers. To discuss complaints or accusations on this plane would be the same as if we were to condemn the word “strike-breaker” as being impermissible, without going into *the essence* of the question of whether the behaviour of the person concerned was actually that of a strike-breaker or not.

There are different kinds of splits. I have repeatedly used the expression a “dishonest” split. I shall now dwell on this aspect of the case. The Central Committee states in its indictment that I cast suspicion on the political integrity of Party members. This is put too mildly and is wrongly applied to the above quotations. I not only “cast suspicion on the political integrity” of the thirty-one and Dan; by the whole content of my election pamphlets I *accuse* them of causing a *politically dishonest* split, or one that is *dishonest from a Party standpoint*. And I insist on this accusation. All attempts to shift the weight of this accusation from the general, basic and fundamental question of the organisers of the split, to petty, particular and subsidiary questions will be of no avail.

Every split is a great crime against the Party, for it destroys the Party, and breaks Party ties. But there are dif-

* See p. 39 of this volume.—Ed.

ferent kinds of splits. The expression "dishonest split" which I have used on several occasions, cannot be applied to every split. I shall quote an example to illustrate this.

Let us assume that two trends have long been contending in the Party, one of which, let us say, is in favour of supporting the policy of the Cadets, and the other is opposed to this. A big political event occurs which accentuates the Cadet tendencies and brings nearer a deal between them and reaction. Those in favour of supporting the Cadets break with those who are opposed to such support. Such a split, like any other split, will inevitably give rise to a very acute and bitter struggle, which will rouse hatred, etc.; but we cannot regard such a split as being dishonest, for there is nothing else behind such a split than the sharpening of differences on matters of principle.

Now imagine another kind of split. Let us assume that the two trends in the Party have agreed to apply varying tactics in various localities. If this general agreement is broken in one of the localities, broken in a secret, underhand fashion, by behaving treacherously towards comrades—then everyone will certainly agree that such a split is a *dishonest* split.

In St. Petersburg, the Mensheviks engineered precisely such a split on the eve of the elections. At the All-Russian Conference both trends solemnly promised, in the first place, to submit to the local tactics of the local organisations during the elections. The St. Petersburg Mensheviks were the only ones in the whole of Russia who broke that promise. That is dishonest. It is treachery to the Party.

Secondly, instead of uniting the Party, the Central Committee pursued a factional policy to such a degree that it positively assisted the Menshevik split, and Dan, a member of the Central Committee, took a most active part in this. That is dishonest. It is tantamount to using against the Party the power delegated by the Party. It is tantamount to driving a poisoned knife stealthily into the back of the Party, while professing to be a defender of Party unity.

These are the *two* main facts which have compelled me to describe the thirty-one and Dan as being politically dishonest. The *whole* of my pamphlet is imbued with the spirit of contempt for such people.

And I have upheld my accusation before this tribunal. I have directed all my efforts to making the tribunal proceedings reveal to the judges all the attendant circumstances of the St. Petersburg split, enabling them to decide with complete conviction the question of whether this split was an honest split or not, whether "poisoned weapons" were used by those who engineered the split or by those who waged a ruthless war of extermination against the organisers of the split.

If this question is cleared up in full, *to its very depth and core*, if it is cleared up by the delegates of the national Social-Democratic parties, who for the first time have become *really* affiliated with the R.S.D.L.P., it may have enormous effect in establishing real Party relations in our Party instead of a thinly disguised split.

The subject of the present trial is not of a formal or strictly juridical nature. Surely the crux of the matter is not whether, in a united party, one should write, bargain or conduct negotiations, elect or place deputies, sell votes for seats or give votes on condition of obtaining seats, etc.; such a conception of the question can, of course, only call forth a smile.

The crux of the matter is whether we attach any real value to the unity of our Party, or whether we are to become reconciled to splits, write about them, and cover up these ulcers with formal subterfuges. Comrade judges, your judgement will determine, and determine, perhaps, to no small degree, whether the St. Petersburg split will be the last one, the really final echo of a bygone general Party split, or ... whether it will be the beginning of a new split and, consequently, of a new, general struggle with poisoned weapons.

Your judgement will determine whether the shaken unity of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party will be weakened or strengthened.

II. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE REAL HISTORY OF THE ST. PETERSBURG SPLIT

At the November (1906) conference of the R.S.D.L.P. it was unanimously decided that everybody would submit to the decisions of *local* Social-Democratic organisations in election matters.

At that same conference Lenin stated: "Let there be no contravention of the St. Petersburg Committee decision by the Vyborg District either" (report of the Menshevik section of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation), thereby giving warning, as it were, of the mutuality of the commitment.

A special article in *Proletary*, No. 8 (November 1906), called on Bolsheviks sharply to criticise blocs with the Constitutional-Democrats, but to remain *subordinated* to the local organisations.

Also in November 1906, Comrade Dan, a member of the Central Committee, participated "*entirely in a personal capacity*" (as he stated at the tribunal) in a meeting arranged by Engineer Fedorovich, at which were present Milyukov and Nabokov (leaders of the Cadet Central and St. Petersburg Committees), one leader of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and Peshekhonov (leader of the Popular Socialists). They spoke about the elections, but (according to Comrade Dan) *not those in St. Petersburg*. Comrade Dan did not find it necessary to report this meeting either to the Central Committee or to the St. Petersburg Committee.

In December 1906, Comrade Dan appeared at an informative meeting on the election question, attended by representatives of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., as well as of the Constitutional-Democrats, Popular Socialists and Socialist-Revolutionaries. Dan stated that he represented the Central Committee, but was expressing his "*own personal views*" on the desirability of *agreements, according to district*, in St. Petersburg.

At a meeting of the Central Committee on January 4, 1907, a decision was taken to demand, in the form of an ultimatum, that the conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation *divide into an urban and a gubernia conference*. The Bolshevik members of the Central Committee (Maximov, Zimin, and Stroyev)¹³¹ submitted a protest against this step, which actually amounted to the Central Committee splitting the St. Petersburg organisation.

The conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation, which decided the question of the elections, was held on January 6, 1907. There were 39 Bolsheviks and 31 Mensheviks present. The Mensheviks walked out of the

conference for two formal reasons—(1) because they considered the mandates incorrectly distributed and (2) because the conference refused to split into urban and gubernia conferences as demanded by the Central Committee.

To assess the value of these reasons for the split, I cite three facts—(1) at the January 6 conference 42 mandates for the Bolsheviks and 28 for the Mensheviks were confirmed. In the pamphlet *issued by the Mensheviks* they stated that 35 mandates for the Bolsheviks and 32 for the Mensheviks should have been recognised, *that is, they admitted* the preponderance of Bolsheviks; (2) because of the split the next conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation was elected under the supervision of a control commission especially appointed by the Central Committee. The elections to the March 25 conference produced 92 Bolsheviks and 41 Mensheviks. The new elections confirmed a still greater preponderance of Bolsheviks; (3) the Central Committee did not demand the division of the conference in any other city in Russia, be it Wilno, Odessa, or Baku. This demand in the form of an ultimatum was unlawful and directed, for patently factional reasons, only against St. Petersburg.

After walking out of the conference, the Mensheviks elected their own executive body and began issuing their own pamphlets (with the participation of Central Committee Menshevik members, Comrade Dan among them) and conducted an independent election campaign. Without the Bolsheviks they entered into agreements with the Narodnik parties (Popular Socialists, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Trudoviks) for a joint agreement with the Constitutional-Democrats.

The bourgeois press in St. Petersburg (*Rech*, *Strana*, *Tovarishch* and others) gave hearty praise to the Mensheviks for the split, styled them “a moderate socialist party”, called for a bold struggle against the Bolsheviks, were jubilant over the isolation of these “Blanquists”, etc. The Bolsheviks who, on January 6, had proposed to the Narodniks a bloc *against* the Constitutional-Democrats, took no part in any of the negotiations.

On January 14, a *Rech* editorial promised the Mensheviks *a seat from the worker curia* in the event of the bloc being successful against the Bolsheviks.

At a meeting held on January 17, the Mensheviks decided to place all seats obtained by them at the disposal of the worker curia. *Tovarishch* wrote about this on January 19.

On January 15, Milyukov was received in audience by Stolypin, after which the Constitutional-Democrats shifted clearly to the Right.

On January 18, there was a conference of Mensheviks, Narodniks and Cadets. The Cadets offered two seats, but three were demanded of them. A break with the Cadets.

On January 20, *Tovarishch* published extracts from a Menshevik pamphlet directed against the Bolsheviks and undermining their election campaign. That same day I wrote the pamphlet *The St. Petersburg Elections and the Hypocrisy of the Thirty-One Mensheviks*, which appeared some three days later.

On January 25, a Left bloc was set up in St. Petersburg. On January 28, there was a meeting of delegates elected (January 7 and 14) by the factories for the worker curia of the city of St. Petersburg. Between 200 and 250 out of the 271 were present. The majority, against ten or twelve, adopted a resolution *in favour of the Left bloc*. The resolution made a special appeal to the Mensheviks "*not to give support to the Cadets even in covert form*".

The Mensheviks, who on January 17 had promised to give "their" places to the worker curia, not only gave no heed to the voice of a meeting of *all* delegates, but straightaway called it "a Socialist-Revolutionary-Bolshevik witches' sabbath".

On January 30 a meeting of *Social-Democratic* delegates was held. The candidates of the St. Petersburg Committee were nominated as electors.

On January 29 the Left bloc called on non-party progressive voters in the Kolomna Ward to tear up their *written* agreement with the Mensheviks, because in that agreement (as well as in the *printed* Menshevik pamphlet) there was the proviso: "*Menshevik electors do not consider themselves bound by the conditions of the Narodnik-Bolshevik bloc insofar as the distribution of deputies' seats is concerned*" (Point II, Subsection 3). This proviso is an obvious attempt to leave open for themselves an opportunity to vote *with the Cadets against the Left bloc* at the second stage of the elections.

On February 7, the elections were held in St. Petersburg. The Black-Hundred danger was completely disproved. The Cadets obtained 28,798 votes, the Left bloc—16,703, the Octobrists—16,613 and the monarchists—5,270. The Left bloc had only to capture 1,573 votes from the Cadets in five wards to have been victorious throughout St. Petersburg. In the *Kolomna* Ward the Left bloc obtained only 199 votes less than the Cadets.

Such is a brief list of the facts. It is clear from them that, *in point of fact*, the election campaign in St. Petersburg was disrupted by the Mensheviks. In point of fact, the conspiracy to effect a split was begun *as early as November*, and was begun by *member of the Central Committee Dan*. In point of fact, it was precisely Dan, plus the Menshevik members of *the Central Committee*, who in St. Petersburg *effected* the split contrary to the wishes of the majority of the local organisation....

Published as a separate pamphlet
in April 1907
Signed: N. Lenin

Published according
to the text of the pamphlet

**THE FIFTH CONGRESS
OF THE RUSSIAN
SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY ¹⁹¹⁷
APRIL 30-MAY 19 (MAY 13-JUNE 1), 1907**

Published according
to the manuscript,
verified with the book

1

SPEECH DURING THE DISCUSSION
ON THE CONGRESS AGENDA
MAY 2 (15)

From the discussion on this question it has become quite clear that major differences of opinion on tactics divide the various trends within the Social-Democratic Party. Who would have thought that, under such circumstances, the proposal would be made to remove all questions of principle from the Congress agenda? And what sophistic arguments were indulged in here in defence of removing these questions of principle—allegedly for the sake of being practical and business-like!

Let me remind you that the R.S.D.L.P. was long ago confronted with the question of the tasks of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. This question was discussed as far back as the beginning of 1905, before the revolution, both at the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., that is, of its Bolshevik section, and at the Geneva Conference of the Mensheviks, which was held simultaneously. At the time, the Mensheviks themselves placed questions involving general principles on the agenda of their congress.

At the time, they themselves discussed the principles underlying the tactics of the proletariat in the bourgeois revolution, and adopted studied decisions on this score. The fact that it is now proposed to throw out such questions is the result of a sense of despondency, and we must fight against this frame of mind, not succumb to it!

Mention was made of the experience of the West-European Social-Democratic parties and their business-like congresses, but I must tell you that at their congresses the Germans

frequently discussed questions that were more abstract and more theoretical than those dealing with an appraisal of the revolution taking place in our country, and the tasks of the proletariat in this revolution. We must not take from the experience of other parties things that bring us down to the level of some period of everyday routine. We must take that which brings us up to the level of general questions, of the tasks of the entire revolutionary struggle of the entire proletariat. We must learn from the best examples, and not from the worst.

We are told—"Serious tactical questions cannot be decided by the majority vote of a dozen". What is this but sophistry? What is this but a helpless shift from adherence to principle to lack of principle?

A solution of the problem is never achieved through voting. For several years now we have been deciding questions of the Marxist appraisal of our revolution. For several years now we have been putting our theoretical views and general tactical decisions to the acid test of experience of our revolution. And we are now being told that it is not yet time to sum up this Party activity! It is not right, they say, to decide on the fundamental principles underlying our tactics; instead it is necessary to follow in the wake of events, making decisions from occasion to occasion....

Just recall the Stockholm Congress. At that congress the Mensheviks, who had gained the upper hand, withdrew their own resolution appraising the given period, withdrew their own resolution on the attitude towards the bourgeois parties. What was the outcome? It led to the Central Committee having no grounds of principle for the solution of problems confronting it; it led to the Central Committee being at a loss for a whole year, with no policy whatever. One day it was in favour of a constituent assembly, the next day it hurriedly advocated a Duma ministry, and the following day "the Duma as an organ of power for the convocation of a constituent assembly"; now it was a Duma with full legislative authority, then blocs with the Cadets.... Is this what you call a consistent proletarian policy? (*Applause from the Centre and from the Bolshevik benches.*)

We are told: "For the sake of peace in the Party, for the sake of practical work let us avoid general questions".

This is sophistry. Such questions must not be evaded; such evasion will not result in peace, but only in blinder and hence more irate and less fruitful Party strife.

Such questions cannot be evaded. They force their way into everything. Recall Plekhanov's words at the opening of the congress: ... Since our revolution was bourgeois, he reasoned, we had to make particular haste to attract allies from among the bourgeoisie. I maintain that the principles underlying this line of reasoning are erroneous. I maintain that unless you analyse these principles you are condemning the Party to endless practical mistakes.

In this same speech Plekhanov stated that opportunism was feeble in the Russian Social-Democratic Party. This may be so if one considers the works of Plekhanov himself feeble! (*Applause from the Bolshevik benches.*) But I am of the opinion that opportunism manifests itself in our Party in the very fact that, at the first really general Party congress, the desire is expressed that general questions concerning the principles underlying our tactics in the bourgeois revolution should be removed from the agenda. We must not remove theoretical questions from the agenda, but raise all the practical work of our Party to the level of theoretical clarification of the tasks of a workers' party. (*Applause from the Bolsheviks.*)

2

SPEECH ON THE REPORT
ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
MAY 4 (17)

I should have liked to speak solely on the political aspect of the question. But Comrade Abramovich's last speech compels me to deal briefly with his remarks. When Comrade Abramovich spoke about the "besieged" Menshevik Central Committee, I thought to myself: "Poor Mensheviks! Again they are in a state of siege. They are 'besieged' not only when they are in the minority, but even when they are in the majority!"

Are there not certain inner reasons stemming from the very nature of Menshevik policy, which impel the Mensheviks to complain eternally about being besieged by the proletarian party?

What are the facts adduced by Comrade Abramovich regarding the siege of the Menshevik Central Committee? There were three—the agitation for an extraordinary congress, the conference of military and combat organisations, and finally "other organisational questions", as Comrade Abramovich put it.

Let us examine these three facts.

Agitation for an extraordinary congress became widespread when it emerged that the Central Committee was indisputably running counter to the will of the majority of the Party. Let me remind you that this was after the Central Committee had launched a slogan calling for support of a responsible ministry. At that time, the Bund had not joined our Party, but the Poles and the Latvians had. Both the former and the latter quite definitely rejected the policy

of the C.C. Hence, it is an absolutely indisputable fact that the C.C. was at the time at variance with the vast majority of the Party. Who, then, was besieging whom—was it the majority of the Party that besieged the Party C.C. when it demanded that the latter render an account of its activities to the congress? Or was it the C.C. that besieged the Party by going counter to it? Call to mind how far Plekhanov went at the time. His letter against the congress was published in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, official publication of the C.C. In this letter Plekhanov reacted to the call for a congress with suspicions concerning the motives behind the agitation, and tirades about the workers' mites. Give this thought: was it not Plekhanov who was wrong to permit himself to do such things against the majority of the Party, which was demanding a congress?

I will say only this—after the decision of the November All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. the agitation for an extraordinary congress ceased.

The second fact—the conference of military and combat organisations. There were two conferences. This, of course, is unfortunate, but it is strange to see in this anything like a “siege” of the C.C. Would it not have been better to explain what was wrong with the decisions of the conference which took place independently of the C.C., rather than to dismiss the matter by complaining about a siege? Let me remind you that representatives of the Moscow and St. Petersburg committees were present at *both* conferences—hence no Party group as such was linked up with either conference. The resolutions of the Bolshevik conference of military and combat organisations, published in November 1906, have not so far encountered any serious criticism.

The third fact—“other organisational questions”. Just what does this mean? Concretely, what is included in this. Is it the St. Petersburg split at the time of the elections, engineered by the Mensheviks with the help of the C.C.? But it would be simply ridiculous to speak about a siege of the C.C. in this connection.

I shall now proceed to the political aspect of the question. Our main task is to examine how the C.C. guided the class struggle of the proletariat, how it applied in practice the tactics adopted at the Unity Congress.

The first slogan which the Central Committee offered the Party was that of support for the demand for a "Duma" or "responsible" ministry. Comrade Martov has stated to us here that this slogan was put out for the purpose of extending and intensifying the conflict between the Duma and the government.

Is that the case? What should the proletarian extension and intensification of the conflict consist in? It should, of course, consist in pointing out the real field of struggle and clashes giving rise to the conflict—the field of the class struggle in general, and, in this particular case, the struggle of the people against the old regime. To extend and intensify the Duma conflict, we ourselves should have understood and explained to the people that the Duma conflict was simply an incomplete and distorted reflection of the conflict between the people and the old regime, that the struggle in the Duma was a faint echo of the revolutionary struggle outside the Duma. To extend and intensify the conflict, we should have raised political consciousness and political demands from the level of Duma slogans to the level of those calling for a general revolutionary struggle. The C.C. acted in the opposite way. It blunted and narrowed down the slogans calling for a revolutionary struggle to the dimensions of those calling for a Duma ministry. It did not call on the people to fight for power, even though this struggle stemmed from the entire objective situation, but to struggle for a deal between the liberals and the government. Whether deliberately or not, the C.C. called upon the Party to adopt the slogans of the parliamentary "peaceful" path at a time when actually objective conditions demanded a revolutionary struggle outside of parliament. Actually there was no serious social movement whatever for a "responsible ministry", nor could there have been one. Even the Menshevik Social-Democratic group in the Duma (the First Duma) did not adopt this slogan of the C.C. (*Martov*: "That's not true!") Yes, it is true, Comrade Martov, and a simple reference to the resolution of the C.C. and to the verbatim reports of the First Duma will show that it is true.

Irrespective of the desires and motives of the C.C., its slogan was actually an adaptation to liberal policy. And this adaptation could not have yielded any results, because

liberal policy did not reflect the genuine social movement of the time but was merely a dream of halting the revolution, although it has by no means halted yet. The course of events showed that this entire business with the "responsible ministry" was an attack with ineffective weapons.

The second slogan of the C.C. dates back to the period of the July strike. We must not blame the C.C. for the failure of the strike at the time. It is not to the discredit, but rather to the credit, of a central committee like that of the Mensheviks that it on that occasion nevertheless went to meet the revolution half-way. It is not the fault of the C.C. that, from its St. Petersburg purview, it did not know the sentiments of the proletariat throughout Russia. Nor can we declare it to be a mistake for us to have been confident of an uprising at the time, and to have expected it. The uprising actually took place, and our preliminary slogans, our policy prior to the uprising, were among the elements which made for the success or failure of this uprising.

The mistake of the Central Committee was, as I see it, in endeavouring, once the revolutionary struggle reached the stage of an uprising, to confine that struggle to non-revolutionary or curtailed revolutionary slogans. This was reflected in the C.C. slogan—"Partial mass expressions of protest". This was reflected still more vividly in the slogan—"For the Duma as an organ of power for the convocation of a constituent assembly". The issue of such lifeless slogans was tantamount to adapting proletarian policy to the policy of the liberal bourgeoisie. And once again events showed how utterly vain and impotent were the attempts to effect such an adaptation. Complaints and whining about the helplessness of the workers' party are frequently heard among us. But let me tell you that you are helpless precisely because you dull the edge of your slogans. (*Applause from the Bolshevik benches.*)

To proceed. Let us examine the question of the bloc with the Cadets during the elections to the Second Duma. In his report on behalf of the C.C. Martov washed his hands of this question with amazingly complacent formalism. You see, he says, the C.C. agreed that blocs are permissi-

ble, and in strict accordance with the C.C. directive blocs were permitted! (*Laughter.*) It would not be at all amiss if, in a political report of the C.C., one were to base oneself not on the formal legitimacy of a decision but on the essential correctness of the given policy as tested in practice. We Bolsheviks constantly asserted that the notorious Black-Hundred danger was nothing but liberal defence against the danger from the Left, and that if we were guided in our policy by fear of the Black-Hundred danger, we should actually be rising to the liberal bait. The election results showed that we were right. In a number of cities the election returns refuted the tales of the liberals and Mensheviks. (*Voices:* "What about Kiev, Poland, and Wilno!") I haven't the time to go into individual localities, but I shall deal with the political results in general. Statistician Smirnov calculated the election returns for 22 cities as follows: 41,000 for the Left bloc; 74,000 for the Cadets; 34,500 for the Octobrists, and 17,000 for the monarchists. Of the 72,000 votes cast in 16 other cities, 58.7 per cent went to the opposition and 21 per cent went to the reactionaries. The elections revealed the fictitiousness of the Black-Hundred danger, while the policy of the "permissibility" of blocs with the Cadets, allegedly by way of exception, *proved* to be a policy of proletarian dependence on the liberal bourgeoisie.

Let me tell you that you should not scorn theoretical disputes, or contemptuously dismiss differences in opinion as factional inventions. Our old disputes, our theoretical, and especially our tactical, differences are constantly being converted, in the course of the revolution, into the most downright practical differences. It is impossible to take a single step in practical politics without coming up against the very same fundamental problems underlying an appraisal of the bourgeois revolution, the relations between the Cadets and Trudoviks, and so forth. Practical experience does not erase differences of opinion; it sharpens and vitalises them. And it was not by chance that such prominent Mensheviks as Plekhanov reduced to the absurd the policy of blocs with the Cadets. In advancing his celebrated "Duma with full powers", Plekhanov advocated a common slogan for the proletariat and the liberal bourgeoisie. Plekhanov only

reflects more saliently and more forcibly than others the quintessence, the basic tendency, of the entire Menshevik policy—replacing the independent line of the working class with adaptation to the liberal bourgeoisie. The bankruptcy of our C.C. was primarily and above all the bankruptcy of this policy of opportunism. (*Applause from the Bolsheviks and part of the Centre.*)

8

SPEECH ON THE REPORT
ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE DUMA GROUP
MAY 8 (21)

I should like once again to bring the discussion back to an appraisal, from the standpoint of principle, of the policy of the Duma group. Comrade Tsereteli stated: "Even though we may have made blunders, we were not guilty of political vacillation". I believe that it would be absolutely wrong to blame a young Duma group, which is only just beginning to function, for its mistakes. But the fact of the matter is that there was *vacillation* in the very policy of the group. And we must frankly admit this vacillation, and make it our business to get rid of it, not for the purpose of condemning individuals, but in order to educate the proletarian party as a whole.

Comrade Tsereteli referred to the history of Europe. "The year '48," he said, "not only taught us that the conditions for socialism were not yet ripe, but also that it is impossible to fight for freedom without some sort of alliance with bourgeois democracy." Comrade Tsereteli's argument is revisionism of the first water. On the contrary, both the revolution of 1848 and subsequent historical experience have taught international Social-Democracy the very opposite, namely, that bourgeois democracy takes its stand more and more against the proletariat, that the fight for freedom is waged consistently only where it is led by the proletariat. The year 1848 does not teach us to make alliances with bourgeois democrats, but rather the need to free the least developed sections of the masses from the influence of bourgeois democracy, which is incapable of fighting even for

democracy. When Comrade Tsereteli referred to the experience of 1848 in the spirit of Bernsteinism, he was demonstrating the very revisionism that Plekhanov had without good reason assured us was weak in our Party. Comrade Tsereteli's statement about the food relief commission was also typical of his wavering on matters of principle. "We have not sufficiently stressed the *legality* of our proposal to investigate the case on the spot," stated Tsereteli. "We were distracted by general discussions and missed the chance to convince others with arguments on the legality of our plan. The next time we shall correct this error."

This presentation of the question throws vivid light on the whole shakiness of our group's position. Just imagine—people are saddened by the insufficiency of their reasoning in favour of legality! Can they really not see that the point at issue is not one of reasons for or references to legality, or "*convincing*" the Cadets or anyone else? Surely it must be clear to them that *by the very nature of things*, the government could not and would not have allowed investigation on the spot, since it saw in it (and justly so) a direct appeal to the masses.

No matter how many references to legality we might make, it would not change the essence of things. And instead of looking down—convincing the masses of the people, showing them the truth—Tsereteli looks up, desiring to convince the liberals, to attract them with legality.... That is real bourgeois parliamentarianism. And the fruitlessness of such petty, miserly, wretched playing at politics strikes one immediately, for it is clear that neither the Mensheviks nor the Cadets can budge Stolypin from his policy, by any parliamentary ruses. Isolation from the masses is a self-evident fact; advantages to be derived from legal persuasion of the Stolypins and the Cadets are but idle dreams of an idle intellectual.

I see the same vain opportunist efforts in the negotiations with the Narodowci; reference to Bebel as a defence of them is most feeble. Bebel, they say, stated: If the cause requires it, we will have dealings with the devil's own grandmother. Bebel was right, comrades: *if the cause requires it*, then, of course, you may have dealings even with the devil's grandmother. But can you tell me for what *cause* your

dealings with the Narodowci were necessary? For none whatever. The advantages of such relations are nil. And so it seems that what Bebel said was correct, but you understand him incorrectly.

All this going to the Narodowci, votes for Golovin, attempts to delete the demand for confiscation are simply component parts of a single incorrect line. They are not manifestations of inexperience, but manifestations of *political vacillation*. And from this point of view inviting Mr. Prokopovich was likewise no trifle. We have been told here that Mr. Prokopovich is not present and that without him we cannot condemn his action. This is merely sending us from Pontius to Pilate. At the St. Petersburg conference we were told that we should put it off until the congress, that we could not get to the bottom of it without a congress. Now at the congress we are told that we cannot do anything without Prokopovich—let us put it off and refer it to the St. Petersburg organisation. That is sophistry.

Prokopovich is a man of letters whose works are known to everyone. He is the type of bourgeois intellectual who has penetrated into our Party with definite, opportunist aims. His joining the Party in the Railway District was sheer hypocrisy. It was a screen for work in the *Duma milieu*. And our C.C. is to blame for his having used such a screen. Our Duma group is to blame for having made it easy for liberal writers collaborating with *Tovarishch*, who do not work in the Party and who are hostile in principle to the Party, to enter our Party by the back door, making use of the Duma.

Cherevanin has here defended the policy of the Duma group; granted the Cadets are backward at present, that they are reactionary at present, he says. But that is not for ever. There is no need to regard it as permanent. The Cadets are no good in a period of decline, but they may be of use during a period of upsurge when they will rapidly swing to the Left.

This is the usual Menshevik line of reasoning, only expressed with particular directness and sharpness. As a result, its falsity becomes more obvious. Take two major landmarks of the revolution—October 1905, when the peak was reached, and the spring of 1907, the period of greatest

decline. Were the Cadets of any use to democracy in 1905? No. The Mensheviks themselves admitted this in *Nachalo*. Witte is an agent of the stock exchange, and Struve is Witte's agent—that is what the Mensheviks wrote at the time, and correctly so. At that time the Mensheviks agreed with us that we should not support the Cadets, but expose them and lower their prestige among the democrats.

Now, in the spring of 1907, once again you are all beginning to agree with us that the Cadets are worthless democrats. And so it seems that the Cadets are no good either in the period of upsurge or in the period of decline. Any historian would call the interval between these periods a period of wavering, when even a section of the Social-Democratic movement veered towards a petty-bourgeois policy, when that section, vainly endeavouring to "support" the Cadets, brought nothing but harm to the workers' party, and in the end realised its mistake.

A few words about Trotsky. He spoke on behalf of the "Centre", and expressed the views of the Bund. He fulminated against us for introducing our "unacceptable" resolution. He threatened an outright split, the withdrawal of the Duma group, which is supposedly offended by our resolution. I emphasise these words. I urge you to reread our resolution attentively.

Is it not monstrous to see something offensive in a calm acknowledgement of mistakes, unaccompanied by any sharply expressed censure, to speak of a split in connection with it? Does this not show the sickness in our Party, a fear of admitting mistakes, a fear of criticising the Duma group?

The very possibility that the question can be presented in this way shows that there is something non-partisan in our Party. This non-partisan something is the Duma group's relations with the Party. The Duma group must be more of a Party group, must have closer connections with the Party, must be more subordinate to all proletarian work. Then wailings about insults and threats of a split will disappear.

When Trotsky stated: "Your unacceptable resolution prevents your right ideas being put into effect," I called out to him: "Give us *your* resolution!" Trotsky replied: "No, first withdraw yours."

A fine position indeed for the "Centre" to take, isn't it? Because of our (in Trotsky's opinion) mistake ("tactlessness"), he punishes the whole Party, depriving it of his "tactful" exposition of the very same principles! Why did you not get your resolution passed, we shall be asked in the localities. Because the Centre took umbrage at it, and in a huff refused to set forth its own principles! (*Applause from the Bolsheviks and part of the Centre.*) That is a position based not on principle, but on the Centre's lack of principle.

We came to the Congress with two tactical lines which have long been known to the Party. It would be stupid and unworthy of a workers' party to cover up differences of opinion and conceal them. We must compare the two points of view more clearly. We must express them in their application to all questions of our policy. We must sum up our Party experience clearly. Only in this way shall we be doing our duty and put an end to vacillation in the policy of the proletariat. (*Applause from the Bolsheviks and part of the Centre.*)

4

STATEMENT OF FACT, MAY 10 (23)

Comrado Martov, quoting from the interview I gave *L'Humanite* (signed Étienne Avenard),* has interpreted several passages incorrectly.

The interview said that the C.C. (its Menshevik part, of course) *secretly and stealthily* gave information to the Cadets. This statement of mine has now been confirmed by the discussions at the Congress. It has transpired at this Congress that, as far back as *November 1906*, Dan went *privately* to Milyukov and "took tea" with him, Nabokov, and leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Popular Socialists. Dan did not consider it necessary to report this either to the C.C. or to the St. Petersburg Committee.

It was this meeting with the Cadets, which was not reported either to the C.C. or to the St. Petersburg Committee, that constituted secretly and stealthily giving information to the Cadets.

Further, the interview states that the Mensheviks did not reject the Cadets' disgraceful proposal to give the workers' seats to the Mensheviks in exchange for Menshevik assistance to the Cadets. Comrade Martov points out that the Mensheviks rejected this *verbally*. I assert that the Mensheviks' *deeds* contradicted their verbal rejection; (1) verbally the Mensheviks promised to give all the seats to the worker curia. Actually, when *all* the workers' delegates, in a body, called on the Mensheviks (by a majority of 220-230 votes aganst 10-20) to abandon their "covert support" of the Cadets, the Mensheviks *refused to obey them*;

* See pp. 145-51 of this volume.—Ed.

(2) after January 25, after the conclusion of the Left bloc, the Mensheviks stated *in print* the condition on which they would assist it—freedom of action for the Menshevik electors at the second stage of the elections. Objectively, this condition could mean only one thing—their readiness to support the Cadets against the Social-Democrats at the second stage.

N. Lenin

5

STATEMENT OF MAY 11 (24)¹⁸⁹⁸

The bureau was right (*Voice*: "Of course it was!") when it explained that it was impermissible to revoke yesterday's decision. In order to revoke it, there must be a special decision of the Congress with regard to the permissibility of putting such a proposal to the vote. In the present case no one proposed revoking yesterday's decision. It still remains in force. Is deferment permissible? Abramovich lost sight of the most important thing, namely, that the question of tabling the decision was the result of new circumstances (the motive given by the Latvians), which arose after yesterday's voting on the directives. This is the new motive which Abramovich failed to take into account. Hence Werner's proposal is formally correct.

6

SPEECH ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS
BOURGEOIS PARTIES
MAY 12 (25)

The question of our attitude to the bourgeois parties is the nub of the differences in matters of principle that have long divided Russian Social-Democracy into two camps. Even before the first major successes of the revolution, or even before the revolution—if it is permissible to express oneself in this way about the first half of 1905—two distinct points of view on this question already existed. The disputes were over the appraisal of the bourgeois revolution in Russia. The two trends in the Social-Democracy agreed that this revolution was a bourgeois revolution. But they parted company in their understanding of this category, and in their appraisal of the practical and political conclusions to be drawn from it. One wing of the Social-Democracy—the Mensheviks—interpreted this concept to mean that the bourgeoisie was the motive force in the bourgeois revolution, and that the proletariat could occupy only the position of the “extreme opposition”. The proletariat could not undertake the task of conducting the revolution independently or of leading it. These differences of opinion stood out in particularly high relief during the disputes on the question of a provisional government (to be more exact, whether the Social-Democrats should participate in a provisional government)—disputes which raged in 1905. The Mensheviks denied that the Social-Democrats could be permitted to participate in a provisional revolutionary government, primarily because they considered the bourgeoisie the motive force or leader in the

bourgeois revolution. This view found most clear expression in the resolution of the Caucasian Mensheviks (1905),¹⁸⁴ approved by the new *Iskra*. This resolution stated forthright that Social-Democratic participation in a provisional government might frighten the bourgeoisie away, and thereby *reduce the scope of the revolution*. We have here a clear admission that the proletariat cannot and should not go further than the bourgeoisie in the bourgeois revolution.

The Bolsheviks held the opposite view. They maintained unequivocally that in its social and economic content our revolution was a bourgeois revolution. This means that the aims of the revolution that is now taking place in Russia do not exceed the bounds of bourgeois society. Even the fullest possible victory of the present revolution—in other words, the achievement of the most democratic republic possible, and the confiscation of all landed estates by the peasantry—would not in any way affect the foundations of the bourgeois social system. Private ownership of the means of production (or private farming on the land, irrespective of its juridical owner) and commodity economy will remain. The contradictions of capitalist society—and the most important of them is the contradiction between wage-labour and capital—will not only remain, but become even more acute and profound, developing in a more extensive and purer form.

All this should be absolutely beyond doubt to any Marxist. But from this it does not at all follow that the bourgeoisie is the motive force or leader in the revolution. Such a conclusion would be a vulgarisation of Marxism, would be a failure to understand the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The fact of the matter is that our revolution is taking place at a time when the proletariat has already begun to recognise itself as a distinct class and to unite in an independent, class organisation. Under such circumstances the proletariat makes use of all the achievements of democracy, makes use of every step towards freedom, to strengthen its class organisation *against* the bourgeoisie. Hence the inevitable endeavour of the bourgeoisie to smooth off the sharp corners of the revolution, not to allow it to reach its culmination, not to

give the proletariat the opportunity of carrying on its class struggle unhampered. The antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat forces the bourgeoisie to strive to preserve certain instruments and institutions of the old regime in order to use them *against* the proletariat.

At the very best, therefore, the bourgeoisie, in the period of greatest revolutionary upsurge, still constitutes an element that wavers between revolution and reaction (and does not do so fortuitously, but of necessity, by force of its economic interests). Hence the bourgeoisie cannot be the leader in our revolution.

The major distinguishing feature of this revolution is the acuteness of the agrarian question. It is much more acute in Russia than in any other country in similar conditions. The so-called peasant reform of 1861 was carried out so inconsistently and so undemocratically that the principal foundations of feudal landlord domination remained unshaken. For this reason, the agrarian question, that is, the struggle of the peasants against the landowners for the land, proved one of the touchstones of the present revolution. This struggle for the land inevitably forces enormous masses of the peasantry into the democratic revolution, for only democracy can give them land by giving them supremacy in the state. The victory of the peasantry presupposes the complete destruction of landlordism.

Such an alignment of social forces inevitably leads to the conclusion that the bourgeoisie can be neither the motive force nor the leader in the revolution. Only the proletariat is capable of consummating the revolution, that is, of achieving a complete victory. But this victory can be achieved only provided the proletariat succeeds in getting a large section of the peasantry to follow its lead. The victory of the present revolution in Russia is possible only as the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

The correctness of this presentation of the question, which dates back to the beginning of 1905—I am referring to the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in the spring of 1905—found full confirmation in events at all the most important stages of the Russian revolution. Our theoretical conclusions were confirmed in practice in the course of the revo-

lutionary struggle. In October 1905, at the very height of the revolution, the proletariat was at the head, the bourgeoisie wavered and vacillated, and the peasantry wrecked the landed estates. In all the embryonic organs of revolutionary power (the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, the Soviets of Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies, etc.) representatives of the proletariat were the main participants, followed by the most advanced of the insurgent peasantry. At the time of the First Duma, the peasants immediately formed a democratic "Trudovik" group, which was more to the Left, in other words, more revolutionary, than the liberals—the Cadets. In the elections to the Second Duma, the peasants defeated the liberals outright. The proletariat marched ahead, the peasantry more or less resolutely following it against the autocracy and against the vacillating liberals.

I shall now pass to the draft resolutions we have before us. The difference in points of view I have described is fully reflected in the antithesis between the Bolshevik and Menshevik resolutions. The Bolshevik draft is based on a definition of the *class* content of the principal *types* of bourgeois parties. We drew up our resolution in the same way for the Unity Congress in Stockholm. There we noted three principal types of bourgeois parties: the Octobrists, the liberals and the peasant democrats (at that time they were not yet fully delineated, and the word "Trudovik" did not exist in the Russian political vocabulary). Our resolution of today retains that same structure. It is simply a modification of the Stockholm resolution. The course of events has confirmed its basic postulates to such an extent that only very small changes were required for due consideration to be paid to experience acquired in the First and Second Dumas.

The Menshevik resolution for the Unity Congress gave no analysis whatever either of types of parties or their class content. The resolution states helplessly that "bourgeois-democratic parties are only just forming in Russia and therefore have not yet had the time to acquire the character of stable parties", and that "at the present historical moment in Russia there are no parties in existence that could simultaneously blend within themselves a consistent democracy and a revolutionary character". Is this not a helpless declaration? Is this not a deviation from Marxist

tasks? Outside the ranks of the proletariat there will never be absolute stability of parties or fully "consistent" democracy. It is, however, our duty to lay bare the class roots of all parties that appear on the historical scene. And our resolution shows that this is something quite feasible. The three types of parties outlined in this resolution have proved sufficiently "stable" throughout a whole year of revolution, as I have already shown by the example of the First and Second Dumas.

What *has* proved unstable is the views of the Mensheviks. Their present resolution is a tremendous step backward in comparison with their draft of last year. Let us examine this resolution, which was published in *Narodnaya Duma*, No. 12 (March 24, 1907). The preamble to this resolution points first to a "number of tasks common" to the proletariat and to bourgeois democracy; secondly, it says that the proletariat must "combine its activities with those of other social classes and groups"; thirdly, it says that in a country where the peasantry predominates and urban democracy is weak, the proletariat "by its own movement impels forward" ... "the entire bourgeois democracy of the country"; fourthly, "that the democratic movement of the country has not yet found its ultimate expression in the present grouping of bourgeois parties", which reflects the "realism" and unpreparedness to fight on the part of the urban bourgeoisie at one extreme, and at the other, peasant "illusions of petty-bourgeois revolutionism and agrarian utopias". Such is the preamble. Now let us look at the conclusions; the first conclusion is that, while pursuing an independent policy, the proletariat must fight both against the opportunism and constitutional illusions of the one, and the revolutionary illusions and reactionary economic projects of the other. The second conclusion is that it is necessary to "combine our activities with the activities of the other parties".

A resolution like this does not answer any one of the questions that every Marxist is obliged to ask himself, if he wants to define the attitude of the workers' party to the bourgeois parties. What are these general questions? First of all, it is necessary to define the class nature of the parties. Then it is necessary to make clear to oneself the basic alignment of the various classes in the present revolution in general,

that is, in what relation the interests of these classes stand to the continuation or development of the revolution. Further, it is necessary to pass over from classes in general to the present-day role of the various parties, or various groups of parties. Finally, it is necessary to furnish practical directives concerning the policy of the workers' party on this question.

There is nothing of this in the Menshevik resolution. It is simply an evasion of these questions, evasion by means of general phrase-mongering about "combining" the policy of the proletariat with the policy of the bourgeoisie. Not a word is said about how to "combine", and with precisely which bourgeois-democratic parties. This is a resolution about parties, but without parties. This is a resolution to define our attitude, which does nothing to define our attitude towards the various parties. It is impossible to take such a resolution as a guide, for it provides the greatest freedom to "combine" anything you like and in any way you like. Such a resolution does not restrict anyone; it is a most "liberal" resolution in the fullest sense of that word. It can be interpreted backwards and forwards. But of Marxism—not a grain. The fundamental propositions of Marxism have been so thoroughly forgotten here that any Left Cadet could have subscribed to such a resolution. Take its main points—"tasks in common" for the proletariat and bourgeois democracy—is that not the very thing the entire liberal press is vociferating about?... The need to "combine"—the very thing the Cadets are demanding.... The struggle against opportunism on the Right and revolutionism on the Left—but that is the pet slogan of the Left Cadets, who say they want to sit between the Trudoviks and bourgeois liberals! This is not the position of a workers' party distinct from and independent of bourgeois democracy; it is the position of a liberal who wants to occupy the "centre" *in the midst* of the bourgeois democrats.

Let us examine the gist of the Mensheviks' proposition: by its own movement the proletariat "impels forward" "the entire bourgeois democracy of the country". Is this true? Absolutely not. Just recall the major events in our revolution. Take the Bulygin Duma. In reply to the tsar's appeal to take the legal path, to adopt his, the tsar's, conditions

for convening the first popular representative body, the proletariat answered with a resolute refusal. The proletariat called on the people to wipe out this institution, to prevent its birth. The proletariat called on all the revolutionary classes to fight for better conditions for the convocation of a popular representative body. This in no way ruled out the question of utilising even bad institutions if they actually came into being despite all our efforts. This was a fight *against* allowing the implementation of worse conditions for convening a popular representative body. In appraising the boycott, the logical and historical mistake is often made of confusing the fight *on the basis* of the given institution, with the fight *against* the establishment of that institution.

What reply did the liberal bourgeoisie make to the proletariat's appeal? It replied with a general outcry against the boycott. It invited us to the Bulygin Duma. The liberal professors urged the students to go on with their studies, instead of organising strikes. In reply to the proletariat's appeal to fight, the bourgeoisie answered by fighting against the proletariat. As far back as that, the antagonism between these classes, even in a democratic revolution, manifested itself fully and definitely. The bourgeoisie wanted to narrow the scope of the proletariat's struggle, to prevent it going beyond the bounds of the convocation of the Bulygin Duma.

Professor Vinogradov, the shining light of liberal science, wrote just at that time: "It would be the good fortune of Russia if our revolution proceeded along the road of 1848-49, and its misfortune if it proceeded along the road taken by the revolution of 1789-93." What this "democrat" called good fortune was the road of an unconsummated revolution, the road of a defeated uprising! If our revolution were to deal as ruthlessly with its enemies as the French revolution did in 1793, then, according to this "liberal", it would be necessary to call upon the Prussian drill sergeant to re-establish law and order. The Mensheviks say that our bourgeoisie are "unprepared to fight". Actually, however, the bourgeoisie were *prepared* to fight, prepared to fight *against* the proletariat, to fight against the "excessive" victories of the revolution.

To proceed. Take October to December 1905. There is no need to prove that during this period of the high tide of our revolution, the bourgeoisie displayed "preparedness

to fight" against the proletariat. This was fully acknowledged by the Menshevik press of that day. The bourgeoisie, including the Cadets, tried in every way to denigrate the revolution, to picture it as blind and savage anarchy. The bourgeoisie not only failed to support the organs of insurrection set up by the people—all the various Soviets of Workers' Deputies, Soviets of Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies, etc.—but it feared these institutions and fought against them. Call to mind Struve, who termed these institutions a degrading spectacle. In them the bourgeoisie saw a revolution that had gone too far ahead. The liberal bourgeoisie wanted to divert the energy of the popular revolutionary struggle into the narrow channel of police-controlled constitutional reaction.

There is no need to dwell at length on the behaviour of the liberals in the First and the Second Dumas. Even the Mensheviks acknowledged that, in the First Duma, the Cadets *hindered* the revolutionary policy of the Social-Democrats and, to some extent, of the Trudoviks, that they hampered their activity. And in the Second Duma the Cadets openly joined up with the Black Hundreds, gave outright support to the government.

To say at present that the movement of the proletariat "impels the entire bourgeois democracy of the country forward" means scorning facts. To maintain silence at the present time about the counter-revolutionary nature of our bourgeoisie means departing entirely from the Marxist point of view, means completely forgetting the viewpoint of the class struggle.

In their resolution, the Mensheviks speak of the "realism" of the urban bourgeois classes. Strange terminology this, which betrays them, against their will. We are accustomed to seeing a special meaning attached to the word realism, among the Right-wing Social-Democrats. For instance, Plekhanov's *Sovremennaya Zhizn* contrasted the "realism" of the Right Social-Democrats with the "revolutionary romanticism" of the Left Social-Democrats. What then does the Menshevik resolution have in view when it speaks of realism? It appears that the resolution praises the bourgeoisie for its moderation and punctiliousness!

These arguments of the Mensheviks about the "realism" of the bourgeoisie, about its "unpreparedness" to fight—

taken in conjunction with the open declaration of their tactical platform on the "one-sided hostility" of the Social-Democrats towards the liberals—speak of one thing, and of one thing only. In point of fact, it all means that the independent policy of the workers' party is replaced by a policy of dependence on the liberal bourgeoisie. And this, the substance of Menshevism, is not something that we have invented or have drawn solely from their theoretical arguments—it has manifested itself in all the major steps of their policy throughout the past year. Take the "responsible ministry", blocs with the Cadets, voting for Golovin, etc. This is what has actually constituted the policy of dependence on the liberals.

And what do the Mensheviks say about peasant democracy? The resolution puts the "realism" of the bourgeoisie and the "agrarian utopias" of the peasantry on a par, offsetting the one by the other as being of equal significance or at any rate wholly analogous. We must fight, say the Mensheviks, equally against the opportunism of the bourgeoisie and against the utopianism, the "petty-bourgeois revolutionism", of the peasantry. This is typical of the Menshevik line of reasoning. And it is worth while dwelling on this, for it is radically wrong. From it inevitably ensue a number of mistaken conclusions in practical policy. This criticism of peasant utopias harbours a lack of understanding of the proletariat's task—to urge the peasantry onward to complete victory in the democratic revolution.

Just look carefully at what is behind the agrarian utopias of the peasantry in the present revolution. What is their main utopia? Undoubtedly, it is the idea of equalitarianism, the conviction that the abolition of the private property in land and the equal division of the land (or of land tenure) are able to destroy the roots of want, poverty, unemployment and exploitation.

No one disputes the fact that, from the point of view of *socialism*, this is a utopia, a utopia of the petty bourgeois. From the point of view of socialism, this is a reactionary prejudice, for proletarian socialism sees its ideal, not in the equality of small proprietors, but in large-scale socialised production. But do not forget that what we are now appraising is the significance of the peasants' ideals, not in the

socialist movement, but in the present, bourgeois-democratic revolution. Can we say that it is utopian or reactionary in the *present* revolution for all the land to be taken away from the landlords and be handed over to, or divided up equally among, the peasants?! No! Not only is this non-reactionary, but, on the contrary, it reflects most conclusively and most consistently the desire for the most thorough abolition of the entire old regime, of all the remnants of serfdom. The idea that "equality" can exist under commodity production and even serve as a foundation for semi-socialism is utopian. The peasants' desire to take the land away from the landlords at once and divide it up on an equalitarian basis is not utopian, but revolutionary in the fullest, strictest, scientific meaning of the word. Such confiscation and such division would lay the foundation for the speediest, broadest and freest development of capitalism.

Speaking objectively, from the point of view not of our desires, but of the present economic development of Russia, the basic question of our revolution is whether it will secure the development of capitalism through the peasants' complete victory over the landowners or through the landowners' victory over the peasants. A bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia's economy is absolutely inevitable. No power on earth can hinder it. But this revolution is possible in either of two ways: in the Prussian, if one might say so, or in the American way. This means the following; the landlords may win, may foist compensation payments or other petty concessions on the peasants, may unite with a handful of the wealthy, pauperise the masses, and convert their own farms into Junker-type, capitalist, farms. Such a revolution will be bourgeois-democratic but it will be to the least advantage of the peasants—to their least advantage from the angle of the rapidity of capitalist development. Or, on the contrary, the complete victory of the peasant uprising, the confiscation of all landed estates and their equal division will signify the most rapid development of capitalism, the form of bourgeois-democratic revolution most advantageous to the peasants.

Nor is this most advantageous to the peasants alone. It is just as advantageous to the proletariat. The class-conscious proletariat knows that there is, and there can

be, no path leading to socialism otherwise than through a bourgeois-democratic revolution.

Hence the more incomplete and irresolute this revolution, the longer and the more heavily will general democratic tasks, and not socialist, not purely class, proletarian tasks, weigh upon the proletariat. The more complete the victory of the peasantry, the sooner will the proletariat stand out as a distinct class, and the more clearly will it put forward its purely socialist tasks and aims.

From this, you see that the peasants' ideas on equality, reactionary and utopian from the standpoint of socialism, are revolutionary from the standpoint of bourgeois democracy. That is why the equating of the liberals' reactionary nature in the present revolution and the reactionary utopianism of the peasants in their ideas of the socialist revolution is a glaring logical and historical error. To put on a par the liberals' endeavours to cut the present revolution off short at compensation for land, a constitutional monarchy, at the level of the Cadet agrarian programme, etc., and the peasants' attempts at utopian idealisation, in a reactionary spirit, of their endeavours to crush the landlords immediately, to confiscate all the land, to divide it all up—to attempt to equate these things is to abandon completely, not only the standpoint of the proletariat, but also the standpoint of a consistent revolutionary democrat. To write a resolution on the struggle against liberal opportunism and muzhik revolutionism in the present revolution is to write a resolution that is not Social-Democratic. This is not a Social-Democrat writing, but an intellectual who sits between the liberal and the muzhik in the camp of bourgeois democracy.

I cannot deal here in as great detail as I should on the famous tactical platform of the Mensheviks with their much vaunted slogan of struggle against the "one-sided hostility of the proletariat towards liberalism". The non-Marxist and non-proletarian nature of such a slogan is more than obvious.

In conclusion, I shall deal with a frequent objection that is raised against us. In the majority of cases, we are told, "your" Trudoviks follow the Cadets against us. That is true, but it is no objection against our point of view and our resolution, since we have quite definitely and outspokenly admitted it.

The Trudoviks are definitely not fully consistent democrats. The Trudoviks (including the Socialist-Revolutionaries) undoubtedly vacillate between the liberals and the revolutionary proletariat. We have said this, and it had to be said. Such vacillation is by no means fortuitous. It is an inevitable consequence of the very nature of the economic condition of the small producer. On the one hand, he is oppressed and subject to exploitation. He is unconsciously impelled into the fight against this position, into the fight for democracy, for the ideas of abolishing exploitation. On the other hand, he is a *petty proprietor*. In the peasant lives the instinct of a proprietor—if not of today, then of tomorrow. It is the proprietor's, the owner's instinct that repels the peasant from the proletariat, engendering in him an aspiration to become someone in the world, to become a bourgeois, to hem himself in against all society on his own plot of land, on his own dung-heap, as Marx irately remarked.¹⁸⁵

Vacillation in the peasantry and the peasant democratic parties is inevitable. And the Social-Democratic Party, therefore, must not for a moment be embarrassed at the fear of isolating itself from such vacillation. Every time the Trudoviks display lack of courage, and drag along in the wake of the liberals, we must fearlessly and quite firmly oppose the Trudoviks, expose and castigate their petty-bourgeois inconsistency and flaccidity.

Our revolution is passing through difficult times. We need all the will-power, all the endurance and fortitude of the organised proletarian party, in order to be capable of resisting sentiments of distrust, despondency, indifference, and denial of the struggle. The petty bourgeoisie will always and inevitably succumb most easily to such sentiments, display irresolution, betray the revolutionary path, whine and repent. And in all such cases, the workers' party will isolate itself from the vacillating petty-bourgeois democrats. In all such cases we must be able to unmask the irresolute democrats openly, even from the Duma platform. "Peasants!" we must say in the Duma in such circumstances, "peasants! You should know that your representatives are betraying you by following in the wake of the liberal landlords. Your Duma deputies are betraying the cause of the peasantry to

the liberal windbags and advocates." Let the peasants know—we must demonstrate this to them by facts—that *only* the workers' party is the genuinely reliable and thoroughly faithful defender of the interests, not only of socialism but also of democracy, not only of all working and exploited people, but also of the entire peasant masses, who are fighting against feudal exploitation.

If we pursue this policy persistently and undeviatingly, we shall derive from our revolution enormous material for the class development of the proletariat; we shall achieve this under all circumstances, whatever vicissitudes may be in store for us, whatever setbacks for the revolution (under particularly unfavourable circumstances) may fall to our lot. A firm proletarian policy will give the entire working class such a wealth of ideas, such clarity of understanding and such endurance in the struggle that no one on earth will be able to win them away from Social-Democracy. Even if the revolution suffers defeat, the proletariat will learn, first and foremost, to understand the economic class foundations of both the liberal and the democratic parties; then it will learn to hate the bourgeoisie's treacheries and to despise the petty bourgeoisie's infirmity of purpose and its vacillations.

And it is only with such a fund of knowledge, with such habits of thinking, that the proletariat will be able to approach the new, the socialist revolution more unitedly and more boldly. (*Applause from the Bolsheviks and the Centre.*)

7

CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE REPORT
ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS BOURGEOIS PARTIES
MAY 14 (27)

I shall begin with the question of the stand taken by the Polish delegation, which has been touched on here. The Polish comrades were accused—particularly by the Bundists—of being inconsistent in agreeing to our resolution, having themselves declared it unsatisfactory at the commission. Such accusations are founded on a very simple subterfuge—an evasion of *the substance* of those questions that confront the Congress on the given item of the agenda. Those who do not want to evade any discussion on the substance of the question will easily see that we Bolsheviks have always seen eye to eye with the Poles on two fundamental questions. First of all we agree on the fact that, for the sake of its socialist tasks, the proletariat must categorically retain its class individuality with respect to all the other (bourgeois) parties, however revolutionary they may be, however democratic the republic they advocate. Secondly, we agree that it is the right and duty of the workers' party to assume leadership of the petty-bourgeois democratic parties, including the peasant parties, not only in the struggle against the autocracy, but also against the treacherous liberal bourgeoisie.

In the resolution on the report of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, which the Polish comrades have presented to the Congress, these ideas and propositions are expressed with the utmost clarity. The resolution speaks forthrightly of the need for Social-Democracy to preserve its class character distinct from all other parties, down to the Socialist-

Revolutionaries. It speaks openly of the possibility and necessity of joint action by the Social-Democrats and the Trudovik groups against the liberals. This is what we in Russia call a Left bloc, or a Left bloc policy.

From this it is clear that we are united with the Poles by genuine solidarity on the fundamental points in the question of the attitude towards bourgeois parties. To deny this or to speak of the contradictory behaviour of the Poles would be to evade a straightforward presentation of differences of opinion in principle.

The socialist aims of the proletariat keep it distinct from all parties, even the most revolutionary and republican; then there is the proletariat's leadership in the struggle of all revolutionary democrats in the present revolution—can it be denied that these are the fundamental and guiding ideas in both the Polish and Bolshevik resolutions?

A few words about Trotsky. I have no time to dwell here on our differences with him. I shall only note that in his book *In Defence of the Party* Trotsky expressed, in print, his solidarity with Kautsky, who wrote about the economic community of interests between the proletariat and the peasantry in the present revolution in Russia. Trotsky acknowledged the permissibility and usefulness of a Left bloc against the liberal bourgeoisie. These facts are sufficient for me to acknowledge that Trotsky has come closer to our views. Quite apart from the question of "uninterrupted revolution", we have here solidarity on fundamental points in the question of the attitude towards bourgeois parties.

Comrade Lieber has most energetically accused me of excluding even the Trudoviks from the bourgeois-democratic allies of the proletariat. Lieber has again been carried away by phrases, and has paid insufficient attention to the substance of the dispute. I did not speak of excluding joint action with the Trudoviks, but of the need to cut ourselves off from the Trudoviks' *vacillation*. We must not fear to "isolate" ourselves from them when they are inclined to drag along in the wake of the Cadets. We must ruthlessly expose the Trudoviks when they fail to take the consistent stand of revolutionary democrats. One of two things, Comrade Lieber—either the workers' party will pursue a genuinely

independent proletarian policy, in which case we allow of joint action with part of the bourgeoisie only when *it*, this section, accepts *our* policy, and not vice versa; or our talk about the independence of the proletariat's class struggle remains nothing but idle talk.

Like Lieber, Plekhanov too evaded the substance of the dispute, only in another way. Plekhanov spoke about Rosa Luxemburg, picturing her as a Madonna reclining on clouds. What could be finer! Elegant, gallant and effective polemics.... But I would nevertheless like to ask Plekhanov: Madonna or not,—but what do you think about *the substance* of the question? (*Applause from the Centre and the Bolsheviks.*) After all, it is a pretty bad thing to have to resort to a Madonna in order to avoid analysing the point at issue. Madonna or not—what must our attitude be towards “a Duma with full powers”? What is this? Does this resemble Marxism, does it resemble the independent policy of the proletariat?

“Agreements from occasion to occasion”, both Lieber and Plekhanov reiterate to us in all sorts of ways. An extremely convenient formula this, but utterly lacking in principle. It is absolutely devoid of content. After all, comrades, we too permit of agreements with the Trudoviks under certain conditions and *also only* from occasion to occasion, absolutely from occasion to occasion. We shall willingly include these words in our resolution as well.

But that is not the question. The question is *what* joint actions are permissible from occasion to occasion, with whom, and for what purposes! Both Plekhanov, with his gallant witticisms, and Lieber with his empty pathetics, have slurred over and obscured these significant questions. And this question is not a theoretical one, but an extremely vital and practical issue. We have seen from experience what the famous agreements from occasion to occasion, the famous “technical” agreements, mean among the Mensheviks! They mean a policy of the dependence of the working class on the liberals, and nothing else. “From occasion to occasion” is a poor cloak for this opportunist policy.

Plekhanov quoted passages from the works of Marx, on the need to support the bourgeoisie. It is a pity that he did not quote from the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*. A pity that

he forgot how Marx "supported" the liberals during the period when the bourgeois revolution in Germany was at its height. Nor is it necessary to go so far to prove something that is indisputable. The old *Iskra*, too, frequently spoke of the necessity for the Social-Democratic Labour Party to support the liberals—even the Marshals of the Nobility. In the period preceding the bourgeois revolution, when Social-Democracy still had to rouse the people to political life, this was quite legitimate. Today, when various classes have already appeared on the scene, when, on the one hand, a peasant revolutionary movement has revealed itself, and there have been liberal betrayals on the other—today there can be no question of our supporting the liberals. We are all agreed that the Social-Democrats must now demand the confiscation of landed estates. And what is the attitude of the liberals towards this?

Plekhanov said: all classes that are in the least progressive must become tools in the hands of the proletariat. I do not doubt that this is Plekhanov's desire. But I assert that in practice the Menshevik policy leads, not to this, but to something quite different. In every case during the past year, when the Mensheviks were supposedly supporting the Cadets, the Mensheviks themselves were actually tools in the hands of the Cadets. The same was true of the support for the demand for a Duma ministry and at the time of the election blocs with the Cadets. Experience has shown that in these cases the proletariat proved to be the tool, despite the "desires" of Plekhanov and other Mensheviks. This is quite apart from the "Duma with full powers" and the voting for Golovin.

We must realise in all seriousness that the liberal bourgeoisie has entered upon the counter-revolutionary path, and we must struggle against them. Only then will the policy of the workers' party become an independent revolutionary policy, not one in word alone. Only then shall we systematically exert our influence on both the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, who are hesitating between liberalism and revolutionary struggle.

There was no point to the complaint made here about the incorrectness of our thesis on the liberals' deception of the petty bourgeoisie. Not only our revolution, but the expe-

rience of other countries, too, has shown that it is by deceit that liberalism maintains its influence in many sections of the population. It is our plain duty to fight to free those sections from the influence of the liberals. In the course of decades the German Social-Democratic Party has fought to destroy—and has destroyed, in Berlin, for instance—the liberals' influence on broad sections of the population. We can and must achieve the same, and deprive the Cadets of their democratic adherents.

Let me give you an example of what the Menshevik policy of supporting the Cadets has led to. In the Menshevik newspaper *Russkaya Zhizn* of February 22, 1907 (No. 45), an unsigned, that is, an editorial, article said the following about Golovin's election and his speech: "The Chairman of the State Duma has undertaken a great and responsible task—to say such words as will embody the principal demands and needs of our 140 million people.... Not for a moment could Mr. Golovin rise above the level of a member of the Cadet Party, and become the exponent of the will of the entire Duma". Don't you see how edifying this is? The Mensheviks derive the responsible task of the liberal—to speak on behalf of the "people"—simply from their having supported him with their votes. This is just handing over ideological and political leadership to liberalism. This is complete abandonment of the class point of view. And I say: if under a Left bloc any Social-Democrat would dream of writing about the responsible task of a Trudovik to reflect the needs of "labour", I would whole-heartedly support the most resolute censure of such a Social-Democrat. The Mensheviks have here an ideological bloc with the Cadets, and we must permit no such blocs with anyone, even with the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Incidentally, Martynov stated that we are descending to such a bloc when we speak of all the land and full freedom. This is not true. Let me remind you of the Menshevik *Sotsial-Demokrat*. In the draft electoral platform compiled by the C.C., published in that paper, we encounter the very same slogans of land and freedom! Martynov's words are mere hole-picking.

In conclusion I would like to say a few words in regard to the Polish comrades. A precise characterisation of the petty-

bourgeois parties may have seemed needless to some of them. Perhaps the more acute class struggle in Poland makes it unnecessary. But to Russian Social-Democrats it is indispensable. An exact indication of the class nature of the Trudovik parties is most necessary as a guide for all our propaganda and agitation. It is only on the basis of a class analysis of these parties that we can quite definitely place before the working class our tactical tasks—the socialist class distinction of the proletariat, and the struggle under its leadership both against the autocracy and the treacherous bourgeoisie. (*Applause from the Bolsheviks and the Centre.*)

8

SPEECH ON THE ATTITUDE TO THE POLISH DRAFT
RESOLUTION ON BOURGEOIS PARTIES
MAY 15 (28)

From the preceding speech you could see how just Comrade Popov's remarks were about the fruitlessness of the present discussion. You have yourselves seen how thoroughly unprincipled Lieber's speech was. I should merely like to remind you that, in our abortive commission, *four Mensheviks, one member of the Bund, and two Poles* voted against us and the Latvians on the question of adopting the *Polish* draft as a basis for the resolution.

Thus the Polish draft was taken as a basis in the commission by those people who in principle were *farthest* removed from the Poles. They did this in order to introduce into the draft amendments in a Menshevik spirit—in order to render the resolution unacceptable to its authors! Lieber himself voted with the Mensheviks both in this case (*Lieber: "That is not true!"*) and in voting on the permissibility of blocs with the Cadets. After this his pathetic speeches about principles are simply ridiculous.

I quite understand the Poles' trying to get their draft adopted as a basis. To them our resolution seemed to go into unnecessary details. They wanted to limit themselves to the two basic principles which truly unite us—(1) the class distinction of the proletariat from *all* bourgeois parties, in everything that concerns socialism; (2) the combination of joint action by Social-Democracy and petty-bourgeois democracy against liberal treachery. Both these ideas run like a scarlet thread through the Bolshevik draft as well.

But the brevity of the Polish draft left too much room for Menshevik juggling. Their amendments compelled even the authors to vote against their own draft as a whole. And at the same time, neither the Mensheviks nor the Bund members undertook to defend the Polish draft they had thus "amended". The result was the collapse of the work of the entire commission.

There is now one thing left for all of us in general, and the Polish comrades in particular, to do—to endeavour to have the Bolshevik draft accepted as a basis. If unacceptable amendments are made to the latter too, then we shall have to acknowledge that the Congress is incompetent. It is, however, possible that on the basis of this draft, which gives a precise analysis of all the fundamental types of parties, we shall be able to reach a decision sufficiently definite in the spirit of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

The objection is raised against our draft that it describes parties in too great detail. Parties, they say, can break up, realign themselves—and then the entire resolution will be useless.

This objection is quite groundless. It is not small groups or even individual parties that we describe in our resolution, but large groups of parties. These groups are so large that rapid changes in their mutual relations are far less possible than a complete change from revolutionary decline to upsurge or vice versa. Take these groups and examine them. A reactionary and a more or less progressive bourgeoisie are unvarying types in *all* capitalist countries. We have added only two more to these two unvarying types: the Octobrists (intermediate between the Black Hundreds and the liberals) and the Trudovik groups. Can *these* types change rapidly? They cannot, unless our revolution takes so radical a turn that we shall, in any way, be obliged to radically reconsider, not only our Congress resolutions, but even our Programme.

Give thought to our *programme* demand for the confiscation of all landed estates. In no other country could the Social-Democrats ever support the confiscatory aspirations of the petty bourgeoisie. That would be a fraud in an *ordinary* capitalist country. But in our country, it is essential

in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. We can, therefore, be sure that fundamental questions in the appraisal of the Trudovik parties will not have to be revised any sooner than our programme demand for confiscation.

Let me furthermore point out that to avoid all misunderstanding and false interpretation of the Left bloc, we have given a precise definition of *the content* of the Trudovik parties' struggle. Actually they are not fighting against exploitation in general (as it seems to them), and certainly not against capitalist exploitation (in the way their ideologists assert); they are fighting *only* against the feudal state and landlordism. And an exact description of this true content of the struggle will at once put an end to all false conceptions of possible joint action by the workers' party and the peasantry in the struggle for socialism, in the struggle against capitalism.

In our resolution we also speak clearly of the "pseudo-socialist nature" of the Trudovik parties, and call for a resolute struggle against any glossing over of the class conflict between petty proprietors and the proletariat. We call for an exposure of the hazy socialist ideology of the petty bourgeoisie. This is something that must be said about petty-bourgeois parties, but it is *all* that need be said. The Mensheviks are profoundly mistaken when they add to this the struggle against the revolutionism and the utopianism of the peasantry in the present revolution, which is what follows from their resolution. *Objectively* such an idea amounts to a call to fight against *the confiscation* of landed estates, and does so because the most influential and widespread ideological and political trends of liberalism declare that confiscation is revolutionism, utopianism, and so forth. It is not accidental, but inevitable, that during the past year the Mensheviks have wandered from such principles towards a renunciation in practice of support for confiscation.

We must not allow things to go so far, comrades! In one of his speeches Dan said jokingly: "We have poor critics if they criticise us mostly for what we have not done. We only wanted to renounce confiscation, but we have *not* renounced it!"

To this I should like to reply—if you had done so we would not now be a united party. We must not let things go so far as such renunciations. If we permit even the shadow of an idea of such a policy we shall be shaking all the revolutionary foundations of the independent class struggle of the proletariat in a bourgeois-democratic revolution. (*Applause from the Bolsheviks. Poles and Latvians.*)

OBJECTIONS TO TROTSKY'S AMENDMENTS TO
THE BOLSHEVIK RESOLUTION ON THE ATTITUDE
TOWARDS BOURGEOIS PARTIES,
ADOPTED BY THE CONGRESS
MAY 15-16 (28-29)¹⁸⁶

I

Two points are important here. They must not be deleted. The first point indicates the economically more progressive strata of the bourgeoisie. This is essential. Even more essential is the point on the bourgeois intelligentsia. In the bourgeois parties there are an increasing number of bourgeois intellectuals who are attempting to reconcile the feudal-minded landlords with the toiling peasantry, and who stand for the preservation of all sorts of remnants and survivals of the autocracy.

II

It must be agreed that Trotsky's amendment is not Menshevik, that it expresses the "very same", that is, Bolshevik, idea. But Trotsky has expressed this idea in a way that is scarcely better. When we say "simultaneously" we are expressing the *general* character of present-day politics. This general character is undoubtedly of such a nature that conditions force us to come out simultaneously both against Stolypin and against the Cadets. The same is true with regard to the treacherous *policy* of the Cadets. Trotsky's insertion is redundant, for we are not fishing for unique cases in the resolution, but are laying down the *basic* line of Social-Democracy in the bourgeois Russian revolution.

10

OBJECTIONS TO MARTOV'S AMENDMENTS
TO THE BOLSHEVIK RESOLUTION
ON THE ATTITUDE TO BOURGEOIS PARTIES
MAY 16 (29)¹⁸⁷

I

Everyone realises that Martov's amendment is highly important. "Technical agreements" is an extremely elastic conception. It seems that under "technical", a "Duma with full powers" is also included. If Martov thinks that our agreements with the Trudoviks are anything but technical, he is mistaken. Our resolution does not say that technical agreements with the liberal bourgeoisie are impermissible. There should be no place for sanctions or interdictions in a resolution; it should indicate an ideological political line. If, however, you are dissatisfied with this absence of interdiction and introduce your notes about "sanction", you are thereby destroying the entire spirit, the entire sense, behind our resolution. And if such an amendment were accepted, we could do nothing but withdraw our resolution.

II

When Martov goes so far as to say that we are refusing to introduce into our resolution any mention of our antagonism towards the revolutionary Narodniks, he is by this open and glaring untruth defeating his own purpose and showing that his own amendment is pure invention. No, it is not we who are refusing to fight against the pseudo-socialist nature

of the Narodniks, but you Menshevik comrades, who have refused to support *revolutionary* democracy, and prefer the *liberals* (the Cadets). The majority of the Narodnik groups (Popular Socialists and Trudoviks) have not only failed to adhere in any special way to the terrorism of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but, on the contrary, have erred on the side of pliancy in dealing with the liberals. The genuine revolutionism of *all* Narodniks is expressed in the endeavour *to destroy* landlordism. *In this* alone do the liberals see "adventurous gambles and utopianism". Martov is, *in point of fact*, helping the liberals.

11

OBJECTIONS

TO MARTYNOV'S AMENDMENTS TO THE RESOLUTION
ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS BOURGEOIS PARTIES
MAY 16 (29)

I

Martynov's amendment is another attempt to introduce the Menshevik view that the peasants are more reactionary (or may be more reactionary) in the present revolution than the Cadets, since the Mensheviks do not say a single word about the reactionary nature of the Cadets. Martynov's argument is all mixed up—the dualism is not due to the peasants' wavering between revolution and reaction but to their wavering between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats. The Mensheviks will inevitably and unavoidably include their favourite idea of the reactionary nature of the confiscation of landed estates and the progressiveness of compensation in the anarchist tendencies of which Martynov speaks. "Anarchist tendencies" in the peasants is a liberal landlord phrase. As to the subjugation of the proletarian movement to the peasant movement—it is ridiculous to speak of this after having declared the reverse, and expressed it scores of times in resolutions.

II

Our acceptance of Martynov's amendment would undoubtedly make a laughing-stock of Social-Democracy. At the beginning of the resolution, we spoke about a decisive struggle

against the feudal state. Now we must draw a political conclusion from this social-economic proposition. Our task is to win that section of the bourgeoisie whose economic position impels it into struggle (the peasantry) away from the influence of the section of the bourgeoisie that is incapable of joining this decisive struggle (from the influence of the liberal landlords, the Cadets). It is in order to confuse a clear political conclusion that Martynov proposes that what is said at the beginning be repeated at the end.

12

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FORMED TO DRAFT
A RESOLUTION ON THE STATE DUMA
MAY 18 (31)

Our commission has not come to any agreement. Six voted for the Bolshevik draft and six against. Five voted for the Menshevik draft and five against. One abstained. I must now briefly defend our Bolshevik draft to you, since the Polish Social-Democrats and the Latvians are in agreement with it.

We proceeded from the proposition that everything already stated in the resolution on the bourgeois parties must be deleted from the resolution on the State Duma, since the Duma struggle is only a part, and not the principal part, of our struggle against the bourgeois parties and the autocracy.

In the present resolution we speak only of what our policy in the Duma must be. As to an assessment of how we managed to get into the Duma, we deleted this part of the resolution—the point on the boycott—for the following reasons. It seems to me personally, and to all the Bolsheviks, that in view of the stand taken by all the liberal press we should have given an appraisal of how we got into the Duma. In opposition to the entire liberal bourgeoisie, the workers' party must declare that, for the time being, we must reckon with such an ugly institution because of the treachery of the bourgeoisie. But the Latvian comrades were opposed to this point, and in order not to hinder the rapid completion of our work (and we must hurry if we are to end the Congress tomorrow as we decided) we withdrew this point. What the Congress wants is clear in any case, and lack of time makes it impossible to conduct debates on matters of principle.

I shall dwell on the basic ideas expressed in our resolution. In essence, all this is a repetition of what was said in our draft resolution at the Stockholm Congress. The first point stresses the complete uselessness of the Duma as such. This is a necessary idea, for extremely broad sections of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie in general still place the most naïve hopes on the Duma. It is our plain duty to dispel these naïve illusions, which are sustained by the liberals for their own selfish class ends.

The second part of the first point speaks of the uselessness of the parliamentary path in general, and about explaining the inevitability of an open struggle of the masses. Here we give an explanation of our positive views on ways of getting out of the present situation. We absolutely must emphasise it, and clearly repeat our revolutionary slogans, since wavering and vacillation, even among the Social-Democrats, is no rare thing in such a question. Let everyone know that Social-Democracy sticks to its old, revolutionary path.

The second point is devoted to an explanation of the relation between direct "legislative" activity in the Duma, and agitation, criticism, propaganda, organisation. The workers' party regards the connection between work within and without the Duma very differently from the way the liberal bourgeoisie regards it. It is necessary to stress this radical difference of views. On the one hand, there are the bourgeois politicians, enraptured by their parliamentary games behind the backs of the people. On the other hand, there is a contingent of the organised proletariat that has been sent into the enemy camp and is carrying on work closely *connected with* the struggle of the proletariat *as a whole*. For us there is only one, single and indivisible, workers' movement—the class struggle of the proletariat. All its separate, partial forms, including the parliamentary struggle, must be fully subordinated to it. For us it is the extra-Duma struggle of the proletariat that is decisive. It would not be sufficient for us to say that we take into account the economic interests and needs of the masses, etc. Such phrases (in the spirit of the old Menshevik resolution) are hazy and can be subscribed to by any liberal. Every liberal is ready to chatter about the economic needs of the people

in general. But no liberal would be willing to subordinate Duma activity to *the class struggle*; it is, however, precisely this view that we Social-Democrats must express with the utmost clarity. It is only by reason of this principle that we really distinguish ourselves from all possible varieties of bourgeois democracy.

It is sometimes pointed out (especially by the members of the Bund—alleged conciliators) that it is also necessary to note the contrary—the links between the extra-Duma Social-Democratic struggle and the work of the Social-Democratic Duma group. I maintain that this is false, and can only serve to sow the most harmful parliamentary illusions. The part must conform to the whole, and not vice versa. The Duma may temporarily serve as an arena of the class struggle as a whole, but only if that whole is never lost sight of, and if the revolutionary tasks of the class struggle are not concealed.

The next point in our resolution is devoted to the liberal policy in the Duma. The slogan of this policy—"save the Duma"—merely serves to conceal the liberals' alliance with the Black Hundreds. We must frankly tell the people this, and explain it to them. The liberal slogan systematically corrupts the political and class consciousness of the masses. It is our duty to wage a ruthless struggle against this liberal haziness. By tearing the mask from liberalism, by showing that, behind the talk about democracy, there lurks voting hand in glove with the Black Hundreds, we shall be wresting the remnants of democracy from the bourgeois betrayers of freedom.

What must guide us in determining our Duma policy? Leaving aside all thought of engendering conflicts for their own sake, our resolution gives a positive definition of "timeliness" in the Social-Democratic sense of the word—we must take into account the revolutionary crisis developing outside the Duma, by force of objective circumstances.

The last point is devoted to the famous "responsible ministry". It was not fortuitous, but inevitable, that the liberal bourgeoisie should advance this slogan to utilise the period of lull in its own interests, and weaken the revolutionary consciousness of the masses. This slogan was supported by the Mensheviks both in the First and Second

Dumas, and during the period of the Second Duma Plekhanov said forthright in the Menshevik newspaper that the Social-Democrats should *make* this demand "*their own*". Hence this slogan played a very definite role in the history of our revolution. It is absolutely essential for the workers' party to define its attitude towards the slogan. We must not be guided by the fact that the liberals are not advancing this slogan at the moment: they have temporarily withdrawn it for opportunist reasons, but actually they are striving even more earnestly to come to terms with tsarism. And the slogan "a Duma ministry" most graphically expresses this innate tendency of liberalism towards a deal with tsarism.

We do not and cannot deny that a Duma ministry may prove a stage in the revolution, or that circumstances may force us to utilise it. That is not the point. The Social-Democrats utilise reforms as a by-product of the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat, but it is not our business to mobilise the people for half-hearted reforms that are not feasible without a revolutionary struggle. The Social-Democrats must expose all the inconsistency of such slogans even from the purely democratic point of view. The Social-Democrats must explain to the proletariat the conditions for its *victory*, and not link up its policy in advance with the possibility of an incomplete victory, the possibility of a partial defeat—yet such are the conditions for the problematic establishment of a "Duma ministry".

Let the liberals give democracy away for a few pennies and throw away the whole for the sake of banal and feeble, paltry dreams of doles. Social-Democracy must rouse among the people consciousness of integral democratic tasks, and imbue the proletariat with a clear understanding of revolutionary aims. We must enlighten the minds of the masses of workers and develop their readiness to struggle, not befog their minds by toning down contradictions, by toning down the aims of the struggle. (*Applause.*)

13

REMARKS DURING THE DISCUSSION ON THE
RE-VOTING ON THOSE ELECTED TO THE C.C.
MAY 19 (JUNE 1)¹⁸⁸

I

We must vote again. Lieber is wrong. His entire line of argument is ridiculous sophistry. After all, who is to decide on this lottery? We are to! We constitute the final session of the Congress. There can be no compromise. This is a congress, not a meeting of factions. You say that we have been empowered to decide only technical and formal questions, yet we have only just adopted a political resolution on a loan.

II

It was intended to intimidate you with terrifying words about the seizure of power. But after all we are empowered to elect candidates to the C.C. at this meeting. (*Stir.*) Keep calm, comrades; anyway, you won't shout me down! We are accused of wanting to take advantage of a single vote. I am of the opinion that this can and should be done. What we are deciding here is a political question, a matter of principle. To let this question be decided by lottery—by blind chance—would be nothing but gambling. We cannot condemn the Party to a year of gambling. I warn you that if—given an equal vote—our Party decides this question by drawing lots, the responsibility will rest with you. That is why this assembly must vote again.

THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS BOURGEOIS PARTIES

The question of the attitude of Social-Democracy towards bourgeois parties is one of those known as "general" or "theoretical" questions, i.e., such that are not directly connected with any definite practical task confronting the Party at a given moment. At the London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., the Mensheviks and the Bundists conducted a fierce struggle against the inclusion of such questions in the agenda, and they were, unfortunately, supported in this by Trotsky, who does not belong to either side. The opportunist wing of our Party, like that of other Social-Democratic parties, defended a "business-like" or "practical" agenda for the Congress. They shied away from "broad and general" questions. They forgot that in the final analysis broad, principled politics are the only real, practical politics. They forgot that anybody who tackles partial problems without having previously settled general problems, will inevitably and at every step "come up against" those general problems without himself realising it. To come up against them blindly in every individual case means to doom one's politics to the worst vacillation and lack of principle.

The Bolsheviks had insisted on including quite a number of "general questions" in the Congress agenda, but succeeded in getting only one passed with the aid of the Poles and the Latvians—the question of the attitude to bourgeois parties. This question not only took first place among the Congress questions of principle but also among all work in general. It turned out that way, and it had to turn out that way, because the real source of almost all differences, certainly all differences of substance, of all disagreements on questions of the practical politics of the proletariat in the Russian

revolution, was a different assessment of our attitude to non-proletarian parties. Since the very beginning of the Russian revolution there have appeared two basic views among Social-Democrats on the nature of the revolution and the role of the proletariat in it. Anyone who attempts to analyse the tactical differences in the R.S.D.L.P. without going into the difference of these basic views will get hopelessly entangled in trivialities and partial problems.

I

The two trends in Russian Social-Democracy on the question of an assessment of our revolution and the tasks of the proletariat in it, had become perfectly clear at the very beginning of 1905, and in the spring of that year were given full, precise and formal expression, recognised by the organisations concerned, at the Bolshevik Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in London and the Menshevik Conference held simultaneously in Geneva. Both the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks discussed and adopted resolutions that people who have forgotten the history of their Party or their section of it, or who desire to avoid an analysis of the real sources of disagreements on matters of principle, are now too inclined to ignore. In the view of the Bolsheviks the proletariat has had laid upon it the active task of pursuing the bourgeois-democratic revolution to its consummation and of being its leader. This is only possible if the proletariat is able to carry with it the masses of the democratic petty bourgeoisie, especially the peasantry, in the struggle against the autocracy and the treacherous liberal bourgeoisie. The inevitability of bourgeois treachery was deduced by the Bolsheviks even then, before the open activities of the Constitutional-Democrats, the chief liberal party; the deduction was based on the class interests of the bourgeoisie and their fear of the proletarian movement.*

The Mensheviks were inclined to the view that the bourgeoisie are the motive force and that they determine the

* The full victory of the revolution, said the Bolsheviks, is possible only as a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

scope of the bourgeois revolution. The proletariat cannot lead the bourgeois revolution, but must fulfil only the role of the extreme opposition, and not strive to win power. The Mensheviks rejected in the most determined manner the idea of a revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

At that time, in May 1905 (just two years ago), the differences were of a purely theoretical and abstract character because no immediate practical task then confronted our Party. It is therefore particularly interesting—for the instruction of those people who are so fond of deleting abstract questions from congress agendas and substituting “business-like” practical questions—to trace *the way in which* these differences later made their appearance in practical work.

The Bolsheviks asserted that the Mensheviks’ views would actually lead to the slogans of the revolutionary proletariat degenerating to the slogans and tactics of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. In 1905 the Mensheviks tried their hardest to prove that they alone defended the true proletarian policy and that the Bolsheviks were dissolving the working-class movement in bourgeois democracy. That the Mensheviks themselves had a most sincere desire for an independent proletarian policy can be seen from the following highly instructive tirade in one of the resolutions of that time, adopted at the Menshevik Conference in May 1905. “Social-Democracy,” says the resolution, “will continue to oppose hypocritical friends of the people, oppose all those political parties that raise a liberal and democratic banner and refuse to give real support to the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat.” Despite all these well-meant intentions, the incorrect tactical theories of the Mensheviks led, in actual fact, to their sacrificing proletarian independence for the liberalism of the monarchist bourgeoisie.

Let us recall on what practical questions of politics the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks have differed among themselves during these two years of revolution. The Bulygin Duma of autumn 1905: the Bolsheviks were for the boycott, the Mensheviks for participation. The Witte Duma—the same again. Policy in the First Duma (summer 1906): the Mensheviks were in favour of the slogan of “a responsible ministry”—the Bolsheviks were against it and in favour of

an executive committee of the Lefts, i.e., the Social-Democrats and Trudoviks. The dissolution of the Duma (July 1906): the Mensheviks brought forward the slogan "for the Duma as an organ of power for the convocation of a constituent assembly"; the Bolsheviks rejected that liberal distortion of a revolutionary slogan. The elections to the Second Duma (end of 1906, beginning of 1907): the Mensheviks were for "technical blocs" with the Constitutional-Democrats (and Plekhanov was for a political bloc with the platform of "a Duma with full powers"). The Bolsheviks were against blocs with the Constitutional-Democrats and in favour of an independent campaign, allowing the possibility of a Left bloc. Compare these important facts from the history of Social-Democratic tactics during the past two years, with the basic differences on matters of principle outlined above. You will immediately see that the general theoretical analysis of the Bolsheviks *has been confirmed* by the two years of revolution. Social-Democracy was compelled to go against treacherous liberalism, *was compelled* "to strike together" with the Trudoviks and the Narodniks; the Second Duma definitely established this preponderance, by a majority vote. The Menshevik good intentions to expose, as hypocritical friends of the people, all those who refused to support the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat paved the road to the hell of *political* blocs with the liberals, up to and including the acceptance of their slogans.

On the basis of a theoretical analysis, the Bolsheviks forecast in 1905 that the pivot of Social-Democratic tactics in the bourgeois revolution is the question of the treachery of liberalism and the democratic capacity of the peasantry. All *subsequent* practical differences on the policy of the workers' party have revolved precisely around this pivot. The Menshevik policy of dependence on the liberals actually has developed historically from the false basis of their tactics.

Prior to the Stockholm Unity Congress in 1906, the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks put forward two substantially different resolutions on bourgeois parties. The Bolshevik resolution in its entirety was imbued with the basic idea of the treachery of liberalism and of a revolutionary-demo-

cratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, merely providing fresh illustrations to this idea in the form of the facts and events of the post-October period (the split between the Octobrists and the Cadets; the formation of the Peasant Union and radical associations of intellectuals, etc.). The Bolsheviks analysed the class content of the basic types of bourgeois parties and filled out, so to say, the skeleton of their old abstract scheme, with concrete data. In their resolution for the Stockholm Congress, the Mensheviks refused to analyse the class content of various parties, on the grounds of their "instability". This meant actually evading an answer on the substance of the matter. This evasion was clearly demonstrated when the Mensheviks, who had gained a victory at the Stockholm Congress, themselves withdrew their resolution on the attitude to bourgeois parties in Russia. In the spring of 1905, a Menshevik resolution proposed exposing, as hypocritical friends of the people, all liberals and democrats who refused to support the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. In the spring of 1906, it was the Bolsheviks and not the Mensheviks who, in a resolution, spoke of the *hypocrisy* of a definite liberal party, the Constitutional-Democrats to be precise, while the Mensheviks preferred to leave the question open. At the London Congress, in the spring of 1907, the Mensheviks revealed themselves still more completely; the old demand that the liberals and democrats support the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat was completely abandoned. The Menshevik resolution (see the draft in *Narodnaya Duma*, 1907, No. 12—an extremely important document) openly and frankly advocates "combining" the activities—in plainer words, making them agree—of the proletariat with those of bourgeois democracy in general!

Down the ladder, rung by rung. The socialist's good intentions and bad theory in 1905. No theory and no intentions in 1906. No theory and an openly opportunist policy in 1907. "The combining" of Social-Democratic and liberal-bourgeois policy—such is Menshevism's last word. And it could have been no other, after blocs with the Cadets, voting for Golovin, private meetings with Cadets, the attempt to remove the confiscation of landed estates from our list of imperative demands, and other gems of Menshevik policy.

At the London Congress, Menshevik policy in respect of liberalism suffered its fullest defeat. The Mensheviks did not risk submitting their first resolution as printed in *Narodnaya Duma* (No. 12). They withdrew it without even submitting it to the commission in which all five Party groups were represented by fifteen members (four Bolsheviks, four Mensheviks, two Poles, two Latvians and three from the Bund). Probably the slogan of "combining", the concord of socialist policy with that of the liberals repelled, not only the Bundists, but even many Mensheviks. The Mensheviks appeared in the commission after having "cleaned themselves up a little"; they wrote a new resolution, and deleted "combining" altogether. Instead of "combining" they inserted "use of other parties by the proletariat for its own ends", the recognition of the establishment of a republic, etc., as a political aim of the proletariat. But nothing could help them. It was far too obvious to everybody that they had deliberately dressed up in this bright raiment as a cover for the same policy of "combining". The practical conclusion to be drawn from the resolution was the same—"enter into agreements with those parties [with both the liberals and the Narodniks] in definite, individual cases". Of the fifteen members of the commission only four—i.e., only the Mensheviks!—consented to accept such a resolution as a basis for discussion. There could not have been a fuller defeat for Menshevik policy as such. The Bolshevik resolution was taken as a basis at the Congress and then adopted in its totality after some insignificant amendments, by 158-163 votes against a little over a hundred (106 in one case), with from ten to twenty abstaining. Before we proceed with an analysis of the basic ideas of this resolution and the significance of the amendments proposed by the Mensheviks, we must mention another episode, not without interest, which took place when the resolution was under discussion in the commission.

Not two, but three draft resolutions were submitted to the commission—the Bolshevik, the Menshevik and the Polish drafts. The Poles agreed with the Bolsheviks in their basic ideas but rejected our type of resolution with an analysis of each separate group of parties. The Poles thought this a mere literary exercise, and considered our

resolution too cumbersome. They constructed their draft as a brief formulation of two general principles of proletarian policy in respect of bourgeois parties—(1) the class individuality of the proletariat, as distinct from *all* other parties, for the purpose of its socialist aims, no matter how revolutionary and how determinedly republican those other parties may be; (2) alliance with the Trudovik parties against the autocracy and against the treachery of liberalism.

It cannot be disputed that these two significant ideas in the Polish resolution cover the point at issue splendidly. Nor can it be disputed that the plan to give a brief, definite directive for the proletariat of all nationalities in Russia, without a "sociological" discussion of the different types of parties, is an attractive one. Experience nevertheless showed that the Congress would not have been able to arrive at a full, clear and definite solution to the problem, on the basis of the Polish resolution. In order to refute Menshevism, it was necessary to determine, in great detail, the positive view of Social-Democracy in respect of the different parties; otherwise there would have been room for vagueness.

The Mensheviks and the Bundists immediately seized on the Polish resolution while it was still in the commission, in order to take advantage of the opportunity provided by such vagueness. The commission accepted the Polish resolution as a basis, by seven votes (four Mensheviks, two Poles and one Bundist) against seven (four Bolsheviks, two Latvians and one Bundist; the fifteenth member of the commission abstained or was absent). The commission then began tacking on to the Polish resolution such "amendments" that it was distorted beyond all recognition. Even an amendment on the permissibility of "technical" agreements with the liberals was accepted. Naturally the Poles withdrew their draft after it had been mutilated by the Mensheviks. It turned out that, besides the Poles, neither the Mensheviks nor the Bundists would consent to submit *such* a draft to the Congress. All the commission's work was wasted, and the Congress had to vote on the Bolshevik draft that had been accepted as a basis for a resolution.

It may now be asked: what is the significance, in principle, of the Congress having accepted the Bolshevik draft as a basis for a resolution? What were the basic points in prole-

tarian tactics that mobilised the Congress for this draft and led it to reject the Menshevik draft?

If we read the two drafts attentively we can quite easily pick out two such basic points. First, the Bolshevik resolution really effects a socialist criticism of the non-proletarian parties. Secondly, the resolution gives a precise definition of proletarian tactics in the present revolution, giving a perfectly clear and concrete content to the concept of "leader" in the revolution, and showing with whom we can and must "strike together", and at whom and under what circumstances to strike.

The basic fault of the Menshevik resolution is that it provides neither the one nor the other, and by its emptiness opens wide the doors to opportunism, i.e., in the final analysis, to Social-Democratic politics being replaced by liberal politics. Just take a glance at the Mensheviks' socialist criticism of the non-proletarian parties. Their criticism amounts to this: "the socio-economic conditions and historic situation in which this [i.e., our] revolution is proceeding hamper the development of the bourgeois-democratic movement, at one pole engendering indecision in the struggle and the illusions of a constitutional, peaceful abolition of the old order, and at the other pole—the illusion of petty-bourgeois revolutionism and agrarian utopias".

First of all, we have before us a resolution on parties, which does not name the parties. Secondly, we have before us a resolution that does not give an analysis of the class content of the different "poles" of bourgeois democracy. Thirdly, this resolution does not even hint at a definition of what the attitude of the various classes to "our revolution" should be. Summing up all these shortcomings we must say that the *Marxist theory of the class struggle* has *disappeared* from the resolution.

It is not the fundamental interests of the various classes of capitalist society that engender the different types of bourgeois parties; it is not class interests that give rise to peaceful illusions or "conciliatory tendencies" in some and "revolutionism" in others. Definitely not! It is some sort of unknown socio-economic conditions and an historical situation that *hamper the development of the bourgeois-democratic movement in general*. And so the conciliatory tendency of

capital and the revolutionism of the muzhik do not arise out of the position of the bourgeoisie and the peasantry in a capitalist society that is emancipating itself from feudalism, but out of some sort of conditions, out of the situation in all "our revolution" in general. The next point even says that "these negative tendencies, hindering the development of the revolution", come more strongly "to the fore at the present moment of a temporary lull".

That is not a Marxist, but a liberal theory, seeking the roots of different social tendencies *outside* the interests of the different classes. This is a Left-Cadet, not a socialist resolution; the extremism of both poles is condemned, the opportunism of the Cadets and the revolutionism of the Narodniks are condemned and thereby *something in between* the two is actually praised. One cannot help wondering whether we are not confronted with *Popular Socialists*, who seek the golden mean between the Cadets and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

If our Mensheviks had not departed from the Marxist theory of the class struggle, they would have realised that the different class positions of the bourgeoisie and the peasantry in the struggle against the "old order" explains the different types of parties—liberal on the one hand, and Narodnik on the other. All these parties, groups and political organisations, which differ in much or in little and have arisen in such abundance in the course of the Russian revolution, always and inevitably gravitate to one of these two types (with the exception of the reactionary parties and the party of the proletariat)—this is beyond all doubt and needs no proof. If we limit ourselves to indicating the "two poles" in a single bourgeois-democratic movement, we offer nothing but platitudes. Always and in everything, two extremes, two "poles" are to be seen. In any social movement of any extent there are always the "poles" and there is always a more or less "golden" mean. To characterise bourgeois democracy *in this way* is to reduce the Marxist postulate to an empty phrase instead of applying it to an analysis of the *class* roots of the *types* of party in *Russia*. The Mensheviks do not offer a socialist criticism of the bourgeois parties, because giving the name bourgeois-democratic to all oppositional, non-proletarian parties does not at all

imply socialist criticism. If you do not show the interests of which classes and which particular interests are dominant at the moment in determining the nature of the various parties and their politics, you are not really applying Marxism and have, *in fact*, rejected the theory of the class struggle. Therefore, the term "bourgeois-democratic", as you use it, is nothing but a platonic declaration of respect for Marxism, since your use of the term is not accompanied by the association of such-and-such a type of liberalism or democracy with such-and-such self-interests of definite strata of the bourgeoisie. No wonder our liberals, beginning with the Party of Democratic Reform and the Cadets and ending with the non-party *Bez Zaglaviya* group from *Tovarishch*, seeing that the Mensheviks apply Marxism in *such a way*, enthusiastically seize on the "idea" of the harmfulness of extremes of opportunism and revolutionism in democracy—seize on it because it is not an idea at all, but a banal platitude. It is, of course, not the *term* "bourgeois democracy" that scares the liberal. What scares him is an exposure, before the people, of what material interests of precisely which wealthy classes liberal programmes and phrases boil down to. That, and not the term "bourgeois democracy", is the gist of the matter. Not he who persistently uses the term "bourgeois democracy" to protect himself, as though he were crossing himself, is applying the theory of the class struggle, but he who shows, in practice, how the bourgeois character of a party manifests itself.

If the concept "bourgeois democracy" implies only condemnation of the extremes of both opportunism and revolutionism, then it is a concept that degrades Marxist theory to the level of banal liberal phraseology. The liberal, we repeat, does not fear such use of the concept, for it is deeds that he fears, not *words*. He may consent to accept a term that is, to him, unpleasant and "reeking of Marxism". But neither the liberal, nor the "intellectual" from *Tovarishch*, who apes the Bernsteinians, will agree to accept the view that he, the Cadet, expresses the interests of the bourgeois who is selling out the revolution to someone or other. It is precisely because in their application of Marxism the Mensheviks reduce that theory to an empty and meaningless phrase committing them to nothing, that the *Bez Zaglaviya*

group, the Prokopoviches and Kuskovas, the Cadets and others, seize with both hands at the idea of supporting Menshevism. Menshevik Marxism is Marxism recut to the measurements of bourgeois liberalism.

And so the first basic fault of the Mensheviks' stand on the present question lies in their failure to offer a real socialist criticism of the non-proletarian parties. In point of fact, Menshevism departs from Marx's theory of the class struggle. The London Congress has put an end to this distortion of Social-Democratic policy and theory. The second basic fault is that Menshevism does not actually recognise the independent policy of the proletariat in the present revolution, and does not offer the proletariat any definite tactics. Avoid extremes of opportunism and revolutionism—such is one of the commandments of Menshevism as taken from their resolution. From time to time, conclude agreements with the liberals and democrats—that is another of their commandments. Combine your politics (make it agree) with those of the liberals and democrats—that is the third commandment expressed in *Narodnaya Duma* and the Menshevik resolution of the time. Delete from here all mention of the third commandment; add desires and demands—"proletarian politics must be independent", add the demand for a republic (as the Mensheviks did at the London Congress)—by these means you will in no way get rid of the second basic fault of Menshevism. The independence of proletarian politics is not determined by writing the word "independent" in the right places, and not by including mention of a republic; it is determined only *by a precise definition of a path that is really independent*. And that is what the Mensheviks do not offer.

The objective alignment of classes and social forces being as it is, we are actually confronted with a struggle between two tendencies—liberalism is striving to stop the revolution, and the proletariat—to carry it on to its culmination. If the proletariat is unaware of this tendency of liberalism, if the proletariat is unaware of its task to engage in a direct struggle against liberalism, if it does not struggle to liberate the democratic peasantry from the influence of liberalism, then the politics of the proletariat *are not actually independent*. It is precisely these non-independent politics that the

Mensheviks are legalising; for that is the significance of admitting the possibility of agreements from occasion to occasion, without defining *the line* of those agreements, without defining the line of demarcation that divides the two tactics in our revolution. "Agreements from occasion to occasion" is a formula that actually serves to conceal the bloc with the Cadets, the "Duma with full powers" and the responsible ministry, in other words, the entire policy of making the workers' party dependent on liberalism. In the present historical situation there can be no question of an independent policy for the workers' party, if that party does not set itself the direct task of struggling to carry the revolution through to its consummation, if it does not struggle, not only against the autocracy, but also against liberalism, for influence over the democratic peasantry. The historical situation in the bourgeois revolution in Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century is such that any other policy on the part of Social-Democracy would actually mean its subordination to the politics of the liberals.

The London Congress's adoption of the Bolshevik resolution on non-proletarian parties means that the workers' party decisively rejects all deviations from the class struggle, and recognises, in point of fact, the socialist criticism of non-proletarian parties and the independent revolutionary tasks of the proletariat in the present revolution.

The rejection of the Menshevik amendments to the resolution adds further weight to this.

II

When the Bolshevik draft was accepted by the Congress as the basis for the resolution on the attitude to bourgeois parties, a shower of amendments came pouring from the Mensheviks and the Bundists. In several statements of protest submitted to the Bureau of the Congress, the total number of such amendments was estimated at 70 or more. I shall not waste time discussing all the ins and outs of the struggle to stop this obstruction, which left Akimov's famous twenty-two amendments at the Second Congress

far behind, nor shall I list the mass of absolutely empty and trivial amendments. I shall mention only *five* amendments that are highly significant in principle. Here they are in the order in which they were discussed at the Congress.

Point Three of the preamble of our resolution speaks directly of the task of the proletariat as filling "the role of leader in the bourgeois-democratic revolution". The Mensheviks proposed an amendment—change the word "leader" for "vanguard", "advanced contingent" or the words "main motive force". All those amendments were rejected. Repeat as often as you will that the proletariat must retain its class independence—the Bolsheviks have nothing against that. But *to weaken* the words on the role of *leader* in the revolution would mean opening the doors to opportunism. The proletariat could be the "main motive force" in a curtailed, landlord-bourgeois revolution. It is possible to be the main motive force of the victory of another class without being able to defend the interests of your own class. Revolutionary Social-Democracy, if it is to remain true to itself, has no right to confine itself to that. It must help the proletariat to rise from the passive role of main motive force to the active role of leader—to rise from the dependent position of a fighter for curtailed freedom to the most independent position of a fighter for complete freedom, a freedom that is to the advantage of the working class. The basic difference in the tactics of the opportunist and the revolutionary tactics of Social-Democracy in the bourgeois revolution is, one might say, that the former is reconciled to the role of the proletariat as the main motive force, while the latter is directed towards giving the proletariat the role of leader and by no means that of a mere "motive force".

The expression "advanced contingent" would also weaken the recognition of the task of the proletariat as that of leading the other democratic classes, or could, at least, be interpreted in that way.

The second amendment—remove from the third point of the resolution proper (the characteristic of the liberal parties) the reference to the democratic petty bourgeoisie being *deceived* by the liberals. The Mensheviks said that it was necessary to remove or change it in the name of

Marxism, for, they said, it is unworthy of materialists to explain by "deceptions" the social composition of parties. The sophistry of this argument had too bad a smell for the Congress to fall for it. To deny, in the name of Marxism, the role of deception in the politics of the bourgeoisie would be the same as denying all forms of violence in the name of the "economic factor". Only the Davids, Vollmars and similar pillars of opportunism understand Marxism in this way. In particular, to deny or attempt to lessen the part played by deception in the Cadets' present policy towards the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie in Russia would be attempting to make liberalism more attractive, and distorting the facts for its benefit. That is because the Cadets' direct deception of the electors from among the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie is the most indisputable of facts. It is wrong to speak of parties deceiving their electors, in cases when the interests of a class engender certain theoretical illusions, i.e., deceptive concepts (for instance, when the interests of the peasantry engender illusive expectations of endless benefits following the expropriation of the landlords). It is necessary to speak openly, for all to hear, of the deception of certain strata of the people by their parliamentary representatives when those representatives sacrifice the direct interests of those strata to their exploiters (the peasants are betrayed to the landlords, etc.). The German bourgeoisie have betrayed the peasants, wrote Marx in 1848. If, in 1907, we in Russia do not risk saying the same about our bourgeoisie and about our Cadets, if we cannot prove this to the masses, we shall be trampling the great banner of Social-Democracy in the mud.

The third amendment—to recognise, as an addendum to that selfsame third point, the permissibility of "technical agreements" with the Cadets. This amendment was rejected, with the Congress delegates voting by name. We announced that if it was accepted we should be compelled to withdraw our resolution as a whole; we had the right to do this if amendments distorted the basic idea of the resolution. We do not say anything about specifically forbidding all agreements with the Cadets, we announced. The point at issue is not one of forbidding or permitting specific cases, but of a general political line. One who wants in good faith to apply

the Congress resolution will not enter into election agreements with the Cadets or put out common slogans with them, although a case of joint voting in the Duma may possibly occur. It would, in general, be useless to try to "ensnare" with any sort of wording those who do not conscientiously fulfil the resolution of the Congress. Our whole Party knows well enough from experience what our Mensheviks understand by "technical agreements" with the liberals.

The fourth amendment—an addendum to Point Four indicating the necessity to struggle against the agrarian utopianism and revolutionism of the Narodniks; this was submitted several times by the Mensheviks, with constant changes of individual words in its text or of the place in the resolution to which it should belong. All these amendments were rejected by the Congress. The debate on these amendments was undoubtedly on matters of principle. The Mensheviks again tried at this point to introduce under the Marxist flag something most hostile to Marxism. There is no doubt that Marxism rejects the agrarian utopianism of the Narodniks and the methods of petty-bourgeois revolutionism. If that is so, argued the Mensheviks, then say it here, in this resolution. "Excuse us, dear comrades," we answered, "everything here is said as it should be. Your addendum, irrespective of your will and knowledge, acquires here the significance of a sally against the *confiscation* of landed estates. We have not forgotten that this confiscation has been called "utopianism" and "revolutionism" by all the liberals and also by many non-party Social-Democrats, such as the Prokopoviches and Kuskovas, and by several (fortunately, not many) party Social-Democrats, who proposed that the Duma group and the Central Committee should not make an ultimatum of their insistence on confiscation.

A resolution must be written in unmistakable language. It must consider all existing political tendencies in actual politics, and not the good intentions of some section or another of Social-Democracy (always allowing that the intentions are of the best). In our resolution we have recognised, forthrightly and definitely, the "*pseudo-socialism*" of the Narodniks. We have called their "socialist" ideology simply "*vague*", and have declared it absolutely imperative for Social-Democracy to fight against their concealment of the

class antithesis between the proletariat and the petty proprietors. Everything has been said in these words, which condemn the really utopian element in Narodism, condemn petty-bourgeois "extra-class" revolutionism. Moreover, our resolution does not merely condemn or refute; it also states what is positive in these parties. "The struggle against landed proprietorship and the feudal state", is the way we define the positive content. And he is not a Marxist who forgets this on account of the struggle against the vagueness of petty-bourgeois socialism. This real content has much greater significance in the present revolution than the Narodniks' vague dreaming of the morrow. It is on account of this actual struggle that liberal and proletarian politics now differ radically. The liberals consider the complete abolition of landed proprietorship and the feudal state to be *utopian and empty revolutionism*; such a *débâcle* is *not to the advantage* of the bourgeoisie, and dangerous to it. In the real politics of our times it is this self-interest of the bourgeoisie as a class, and nothing but that self-interest, that finds expression in attacks on the utopianism and revolutionism of the Narodniks. Proletarian politics, on the contrary, separate utopianism, revolutionism and the general *vagueness* of "equalitarian" dreams of non-class socialism, from the *reality* of the decisive struggle against the landlords and serf-owners. That which the liberals consider a harmful utopia, we consider to be the vital interest of the proletariat at the present moment—the complete abolition of landed proprietorship and the feudal state. On these grounds we must now pursue the most intense, immediate and practical struggle against liberalism, a struggle to emancipate the democratic peasantry from its influence.

The amendments under discussion have reflected one of the most widespread errors of Menshevism—the equating of the reactionary nature of the bourgeoisie in the present revolution (that is, reactionary in the struggle against the landlords and the autocracy) with the reactionary nature of the peasantry (which is reactionary from the viewpoint, not of the struggle against the landlords and the autocracy, but of the struggle against capital, i.e., it is reactionary, not in respect of the tasks of the present, bourgeois revolution, but in respect of the future, socialist revolution).

This radical Menshevik error was rejected by the Congress. The practical significance of this error is very great because it conceals a policy that allows equally joint action by the proletariat with the liberals and with peasant democracy.

The last Menshevik amendment of any interest also refers to Point Four, to its end. The Mensheviks proposed removing from this point reference to the struggle against the Cadets ("... side with the Social-Democrats against the Black Hundreds and the Constitutional-Democrats"). To give this amendment, which is quite unacceptable to the present Congress, a *semblance* of something acceptable, they proposed replacing the words objectionable to them by an indication that the democratic revolution must be carried through to its consummation. This was an original attempt at sweetening the pill, an attempt to carry through a *policy* unacceptable to the Bolsheviks (not to struggle directly against the Cadets) under cover of a *slogan* particularly acceptable to the Bolsheviks. Your flag and our cargo—that is what the Mensheviks, like the true opportunist politicians they are, were actually saying by their proposal.

The Mensheviks' innocent stratagem was, of course, immediately exposed, amid laughter from the Bolshevik benches (in the London church we actually sat on benches so that the expression is not figurative). And then came truly Homeric laughter and a thunder of ironic applause from those same benches when one of the Poles, after the defeat of the Menshevik amendment, proposed another—to retain the words about *the struggle* against the Cadets, and at the same time add recognition of a struggle to carry through the revolution to its consummation. The Congress, of course, accepted that amendment. The Mensheviks particularly deserved ironic applause for voting in favour of it (*noblesse oblige!*) after L. Martov had called down thunder and lightning upon us in *Otgoski* (No. 5) for the allegedly bourgeois-republican idea of carrying through the revolution to its consummation.

The Mensheviks' unsuccessful ruse rendered us very good service, because on account of this amendment the Congress understood the very important idea in another of our resolutions which had not been presented to the Congress—the resolution on the class tasks of the proletariat.

III

There is no need to record the present attitude to the Cadets, said a prominent Menshevik (Martynov, I believe) at the Congress, who wanted, one might say, to enable the Mensheviks to turn their flight into an orderly retreat. The Cadets are not worth anything at the moment; all right, but do not record it for they may yet be worth something.

These words are an unfortunate formulation of a very significant Menshevik idea, which it is worth while dealing with to conclude our analysis of the question of the attitude to bourgeois parties. The wording is unfortunate because the resolution defining the class roots of present counter-revolutionary policy does not preclude the possibility of using everything that can be of "value". The important thing is the idea that, if the Cadets do not today justify the confidence of the Mensheviks, there was a time when they did.

This idea is fallacious. The Cadets have never justified Menshevik confidence in them. To convince ourselves of this, we have only to take the greatest upsurge of our revolution, the period between October and December 1905, and compare it to the present period, probably the period of greatest decline. Neither at the time of the greatest upsurge nor at the time of the greatest decline did the Cadets justify the confidence of the Mensheviks; they did not confirm the correctness of Menshevik tactics but disproved it by their behaviour. In the period of upsurge the Mensheviks themselves engaged in an active struggle against the liberals (recall *Nachalo*), and at present the totality of voting in the Second Duma speaks most clearly in favour of a "Left bloc" policy, and against the policy of support for the Cadets.

The future historian of Social-Democracy in Russia will have to call the period between the greatest upsurge and the greatest decline of our revolution an epoch of vacillation. At that time, Social-Democracy, as personified by the Mensheviks, wavered in the direction of liberalism. The year of disputes (end of 1904-end of 1905) was the historical preparation of disputed questions and of a general assessment of them. A year and a half of revolution (end of 1905-mid

1907) was the practical test of those disputed questions in the realm of practical politics. In practice, this test demonstrated the complete fiasco of the policy of support for liberalism; this test led to the recognition of the one and only revolutionary policy of the proletariat in the bourgeois revolution—the struggle to carry the revolution through to its consummation, winning over the democratic peasantry to the proletariat, against the treachery of liberalism.

It would be risky to say that the London Congress has put an end to that period of Social-Democratic hankering after liberalism. However, a serious step has, in any case, been taken towards putting an end to it.

P. S. The bourgeois press is making excessive use of the forced silence of the Social-Democrats and the “semi-legality” of the London Congress, to malign the Bolsheviks as though they were dead. It stands to reason that without a daily newspaper we cannot think of keeping pace with the non-party *Tovarishch*, in which the former Social-Democrat, A. Brahm, and also Mr. Yuri Pereyaslavsky and *tutti quanti* are performing a real cancan; thank goodness there were no minutes, and they can lie with impunity. These articles by the Brahms, Pereyaslavskys & Co., contain nothing but the usual spitefulness of non-party bourgeois intellectuals, so that mere mention of these articles is enough for them to be treated with the contempt they deserve. The interview with Mr. Struve is another matter; it was reported in *Birzheviye Vedomosti* and, I believe, has not yet been refuted. Besides contempt it deserves a scientific study of that—er—specimen. His gravitation towards the Octobrists and his hatred of the Lefts are a truly classic expression of the innate tendencies of liberalism. Mr. Struve admits the truth of the old rumours that he voted for the Octobrist during the election to the bureau (of the Duma) and that he, in general, conducted negotiations and took part in conferences with the Octobrists. He favours unification with the Octobrists! Thank you, Mr. Struve, for your splendid confirmation of what was said last autumn in *Proletary* (No. 5—“An Attempt at a Classification of the Political Parties

of Russia")* about the Octobrists and the Cadets! Mr. Struve senses the impotence of the bourgeois *intelligentsia* and wants to shift liberalism's centre of gravity closer to the *propertied classes*. An agreement with the Crown will not come off with liberals of the Cadet type—so down with the Cadets, let it come off at least with "liberals" of the Octobrist type. That is consistent. And it is to our advantage, for it brings clarity and definiteness into the situation. A new landlord Duma; a new election law that separates, splendidly and with all desirable precision, the reliable landlords and bourgeois tycoons from the unreliable peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie and workers. A new trend in liberalism; Mr. Struve's war against "the adventurous politics of the Lefts" with their "*exploitation of the dark social instincts of the undeveloped peasant masses*" ("social instincts" is illiterate but is all the clearer in its illiteracy. Mr. Struve's writing will apparently be the more illiterate and clearer, the closer that gentleman approaches to the Union of the Russian People, which already stands quite close to him).

This was by no means fortuitous. As an intellectualist party, bourgeois liberalism is impotent. It is impotent outside the struggle against the revolutionary ("dark social instincts") peasantry. Liberalism is impotent outside a close alliance with the moneybags, with the mass of the landlords and factory owners,...*with the Octobrists*. There's no getting away from the truth. We said to the Cadets long ago: "That thou doest, do quickly." Those in favour of an agreement with the Crown—go to the Octobrists, to the Stolypins, to the Union of the Russian People.

Those in favour of the people—follow the Social-Democrats, who alone have conducted and are now conducting a ruthless struggle against liberalism's influence over the Trudoviks.

There were some people who thought that precisely the Mensheviks' policy was capable of splitting the Cadets. A naïve illusion! *Only* the Left-bloc policy of revolutionary Social-Democracy has and will split the Cadets. *Only* that policy will accelerate the inevitable demarcation—bour-

* See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 225-31.—*Ed.*

geois liberals to the Octobrists, bourgeois democrats to the Trudoviks. In future as heretofore, Social-Democracy will compel these latter to choose between consistent proletarian democracy and liberalism.

Go boldly onward, politicians *à la* Struve!

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Signed: N. Lenin

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